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Abstract|State-Narco Networks and the ‘War on 
Drugs’ in Post-Transition Bolivia, with 
special reference to1989-1993 
 
This thesis examines the development of state-narco networks in post-transition 
Bolivia.  Mainstream discourses of drugs tend to undertheorise such 
relationships, holding illicit economies, weak states and violence as synergistic 
phenomena.  Such assumptions fail to capture the nuanced relations that 
emerge between the state and the drug trade in different contexts, their 
underlying logics and diverse effects.  As an understudied case, Bolivia offers 
novel insights into these dynamics.  Bolivian military authoritarian governments 
(1964-1982), for example, integrated drug rents into clientelistic systems of 
governance, helping to establish factional coalitions and reinforce regime 
authority.   Following democratic transition in 1982 and the escalation of US 
counterdrug efforts, these stable modes of exchange between the state and the 
coca-cocaine economy fragmented.  Bolivia, though, continued to experience 
lower levels of drug-related violence than its Andean neighbours, and sustained 
democratisation despite being a major drug producer.  Focusing on the 
introduction of the Andean Initiative (1989-1993), I explore state-narco 
interactions during this period of flux: from authoritarianism to (formal) 
democracy, and from Cold War to Drug War.  As such, the thesis transcends the 
conventional analyses of the drugs literature and orthodox readings of Latin 
American narco-violence, providing insights into the relationship between illicit 
economies and democratic transition, the regional role of the US, and the 
(unintended) consequences of drug policy interventions. 
 
I utilise a mixed methods approach to offer discrete perspectives on the object 
of study.  Drawing on documentary and secondary sources, I argue that state-
narco networks were interwoven with Bolivia’s post-transition political 
settlement.  Uneven democratisation ensured pockets of informalism, as 
clientelistic and authoritarian practices continued.  This included police and 
military autonomy, and tolerance of drug corruption within both institutions.  
  v 
 
Non-enforcement of democratic norms of accountability and transparency was 
linked to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium.  Interviews with key 
US and Bolivian elite actors also revealed differing interpretations of state-narco 
interactions.  These exposed competing agendas, and were folded into 
alternative paradigms and narratives of the ‘war on drugs’.  The extension of US 
Drug War goals and the targeting of ‘corrupt’ local power structures, clashed 
with local ambivalence towards the drug trade, opposition to destabilising, 
‘Colombianised’ policies and the claimed ‘democratising mission’ of the Bolivian 
government.  In contrasting these US and Bolivian accounts, the thesis shows 
how real and perceived state-narco webs were understood and navigated by 
different actors in distinct ways.  ‘Drug corruption’ held significance beyond 
simple economic transaction or institutional failure.  Contestation around state-
narco interactions was enmeshed in US-Bolivian relations of power and control. 
  vi 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Over the course of four years of research, countless hours in the office, trips 
back and forth across the Atlantic, and months of fieldwork in the Americas, I 
have inevitably indebted myself to a great many people.  Their support has been 
invaluable to the completion of this thesis, and is well-worthy of recognition. 
 
My PhD supervisors, Alex Marshall, Mo Hume and Jacqueline Atkinson, have 
provided strong guidance throughout the project.  Their engagement with my 
work, patience and willingness to challenge my assumptions have been 
important during all stages of the PhD.  I would also like to thank them for their 
advice and pastoral support.  They have often gone above and beyond the duties 
of a supervisor, not least coordinating the replacement of a stolen passport 
between Buenos Aires and Glasgow.  I am deeply grateful for their hard work. 
 
I have been privileged to travel extensively in the completion of my fieldwork 
and language training.  My thanks to everyone who made me feel welcome along 
the way, alleviating any feelings of homesickness.  This includes: the 
communities of Sustainable Bolivia, and Spanish in Rosario; the Balderrama 
family in Cochabamba; Stephanie, Claudio and Juani in Rosario (¡Aupa Central y 
Celtic!); Maria del Carmen in Madrid; and Tessa Kahn and friends in Washington, 
DC.  My thanks also to all of those who agreed to interviews.  Participants were 
generous with their time, and helped me greatly with my research.  Without 
their contribution, this thesis simply would not have been possible.   
 
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my friends and family.  
Friends have endured my lectures on drug policy and Latin America, and listened 
to my complaints; celebrating and commiserating through the ups and downs of 
the PhD.  Much the same goes for my family.  Louise, Martin, Anna, Isabel, 
Jenny, Dominic, Liz and Kevy have shown great caring and encouragement.  
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my father and late-mother – John and Angela – 
for their unwavering love, support and belief.  Words cannot express my 
appreciation for everything they have given me.
  vii 
 
List of Figures & Tables 
 
Figures  
 
4.1 
 
4.2 
4.3 
6.1  
6.2 
6.3  
 
7.1  
 
 
SUBSEDAL Estimates of Total National Coca Production in Metric 
Tonnes (1970-1989) 
Size of Bolivian Coca-Cocaine Economy (1986-1990) 
Andean Coca Cultivation in Hectares (1985-1995) 
US INC and FMF Assistance to Bolivia (1982-1989) 
US INC, FMF and ESF to Bolivia (1987-1995) 
US State Dep. INCSR Figures for Coca-cocaine Seizures in Bolivia 
(1987-1994)  
USAID Estimates of Bolivian Coca Leaf Price (1986-1995) 
 
 
 
 
 
123 
130 
130 
176 
188 
 
195  
209 
 
Tables  
 
6.1 
 
US State Dep. INCSR Figures for Labs Destroyed (1989-1994) 
 
195 
 
 
  viii 
 
Abbreviations & Acronyms 
 
ADEPA Asociación de Productores de Algodón  
ADN  Acción Democrática Nacionalista 
APTA  The Andean Trade Preference Act 
BAB Banco Agrícola de Bolivia 
CEDIB  El Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
COFADENA La Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas para el Desarrollo Nacional  
COMIBOL Corporación Minera de Bolivia 
DEA   The Drug Enforcement Administration 
DIRECO Dirección de Reconversión Agrícola 
DoD  US Department of Defense 
ESF US Economic Support Fund  
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigations 
FECLN La Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra El Narcotráfico  
FINSA Firma Integral de Servicios Arévalo 
FMF US Foreign Military Financing 
FOIA US Freedom of Information Act 
GAO US Government Accountability Office 
IADB Inter-American Development Bank 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
INC US International Narcotics Control Assistance 
INCSR US International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
INL State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Law 
Enforcement (formerly INM) 
INM State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Matters 
MAS El Movimiento al Socialismo 
MIR El Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
MNR El Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
NAS US Narcotics Affairs Section 
NSA The National Security Archive 
NSC The US National Security Council 
  ix 
 
ONDCP US Office of National Drug Control Policy 
PDCR El Partido Democrática Cristiano Revolucionario  
Southcom 
SUBSEDAL 
US Military Southern Command   
Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternativo 
UDP Unidad Democrática y Popular 
UMOPAR Los Unidades Móviles de Patrullaje Rural 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USCIS The Office of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
USIA US Information Agency 
USAID US Agency for International Development 
USMILGP US Military Group 
 
Chapter 1  1 
 
Chapter 1|Introduction 
 
On 21 February 1981, Colonel Luis Arce Gomez reportedly met with Bolivia’s top 
drug traffickers in Santa Cruz (Leclere & Fallareau: 1981a).1  The ‘Minister of 
Cocaine’, as he had been dubbed by the US press, represented the authoritarian 
military government of General Luis García Meza (1980-1981).  The regime had 
gained international notoriety, not only for its human rights abuses, but for its 
strong links to Bolivia’s burgeoning coca-cocaine economy.  With US pressure 
mounting to take action against the drug trade, Arce Gomez advised the 
assembled traffickers to move their operations deeper into Bolivia’s remote Beni 
department.  He also requested payment to the regime of US$500,000 to secure 
protection of production facilities, commercial operations and drug flights 
(Ibid.).  Such arrangements were indicative of the state-narco networks that 
operated in Bolivia at this time.  In return for a share of the profits, trafficking 
organisations were co-opted by the promise of unhindered business.  Rents from 
the coca-cocaine trade were in-turn utilised by the government to buy the 
loyalty of factions within the state, including, most significantly, the military.  
Shared interests were established, blurring the distinction between the state 
and the illicit sphere.  This thesis examines the evolution of these state-narco 
networks following Bolivia’s 1982 transition to democracy.   
 
The development of the Bolivian drug trade during this period confounds the 
typical assumptions of the conventional policy and academic discourse, where 
illicit economies, weakened state capacity, instability and violence are held 
generally as synergistic phenomena (e.g. Cornell, 2007; Hargreaves, 1992; INCB, 
2011; ONDCP, 2015; Youngers & Rosin, 2005).  Alongside Colombia and Peru, 
Bolivia played a major role in the Andean cocaine trade.  But while its 
neighbours descended into various forms of drug-related violence, Bolivia’s coca-
cocaine economy remained relatively peaceful.  Furthermore, despite the 
exponential growth of its illicit trade, Bolivia sustained its long-promised 
democratic transition.   All of this occurred against the background of escalating 
US militarised counterdrug efforts in the region, as Bolivia became a key test 
                                         
1 See Appendix D for a map of Bolivia. 
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case for the newly renascent ‘war on drugs’.  This thesis considers the role of 
state-narco networks – a hangover from the authoritarian era – within these 
complex processes; an important factor in the function of the illicit trade, 
shaping its wider political, social and economic implications.   
 
In so doing, my analysis addresses a weakness of the mainstream policy and 
academic discourse on illicit drugs:  the undertheorisation of the relationship 
between the state and the drug trade in the Global South.2  The broad 
assumption of synergy between drugs, violence and weakened state capacity 
fails to capture the nuanced forms of interaction that emerge between the state 
and the drug trade in different contexts, their underlying logics and diverse 
effects.  The nature of these relations has wide implications: shaping the local 
political order (Goodhand, 2008), the workings of formal and informal 
institutions (Meehan, 2015; Snyder, 2006), and whether or not the drug economy 
is associated with high-levels of violence (Snyder & Martínez, 2011).  As such, 
drug policy interventions and their subsequent (unintended) consequences 
interact with the function of state-narco networks (Mansfield, 2016).  Centring 
on the introduction of the Andean Initiative (1989-1993), a multi-billion dollar US 
counterdrug aid package, I trace the relationship between the Bolivian state and 
the drug trade during a period of flux: from authoritarianism to (formal) 
democracy, and from Cold War to Drug War.  The thesis thus aims to transcend 
the conventional analyses of the drugs literature and orthodox readings of Latin 
American narco-violence.  In utilising an understudied case with distinct 
dynamics, my analysis provides additional insights into the relationship between 
illicit economies and democratic transition, the regional role of the US, and the 
course of the ‘war on drugs’ in the Andes. 
 
To interrogate this topic, the thesis employs a novel mixed methods approach 
and develops original research in both the US and Bolivia to offer multiple 
perspectives on the object of study.  This blends documentary sources with elite 
interviews of key US and Bolivian political actors from the period.  The first 
                                         
2 The drugs literature classifies countries according to their role in the drug trade: producer, 
transit or consumer. During the period of study, Bolivia was primarily a producer of coca-
cocaine. 
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strand of this approach uses secondary and documentary sources to reconstruct 
the relationship between the Bolivian state and the drug trade from 1964 to 
1993.  This serves as a rich base-line account of state-narco relations; tracing 
the interplay of the changing domestic and international political context, and 
the development of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy.  Such sources, though, are 
incomplete and, at times, difficult to verify.  This is a common methodological 
issue of research into illicit activity.  The second strand of my approach thus 
shifts focus to consider elite interpretations and responses to this phenomenon; 
thereby mediating this methodological limitation and providing new insights into 
the case.  Drawing on interviews with key US and Bolivian actors from the period 
of the Andean Initiative (1989-1993) and employing elements of oral history 
methodology, I reveal differing perceptions of state-narco networks.  These 
were folded into alternative paradigms and narratives of the ‘war on drugs’, and 
exposed competing agendas.  These two strands of my approach simultaneously 
complement each other and offer discrete perspectives on the research topic, 
producing original findings. 
 
First, local trafficking organisations were absorbed into existing political 
structures, which acted to manage and mediate the violent excesses of the coca-
cocaine economy.  Drug rents were, in-turn, integrated into informal forms of 
clientelistic governance, and used to reinforce the political order.  Second, 
tacit-acceptance of drug links running through the military, police and the 
political parties was bound to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium.  
Government toleration of such practices ensured the continued support of major 
political actors for democratisation.  In this sense, the illicit economy was 
interwoven with Bolivia’s uneven democratic governance.  Third, the booming 
drug trade helped to stabilise the national economy during crisis and harsh 
structural reforms.  The coca-cocaine economy acted as a social safety net, 
providing employment and inward investment, while also bolstering the banking 
system with foreign capital reserves.  Taken together, these factors created 
ambivalence among the Bolivian political elite toward the illicit economy and 
resistance to the escalation of the US securitised counterdrug response.  In 
contrasting US and Bolivian interview accounts, my analysis shows how real and 
perceived state-narco networks were understood and navigated by US and 
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Bolivian actors in distinct ways.  ‘Drug corruption’ held significance beyond 
simple economic transaction or institutional failure.  Contestation around state-
narco interactions was enmeshed in US-Bolivian relations of power and control. 
 
In this introductory chapter, I outline the main elements of my theoretical 
approach, methods and empirical analysis.  First, I provide justification for my 
case selection, including discussion of the distinct characteristics of the Bolivian 
case.  Second, I situate the research question within the wider literature on 
drugs and coercion, and elucidate my analytical framework.  As part of this, I 
discuss my methodological approach and its influence on empirical analysis.  
Finally, I outline the main findings of the thesis.  In this way, the chapter guides 
the reader through the rationale for the study and its main components. 
 
1.1 Case Selection 
 
As stated previously, the case of post-transition Bolivia contradicts the assumed 
link between drugs, violence, weakened state capacity and instability found in 
mainstream discourses of drugs.  I argue that state-narco networks played a 
significant role in shaping the function of Bolivia’s drug trade during this period.  
The country’s 1982 transition to democracy, and its role as a major arena of the 
US ‘war on drugs’ constitute further interesting contextual dynamics for study.  
These factors serve as justification for the selection of the case, and its value to 
the theoretical development of drugs literature.  In this section, I outline these 
dimensions in greater detail by providing historical background to the case and 
the establishment of the modern US ‘war on drugs’. 
 
The history of Bolivian state-narco networks pre-dated political transition and 
García Meza’s 1981 regime.  They had been a feature of Bolivian military-led 
governments since the mid-1960s, and were based in clientelistic and 
authoritarian modes of governance; a consequence of historic processes of state 
formation, and the country’s political, social and economic development.  
General René Barrientos, who served as president between 1964 and 1969, 
encouraged elements within the army and police to manage emerging domestic 
coca-cocaine operations (Rodas M., 1996: 51).  This created patron-client bonds 
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that enabled Barrientos to build support within both institutions.  General Hugo 
Banzer (1970-78) adopted a similar model.  The rapid expansion of the cocaine 
market in the 1970s meant that links between the state, economic elites and the 
drug trade were developed and deepened under his rule (Dunkerley, 1984: 315).  
These networks strengthened Banzer’s regime, providing power bases both 
internal and external to the state.  Rather than deviation from accepted norms, 
this form of ‘corruption’ was instead assimilated into engrained political 
processes.  Bolivia’s trafficking clans, based in kinship ties, sought 
accommodation with the state rather than conflict.  Stables modes of exchange 
between the state and these traffickers engendered stability in the drug trade; 
helping to control violence. 
 
The year 1982, though, represented a point of fracture for the state-narco 
networks of the authoritarian era.  Transformations in the domestic and 
international context threatened the operation of well-established state-narco 
networks.  Bolivia’s democratisation and the emergence of the ‘war on drugs’ as 
a US foreign policy priority changed ‘the rules of the game’.  First, democratic 
reform promised an effective rule of law, the accountability of state officials, 
transparent government and civilian control of the military.  In this way, the 
clientelistic and authoritarian practices of the past, which had contributed to 
the formation and maintenance of state-narco networks, would be swept away 
by the institutionalisation of democratic safeguards (Whitehead, 2002: 801).   
 
Allied to this, the US began to push for heightened counter-supply efforts within 
Bolivia.  The northern hegemon had previously backed Bolivian authoritarian 
governments with the aim of halting the spread of leftist influence.  Cold War 
goals ensured tolerance of ‘counter-subversion’ tactics and even exploitation of 
drug revenue streams (Gamarra, 1999a: 182).  The declining power of the Soviet 
Union in the late-1970s, though, resulted in the withdrawal of US support for 
military-led rule3 and, over the course of the decade, a shift in focus from Cold 
War to Drug War (Morales Q., 1989).4  Official complicity in drug trafficking 
                                         
3 President Jimmy Carter’s (1977-81) strong advancement of human rights in the Americas was 
also an important factor. 
4 This was an uneven process across Latin America.  In Central America, for example, President 
Ronald Reagan (1981-89) maintained a strong US focus on countering Left-wing influence. 
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would now provoke US diplomatic and economic sanction, as Bolivia’s post-
transition governments were pressured to take action against drug corruption.   
 
President George H.W. Bush (1989-93) ramped-up the Drug War hyperbole and 
brought the issue to the fore.  During the first year of his term, Bush (1989) 
solemnly addressed the nation from the Oval Office to unveil the government’s 
response to the ‘the gravest domestic threat facing’ the nation: drugs.  Holding-
up a bag of crack-cocaine, apparently seized from Lafayette Park – just across 
from the White House – the President offered the picture of a country beset with 
drugs.5   
 
It's as innocent-looking as candy, but it's turning our cities into battle 
zones, and it's murdering our children.  Let there be no mistake: this stuff 
is poison.  Some used to call drugs harmless recreation; they're not.  Drugs 
are a real and terribly dangerous threat to our neighbourhoods, our 
friends, and our families.  (Bush, 1989) 
 
The administration’s rhetoric and counterdrug strategy reflected the US Drug 
War Paradigm (outlined below).  On the domestic front, prevention, education 
and treatment all received support, but the policy was overwhelmingly 
enforcement focused.  Bush (1989) argued that the US needed ‘more prisons, 
more jails, more courts, more prosecutors’ and adjusted government spending 
accordingly.  This hard-line response was replicated on the counter-supply side.  
In August 1989, Bush authorised National Security Decision Directive 18 (NSDD 
18), sponsoring ‘a steady expansion of the US military’s role in drug interdiction, 
both along US borders and overseas, and (intensifying) US pressures on other 
governments in the Western Hemisphere to assign a greater role to their own 
armed forces in combating drug-trafficking’ (Bagley, 1991: 14).  Coming out of 
this was the Andean Initiative, the centrepiece of Bush’s drug control strategy.  
With the US$2.2 billion aid package, Bush signalled the US government’s intent 
to hit the cocaine supply at source; establishing the foundations for the modern 
‘War on Drugs’ in Latin America. 
                                         
5 The Washington Post revealed later that the DEA had gone to great trouble to provide the 
President with his prop.  They had lured a crack dealer to the park to give them their sensational 
sting. ‘In fact, when first contacted by an undercover DEA agent posing as a drug buyer, the 
teenage suspect seemed baffled by the agent's request. “Where the {expletive} is the White 
House?”’ (Isikoff, 1989). 
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Bolivia was viewed as a key test case for the US counterdrug approach.   
Although it was strategically less significant than its Andean neighbours, US 
policymakers nevertheless recognised both its role within the regional trade and 
its symbolic importance to US counterdrug policy in Latin America.6  In 1989, for 
example, Peruvian coca was estimated to constitute roughly two-thirds of the 
total market (US State, 1990).  Colombia, meanwhile, was the epicentre of the 
trade, with international criminal organisations based out of Medellin and Cali 
controlling trafficking (Thoumi, 2003).  However, Bolivia remained a vital point 
in the coca-cocaine commodity chain linking the Andes to the US, accounting for 
around a quarter of net coca cultivation in the Andes over the late-1980s (US 
State, 1986-1990).  Coca producers and local trafficking organisations were 
vertically integrated into a structure headed by the Colombian Cartels (Painter, 
1994: Ch. 2).  In addition to this, as problems related to internal armed actors 
and powerful and violent traffickers were, unlike Peru and Colombia, largely 
absent in Bolivia, so too were the attendant complications of applying 
counterdrug efforts in such contexts (US OIG, 1991: Appendix A).  The size and 
dynamics of the drug economy in Bolivia thus made success seem more 
attainable (Ledebur, 2005: 145).   
 
Historical factors were also evident.  The US had been the dominant partner in 
relations with Bolivia and viewed the country as falling within its sphere of 
influence (Lehman, 1999).  The ‘war on drugs’ was a natural progression of its 
liberalising mission in the Americas: providing the security conditions for a 
liberal market democracy in the heart of South America.  Giving new impetus to 
relations between the countries, the US placed counterdrug goals at the core of 
their relationship with Bolivia (Lehman, 2006: 132).  Extensive US counterdrug 
funds were allotted to this end: from Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 – marking 
a shift towards the militarisation of US counterdrug policy – through to Plan 
Dignidad’s comprehensive, and controversial, program of eradication in 1997.  
The 1989 Andean Initiative, though, forms the focus of enquiry.  Its three central 
                                         
6 Former-ONDCP official, John Carnevale (interview, 2013) took a slightly different angle: ‘It’s 
always been, for the (ONDCP) drug czars, a source of irritation: ( . . . ) the (Bolivians’) view of 
the coca leaf and their resolve in ensuring that the US opinion didn’t prevail’.   
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tenets – eradication, interdiction and alternative development – formed the 
blueprint for US counter-supply efforts.  While the Andean Initiative did not 
invent the US drug war paradigm, the policy institutionalised it; establishing a 
large drug war bureaucracy, which has reproduced itself through each US 
budgetary cycle.   
 
Finally, different theories have been advanced for the relative lack of drug-
related violence during this period.  Thoumi (2003) argues that Bolivia was 
vertically integrated into cocaine transit routes in the 1980s controlled by the 
Colombian Cartels.  As such, violent competition occurred further up the 
commodity chain, rather than in Bolivia itself.  Added to this, Bolivia’s society 
was said to be heavily influenced by indigenous cultural values: more peaceful 
than Colombia – valuing compromise over violence (Ibid: 250).  Such an 
environment was thus unpropitious for the emergence of large drug trafficking 
organisations; an industry where the ability to deploy violence is viewed as a 
comparative advantage.  The strong influence of the coca unions may be added 
as a contributing factor here.  UNODC (2016: 156) suggests that the sindicatos 
have closed-off space for the growth of trafficking empires.  While it is certainly 
the case that Bolivia’s drug clans were dwarfed by their Colombian counterparts 
during the post-transition period, the power and influence these local groups 
held cannot be dismissed.  They headed an industry estimated to be worth US$ 
674m by 1988, constituting 53.9 per cent of all Bolivian exports (Franks, 1991: 
20).  How exactly this revenue was divided between the various sectors involved 
in the coca-cocaine economy is uncertain, but the role of local organised crime 
in Bolivia in controlling a large share of this wealth is undeniable.  Bolivia’s 
organised crime sector was large and significant.   Despite this, though, drug-
related violence was largely absent; not only between traffickers, but also 
against the state and society.  This thesis argues that state-narco networks 
played a pivotal role in this, mediating the coca-cocaine economy.   
 
In sum, the post-transition period and the implementation of the Andean 
Initiative in Bolivia constitutes a crucial case study within the wider literature on 
drugs.  My analysis speaks to the central themes of this literature, drawing out 
the competing agendas of US and Bolivian actors and their distinct 
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interpretations of the period.  But in applying a different theoretical focus, the 
thesis transcends these discourses; focusing on a period of flux, when internal 
and external contextual factors were changing.  The bases of Bolivia’s long-
established state-narco networks were also fragmenting.  The dynamics of the 
Bolivian case during this period thus provide a distinct environment within which 
to explore aspects of the relationship between the state and the drug trade.  
This illuminates the factors that underpin Bolivia’s divergence from the 
conventional assumptions of policy and academic discourse of drugs.  
 
1.2 Advancing a Nuanced Understanding of State-Narco Networks 
 
This thesis speaks to key themes of the drugs literature, such as prohibition 
versus decriminalisation/legalisation (e.g. MacCoun & Reuter, 2001), the social, 
political and economic effects of drug policy (e.g. Buxton, 2006; Tullis, 1995; 
Painter, 1994; Youngers & Rosin, 2005) and the role of the US in advancing 
counterdrug policies (e.g. Bewley-Taylor, 2002; Menzel, 1996; Musto, 1999; 
Reiss, 2014).7  The Drug War and Development Paradigms are present across this 
literature, and serve as overarching frameworks for analysing the causes of the 
drug trade, the appropriate response and, within this, conceptualisations of 
state-narco interactions and the effects of illicit economies on nations in the 
Global South.  These alternative paradigms have also informed policy debates, 
and were evident during the negotiations and implementation of the Andean 
Initiative.  Crucially for this thesis, they were frequently drawn on by US and 
Bolivian actors during our interviews.  Both paradigms are critical to 
understanding the onset of the modern US Drug War in Bolivia; offering insights 
into US and Bolivian preferences for policy, and how actors responded to various 
facets of the ‘war on drugs’ and justified their actions.  In addition to this, 
though, my engagement with both of these paradigms aims to expose the 
limitations of conventional academic and policy discourses of drugs in accounting 
for the exceptional case of post-transition Bolivia.  Specifically, I argue that 
these discourses undertheorise the relationship between the state and the drug 
trade in the South and its nuanced effects.   
                                         
7 There is overlap and interaction between these three broadly drawn themes. 
Chapter 1  10 
 
 
Addressing this weakness, my analytical framework builds on theories of state 
coercion.  The research agenda here centres on the role of formal and informal 
institutions of rent extraction – typically related to illicit economies – in 
processes of state formation (e.g. Meehan, 2015; North, et. al., 2007; Snyder, 
2006), and/or conflict resolution (e.g. Le Billion, 2003; Reno, 2009a).  For 
example, Goodhand (2008: 414) contends that the effects of drug corruption are 
dependent on underlying power relations between relevant actors, the nature of 
the agreements they make and the influence of international policies.  As 
opposed to a source of instability and weakened state capacity – as typically 
assumed by the drugs literature – these may form a basis for political order.  
Aspects of this theoretical framework, therefore, provide insights into the 
development of state-narco networks and their varied effects.  This is 
supplemented with analysis of uneven democratisation in Latin America (Auyero, 
2007; Barrios M., 1994; O’Donnell, 1996). Following the Third Wave, clientelistic 
and authoritarian practices continued alongside formal elements of democracy 
across the region, as distinct forms of ‘polyarchy’ emerged during uncertain 
processes of democratisation.  Bolivia’s transition followed a similar path.  This, 
I argue, was a crucial contextual factor in the function of Bolivian state-narco 
networks.   
 
Drawing on these different areas of the literature, the thesis moves beyond the 
dominant debates and overarching paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’: tracing the 
development of state-narco interactions during a critical period in Bolivian 
history and the trajectory of counterdrug policy in Latin America. 
 
1.2.1 Alternative Paradigms of the ‘War on Drugs’  
 
The Drug War Paradigm is based in US moralistic cultural attitudes towards 
drugs, and advocates prohibition policies (Gootenberg, 2009: 37).  Drugs are 
viewed as a threat to US values and society that must be defeated with a hard-
line approach (Reinarman & Levine, 1997a).  As part of this, the issue is 
considered an issue of US national security, thus justifying the extension of the 
‘war on drugs’ in producer nations (Bewley-Taylor, 1999).  Grounded in themes 
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of American Exceptionalism, this is held to be beneficial to such nations in the 
Global South (Lundestad, 1986): freeing countries from the tyranny of the drug 
trade – including violence and institutional decay – and creating the conditions 
for liberal democracy and economic development (ONDCP, 1990).  According to 
this paradigm, then, state-narco interactions are conceptualised one-
dimensionally as drug corruption: deviant behaviour understood as personal 
moral failure, as well as institutional failure (Mares, 2004: 22).  As both a cause 
and a consequence of a weak state (Meehan, 2011: 377), these represent a 
barrier to Drug War ‘success’(Nadelmann, 1994: 259).  This ‘legitimises’ US 
actions to bypass or eliminate corrupt local power structures. 
 
By contrast, the Development Paradigm identifies demand in consumer nations, 
and underdevelopment in the South as the roots of the drug problem.  Producer 
nations in Latin America are, therefore, ‘victims’ of the drug trade, its 
associated violence and destabilising effects.  Counterdrug policies, it is argued, 
should focus on demand reduction, development and institution building 
(Younger & Rosin, 2005).  Critiquing the US approach, the ‘war on drugs’ has 
made little progress and exacerbated the local harmful effects of the drug trade 
(Buxton, 2006: Ch. 10).  Viewed through the prism of el Imperialismo Yanquí, 
the Drug War represents US hegemonic control in the hemisphere (Stokes, 2004).  
State-narco interactions are also viewed one-dimensionally as drug corruption 
here, but the emphasis is placed on drug consuming nations, i.e. drug 
consumption in the US has created powerful traffickers with the wealth to 
subvert institutions in the South (Thoumi, 2003: 39 & 179).  The damaging 
effects of such practices, though, are most effectively addressed with a 
development-led response, rather than militarised counterdrug policies.   
 
While these overarching paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’ diverge in significant 
ways, they thus share common assumptions of the effects of the drug trade and 
conceptualisations of state-narco interactions.  The ‘essentialised’ linkages 
between drugs, instability, weak states and violence are reproduced across both 
paradigms (Meehan, 2011: 402).  On a fundamental level, both view the drug 
trade as destabilising and conceptualise drug corruption as deviance, with 
attached corrosive effects for the state and society. In this view, the dividing 
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line between the state and the drug trade is held as clear and definitive 
(Heyman & Smart, 1999: 11), ‘illegality and violence are directly connected’ 
(Snyder & Martinez, 2009: 253), and ‘the drug economy is conventionally viewed 
as an index of state power, so that low capacity regimes are more likely to have 
a “drug problem” than high capacity regimes’ (Goodhand, 2008: 413).  This 
thinking, then, has been evident across the conventional policy and academic 
discourse of drugs. 
 
Considering the policy sphere first, counterdrug efforts have evolved since the 
inception of the modern ‘war on drugs’ during the 1980s.  Public health 
responses have gained greater traction in the US and Europe, while several 
countries have experimented with decriminalisation (e.g. Portugal) and 
legalisation of drugs (e.g. Uruguay).  In many ways, though, the discourse of 
prohibition and the assumed links between illicit drugs, violence and instability 
in the Global South still hold sway.  The US Office of National Policy Drug Control 
Policy’s (ONDCP) 1990 National Drug Control Strategy – the first such strategy of 
the newly formed executive agency – demonstrates these enduring themes.   
 
The cocaine producing industry is directly responsible for violence, drug-
related corruption, and intimidation by drug traffickers of persons and 
governments in the three Andean countries where coca leaf is grown. (It) 
is, moreover, but one threat in the Andean region.  Economic instability 
and insurgencies also present serious challenges to democratic institutions 
and stability in the area.  The three are interrelated: addressing one 
without also addressing the others is unlikely to achieve reduced cocaine 
supply. (ONDCP, 1989: 63) 
 
Here, the drug trade is both symptom and disease: indicative of weak state 
capacity, economic instability and deficient institutions, while simultaneously 
compounding these problems.  Defeat of the drug trade through a militarised 
response was held as a catch-all cure for the multi-faceted issues the region 
confronted.  In the 2015 version of this strategy, more emphasis was given to 
demand reduction, but similar assumptions around the effects of the drug trade 
were evident.  
 
Drug trafficking networks severely threaten the security and prosperity of 
many countries in the Western Hemisphere and other regions.  
Dismantling these groups allows affected nations to develop stronger 
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institutions better able to withstand the corrosive and corruptive effects 
of the trafficking organisations.  It also addresses the impunity of 
criminals and corrupt officials – a top priority for improving security in 
regions like Central and South America. (ONDCP, 2015: 65) 
 
This is indicative of the dominant ‘policy narrative on illicit drug production’, 
which is ‘underpinned by an idealised notion of the state’ (Mansfield, 2016: 17).  
In drug producing nations, the state is viewed as ‘weak’, unable to effectively 
impose control over the national territory.  As a result, state-building notions of 
strengthening institutions and bolstering the security forces have bled into 
securitised counterdrug responses.  Attempts to create alternative rural 
economies and deny space for armed actors may be viewed as complementary to 
this agenda.  This reflects international interventionist trends: the impulse to 
stabilise the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of ‘weak states’ that represent a securitised 
threat to Western nations (Duffield, 2007).  While the correlation between illicit 
drug economies, violence and instability is undoubtedly clear, the top-down 
conceptualisations of the Drug War and Development Paradigms – both present in 
contemporary US policy discourse – underplay contextual factors within drug 
producing nations.  As a result, US counterdrug policy has frequently failed to 
account for nuance in the form and function of the drug trade in Latin America 
and beyond; the complex inter-linkages between illicit drug economies and local 
social, political and economic structures.  A one-dimensional conceptualisation 
of the relationship between the state and the drug trade is a significant aspect 
of this failure. 
 
Internationally, the UN drug control regime has been criticised for simply 
reproducing the prohibition model favoured by the US (Bewley-Taylor, 1999).  It 
is, therefore, unsurprising that similar trends are observed in international 
policy discourses.  The 2015 Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 
(2016:4), for example, describes violence as ‘perhaps the most visible and 
pernicious outcome of drug trafficking’, arguing that ‘when drug dealing 
becomes intertwined with political conflicts, horrific levels of violence may 
ensue.’   Furthermore, ‘corruption and drug-related problems are mutually 
reinforcing, and corruption and other social problems greatly contribute to the 
development of the illicit drug industry’ (Ibid.).  Relating this to questions of 
development, eradication of the drug trade is viewed as a necessary precursor to 
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ensuring security, stability, good governance and economic growth.  Discussing 
the case of Afghanistan, for example, the following World Bank report displays 
such tendencies. 
 
The nexus of drugs with insecurity and warlords - a vicious circle that 
would keep Afghanistan insecure, fragmented politically, weakly 
governed, poor, dominated by the informal/illicit economy, and a hostage 
to the drug industry - is clearly the most serious problem. This threatens 
the entire state-building and reconstruction agenda and as such outweighs 
all the combined economic benefits. (Byrd & Ward, 2004: i) 
 
As the work of Chouvy (2009), Goodhand (2008) and Mansfield (2016) 
demonstrate, though, such linkages are overly simplistic.  The conventional 
policy discourse ignores the ways in which the drug economy may become 
bound-up with uneven processes of state-building and development in such 
cases.8  In certain parts of Afghanistan, dominant coalitions have established 
‘cooperation and order by limiting access to valuable resources’, such as the 
opium economy; securing elite loyalty to the system, limiting violence and 
reducing disorder (Goodhand, 2009: 23).  Counternarcotics policies during this 
time have sought to centralise authority in the country and eradicate these 
rents; creating tensions and undermining ‘emergent interdependencies between 
centre and periphery’ (Ibid.).  In this sense, counterdrug goals may in-fact run 
contrary to a state-building agenda. 
 
By contrast, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug 
Report 2016 marked a small shift away from the broad generalisation of the drug 
policy discourse.  The report considered the complex ways in which illicit 
economies interact with issues of sustainable development in the Global South 
(UNODC, 2016: Chp. 2).  For example, the report acknowledges that ‘the 
connection between drugs and violence is not an automatic one’ (Ibid: 95), 
noting that ‘while violence is likely to be more prevalent in cocaine-producing 
countries, the different homicide levels demonstrate that socioeconomic and 
political factors mediate this relationship.’  Although the report remains 
weighted to the conventional themes of the Drug War and Development 
                                         
8 The area of the literature in which both Goodhand and Mansfield are situated is discussed 
below. 
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Paradigms, it indicates a move towards a more contextualised understanding of 
the phenomenon.  As noted previously, failures in this regard have led to 
ineffective and counterproductive policies. 
 
Rather than recognise the fact that the illicit drug trade is woven into the 
very fabric of societies, the prevailing counternarcotics narrative and the 
core analysis of the UN law enforcement system treats it as a separable 
problem – something akin to a malignant tumour that can be isolated and 
surgically removed from a healthy body.  (But) it is not even remotely 
that simple: this is a tumour that cannot be easily removed.  It has spread 
to become an almost necessary part of the whole body. ( . . . ) Removal 
could cause certain organs to fail. (Gutierrez, 2015: 2) 
 
Areas of the literature also reproduce these conventional assumptions and, as a 
result, tend to undertheorise the relationship between the state and the drug 
trade.  As the ‘war on drugs’ escalated during the 1980s and early-1990s, there 
were numerous examples in the literature of uncritical adoption of the premises 
of US counterdrug policy.  For example, Mabry (1984: 4) argued that, ‘the 
violence and corruption accompanying the drug business are destabilising’ the 
Andean nations; their ‘instability’ was thus a ‘threat’ to US national security.  
Within the parameters of the Drug War Paradigm, the contextual factors that 
determined whether or not the drug trade was in-fact associated with violence 
were underplayed.  State-narco interactions were equally generalised as one-
dimensional corruption, with little attempt to understand the dynamics that 
underpinned such relations (e.g. Clawson & Lee III, 1996: 169-177).  While critics 
of the US ‘war on drugs’ placed greater emphasis on the damaging effects of 
counterdrug policies, they too uncritically adopted many of the underlying 
assumptions of those on the other side of the drugs debate. 
 
The drug trade itself, and the violence it generates, has had a devastating 
impact throughout the region. Drug trafficking breeds criminality, 
exacerbates criminal and political violence, and fuels armed groups. It 
greatly increases problems of citizen security, public order and ultimately 
law enforcement. Across the region, drug trafficking-related corruption 
has further weakened national and local governments, judiciaries and 
police forces. (Youngers & Rosin, 2004: 4) 
 
Widening this discussion, Meehan (2011) points to the ‘presumed linear 
relationship between drugs and conflict’ as a contributing factor to the 
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conventional assumptions of the drugs literature.  The greed/economic model of 
post-Cold War civil conflict, advanced by Collier (2000) and Le Billion (2001) for 
example, argues that lootable resources create the means and the motivation 
for armed campaigns.  As such, illicit drugs are associated with violence, state 
breakdown and instability.  In the cases that dominate the Latin American drugs 
literature, such theories hold resonance: Colombia and its mix of drug-funded 
guerrilla and paramilitary groups; Peru and Shining Path’s ambiguous 
relationship to the coca-cocaine economy; and the emergence of quasi-narco-
paramilitaries and the challenge to the state of powerful drug mafias in the 
Mexican Drug War.  For example, Cornell (2007) argues that the ‘crime-rebellion 
nexus’ in Colombia had the effect of strengthening armed actors, while 
simultaneously weakening the state.  The cocaine trade is identified as a key 
factor fuelling the internal conflict.  It created economic incentives for fighters 
to reject peaceful settlement.  For the understudied and exceptional case of 
Bolivia, though, such theoretical models have limited explanatory power.  In 
order to understand the development of the Bolivian drug trade, the emergence 
of state-narco networks and their effects, the thesis draws on the literature on 
coercion and democratisation. 
1.2.2 The Coercion Literature  
 
These top-down conceptualisations thus fail to account for the distinct forms of 
interactions that arise between the state and illicit economies in different 
contexts.  The ‘frontier of the state’ (Meehan, 2015: 258) dissolves as the drug 
trade is integrated into existing political structures and processes.  The causes of 
state-narco interactions, then, may be more complex than moral failure or 
North-South economic disparities, and their effects less corrosive to state 
authority than the orthodoxy prescribes.  Snyder’s (2006) work on ‘institutions of 
joint-wealth extraction’9 has utility in explaining such dynamics.  Here, the state 
may form common interests with the illicit sphere; protecting and fostering 
illicit enterprise in return for rents.  Through joint wealth-extraction, a level of 
order and stability may be achieved, as potentially hostile rivals are absorbed 
into existing political structures.  Furthermore, drug rents provide the 
                                         
9 ‘Informal bargains rooted in personal ties among rulers, their cronies, and private elites’ 
(Snyder, 2006: 954). 
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government with the tools to govern, and are used to reinforce authority.  In the 
case of Mexico during the rule of the PRI, for example, ‘state-sponsored 
protection rackets’ created stable interactions with the illicit sphere, and 
ensured control of the violent excesses of crime (Snyder & Martínez, 2009).  The 
hegemonic power of the ruling party, a political culture of clientelism and the 
coherent command structure of organised crime during this period, allowed for 
the creation of such systems.  Organised crime was thus incorporated into the 
PRI’s centralised, mode of rule (Lupsha, 1992: 179).  These particularistic 
systems helped to bind factional interests to the existing political order (North, 
et. al., 2007: 7).  Linking this to historic processes of state formation and the 
centralisation of the means of coercion, Goodhand (2009: 9) argues: 
 
Shadow economies may be seen as part of the long brutal politics of 
sovereignty.  Illegality and the state have been constant companions, and 
control of illicit flows of revenue may actually strengthen the state.  
 
This emerging area of the literature, though, generally focuses on authoritarian 
and/or (post-)conflict states.  In studying the Bolivian case, therefore, I explore 
facets of this approach in a distinctive setting.  This includes both the country’s 
shift to democratic government and its status as a crucial venue of the modern 
US ‘war on drugs’.  Furthermore, Bolivia has not experienced high-levels of drug 
related violence compared to its neighbours in the region, and has maintained 
elected government.  Such dynamics contradict common assumptions around the 
nature of the drug trade and narco-violence in Latin America, holding the drug 
trade as necessarily violent and destabilising.  Snyder (2006: 965) notes the need 
for such research in this area, addressing democratic regimes and illicit drug 
economies in the Global South.   
 
As part of this, then, the thesis provides insights into the relationship between 
state-narco networks and Bolivia’s democratic transition.  O’Donnell (1996) 
discusses the distinct path of the Third Wave in Latin America, where transitions 
were determined by local context.  This resulted in distinct forms of democratic 
regime – or polyarchy.  Such regimes proved to be enduring, but showed little 
sign of movement towards a Western-liberal model of democracy, as assumed by 
theories of democratic consolidation.  Bolivia was no different in this regard 
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(Whitehead, 2002).  Clientelism and authoritarian remnants continued alongside 
formal elements of democracy.  These legacies of military authoritarian 
government allowed for the survival and adaptation of state-narco networks.  
More than this, Bolivian elite actors viewed these legacies and tacit-acceptance 
of state-narco links in the military, police and political parties as necessary to 
ensuring, at least nominal, commitment to democracy of potential veto players 
(Levitsky & Murillo, 2014).  For example, the military, often in conjunction with 
civilian politicians, had a long-history of political intervention.  Such 
considerations entered into the calculations of elite political actors.  The thesis 
thus builds on the political transition literature and integrates its insights into 
the literature on drugs, arguing that state-narco networks were interwoven into 
Bolivia’s uneven democracy and post-transition political settlement.   
 
In chapter 2, I discuss these two areas of the literature in greater detail; 
outlining how the thesis builds on these theoretical insights to construct a 
framework for analysis.  
 
1.2.3 The ‘War on Drugs’, Violence and Instability 
 
Of course, external pressure to adopt counterdrug policies also shapes the form, 
function and implications of state-narco interactions.  Snyder (2006: 949-951) 
notes that the involvement of the state in drug trafficking risks international 
sanction.  Cooperation, meanwhile, brings reward.  In the case of the US Drug 
War in Latin America and the introduction of the Andean Initiative specifically, 
US decertification threatened foreign governments with the blocking of 
international credit and US aid; the adoption of counterdrug goals protected 
vital US economic support and brought increased budgets for the security forces.  
International legitimacy also played a key role in these dynamics, as supposed 
‘narco-states’ would be marked as international pariahs (see Chouvy, 2015).  In 
many cases, these were potent tools of US foreign policy and ensured the export 
of the ‘war on drugs’.  As a result of this, international pressure and resultant 
securitised counterdrug responses placed states in drug producing nations into a 
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conflictive relationship – a drug war – with the illicit economy.10  This would, in 
theory, inhibit the formation of shared interests between the drug trade and the 
state; and, by extension, the establishment of informal institutions of control.  
The Drug War Paradigm tied defeat of the drug trade to wider notions of 
security, order, democracy and economic development, i.e. the state-building 
agenda (Mansfield, 2016).   
 
Critics argue, though, that this model of prohibition has not delivered on these 
supposedly complementary goals.  Instead, it has exacerbated the violence and 
instability associated with illicit drug economies.  In this sense, ‘disruptive 
market interventions, weapons flows and training of paramilitary counter-
narcotics units are the drivers of violence in the Global South, not the drug 
markets themselves’ (Buxton, 2016).  For Latin America, it is argued, such policy 
interventions have not only been ineffective in reducing the supply of cocaine to 
consumer countries, they have been ‘counterproductive, severely jeopardising 
democracy and stability’ throughout the region (ICG, 2008: 1).   
 
The market effects of prohibition are identified as a key force underpinning 
these dynamics.  Prohibition inflates the price of commodities such as coca-
cocaine.  Eradication and interdiction efforts thus have the perverse effect of 
inflating prices further by creating scarcity, encouraging more market activity 
(UNDP, 2015: 23).  In other words, ‘through the alchemy of capitalism, the lead 
of suppression has often been transformed into the gold of stimulus’ (McCoy & 
Block, 1992: 11).  To protect/widen market share in an unregulated market, 
trafficking groups heighten violence against competitors and bribe would-be 
suppressers of their business.  While the coercion literature contends that 
informal mechanisms of control over the ‘illicit’ economy may emerge in certain 
contexts, the ‘war on drugs’ calls for all out confrontation rather than 
pragmatism.  This dogmatic approach to the issue, it is argued, has led to a 
downward spiral of violence in Latin America and beyond. 
 
                                         
10 Although in some cases, such as Colombia, it may be argued that such a war was in progress 
prior to the escalation of US counterdrug policies in the Andes. 
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Violence is not universally associated with drug trafficking, but it is 
intense and epidemic in settings where drug markets are heavily 
contested between competing gangs. Paradoxically, violence often 
intensifies as governments attempt to disrupt the drug trade by killing or 
arresting the heads of the criminal organizations: their semi-stable 
oligopoly is replaced by a multitude of warring factions. (Keefer & 
Loayza, 2010: 19) 
 
The empirical analysis of Werb, et. al. (2011) supports these assertions.  The 
study found that increases in the intensity of counterdrug interventions were 
positively correlated with increases in drug related violence.  As well as creating 
a price incentive for organised crime, such interventions open gaps in the 
market for new actors.  This may result in violent competition as rival groups 
fight for market share.  In addition to this, a process of ‘target hardening’ may 
occur.  Organised crime responds to the escalation of enforcement measures 
with its own more extreme measures, e.g. increased firepower or acts of 
intimidation.   
 
Such trends are evident in the case of Mexico.  For example, Guerrero-Gutiérrez 
(2011: 66-67) notes the relationship between the removal of drug kingpins and 
spikes in drug related violence.  Competition to replace crime bosses and score-
settling between groups at perceived grievances are linked to these outbreaks of 
violence.  Such policies, then, may cause shocks to organised crime and its 
function, but are ill-suited to dealing with the fall-out from ‘successful’ 
operations as gains against organised crime are not consolidated.  Castillo, Mejía 
& Restrepo (2014) take this analysis further.  While the decapitation of criminal 
organisations may increase violence, they highlight the additional role of market 
scarcity as an important contributing factor.  The authors argue that effective 
targeting of the Colombian cocaine trade during the last decade tightened the 
market in Mexico and increased prices.  Where there was existing competition 
and high turnover of crime bosses, this scarcity had the effect of intensifying 
conflict between trafficking organisations.  Such trends and an ever increasing 
death count in the Mexican Drug War have led to calls for new approaches to the 
illicit drug economy.  For example: 
 
The ‘war on drugs’ represents a poor application of strategy and tactics. 
Approaches must instead be measured and pragmatic if peace and 
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stability are to be restored where a culture of war has flourished. All-out 
militarized enforcement responses have, counter-intuitively, undermined 
security in places like Afghanistan, Colombia, and Mexico. ( . . . ) In some 
cases, militarized responses in one country have resulted in dramatic 
spikes in violence in others. (GCDP, 2015: 23-24) 
 
As part of this, Chouvy (2007) notes the destabilising effects of eradication 
campaigns; deepening the economic imperatives (poverty and 
underdevelopment) that lead rural communities to drug production in the first 
place.  Failure to adequately compensate communities in the Afghan and 
Burmese periphery, for example, instilled a sense of grievance and created 
fertile ground for armed groups.  In such cases, this may also lead to the 
expansion of other predatory economies, such as human trafficking.  The ‘war on 
drugs’, therefore, is associated with political, social and economic instability. 
 
As section 1.1 describes, the US pushed for similar militarised counterdrug 
responses in Bolivia.  Locally, though, the drug trade was not considered a 
threat to national security.  There was ambivalence towards it, given its 
relatively peaceful nature and its importance to the national economy.  Instead, 
US counterdrug policies were viewed as the main source of violence and 
instability in Bolivia’s illicit economy (Gamarra, 1997).  There are, therefore, 
strong parallels with the preceding discussion: the drug trade itself was not 
viewed as inherently violent, but rather disruptive market interventions were 
identified as the root of such instability.   
 
These strands of argument are drawn on throughout the thesis.  Primarily, local 
elite opposition to US counterdrug policies and the ‘Colombianisation’ of Bolivia 
was underpinned by the belief that such a strategy would worsen violence and 
instability; jeopardising the country’s democratic transition.  As such, these 
insights complement my analysis of state-narco networks and their role in 
mediating the drug trade.  US counterdrug policies placed stress on long-
established state-narco networks; inter-linkages that were interwoven with 
Bolivia’s post-transition settlement and uneven democratic governance.  Among 
certain elements of the Bolivian political elite, the relatively ‘benign’ effects of 
the coca-cocaine economy were viewed as preferable to an escalated ‘war on 
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drugs’ and potential democratic reversal. Resistance to the US Drug War 
Paradigm demonstrated recognition of its destabilising effects. 
 
1.3 Studying Illicit Activity: a Mixed Methods Approach 
 
My mixed methods approach to the study of the Bolivian case combines intense 
document analysis with oral history methods.  In one sense, this compensates for 
certain methodological challenges in collecting data on illicit activity.  For 
example, actors involved in drugs actively conceal their business from outsiders 
(e.g. see Vlassenroot, 2006: 196-197), while governments engage in politicised 
‘guesstimates’ of drug production and trafficking flows (Allen, 2005: 2-3).  
Furthermore, attempting to observe state-narco networks ‘directly’ or eliciting 
open and honest accounts of illicit activity from those involved is doubtful.  
Ethical issues of risk management are also salient here, as the researcher may 
put himself/herself and participants in danger when collecting data (Felbab-
Brown, 2014).  These issues were thus taken into account and managed 
throughout the planning and conduct of my research.  Secondary and document 
sources provided some insights into the dynamics of illicit activity, and these 
were used where appropriate to support my assertions.  However, the nature of 
these sources, including the issue of unverifiable claims and 
unreliable/politicised metadata on the coca-cocaine economy, limits the 
strength of conclusions.  I supplemented this strand of analysis, then, with 
interviews with key US and Bolivian elite political actors from the period.   
 
Here, the focus shifts to their interpretations of state-narco interactions and 
attached issues; examining how these actors understood such relations and 
responded to them.  This exposes distinct framing narratives of the ‘war on 
drugs’, and reveals the motivations and beliefs that underpinned the actions of 
key elite actors during this important moment in US-Bolivian history.  As such, 
this mixed methods approach compensates for methodological constraints in 
studying illicit activity, while offering multiple and novel perspectives on state-
narco interactions. 
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1.3.1 Creating a ‘Base-line’ Account 
 
I gathered an extensive range of documentary evidence from various sources.  
This included Bolivian government publications, media articles, and reports from 
third sector and international organisations.  The US government, though, 
proved to be the main source of documentary evidence.  Extensive and detailed 
records of the US democratic process, and policy development, implementation 
and evaluation were readily accessible on US government websites, and internet 
search engines, such as the HathiTrust and Google.  In the case of the Andean 
Initiative, a range of publicly available documents present the US government’s 
official line, and the (contested) evidence that informed policy.  The 1990 
National Drug Control Strategy Report, for example, lays out the Bush 
administration’s conceptualisation of the ‘drug problem’, its proposed solution 
and targets (UNODC, 1990).  Over the years, the counter-supply aspect of the 
policy was evaluated against the development of the Andean coca-cocaine 
economy in the US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics Matters 
(INM)11 International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSR) (US State, 
1990…1994).  Simultaneously, various US Congressional committees and sub-
committees scrutinised the work of the executive branch (e.g. US Congress, 
1990a; 1990b).  Hearings and reports commissioned by these bodies often 
challenged the image projected by the administration and the various 
counterdrug agencies.   
 
Unpublished US government materials added another level to the analysis.  
Through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)12 requests and archival research – the 
                                         
11 This is now named the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). 
12 FOIA requests were slow-moving, and it was difficult to establish which documents were 
available on the topic.  I placed two sequential FOIA request to the US State Department in the 
second year of my PhD for specific documents: the first took 8 months to complete; the second, 
6 months.  However, the NSA archive on the ‘war on drugs’ contained an extensive collection of 
declassified documents from the period of the Andean Initiative, themselves obtained through 
FOIA requests.  This, then, replaced direct FOIA requests as my main source for unpublished US 
government documents.  Some sections of the NSA’s declassified documents, though, had been 
redacted by the US government, with claims of national security taking precedence over 
transparency.  The FOIA process, while valuable, allowed US government agencies to exert some 
control on the release of information.  Although elements of oversight can increase the 
researcher’s confidence that such controls are well reasoned, it does raise questions over 
authenticity and the extent to which relevant information is withheld.  In this sense, the 
‘insider’ status of such sources does not necessarily render them as more complete or accurate.   
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National Security Archive (NSA) and the Centro de Documentación e Información 
Bolivia (CEDIB) – I obtained internal reports by the Government Accountability 
Office (e.g. GAO, 1989), US Embassy cables and bilateral US-Bolivian agreements 
(e.g. US NSC, 1989).  Many of these sources also presented divergent accounts of 
US counterdrug efforts to those in some published sources.  For example, an 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) audit (1991) of the US Embassy in La Paz 
fundamentally questioned the basis of US counterdrug strategy and the 
management of the country team.  In response, the US Embassy in La Paz 
accused the OIG of unprofessionalism, arguing that they had pre-judged their 
conclusions and failed to carry out a thorough investigation (OIG, 1991: 1).  This 
demonstrates, not only the multifaceted nature of the US state, but also the 
competing (and at times conflicting) agendas and accounts of the ‘war on drugs’ 
in Bolivia.13   
 
Comparison of documentary evidence from different sources thus informed the 
empirical analysis.  Although inconsistencies in reporting are perhaps inevitable, 
the advancement of these competing agendas caused me to question how the 
‘real’ policy on the ground emerged, and the distinct ways in which actors at the 
level of implementation made sense of policy, and their underlying motivations, 
beliefs and evaluations of the local context.  These were important themes 
during subsequent interviews.  In addition to this, though, these inconsistencies 
also highlight issues in drawing definitive conclusions on the illicit trade from 
such sources.   
 
In working with documents generally it may be tempting to view them as more 
‘reliable’ or ‘factual’ than information obtained from interviews; that 
documents allow the researcher to access ‘an underlying social reality’ (Bryman, 
2008: 526).  In my case, documents produced at the time of the Andean 
Initiative certainly had the advantage of being more immediate to events in 
comparison to the interviews I conducted.  They provide more details, as well as 
figures, dates and places.  But it is important to take into consideration the 
many factors that underpin these documents:  the identity of the producer, the 
function of the document, the context, and its audience, conventions, structure 
                                         
13 These themes are returned to in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 1  25 
 
and implicit assumptions (drawn from Phillips & Brown, 1993).  In terms of data 
on the size, structure and function of the drug trade, methodology and rigour of 
investigation must also be taken into account.  Often these aspects of published 
data are obscured from the reader.  These sources, or rather the actors who 
produce them, project their own version of ‘reality’ (Atkinson & Coffey, 2011: 
78). 
 
The INCSR, for example, is aimed at the public and those involved in the 
budgetary process.  The State Department may have failed to make progress in 
certain areas, but yet it seeks to present the information in ways that highlight 
success and minimise failure.  The ‘facts’ may also be highly politicised, with 
estimates of drug production used to apply pressure on foreign governments.  
This was arguably the case during the Paz Zamora administration, when INSCR 
1990 presented data claiming that Bolivia had made the transition from coca to 
cocaine HCl producer (see Chapter 6.6).  Such documents also entail a process of 
‘fact-making’; creating the ‘official record’.  This impresses connotations of 
legitimacy on the account and, by extension, its producer.  Meanwhile, the Drug 
War Paradigm and American Exceptionalism are essential elements to many of 
these documents.  The following quote from President Bush’s letter to 
Ambassador Charles Bowers (Bush correspondence, 1991) is demonstrative of the 
latter theme: 
 
As leader of the democracies, our Nation faces an historic opportunity to 
help shape a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world, in which our 
ideals and way of life can truly flourish.  As President, I intend to advance 
these objectives around the globe, and I look to you, as my personal 
representative in Bolivia, as my partner in this task. 
 
Rather than accessing an ‘underlying social reality’, they reveal the agendas 
being advanced in Bolivia at this time, and reflect the beliefs and ‘facts’ at play; 
they frame the issue of drugs in certain ways and define the parameters of the 
‘problem’.14  
                                         
14 For example, while the Republican Bush administration argued for increased funds to US and 
Andean security forces as part of ‘an international strategy designed to disrupt and dismantle’ 
multinational drug trafficking organizations (US Gov., 1990: 49), the Democrat-led Committee on 
Government Operations framed drug production as a social and economic issue, stating that 
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Other sources dealing with activity in the illicit sphere are also often 
unverifiable and/or unreliable.  Journalistic accounts may, at times, be laced 
with ‘best guess’, rumour and/or exaggeration, while ‘official data’ on the drug 
trade suffers from methodological problems and, at times, wilful manipulation 
to suit political agendas (Allen, 2005; Reuter, 2004; Thoumi, 2005).  In 
formulating models on the size of the drug trade, for example, a range of 
assumptions are made on numerous factors, such as coca acreage and yield, the 
alkaloid content of coca leaves, and the efficiency of production processes.  
Information on these assumptions may be drawn from satellite imagery,15 and 
reports from coca farmers, police officials and various other actors.  Unreliable 
estimates here, in-turn, further reduce the reliability of the model.  
Furthermore, as noted above, such figures may then be politicised to advance a 
particular agenda or narrative.  Laserna (in Justiniano S., et. al., 1991) notes 
that the reporting of Bolivian government data on coca cultivation was 
frequently influenced by US eradication deadlines (these targets were tied to 
the release of crucial economic support).  Equally, there remained questions 
around the size of Bolivia’s drug trade when US counterdrug aid began to 
increase during the 1980s, i.e. whether the Bolivian government sought to 
leverage the issue for increased assistance (Lehman, 1999: 199).  Such examples 
urge caution around the use of this type of data.   
 
Finally, uncertainty over how the illicit economy actually functions exacerbates 
such problems.  For example, former-NSC official David Miller (interview, 2013) 
commented on how the US government encountered this issue in the formulation 
of policy. 
 
I don’t think we understood the industry well.  I think that it was the first 
time that we had taken on at a national level the production cycle of 
cocaine.  Going right back down to Cochabamba and find the guy growing 
the stuff and say, ‘what are you doing friend?  Why are you doing this? 
Don’t you want to grow peppers?’  It’s immensely complicated.  It’s both 
a macro-economic issue, and a micro-economic issue about price 
                                                                                                                           
‘further ‘militarizing’ the present strategy will not address the roots of the problem in source 
countries’ (US Congress, 1990b: 9).   
15 This technology and analysis was in its infancy at the time of the Andean Initiative. 
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elasticity and margins, and so on and so forth.  It’s an agriculture issue 
about what products might work in a market. It’s a domestic consumption 
issue – some coca down there is just fine, folks love chewing on it and 
making it into tea.  You can’t go around and spray all the stuff with 
herbicide without killing people, so you get all that. Then you get a 
consumption problem, which was notionally off the NSC plate, that wasn’t 
our problem, but it was Drug Czar Bennett’s problem, and so you sort of 
say, how you going to win this thing if people keep using?  And so did we 
understand it?  Well, at the start I don’t think so.  It’s like understanding 
the international automobile industry.  Where’s the best place to make 
spare parts for a Toyota?  You want all the spare generators made in a 
plant in X, you want that dispersed around the world – what are the 
shipping costs of the generator versus the production costs?  What 
percentage of the generator is labour?  So what are labour rates?  You 
know?  It’s a huge industry; I mean drugs are a huge industry. It’s hard. 
 
Miller’s description of the problems the US government faced in formulating and 
evaluating counterdrug policy reveals some of the limitations of data on the drug 
trade.  Falls in coca cultivation, for example, have frequently been used as an 
indicator of success in counterdrug policy in the Andean region.  However, these 
figures say little in isolation about the overall function of the drug economy; 
how falls in coca supply are mediated by trafficking organisations, e.g. through 
changing their profit margins, stockpiling of coca paste, sourcing from 
alternative markets and/or improving production processes.  Other factors 
further up the commodity chain may also have an effect, e.g. whether a specific 
trafficking route is opened or closed, and the comparative influence of different 
criminal groups at different stages.  Vellinga (2004b: 319) notes the wide 
estimates of the size of the cocaine trade in the Andes (US$ 8 to 12 billion) and 
the US (US$ 46 to 74 billion) during the 1990s, and the considerable uncertainty 
over how this was divided-up between traffickers in the Andes, Mexico and the 
US.  The mechanisms of money laundering add further uncertainty to estimates 
of export income returning to source countries.  In the case of state-narco 
interactions, then, such figures may only be loosely correlated with the level of 
drug rents available to pay-off corrupt state officials.  As such, attempts to draw 
direct causal effects between macro-data on the drug trade and state-narco 
networks should be avoided.   
 
With these important caveats in mind, then, I triangulated documentary sources 
to formulate a detailed chronology of the development of the Bolivian coca-
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cocaine economy, the Andean Initiative and various attached events.  The types 
of factors described, which are crucial to understanding the evidence, are taken 
into account in my analysis of the data.  However, interview data, and a distinct 
form of interpretivist analysis, formed a complementary parallel strand of my 
mixed methods approach.   Rather than focus on a necessarily incomplete 
reconstruction of the relationship between the state and the drug trade, I 
supplemented documentary evidence and macro-data with analysis of how elite 
actors on the ground understood and responded to state-narco networks. 
 
1.3.2 Oral History Methodology 
 
I completed fieldwork in the US in 2013 and then Bolivia in 2014; conducting 41 
interviews, mostly with elite political actors with backgrounds relating to the 
Andean Initiative.16  My data, then, is not representative, but rather particular: 
accessing the subjective experiences of these key actors.  This research focus is 
informed by my conceptualisation of state-narco networks and their relation to 
the political dynamics of the post-transition period.  This is outlined in greater 
detail in Chapter 2, but essentially these interactions are viewed as a Bolivian 
elite game involving political trade-offs.  Additionally, in the course of pursuing 
the implementation of Drug War policies, elite actors within the US Embassy 
negotiated with Bolivian government counterparts.  Their positionality to these 
Bolivian elite actors, as well as their influential role in determining the realities 
of US policy in Bolivia made their accounts pivotal to my analysis.17  Through 
comparison of these accounts, the thesis draws out the differing perceptions 
held by these important actors of the coca-cocaine economy, state-narco 
interactions and the ‘war on drugs’.  Their distinctive interpretations and 
priorities had important implications for how the drug trade and state-narco 
networks interacted with social, political and economic structures in Bolivia, and 
the nature of US-Bolivian relations. 
 
                                         
16 Details on all interviewees are provided in Appendix C.  The conduct of fieldwork is detailed 
in-depth in Chapter 3. 
17 The US Embassy’s key role in shaping counterdrug policy on the ground in Bolivia is also 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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To analyse the accounts of these actors, I employ elements of oral history 
methodology.  My application of this method helps to unfurl the various 
meanings these actors attached to state-narco interactions and the introduction 
of the Andean Initiative; mediating an overreliance on document sources and the 
associated issues described previously.  However, this approach also provides 
novel insights into the phenomenon: contrasting elite interpretations of state-
narco networks and the ‘war on drugs’.  Borrowing from Auyero’s (2009: 26) 
understanding of Cubism, my research blends different sources and narratives to 
capture the object of study from multiple points of view. 
 
Oral history is more typically associated with ‘lost histories’: individuals and 
communities marginalised in mainstream accounts of historical events (Abrams, 
2010: 5).  I nevertheless found the insights of this methodology useful in the 
practice and analysis of my interviews.  The Andean Initiative was implemented 
in Bolivia over 25 years ago, and the accounts offered by interviewees were 
shaped by the intervening years.  Factors such as the trajectory of history, 
ideology, beliefs, the present-day context and the interview situation itself also 
had to be taken into account.  While interviews provided some ‘facts’ about the 
case, they revealed more about how actors understood events and their role 
within them.   This had implications for how they responded to policy; what 
their priorities and motivations were, and how the ‘real’ policy emerged in 
Bolivia.  Oral history methodology offered a way of plugging into these 
dynamics; understanding the subjective experience of the interviewee.  
 
The unique and precious element which oral sources force upon the 
historian and which no other sources possess in equal measure is the 
speaker’s subjectivity. (Portelli, 2006: 36) 
 
An oral history, then, is fluid, with the interviewee interpreting and 
reinterpreting historic events and their role within them in the act of recounting 
their memories (Abrams, 2010: 7).  This had implications for my data collection.   
 
Interviews were semi-structured, allowing space for the interviewee to engage 
the topic on their own terms.  In giving voice to their experience, interviewees 
develop their own understandings of events, or at least the understanding they 
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wish to present to the researcher.  These understandings may be structured in 
relation to episodes seemingly peripheral to the researcher’s main theoretical 
interest.  In these aspects of the account, though, lie meanings and motivations, 
for example, crucial to the interviewee.  Therefore, I allowed interviews to 
flow, listening and responding to the accounts of interviewees rather than 
limiting discussion to a narrow range of questions.  These features of oral history 
methodology are demonstrated by the following extract from my interview with 
former US Ambassador to Bolivia, Robert Gelbard.   
 
Before re-counting the formulation of the US counterdrug strategy in Bolivia, 
Gelbard outlined his previous experience with the Peace Corps in 1960s Bolivia.   
 
RG: I don’t know if you know this but, you know I was a Peace Corps 
volunteer in Bolivia? 
 
AG: Yes, I’d read that. 
 
RG: Okay, so I first went to Bolivia in the mid ‘60s –’64 to ’66 – and this is 
relevant.  I did most of my time – have you been to Bolivia? 
 
AG: Yes, I was there last summer. 
 
RG: Okay. I did most of my time in the Cochabamba Valley, but actually I 
ended up living in a town at the foot of the mountains, and then working 
way up in the mountains with pure Quechua-speaking people. So I speak 
Quechua, or I did, I don’t use it much anymore. But that gave me… and I 
was involved in setting up a national community development 
programme… but that really gave me – I believe – a much deeper 
grounding than the typical American ambassador in Bolivia would normally 
have, or the typical American policy maker working on those issues. This 
was ’64 to ’66. ( . . . )  I was not enthusiastic about going there as 
ambassador, having been a peace corps volunteer there and it having 
been the first time I had lived for any serious period outside of the US, I 
felt I could not be objective. I really had enormous affection for the 
country and for the people, but the then Secretary of State, George 
Schultz, insisted that I go because I had told him so much about Bolivia.  
(I felt that I) had some pretty good grounding in the country, and what I 
really tried to do was put together a much more comprehensive strategy 
to try to deal with all aspects of the drug problem within the context of 
Bolivia as a newly-renascent democratic society, and trying to fortify 
democratic institutions and at the same time trying to build up the 
economy, which was going through a big transformation after the collapse 
of the mining industry. (Gelbard interview, 2013) 
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This outline served to frame his subsequent account.  His experience with the 
Peace Corps established both his good intentions in Bolivia and his credentials to 
advance an effective counterdrug policy.  He told me that the strategy in Bolivia 
became the model for US programmes elsewhere in Latin America.  The reasons 
for its success lay not only with the skills of his team, but in his deep 
understanding of the local context.  As a result, eradication against peasant coca 
farmers was scaled-back and alternative development efforts were increased, 
while interdiction targeting corrupt officials and violent traffickers was 
emphasised.  The laudable goals of supporting democracy and economic growth 
are also referenced.  The underlying assumptions of the account, shaped by 
Gelbard’s own personal history, justified his role and that of the US in Bolivia 
during this time.  Themes of American Exceptionalism were present, as well as 
paternal attitudes towards Bolivia.   
 
This type of discursive framing was common across interviews.  As I analysed my 
data, I sought to uncover these aspects of the interviewee’s account; working 
back and forth both within the data set, as well as between data and theory.  My 
aim was not only to understand the interviewee’s experience on its own terms, 
but to relate this back to my main research questions and wider themes in the 
literature.  This is tempered by modesty at the researcher’s ability to access 
‘meaning’ from the memories of interlocutors (James, 2000: 152).  For many US 
officials, though, their accounts were framed by elements of the Drug War 
Paradigm.  For example, the proposition that US counterdrug policy in Bolivia 
was justified because ‘drugs were poisoning American kids’, had clear parallels 
with the tone of the domestic debate at that time.  Such ideas provided a 
morally unambiguous logic for the actions of US government agencies 
implementing the Andean Initiative.  State-narco interactions and the Bolivian 
drug trade more generally, were viewed through the prism of securitisation. 
 
Bolivian officials, meanwhile, tended to ground their responses in alternative 
discourses.  One of these may be described as el Imperialismo Yanquí.  This 
draws on the history of fractious relations between the US and its Latin 
American neighbours, and has numerous strands, from the Monroe Doctrine 
through to US backing of authoritarian regimes during the Cold War.  There are 
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also more general elements present, such as the history of colonial exploitation 
in Latin America and North-South relations.  This discourse manifested itself in 
claims that the US itself had been involved in the management of the cocaine 
trade in Bolivia, acting in collusion with local allies to manipulate Bolivian 
politics.  Former-President Jaime Paz Zamora described one such conspiracy.  
 
During my government, one of the problems we had with the US Embassy 
was that they said Bolivia was already a producer of cocaine.  Until that 
moment, Bolivia produced coca paste and it was normally in Colombia or 
elsewhere that they processed it into cocaine. (. . . ) But the Americans 
wanted to sustain the theory that Bolivia was already a producer of 
cocaine, a world producer of cocaine.  I never accepted it, I rejected it. ( 
. . . ) Then, incredibly, all of a sudden from La Paz airport… an enormous 
plane leaves from La Paz to Lima with four tonnes of cocaine… four 
tonnes of drugs, but processed cocaine. How could they have managed 
this?  Impossible!  In Lima, they seized it. ( . . . )  It was a typical 
operation.  We couldn’t say anything about it in Bolivia: it was four tonnes 
of refined drugs. (. . . )  The ‘war on drugs’, like the Cold War, justified 
everything.  (These operations were) psychological warfare derived from 
previous Cold War methods, and they interfered with Bolivian democracy. 
(Paz Zamora interview, 2013) 
 
Such conspiracies, which echoed with CIA complicity in shadow operations in 
Latin America and US alliances with regional military institutions, served to 
highlight US hypocrisy and diminish Bolivian complicity in the trade.  Such 
narratives highlighted ambivalence towards the drug trade and its effects, and 
underpinned opposition to ‘Colombianised’, destabilising US counterdrug 
policies. 
 
My application of an oral history methodology, then, helped me to uncover such 
dynamics.  In the examples provided this included discursive framing of the case 
through reference to American Exceptionalism, moralistic attitudes towards 
drugs or the historical narrative of US imperialism in Latin America.  These 
important discursive frameworks are detailed in Chapter 5.  In contrasting US 
and Bolivian accounts, the thesis shows how real and perceived state-narco webs 
were understood and navigated by different actors in distinct ways.  This aspect 
of my mixed methods approach, then, was crucial in establishing several of the 
thesis’ key findings.  These are summarised below. 
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1.4 Entrenched State-Narco Networks, Competing Narratives of 
the ‘War on Drugs’ and US-Bolivian Contestation 
 
This thesis advances original findings along several dimensions.  First, my 
analysis elucidates the interplay between Bolivia’s political development and the 
adaptation of illicit economies.  I argue that fragmented authoritarian era state-
narco networks formed part of Bolivia’s post-transition political settlement.  
Uneven Bolivian democratisation was reflected in the continuation of 
clientelistic and authoritarian practices, including police and military autonomy.  
As part of this, tolerance of drug corruption within both institutions was linked 
to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium.  Challenging mainstream 
discourses of drugs, the thesis shows how state-narco links were integrated into 
informal forms of governance, and used to reinforce the political order.  These 
modes of exchange contributed to the relative stability of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine 
economy, as drug traffickers sought accommodation with the state rather than 
conflict.   
 
US and Bolivian actors from this era recognised these networks to varying 
degrees, but understood and responded to them in different ways.  Their 
accounts of these interactions were interpreted and related through conflicting 
narratives of the ‘war on drugs’.  The US drug war paradigm and the Latin 
American development paradigm of illicit drugs offered frameworks of analysis 
for these actors: how they conceptualised ‘the problem’, the appropriate 
response, and the nature of US-Bolivian relations.18  In terms of the former, US-
cultural attitudes towards drugs, the securitisation of drugs, and American 
Exceptionalism were present; for the latter, North-South economic analysis, the 
cultural significance of coca, and views of el Imperialismo Yanquí and the legacy 
of the Cold War, were all strong themes.  While the accounts of US and Bolivian 
interlocutors therefore reflected common themes of the drugs literature, they 
were also distinctive along a number of dimensions.  These exposed competing 
agendas, diverging US-Bolivian priorities, and alternative interpretations of what 
state-narco interactions represented and how they should be addressed.   
                                         
18 These paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’ are outlined in detail in Chapter 2. 
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On the US-side, for example, Bolivia was viewed as both victim and perpetrator 
of the drug trade.  The Bolivian coca-cocaine economy was acknowledged to be 
a consequence of underdevelopment, but it was also regarded as a threat to the 
US.  Moralistic views of drugs and Western-centric theories of the relationship 
between the state and the illicit sphere were reproduced, e.g. the presence of 
the drug trade as both a cause and consequence of a weak state (Meehan, 2011: 
376).  The export of the US security apparatus and strident action against those 
involved in the trade were held as legitimate, as the US sought to bypass 
‘corrupt’ local power structures.  By contrast, Bolivian actors emphasised goals 
of democratic consolidation and political stability.  Although incompatible with 
democratic government, state-narco networks formed part of a fragile political 
equilibrium.  There was a degree of ambivalence towards them, with Bolivian 
actors arguing against the country’s ‘Colombianisation’ and the breakdown of 
political order.19  Drawing on Bolivia’s turbulent political history, they contrasted 
the Paz Zamora government’s (1989-93) ‘democratising mission’ against the US 
‘war on drugs’.  These accounts, then, reveal how US and Bolivian actors 
navigated state-narco networks, and the place of such systems within wider 
contested political dynamics.   
 
This contestation, though, was most evident around interpretations of the 
Bolivian political class’s relationship to the drug trade.  Accusation/counter-
accusation and attached conspiracy theories served both practical and rhetorical 
purposes.  For US actors, perceived widespread corruption within the Paz 
Zamora government justified the extension of US control, and explained policy 
difficulties.  US intelligence was used to remove ‘uncooperative’ Drug War 
partners, while the political implications of such practices were glossed over.  
For Bolivian actors, US actions were indicative of top-down control, following in 
the lineage of US Cold War politics.  Linkages between politicians and drug 
traffickers were downplayed, with accusations of drug corruption assumed to 
have political subtext.  This partly served to deflect the claims of US actors, as 
                                         
19 During this period, Colombia was experiencing high-levels of drug related violence, as powerful 
drug trafficking organisations – the Cartels – carried out assassinations and bombings in response 
to government counterdrug policies. 
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former members of the Bolivian government argued that the US used the 
exposure of supposed drug corruption to manipulate the country’s internal 
politics.  Perceptions around state-narco networks were folded into historical 
narratives of US influence in the hemisphere.  At this key moment in the 
escalation of the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America, then, deep fault lines of trust 
ran between the US and the Bolivian government.  Contested allegations of 
corruption were subsumed into accounts of US-Bolivian relations of power and 
control. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter establishes the original approach of the thesis.  Addressing an 
underlying weakness of the drugs literature, I explore the nuanced interactions 
between the Bolivian state and the drug trade at an important point in the 
historical development of the ‘war on drugs’.  As part of this, I utilise the 
literature on coercion.  The Bolivian case, and the distinct dynamics that it 
represents, is understudied in this literature.  My analysis thus advance this 
research agenda: exploring aspects of this approach in distinctive context.  
Furthermore, in my application of a dual analytical approach, the thesis offers 
multiple perspectives on the phenomenon.  Interviews with key actors from the 
period form a rich historical account of the period, and reveal competing (and 
contradictory) narratives of the ‘war on drugs’.  In this way, the chapter draws 
links between theory, methods and empirical analysis.  The thesis is organised as 
follows.   
 
The next chapter outlines my theoretical framework.  Drawing on the drugs 
literature, I outline the two main paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’, and the 
attached political and institutional factors that shaped the introduction of the 
Andean Initiative.  This places the research in relation to the drugs literature, 
explains the onset of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia and guides the reader through 
two important framing narratives of interlocutors.  The second part of the 
chapter elucidates the main themes of the coercion literature and their 
application to the Bolivian case.  As part of this, I examine uneven democracy as 
a crucial contextual factor.  Building on aspects of these different areas of the 
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literature, the thesis both furthers and moves beyond the dominant debates of 
the ‘war on drugs’. 
 
Chapter 3 addresses methodology, specifically the conduct of fieldwork in the US 
and Bolivia.  This concerns the influence of my fieldwork on the development of 
my methodological approach, detailing key steps of the research process.  As 
part of this, the chapter considers the implications for empirical analysis of 
various ethical considerations, contested language, the researcher-researched 
relationship, my rejection of a positivist conception of elite interviewing and the 
juxtaposition of US and Bolivian fieldwork.  Through discussion of these issues, I 
explore the parameters of my data and conclusions.  The chapter thus gives the 
reader understanding of the development of the research project, while also 
standing alone in providing insights into elite interviewing methodology, and 
research on politically sensitive topics and illicit practices. 
 
In Chapter 4, I trace the development of Bolivia’s systems of joint-wealth 
extraction from the authoritarian period through to the immediate post-
transitions period.  This includes: the Barrientos regime and its model of patron-
client politics (1964-1969); Banzer’s role in the cocaine boom of the 1970s 
(1971-78); the ‘cocaine-coup’ of García Meza (1980-1981); and the post-
transition governments of Siles Suazo and Paz Estensorro (1982-1989).  The 
development of state-narco networks is understood in relation to the trajectory 
of Bolivian history over this period.  The evolving structure of the drug trade and 
its ties to the state, are placed in the context of wider social, political and 
economic forces.  This serves as important context for later chapters, as well as 
establishing out original findings.   
 
Chapter 5 maps competing US and Bolivian narratives of the ‘war on drugs’.  I 
argue that these underpinned divergent agendas, and fractured relations 
between the US Embassy and the Bolivian government.  Drawing on interviews 
with US and Bolivian actors, I outline their distinct conceptualisations of ‘the 
drug problem’, incorporating analyses of state-narco interactions, and wider 
political, social, and economic forces.   I also consider how interlocutors 
conceived of US-Bolivian relations.  This places American Exceptionalism against 
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historically-grounded narratives of the US role in Latin America.  This analysis is 
crucial to the final two empirical, considering the discursive frameworks that 
shaped how elite actors understood and responded to state-narco networks.   
 
Chapter 6 examines how police/military state-narco networks were interwoven 
in the political dynamics of post-transition Bolivia.  I discuss Bolivia’s post-
transition political settlement and the introduction of the Andean Initiative as 
important contextual factors.  In terms of the former, I argue that informalism 
contributed to the tolerance of drug corruption in the police and military; I 
detail the clash of US Drug War goals with the proclaimed ‘democratising 
mission’ of the Paz Zamora government and its ambivalent attitudes towards the 
coca-cocaine economy.  My analysis shows how differing interpretations of drugs 
and state-narco networks informed divergent US and Bolivian counterdrug 
preferences.  Distinct priorities led to competitive US-Bolivian relations of power 
and control. 
 
This is followed by analysis of state-narco interactions in the Bolivian political 
class in Chapter 7.  I consider the penetration of drug money through Bolivia’s 
political parties, supporting the notion that the diffusion of power following 
transition led to new patron-client bonds between the state and the drugs trade.  
In addition to this, I detail how drug corruption accusations were enmeshed in 
US-Bolivian relations of power and control.  At the time of the Andean Initiative, 
corruption claims – supported by seemingly rigorous US intelligence – were used 
to pressure for the removal of ‘uncooperative’ Drug War partners.  US 
interlocutors now referenced such cases to justify the extension of the US Drug 
War model.  By contrast, Bolivian interlocutors viewed the Embassy’s actions 
within the historic logic of US Cold War tactics and the manipulation of Bolivian 
politics.  This resonated with views of ‘Yankee Imperialism’, questioning the 
stated aims of the US in Latin America and assuming underlying goals.   
 
In the final chapter, I pull together the main findings of the thesis.  I outline 
their theoretical importance, and consider their normative implications.  As 
Latin American leaders both past and present challenge the US Drug War 
orthodoxy and the international drug control regime comes under increasing 
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pressure, it is important to consider the historical foundations and underlying 
assumptions of the ‘war on drugs’.  The thesis contributes to a better 
understanding of the relationship between states and illicit economies, and how 
this interacts with newly-transitioned (formal) democracy. 
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Chapter 2|Contextualising State-Narco Relations 
 
In this chapter, I build on different areas of the literature to construct my 
framework for analysis.  This incorporates elements of the literature on drugs 
(e.g. McCoy, 2003; Musto, 1999; Thoumi, 2003), coercion (e.g. Goodhand, 2008; 
Meehan, 2015; Snyder, 2006) and democracy in Latin America (e.g. Auyero, 
2007; O’Donnell, 1993).  First, my approach speaks to the research agenda of 
the drugs literature, drawing on its key findings to examine the escalation of the 
‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia during the 1980s, and prevailing understandings of 
corruption.  But in addressing the nuanced interactions between the state and 
the drug trade, a change of theoretical approach is needed.  Challenging 
mainstream accounts of this relationship, I employ the coercion literature to 
advance a contextualised analysis.  The form and function of state-narco 
relations is conditioned by local dynamics in producer nations.  As such, I 
supplement this with insights from the literature on Latin American democracy, 
arguing that uneven democratisation in post-transition Bolivia allowed for the 
continuation of clientelistic and authoritarian practices, and thus the 
maintenance of atomised state-narco networks.  Rather than a cause of violence 
and institutional collapse, these linkages were associated with the preservation 
of political stability.  Building on aspects of these different areas of the 
literature, the thesis both furthers and moves beyond the dominant debates of 
the ‘war on drugs’. 
 
In the first part of the chapter, then, I utilise the drugs literature to provide an 
overview of two alternative paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America: 
the Drug War and Development Paradigms.  Both contain conceptualisations of 
‘the problem’, ways of understanding the drug trade, corruption and the 
parameters of response.  Discussion of each paradigm is accompanied with an 
outline of the additional political and institutional factors that shaped the 
introduction of the Andean Initiative: US post-Cold War imperatives, and local 
Bolivian realities.  This forms the first strand of my analytical framework, and 
serves two main purposes.  One, this discussion relates my thesis to the drugs 
literature and elucidates its central themes.  As well as serving as important 
background to the case, components of this literature are integrated into my 
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analysis, such as the securitisation of drugs.  Two, these paradigms, and the 
wider political and institutional factors of the period, framed the accounts of US 
and Bolivian interlocutors.  During interviews, they provided cues for how actors 
understood the period and the meanings they attached to state-narco relations.  
As part of my analysis, then, it is important to account for these perspectives 
and their underlying assumptions.  These appear throughout later chapters, 
contributing to competing narratives of the period and crystallise conflicting US 
and Bolivian agendas. 
 
These mainstream accounts of the ‘war on drugs’, though, are essentially 
limited in their theorisation of the relationship between the state and the drug 
trade.  They underplay the complex ways the drug trade becomes embedded 
within political, social and economic structures in source and transit countries.  
The second part of my framework thus introduces elements of the coercion 
literature.  I discuss the role of informal institutions of rent extraction in 
processes of state formation; how they evolve and their possible effects.   I 
explore the main strands of this approach through reference to examples from 
Burma and Mexico, demonstrating the interactions that arise between the state 
and the drug trade in different settings.  Finally, in laying out the nature of 
Bolivian state-narco networks, I draw on theories of uneven democracy in Latin 
America.  This constitutes a crucial contextual factor of the Bolivian case.  This 
facet of my analytical framework challenges orthodox understandings of state-
narco relations.  
 
2.1 The Drug War Paradigm 
 
“Do you think the Russians allow dope?  Hell no!  You see, homosexuality, 
dope, immorality in general: these are the enemies of strong societies.  
That’s why the Communists and the left-wingers are pushing the stuff.  
They’re trying to destroy us.”  
- US President Richard Nixon (1969-74), talking with aides in the Oval 
Office, May 1971 (quoted in McCoy, 2003: 392). 
 
The Drug War Paradigm is a cultural and conceptual construct, underpinning the 
US response to the issue of drugs.  With antecedents in the past, it is rooted in 
US cultural attitudes towards drugs.  From the Puritans of the prohibition 
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movement to the Drug War rhetoric of Richard Nixon,1 drug-use is viewed 
through a moral lens: as deviant behaviour, weakness and/or ‘un-American’.  
Frequently, this has been used to demonise ethnic minorities and fringe groups 
in the US (Musto, 1999: 294-295).  At the turn of the nineteenth century, for 
example, opium was branded a corrupting foreign influence, brought to the US 
by ‘sexually deranged’ Chinese immigrants (Steiner, 2001: 194).  Later, the 
White population of the segregated South feared that cocaine use made African 
American men ‘uncontrollable’ (Reinarman & Levine, 1997a: 7).  The ‘crack 
epidemic’ of the 1980s – outlined in more detail below –was another episode in 
this recurring cycle.   
 
Drugs were viewed to tear at the very fabric of mainstream US society, so 
requiring hard-line policies.  Such perceptions helped to entrench the US 
prohibition model of drug control, as politicians aligned with, and at times led, 
popular fears over the spread of drug-use.  Thoumi (2003: 27) argues, for 
example, that the ‘perceptions, principles and prejudices’ of the US view on 
drugs have been a persistent and enduring influence on policy.  Domestically, 
this has meant stringent law enforcement measures and an ever growing prison 
population of dealers and users alike.  At an international level, the US has 
waged its ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America, with the aim of halting the flow of 
drugs to the North.   
 
The promise of US drug policy is overwhelmingly exterminationist.  Drug 
evils will be ‘wiped out’ or at least fundamentally contained. ( . . . )  
These ideas enjoy great historical stamina, a powerful and power-laden 
genealogy, periodically invigorated by novel drug scares and refurbished 
imagery of social panic and disgust. (Gootenberg, 2009: 37) 
 
The ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America (and beyond), then, is generally viewed as a 
US invention (e.g. Bewley-Taylor, 1999; Buxton, 2006; McCoy, 2003; Reiss, 2014; 
                                         
1 The term ‘war on drugs’ was first coined by Richard Nixon during his 1968 presidential 
campaign.  Concerned by drug use associated with the 1960s counter-culture and the growing 
number of heroin-addicted soldiers returning from the Vietnam War, President Nixon formulated 
a response that would have a lasting legacy in the US.  This included tough drug laws, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the State Department’s role in international counterdrug efforts.  
Securitisation of illicit drugs advanced at this time, with ‘the metaphor and mind-set of war’ 
(McCoy, 2003: 391) applied to the issue.  However, the Cold War continued to dominate the 
security agenda and, by the time Nixon left power in 1974, the ‘war on drugs’ was no longer 
viewed as a priority. 
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Youngers & Rosin, 2005).  Reflecting its strong global influence across the 20th 
century, the US has successfully lobbied for a system of international drug 
controls based on the principal of prohibition (see, for example, Gootenberg, 
2008: Ch. 5; Reiss, 2014: Ch. 1).  As such, the Drug War Paradigm has been 
transposed onto the UN drug control regime; promoting, perpetuating and 
legitimising ‘the current US-style prohibitionist-based approach to drug use’ 
(Bewley-Taylor, 1999: 174).  International agreements, then, have been used to 
justify the vigorous pursuit of US counterdrug efforts in source/transit nations.  
Replicating hard-line domestic drug control measures, these policies lurched 
towards militarisation during the 1980s;2 prioritising eradication and interdiction 
(McCoy & Block, 1992).  These echo the moralistic view of drug-use, where 
trafficking is viewed as an evil and a scourge which must be fought with force.  
 
Conceptually, production and trafficking of drugs are understood as being both a 
cause and consequence of a weak state and the absence of the rule of law 
(Meehan, 2011: 377).  The solution is thus ‘more state’: tougher enforcement 
through militarisation and strengthening of the state’s security apparatus.  
Mirroring the moral dichotomies of drug-use, binary distinctions are made 
between organised crime and the state, and the licit and illicit spheres (Ibid: 
399).  Counterdrug responses seek to remove the ‘tumour’ of the drug trade, 
from the ‘healthy body’ of state and society (Gutierrez, 2015: 2).  Under this 
conception, weak states unable to exercise control over their territory – as was 
argued in the case of coca-cocaine production in Bolivia – pose a 'threat' to the 
US.  The borders of US security, therefore, were re-drawn to incorporate drug 
producing countries in the Andes.  This is indicative of an interventionist US 
foreign policy stance in Latin America, which stretches back to the 1823 Monroe 
Doctrine and Manifest Destiny (Lehman, 1999: 29-31).   
 
However, this is also held to reflect benevolent foreign policy intentions, 
justified through the prism of American Exceptionalism.  The application of 
counterdrug efforts is aimed not only at cutting-off the supply at source, but 
freeing partners from the tyranny of illicit drug markets.  This view is based on 
foundational US national myths around the idea of ‘the city on the hill’: a 
                                         
2 The post-Cold War escalation of the ‘war on drugs’ is discussed below. 
Chapter 2  43 
 
country founded on liberty and democracy, which seeks to extend these ideals 
to the world (Ibid: x).3  In other words, ‘while other states had interests, the 
United States had responsibilities. Its prime mission was nothing less than to 
save the world’ (Lundestad, 1986: 405).  This construct thus shaped and 
‘legitimised’ the exercise of US power in extending the Drug War model 
(Hilfrich, 2012: 6).  The ‘war on drugs’ was seen to complement wider US goals 
of promoting democracy and free market economics; establishing necessary 
preconditions of security and the rule of law.   
 
From a critical perspective, though, this may instead be viewed as part of the US 
hegemonic project in the Western Hemisphere (drawn from Duffield, 2007; 
Newman, 2013: 145).  Here, ‘the conceptual framework of US drug policy has 
traditionally served Washington’s quest for power and prestige in the Americas’ 
(Walker III, 1994: 13).  In a similar vein, Reiss (2014) argues that the US used 
international drug controls – and the delineation between legal and illegal drugs 
– to project its power on a global scale post-WWII.  This included privileging the 
interests of the influential US pharmaceutical industry and controlling access to 
medicines.  For example, during the 1950s, the US sought to control opium flows 
and its ‘legitimate’ uses in medicine through the introduction of international 
drug treaties, while advancing the idea that Communist China was attempting to 
subvert US soldiers in Korea and the ‘American youth’ by encouraging heroin use 
(Ibid: 182-92).4  According to this view, the Drug War Paradigm was grounded in 
the pursuit of US strategic goals and efforts to exercise control in the Andes.  
These types of US-centric analyses assume power flows solely from North to 
South.   
 
                                         
3 The foundational myths of the US are used in foreign policy by ‘imperialists’ (the US has the 
right to extend democracy) and ‘anti-imperialists’ (the US has the duty to refrain from aggressive 
behaviour and instead act as an example to the world) alike.  The end, then, of democracy is 
agreed, but the means of achieving its spread is a point of contention.  In both cases, though, 
appeals to Exceptionalism are used to instil legitimacy on foreign policy.  The malleability of a 
term such as democracy, has allowed both camps to claim their strategy advances its cause 
(drawn from Hilfrich, 2012: 2-5). 
4 These linked into domestic narratives which racialised heroin addiction.  For example, it was 
associated with African Americans and the ‘rebel’, inter-racial, subculture of jazz music.  Such 
groups challenged the beliefs, and order, of mainstream US society (Reiss, 2014: 206-9).   
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Elements of the Drug War paradigm may be identified across the three US 
imperatives that contributed to the progression of the ‘war on drugs’ during the 
post-Cold War period.  Although source and transit nations in the South 
recognised the damaging effects of the illicit trade, the response to drug 
trafficking in the Americas during the 1980s was driven by the regional hegemon.  
By the end of the Cold War, the dominant hemispheric force had become the 
dominant global force.  The realities of this new uni-polar world shaped the 
development of the ‘war on drugs’.  During the Bush administration (1989-1993), 
Cold War shifted to Drug War in Latin America, as the US searched for new ways 
of defining itself and its role in the region.  In the following section, I outline 
these political and institutional factors. 
 
2.1.1 US Domestic, Foreign Policy and Institutional-Bureaucratic 
Imperatives 
 
The advancement of the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America during the 1980s 
occurred against a background of US public panic over the so-called ‘crack-
epidemic’.5  A media frenzy surrounded the issue, with newspapers, magazines 
and television networks carrying sensationalised stories of ‘instantaneous 
addiction’, spreading unchecked throughout the nation (Reinarman & Levine, 
1997a: 3).  The very notion of ‘epidemic’ suggested that the US was in severe 
danger.  In 1989, one third of the US public reported drugs as the primary 
problem facing the country (Riley, 1996: 35).  As in past US drug scares, crack-
cocaine was associated with a ‘foreign other’.  In this case, low-level dealing 
and crack-use was linked with urban African American communities.  The 
spillover effects of the trade were presented as a threat to ‘American values and 
society’ (Grayson, 2003a: 154).  US politicians from both parties engaged in Drug 
War politics.  President Reagan (1981-89), for example, stated that ‘drugs, in 
one way or another, are victimizing all of us’, and argued for ‘a national crusade 
against drugs: a sustained, relentless effort to rid America of this scourge,’ 
(Reagan, 1986).  As part of this, Reagan issued National Security Decision 
                                         
5 The prevalence data around this time on cocaine-use, and crack specifically, is difficult to 
interpret (e.g. disaggregating occasional and problem users), although it suggests a significant 
increase in use during this period (see Riley, 1996: Ch. 1). 
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Directive 21 (NSDD 21 – April 1986): branding illicit drugs an issue of national 
security, ascribing blame to Latin American nations for domestic US drug-use and 
‘legitimising’ US military force against the issue abroad (McCoy, 2003: 443).  This 
attempt to externalise the problem (Diamint, 2004: 53) complemented the 
association of crack-use with marginalised groups: the demarcation of the 
problem from mainstream, ‘American’ society (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2007: 
271-2; Walker III, 1996: 231). 
 
Despite the rhetoric, Cold War goals continued to dominate Reagan’s 
presidential agenda.  Under his successor, though, the ‘war on drugs’ gained 
greater prominence.   As the Soviet Union declined, George H. W. Bush (1989-93) 
made the issue a cornerstone of his presidency.  Viewing drugs as ‘national 
security threat’, Bush pursued counter-supply goals abroad with the introduction 
of the Andean Initiative.  Making the case for the policy, Bush stated: 
 
“The logic is simple.  The cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to 
destroy them at source. ( . . . )  We need to wipe out crops wherever they 
are grown and take out the labs wherever they exist.” (Quoted in 
Crandall, 2001: 100) 
 
In addition to the domestic threats to ‘American society’ noted previously, the 
cocaine trade’s destabilising effects in ‘America’s backyard’ were also used to 
justify Drug War measures.  This included the violence of international criminal 
organisations and perceived links between the drug trade and left-wing Latin 
American guerrilla movements (Marcy, 2010: 90).6  The hemispheric threat to 
the US no longer came from Moscow-backed rebel groups and Castroite 
governments, but from ‘narco-guerrillas’, so-called ‘narco-states’7  and 
notorious drug lord figures like Pablo Escobar.  In search of a new ‘crusade’, 
illicit drugs and international criminal groups substituted for communism as the 
national ‘enemy’ (Thoumi, 2003: 25-26).  Both responding to and driving the 
                                         
6 Against the background of the Cold War, the Reagan administration sought to link the 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas with drug trafficking; arguing that drug money would enable them to 
sustain their campaign and damage American society by flooding the US with drugs.  While these 
links were tenuous, the Iran-Contra scandal fully exposed the US-backed Contras’ involvement in 
the drug trade and the CIA’s role in facilitating this (see Scott & Marshall, 1991). 
7 Chouvy (2015) highlights the lack of an agreed definition of this term in the literature, and 
notes its use by politicians to delegitimise certain countries and/or force them into accepting 
counterdrug efforts. 
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domestic-political agenda around drugs, President Bush entrenched the modern 
‘war on drugs’ in Latin America. 
 
These domestic-political dynamics thus fed into the foreign policy imperative of 
the ‘war on drugs’.  The US had become the single global superpower by the 
late-1980s, but policymakers were unsure of how to use this new dominance.8  
Concerns around the balance of power between East and West, and avoiding 
open war with the Soviet Union had long dominated.  The US now sought to 
define its new global role, its priorities and how it would engage with the world.  
The identification of non-traditional security threats, blurring the lines between 
domestic and international spheres (Loveman, 2006: 5), informed this process.  
 
Reflecting an international trend toward securitisation,9 security threats were 
not restricted to matters of state survival and the stability of the international 
system, but incorporated wider concerns, such as the environment, the 
economic system and society.  Emboldened with post-Cold War confidence, the 
US could now direct its vast political, economic and military resources to the 
new and diverse challenges of the 21st century.  Illicit drugs were included 
under this broader conception.  US political leaders advanced the idea that drugs 
posed an existential threat to US society and its institutions.10  In his first speech 
as President, Bush (1989) stated: 
 
All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is 
drugs.  Drugs have strained our faith in our system of justice.  Our courts, 
our prisons, our legal system, are stretched to the breaking point.  The 
social costs of drugs are mounting.  In short, drugs are sapping our 
strength as a nation. ( . . . )  If we fight this war as a divided nation, then 
the war is lost.  But if we face this evil as a nation united, this will be 
                                         
8 As Loveman (2006: 4) puts it: ‘not yet the world’s policeman yet determined to maintain a 
forward presence in the world’. 
9 In a new unipolar world, traditional Realist concerns over international stability, the ‘balance 
of power’ and state survival, lost some of their resonance.  New issues started to gain 
recognition, as wider conceptions of human security were advanced internationally, including 
economic and environmental agendas, societal identity and transnational organised crime, 
(Hurrell, 1998; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010: 7). 
10 Buzan, et. al. (1998) argue that an issue becomes a ‘security threat’ through an act of 
securitisation.  Adopting a constructivist stance, ‘security is a quality actors inject into issues’ 
through speech acts, which must then be accepted by the appropriate audience to become 
‘securitised’ (Ibid: 204).  
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nothing but a handful of useless chemicals.  Victory – victory over drugs – 
is our cause, a just cause. 
 
Drug consumption, then, was viewed as criminal, deviant and ‘other’, while drug 
producing nations were ‘security threats’.  More than simple rhetoric, these 
ideas established the terms of the debate and influenced how US counterdrug 
efforts were understood.  O’Driscoll (2008: 6) highlights ‘the close connection 
between language and the constitution of political life’, arguing that public 
rhetoric reflects ‘the structures of meaning that govern the conduct of politics 
and public life at any given time’.  The ‘threat’ of drugs thus justified the 
extension of US military resources and power to the Andean nations, as 
securitisation provided a new logic for US foreign policy in Latin America.  
During the next decade, NSDD 21 and the ‘war on drugs’ subordinated all US 
foreign policy goals in Latin America to the ‘all-encompassing focus’ of stopping 
the drug flow (McCoy, 2003: 443).  This was proffered as advantageous to both 
parties: cutting-off the supply of illicit-drugs to the US; tackling the harmful 
influence of criminal networks in the region, strengthening democratic 
government, reducing societal violence and bolstering economic performance.    
 
This newly defined security agenda also ensured sustained US security presence 
in Latin America.  While the US continued to promote its liberal democracy/free 
market orthodoxy with Latin American governments, the extension of the ‘war 
on drugs’ allowed for the maintenance and strengthening of bonds with regional 
security partners (Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, 2007: 286-287; Blixen, 1998).  
Isacson (2005: 21-2) argues that the notion of ‘human security’ replaced the 
National Security Doctrine as a rationalisation for a new regional, US-led security 
plan.  Although outwardly supporting democratisation, military-to-military links – 
built-up during the Cold War – remained an important facet of US foreign policy 
in Latin America; providing a political ‘safety-valve’ for the US and its interests 
throughout the region (Ledebur interview, 2014).  The securitisation of the coca-
cocaine trade helped to serve this end.  
 
As the prospect of budgetary cuts to Cold War-era funding loomed, the ‘war on 
drugs’ also fulfilled the pragmatic purpose of securing agency budgets (Andreas 
& Nadelmann, 2006: 157).  The issue had taken centre stage and there was 
Chapter 2  48 
 
political and financial backing for a comprehensive strategy.  Standing at US$11 
billion in 1991, the Drug War constituted one of the largest US government 
programs (McCoy & Block, 1992: 1).  Multiple US government agencies supported 
this agenda.  In addition to swelling the budgets of the DEA and INM, 
counterdrugs brought new missions and funding to the US Armed Forces.  The 
DoD had initially been reluctant to adopt a counterdrug mission during the 
Reagan administration, but as budgets threatened to dry-up, many within the 
Pentagon saw the advantages of an expanded role (Bagley, 1991).  With few 
credible hemispheric security threats remaining, Southcom seized on the ‘war on 
drugs’.  As well as defending its own function in the Americas, Southcom has 
played a crucial role in securing funding for the armed forces of the region and 
promoting militarised counterdrug efforts (Loveman, 2006: 10 & 20).  
Counterdrugs ‘filled the vacuum’ left by the Cold War, ensuring levels of military 
assistance were maintained and even increased (Isacson, 2005: 15).  These 
agencies thus played a key role in the formulation and implementation of the 
Andean Initiative.   
 
The US policy process on the issue of international drug supply, though, involved 
multiple actors within government and the state.  By the time of the Andean 
Initiative, the US counterdrug strategy was coordinated and consolidated under 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), part of the Executive Office 
of the President.  Congress had long pushed for such a body, aimed at pulling 
together the different strands of both international and domestic drug policy 
from across the numerous federal agencies involved.11  This reflected the 
growing political importance of the issue, as well as the rapidly growing budget 
apportioned to the ‘war on drugs’.  Congressional concerns that the money was 
not being spent effectively by the executive branch would be eased by the 
                                         
11 The ONDCP was preceded by the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB).  Created in March 1987 by 
presidential decree, the NDPB was headed by the Attorney General and comprised of 15 
different federal departments.  Its purpose was to coordinate US drug policy, both foreign and 
domestic (Van Wert, 1988: 6-7).  The formation of the NDPB, though, had been something of a 
compromise.  While the Senate Judiciary Committee had advocated the creation of a federal 
agency with responsibility for setting overall policy, the Reagan administration opposed the 
creation of a powerful new government actor and proposed the NDPB, sitting within the 
Executive Office of the President.  This reflected Reagan’s focus on the Cold War rather than the 
‘war on drugs’.  With the President’s second term coming to an end, Congress tried again, and 
the NDPB was replaced with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1989 (Part of 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988).   
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creation of a central body, formulating a coherent national strategy (Carnevale 
interview, 2013).   
 
Indeed, this demonstrated Congress’ primary role in this policy area: setting and 
approving budgets, and providing oversight (Perl, 1989).12  As part of this, 
Congress established the process of certification for drug producing countries.  
The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act obligated the president to report to Congress on 
the performance of partner governments in the area of counterdrug policy.  
Decertified countries were at risk of a range of sanctions: withdrawal of US 
economic and military aid, blocking of export-import bank credits, US opposition 
to World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank projects, elimination of US 
government foreign investment insurance for US firms looking to invest in that 
country, and discretionary economic sanctions (Marcy, 2010: 88).  Through these 
mechanisms, Congress was able to shape the US international counterdrug 
response, e.g. advancing the hard-line US counterdrug model abroad.  During 
this period, the Drug War Paradigm generally dominated, i.e. appearing ‘soft on 
drugs’ had an electoral price (e.g. see Steiner, 2001: 200).  While Congress 
provided strong criticism of the strategies of both Reagan and Bush (e.g. US 
Congress, 1990a & 1990b), the broad parameters of an enforcement-led response 
were largely unchallenged. 
 
Returning to the ONDCP, President Bush worked through his ‘drug czar’ Bill 
Bennett (1989-1990) to set the direction for the government’s international 
counterdrug strategy.13  Although the ONDCP had the strong backing of the 
President, as a newly created body, it lacked a degree of authority to direct 
other powerful state agencies (Miller interview, 2013).  As such, Bush also 
                                         
12 Multiple committees and subcommittees provided such oversight.  This included the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Senate 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Global Narcotics Affairs, House 
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Appropriations), House 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, and the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control (disbanded 1993). 
13 The role and influence of the ‘drug czar’ is very much determined by the emphasis the sitting 
president places on the issue, as well as the political capital of the ONDCP director.  For 
example, President Clinton’s relative initial disinterest in the issue, in part, hamstrung ONDCP 
Director Lee Martin (1993-1996).  Under political pressure, Clinton gave greater prominence to 
the issue toward the latter half of his presidency, appointing General Barry McCaffrey to the role 
(1996-2001).  McCaffrey proved to be a more effectual operator in driving the direction of drug 
policy (Carnevale interview, 2013). 
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utilised the long-established National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate the 
relevant agencies, including INM, the DEA, the DoD (Southcom and the Coast 
Guard), the FBI and the CIA (Burke interview, 2013).14  International counter-
supply efforts figured to greater and lesser degrees for each of these agencies, 
with slightly differing approaches and priorities.15  Each agency sought to bring 
its own expertise to bear in the formulation and implementation of the broad 
strategy of the Andean Initiative.  They also sought to protect their budget and 
corporate interests.   
 
While this policy did not invent the US Drug War Paradigm, then, it contributed 
to its institutionalisation; establishing a large Drug War bureaucracy that has 
reproduced itself through each budgetary cycle.  This has included utilising 
agency links to Congress to apply political pressure (e.g. making ‘expert’ 
statements to congressional committees), and controlling the flow of 
information on the ‘progress’ of the ‘war on drugs’ (e.g. the INCSR).  These can 
be effective means of shaping the governmental approach to the issue 
(Carnevale interview, 2013).  This bureaucracy was thus a significant driver of 
US international counter-supply efforts during this era.  The thesis draws on 
interviews with high-level representatives across these agencies to understand 
the perspectives of key actors from within these agencies.  Furthermore, many 
of these actors had direct experience in the formulation and implementation of 
the Andean Initiative, e.g. David Miller (NSC), John Carnevale (ONDCP) and Terry 
Burke (DEA) (see appendix C).  These interviews provide strong insights into the 
US policy process, and the key factors driving US engagement in the ‘war on 
drugs’ in Bolivia. 
                                         
14 Further to this: ‘Section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires that, while preparing 
the President's National Drug Control Strategy, the Director of the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy (ONDCP) will seek advice from a broad range of sources -in government and out. 
Specifically, the Act requires the Director to consult with: heads of National Drug Control 
Program Agencies; Members of Congress; State and local officials; and private citizens with 
experience and expertise in demand and supply reduction’ (ONDCP, 1990: 130). 
15 For example, INM was ‘responsible for developing, coordinating, and implementing the overall 
US international narcotics control strategy’, carrying out its responsibilities through ‘diplomatic 
efforts, assisting host governments in crop control and interdiction, training foreign personnel, 
participating in international organizations, and providing technical assistance’ (GAO, 1988: 10).  
The DEA was focused on law enforcement measures abroad, while the inclusion of the DoD 
indicated the ascendency of more militarised responses.  These overlapping jurisdictions raised 
the possibility of interagency friction.  The Andean Initiative, though, required each agency to 
work together.   
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In addition to this, though, the ground-level implementation of the policy was 
crucial to these processes.  As the Andean Initiative filtered down to region, the 
local US Embassies would play a major role in determining what that policy 
actually meant in practice.  At times, this exposed gaps between the policy as 
planned, and the policy as executed.  In the case of post-transition Bolivia, the 
country tended to be a low priority for US foreign policy.  This allowed the US 
Embassy in La Paz a degree of autonomy in shaping the US counterdrug strategy 
in Bolivia.  Of course, this had to align with the overall US approach, and the 
Embassy remained subject to oversight mechanisms (Bowers interview, 2013).  
However, policymakers in Washington also recognised the need to adapt the 
policy to local conditions, and balance the objectives of counterdrug policy with 
wider US aims within the country (Gelbard interview, 2013).  Analysis of the 
course of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia, therefore, must take into account the 
significant influence of the US Embassy during this period.   
 
There are strong examples of this influence.  This includes Ambassador Ed 
Rowell’s (1985-1988) advancement of Operation Blast Furnace in 1986, using 
Southcom’s assets in a counterdrug mission for the first time in Latin America 
(see Chapter 4).  Robert Gelbard (1988-1991), meanwhile, was described as an 
‘activist ambassador’ during his posting in Bolivia (El Tiempo, 1996).  He claimed 
a leading role in forming US counterdrug strategy in the country at this time (see 
Chapters 6 and 7).  As part of this, Gelbard drew on the expertise and skills of 
his country team, made-up of representatives from INM, the DEA, USAID, the CIA 
and Southcom (among others).   Although these members of the country team 
were still beholden to their agency heads, the ambassador held ultimate 
responsibility for their actions while in Bolivia.  High-level embassy officials 
were pivotal in setting the direction for policy in Bolivia and managing the day-
to-day operation of the ‘war on drugs’ (Bowers interview, 2013).   
 
The thesis draws on interviews with such actors, e.g. Robert Gelbard, Dick 
Bowers and David Greenlee (see appendix C).  As part of their responsibility for 
US counterdrug strategy during this time, they had regular dealings with high-
level officials in the Bolivian government; many of whom were also interviewed 
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for this thesis.  Interactions between these elite actors were critical in 
determining counterdrug strategies, and how these policies responded to state-
narco networks.  How these actors understood and navigated the relationship 
between the Bolivian state and the drug trade was thus crucial to the form and 
function of state-narco networks.  My analysis reveals how these were viewed 
from divergent perspectives, reinforcing competing agendas and subsumed into 
US-Bolivian relations of power and control.  This serves a strong justification for 
my analytical focus on these elite actors and their particular perspectives of the 
illicit drug economy, the ‘war on drugs’, US-Bolivian relations, corruption and 
drug violence. 
 
2.2 The Development Paradigm 
 
“I have always thought of drug trafficking as the final stage of capitalist 
consumerism.  The problem does not lie in the fact that a poor town 
produces coca leaves in the Peruvian jungle.  The basic problem lies in 
the world’s big consumer markets, consisting of the richest societies.” 
- Peruvian President Alan García (1985-1990), talking during a TV 
interview, July 1987 (quoted in Lee III, 1991: xv). 
 
The Development Paradigm stands in contrast to the US Drug War Paradigm, and 
is based in Latin American views of drugs.  Although the picture is now changing, 
cocaine-use was viewed as a North American issue.  As the US sought to 
externalise its problems with drug abuse, Latin American leaders looked to shift 
blame back to the North.  Their arguments were based in the discourse of 
development and the position that US consumption constituted the root of the 
problem.  In Bolivia, for example, the drug trade was not viewed as an issue of 
national security (Gamarra, 1997: 224; Menzel, 1996: 85). 
 
Drawing on the simple economic argument, ‘where there is demand, there is 
supply’, the presence of the coca-cocaine trade in the region is a consequence 
of the lucrative returns offered by the US illicit market (Thoumi, 2003: 39).  
Therefore, the harmful effects of drug violence and corruption are also traced 
back to consumer demand for Andean cocaine.  While this demand created 
powerful incentives for the creation of the trade in Latin America, 
underdevelopment and weak institutionalisation allowed it to take hold.  From a 
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development perspective, then, focus should be given to the structural factors 
that have contributed to the rise of the coca-cocaine economy in Latin America 
(Younger & Rosin, 2005: 4).  Development and institution building should take 
priority over militarised enforcement efforts, which only serve to heighten drug 
violence and the social costs borne by local communities (e.g. see Tullis, 1995).  
The Development Paradigm, then, advances the idea that Latin American nations 
are victims of their circumstances: the stimulus of US drug demand, alongside 
socio-economic and political underdevelopment.  The twin aspects of this 
narrative support calls for ‘shared responsibility’ between the US and Latin 
America.  Not only should the US reduce domestic demand, but it has a duty to 
address the structural causes of the drug trade in Latin America (NSC, 1989: 4).   
 
The role of coca farmers in the illicit trade demonstrates this view.  Although 
the US incorporated alternative development into its counterdrug model (partly 
prompted by the demands of Latin American governments), the Drug War 
Paradigm designates coca farmers as legitimate targets for eradication efforts 
and justifies the extension of US power (Sanabria, 2004: 153).  Such policies may 
be applied with force if farmers refuse to cooperate.16  The historic tradition of 
coca cultivation in Bolivia and Peru, though, means that cocaleros are viewed 
through a different lens in the Andes.  Coca is woven into the cultural fabric of 
these countries, and is viewed as an historic ‘right’ (Healy, 1988b: 118).17  
Therefore, it is argued that ‘coca is not cocaine’; farmers should not be held 
responsible for the harms caused by drug trafficking, nor the choices of drug 
consumers in developed countries (Riley, 1996: 102).   
 
In addition to this, coca cultivation may be explained by the lack of alternatives 
in rural, deprived areas: a livelihood matter, rather than exploitation of 
addiction in the North.  The crop is one of the few viable and stable sources of 
income for coca farmers (Quiroga, 1990).  But this income is modest in 
comparison to the profits made by those further up on the cocaine commodity 
                                         
16 In Colombia, this entailed fumigation of coca, which frequently destroyed legitimate crops.  
Additionally, affected communities claimed negative health effects linked to the chemicals and 
environmental damage (see O’Shaughnessy & Branford, 2005). 
17 The leaves of the coca bush have been used in the Andes since before the age of the Incas: as 
an integral part of indigenous religious ceremonies and customs, and as a stimulant and hunger 
suppressant, aiding work at high altitude (Mathewson, 2004: 14).   
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chain (Vellinga, 2004a: 7).  Coca producing communities benefit least in the 
coca-cocaine trade, so it is unfair that counterdrug measures should focus on 
them.  In this view, cocaleros are victims of the trade, rather than complicit.  
Where there are efforts to reduce cultivation, the US has responsibility to 
address the socio-economic fallout of withdrawing coca (Morales, 1994: 170-1).  
A revealing tension is exposed here, where the positive effects of coca-cocaine 
as a driver of development are tacitly recognised alongside calls for help in 
combatting the destructive effects of the trade. 
 
Drug production and trade is seen simultaneously both as an answer to 
constraints on economic development and as a source of violence (and) 
corruption. (Healy, 1988: 19) 
 
As a reaction to the Drug War Paradigm, it critiques the imposition of abrasive 
US counterdrug policies in Latin America.  Drawing on theories of dependency, 
the foundations for the trade in Latin America are viewed to be a result of 
historic structural inequalities and US neoliberal economic reforms (Tovar, 1994: 
88).  As 1980s neoliberal policies increased precarious living conditions 
throughout the region, the trade became an important source of revenue for 
those involved in cultivation and production of coca paste.  Despite this, the US 
continued with a policy agenda that disregarded local social, economic and 
political conditions and trampled on national sovereignty (Lee III, 1991: xv).   
 
Uneven power relations between centre and periphery, then, are evident in the 
function of the drug trade and the policies designed to address it.  The process 
of certification, for example, was viewed as hypocritical, arbitrary and overtly 
political (Youngers & Zirnite, 1998: 217-8): not applied to US allies, but used to 
punish opponents of Drug War (and other US) policies.  The fact that US demand 
was identified as the main cause of the problem added to this sense of injustice.  
Acting as judge and jury on the counterdrug efforts of foreign nations, for many, 
the policy embodied Yankee Imperialism. 
 
At the top of its hierarchy of values, the United States always stood for 
democracy, except when a popularly elected Left-wing government could 
be seen working closely with the Soviet Union or when authoritarian law-
and-order regimes were supported, for various reasons (Lundestad, 1986: 
406). 
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Under this conception, the ‘war on drugs’ represents continued US interference 
and hypocrisy in Latin America.  It reinforces US dominance in the hemisphere, 
allowing the US to exercise influence over Latin American governments and 
promote its neoliberal world order (Stokes, 2004: 47).  As such, the 
identification of the Andean cocaine trade as security threat was used to 
legitimise US control in Latin America and strengthen its position as the regional 
hegemon (Walker III, 1994: 12). 
 
2.2.1 Local Bolivian Realities 
 
The Development Paradigm both reflected and intertwined with local Bolivian 
realities.  The former provided ways of understanding the issue and the 
appropriate response.  But social, political and economic factors also shaped the 
policy preferences of Bolivia’s post-transition governments.  Gamarra (1994b: 
218) argues, for example, that the governments of this period sought to balance 
the demands of international drug control with those emanating from ‘myriad 
social forces’ domestically.  Where the Bush government had its post-Cold War 
imperatives, then, the Paz Zamora government (1989-93) responded to these 
local pressures.  These added weight to Paz Zamora’s calls for a development-
led response and greater economic support from the US. 
 
First, the recovering, yet still fragile, Bolivian economy was reliant on the 
employment and wealth generated by coca/cocaine (Healy, 1988a: 106; 
Justiniano, 1992).  Defining the relationship between a hidden illicit market, 
such as drugs, and the wider economy necessarily entails a degree of 
uncertainty.  There may be both positive and negative effects. The drug trade 
may generate jobs and localised economic booms, while at the same time, 
practices such as money laundering can distort the licit economy (Vellinga, 
2004b: 320).   Hence Bolivia was no doubt subject to both positive and negative 
impacts.  However, the general consensus held that coca-cocaine had been a 
crucial part of the national economy during this period (Toranzo R., 1988: 73).  
In 1991, for example, the President of Bolivia’s Confederation of Private 
Businesses was noted to have said, ‘if coca were to be eradicated today, the 
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country’s economy would collapse’ (US OIG, 1991: 10).  As Morales Q. (1992a: 
161) argues, ‘cocaine was (a) logical method of economic survival, (but) a recent 
consequence of Bolivia’s perverse and dependent economic system’.   
 
Neoliberal structural reforms introduced first under President Paz Estensorro 
(1985-89) brought the economy back on track after a period of instability, but at 
significant social cost.  Coca-cocaine had softened the blow of the stabilisation 
program, providing jobs both directly (cultivating coca and low-level 
transportation and processing) as well as indirectly (in boom areas such as 
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and the Chapare).  The trade constituted a significant 
part of Bolivia’s already large informal sector.  Conaghan & Malloy (1994: 198) 
estimate that around 50 to 60 per cent of ‘the economically active population by 
the mid-1980s were located in the informal sector’, while a US government 
source reported that 350,000 people were reliant on coca for living and up to 30 
per cent of Bolivia’s GDP was from the drug trade (US OIG, 1991: 2).    
Furthermore, cocaine dollars had helped to stabilise national reserves, with 
government banking reforms in 1987 removing capital controls and thus allowing 
traffickers to repatriate their profits (UDAPE, 1990).  US counterdrug efforts, it 
was reasoned, should compensate for the possible economic effects of removing 
this source of jobs and inward investment. 
 
Closely allied to these economic pressures were the demands of societal actors.  
Paz Zamora’s electoral campaign had plugged into widespread disapproval of the 
‘war on drugs’.  On the campaign trail, he had worn a coca leaf pin to emphasise 
his anti-drug war credentials (Lehman, 2006: 133).  After taking office, he 
sought to portray himself as standing up to the US on matters of counterdrug 
policy, defending Bolivian national ‘dignity’ (Gamarra, 1994b: 228).  For 
example, US-led, Operation Blast Furnace in 1986 was viewed in some sectors as 
an incursion on Bolivian sovereignty, with the sight of US military helicopters 
over Bolivian soil stirring-up anti-US sentiment (Lehman, 1999: 200).   Opposition 
to militarised counterdrug policies came from politicians across the spectrum, 
organised labour, the media, academics, the Church and, perhaps most 
significantly, the coca unions or sindicatos (see Campaña de Soberanía Nacional, 
1990).  
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Adopting militant tactics learned from the once powerful Bolivian miners, the 
sindicatos were able to mobilise en masse to stage protests, hunger strikes and 
blockades (Hargreaves, 1992: 44).  Led by their then leader, Evo Morales, the 
Chapare arm of the coca growers union carried political clout, shutting down 
parts of Bolivia’s national infrastructure (Lee III, 1998: 8).  They defended their 
livelihood and their ancestral ‘right’ to grow coca in the face of global pressure 
to reduce the flow of cocaine from the Andes.  As such, they plugged into anti-
US sentiment and North-South narratives of globalisation: impoverished 
communities in the Andes were held guilty for the crimes of US drug consumers 
(see Sanabria, 1997).  This held resonance with wider Bolivian opposition to the 
‘war on drugs’.  Demands from below, then, placed certain political strains on 
Paz Zamora’s government (Gamarra, 1994b: 219).  To be seen to be too close to 
the US carried political consequences for Bolivian politicians, as did support for 
policies that targeted powerful societal groups. 
 
Finally, compared to its neighbours, the effects of the Bolivian drug trade were 
viewed as relatively benign.  In Peru, Shining Path guerrillas had partly funded 
their violent campaign with taxes on coca and trafficker flights (Palmer, 1994a).  
In Colombia, cocaine profits had created powerful Cartels, who challenged the 
authority of the state.  The trade was also helping to fuel the country’s long 
running internal conflict (Felbab-Brown, 2010: Ch.4).  As such, coca-cocaine was 
linked to high-levels of violence and internal instability in both of these 
countries.  In the case of Bolivia, there were no major operational armed groups 
to speak of, while its trafficking organisations, if acknowledged, were viewed as 
small-scale and subordinate to Colombian groups.  Bolivia was portrayed as a 
‘victim’ of the coca-cocaine economy, with its role largely limited to 
agricultural production.  This links into Thoumi’s (2003: 242) ‘evil 
Colombian/foreigner’ thesis, which he claims was prevalent in Bolivia.  In this 
sense, responsibility for the trade and its associated violence was said to lie with 
powerful Colombian Cartels.  Bolivia’s role in the Andean cocaine economy was 
proffered to be limited to humble coca cultivation, with power and wealth 
accumulated further-up the commodity chain.   Thoumi (Ibid.) argues that this 
‘provides a smokescreen behind which many of the social, political and 
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economic effect of the drug trade can be hidden and denied, (such as) the 
relationship between politics and drug money’.  Whether one accepts this or 
not, Bolivian views of the nature of country’s role in the coca-cocaine economy 
meant that there was generalised opposition to the US militarised approach 
(Morales, 1992: 362). 
 
2.3 Conceptualising Drug Corruption 
 
These overarching paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’, US post-Cold War 
imperatives and local Bolivian realities are critical to understanding the 
dynamics of the period of study.  These are examined through survey of the 
drugs literature, and used throughout the analysis in later chapters of the thesis, 
e.g. helping to determine how policy was formulated and implemented, and 
shaping competing US and Bolivian agendas.  Most significantly for my analysis, 
though, these were drawn on by US and Bolivian elite actors during our 
interviews; serving as frameworks for their interpretations of the period.  This 
included certain underlying assumptions around the nature of state-narco 
interactions.  In this section, then, I outline how both paradigms conceive of 
drug-corruption: causes, consequences and response.  These largely reflect the 
conventional analyses of the relationship between the state and the drug trade 
found in the drugs literature. 
 
2.3.1 The Drug War Paradigm and Corruption 
 
The Drug War Paradigm views state-narco interactions one-dimensionally as 
corruption: deviant behaviour thus requiring stronger enforcement.  US cultural 
views of drugs and Western-liberal political ideals are important factors in this 
conceptualisation.  In terms of the former, moral failure and personal 
enrichment explain the actions of corrupt state officials and politicians.  
Deviance here refers to the traversing of social norms (US cultural views on 
drugs) and focuses on individual agency.  When explaining the perceived 
corruption of the MIR after entering government in 1989, for example, 
Hargreaves (1992: 170) argues that the party ‘had been in the political 
wilderness for 20 years and was now hungry for the privileges that (went) with 
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power.’  In this view, the corrupt actions of such politicians stem from 
dereliction of duty and greed: seeking personal gain from public office (Tullis, 
1995: 9).  This links into Western-liberal views of corruption: state officials must 
act according to the public interest (however that is defined) and be 
accountable for their actions.  This aspect of the paradigm, though, centres 
more on the failure of institutions.  Corruption represents deviance from how 
public institutions should function, i.e. in accordance with the rule of law and 
the principles of liberal democracy.  Historic institutional and socio-economic 
differences in the South are underplayed, as producer nations are judged 
according to the standards of industrialised Western democracies (Thoumi, 2003: 
175).18  States unable to enforce such standards are held as deficient and weak 
(Mares, 2006: 22).   
 
The consequences of deviation from social and institutional norms are 
necessarily damaging.  This includes, for example, social disintegration and the 
further weakening of the state.  But more than this, corruption and the 
subversion of the rule of law are crucial to the function of organised crime: ‘to 
perpetuate their illicit activities, to operate with minimal interference from the 
authorities and to derive maximum profit from illicit drug markets’ (INCB, 2011: 
1).  State-narco interactions, then, limit counterdrug policy effectiveness, 
inhibiting US efforts to ‘defeat’ the drug trade (Nadelmann, 1994: 259).  In an 
evaluation of the Andean Initiative, for example, the Congressional Committee 
on Government Operations (US Congress, 1990b: 40) reported that ‘institutional 
weakness and corruption’ in the Andes was a critical limiting factor in ‘the 
ability of host governments to confront the narcotics trade’.  According to the 
securitisation agenda, the Andean drug trade and, by extension, corrupt state 
institutions posed a ‘threat’ to US national interests.  In Colombia and Peru, this 
was also linked to the continuation of internal conflict and regional instability, 
as armed actors exploited drug revenue streams.19   
                                         
18 Of course, many normalised practices in Western industrialised democracies may be viewed as 
corrupt.  The influence of campaign donors on the votes of US congressmen, for example, would 
be considered corrupt in other countries.  This speaks to the ambiguity around the concept, and 
its contextually bound nature. 
19 ‘US government thinking has been dominated by the conventional view of the nexus between 
illicit economies and military conflict. ( . . . )  This is based on three key premises: belligerents 
make money from illicit economies; the destruction of the illicit economy is both necessary and 
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Liberal state-building perspectives and the greed-based analysis of 
contemporary conflict have encouraged policy-makers to view illicit drug 
economies as contributing to a downward spiral of intractable conflict and 
ever-weakening state capacity, embodying a security threat to the West 
by creating ungoverned spaces in which transnational crime and terrorism 
are able to flourish (Meehan, 2015: 259). 
 
In responding to corruption, then, the Drug War Paradigm calls for more strident 
enforcement.  The overriding priority of halting the northward flow of cocaine 
justifies the extension of US control in producer nations.  For example, the US 
has exported its security apparatus to the Andes to bypass corrupt local power 
structures.  This has included the creation of ‘Americanized’ anti-drug police 
units (Nadelmann, 1994); acting as Drug War proxies for the US. 20  In addition to 
this, diplomatic and economic pressure has been used to leverage ‘corrupt’ 
foreign governments and politicians (Joyce, 1999).  
 
Again, American Exceptionalism held that US actions were to the benefit of the 
Andean countries: tackling the corrosive influence of drug corruption and so 
allowing democracy to flourish.  This incorporates paternal attitudes towards the 
South, where ‘corrupt’ practices are viewed to be ‘cultural’.  Latin America’s 
Hispanic colonial past is contrasted with the foundational myths of the US.  
Nadelmann (1994: 261) recognises that corruption is by no means unique to Latin 
America, but argues that the gap between the law and accepted norms in the 
region ‘is often strikingly broad’.  In the US, the principles of a free press, the 
independent US judiciary and the integrity of the federal government ‘prevent it 
from descending into the levels of corruption found in much of Latin America’ 
(Ibid: 264).  Calling on similar lines of argument, the export of the ‘war on 
drugs’ against ‘corrupt’ states has been bound with the export of proclaimed US 
liberal-democratic values. 
 
                                                                                                                           
optimal for defeating belligerents because it will eliminate their critical resources; and 
belligerents who participate in the illicit economy should be treated no differently from 
criminals’ (Felbab-Brown, 2010: 5). 
20 Toro (1999: 629) argues that this DEA strategy, first devised and applied in Mexico in the 
1970s, has been used throughout Latin America to circumvent sovereignty restrictions on US 
agencies: ‘Building indigenous drug-fighting capabilities in drug-producing and -transit countries, 
that is, transforming foreign police into “vicarious surrogates.”’ 
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2.3.2 The Development Paradigm and Corruption 
 
The Development Paradigm also recognises drug corruption as damaging to the 
societies, polities and economies of source/transit nations.  According to this 
model, though, interactions between the state and the drug trade are a 
consequence of socio-economic conditions.  Conceptualising Latin America as 
victim of the drug trade does not absolve those involved in corrupt activities, 
but apportions ultimate blame to consumer nations.  Understood in terms of 
North-South interpretations of globalisation, consumer demand for cocaine in 
the US has contributed to exploitation, corruption and violence in the South.  
Cocaine dollars have created trafficking organisations with the power and wealth 
to undermine public institutions in Latin America.  Underdevelopment and weak 
institutionalisation have rendered source nations susceptible to these forces.  
These pre-existing vulnerabilities are partly a result of historical dependency 
and Yankee Imperialism in the region (Lehman, 1999).  Rather than focus on a 
failure of will/moral fortitude in the South, the responsibility of consumer 
nations in creating these uneven dynamics is emphasised.   
 
The vast quantities of money generated by the drug trade can have a 
devastating impact. ( . . . )  Corruption has influenced the actions of 
politicians across the political spectrum.  The drug trade undermines 
efforts to reform and improve the efficacy of police forces and the justice 
system. ( . . . )  (The drug trade) is creating new challenges for local 
governments already struggling to overcome endemic poverty and 
injustice (Youngers & Rosin, 2005: 8). 
 
As part of this, the simple economics of corrupt transactions are highlighted.  
For example, poorly paid officials are deemed unlikely to resist bribes worth 
many times their annual salary.  Discussing the Bolivian case in the early-1990s, 
Painter (1994: 71) notes that ‘such payments offer immediate benefits to the 
poor struggling to earn a living wage’, and ‘a form of life assurance for the 
professional classes in a country where pension schemes are not the norm.’  
Developing nations, unable to pay their officials more or adequately resource 
their government agencies, are thus more vulnerable to rich traffickers.21  
                                         
21 Although it should be noted that corruption ‘has occurred in all countries at some point in 
time, regardless of the level of economic or institutional development’ (Buxton, 2006: 128). 
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Furthermore, the threat of violence that typically accompanies the offer of a 
bribe – ‘silver or lead’ – is also taken into account (Garzón, 2014: 5).  Under such 
conditions, accepting a bribe may be more a question of survival than greed.   
 
In this way, the drug trade has weakened state institutions and society in source 
nations.  When organised crime establishes ‘an institutionalised presence in the 
state’, ‘freedom of speech is negated, political choice is restricted, rights of 
association are contained by the threat of violence and the rule of law is eroded’ 
(Buxton, 2006: 129).  Corruption is thus an obstacle to democratic development 
in the historically authoritarian political systems of Latin America (Thoumi, 
2003: 177).  But so too is the punitive, ineffective and harmful Drug War model 
of the US.  Militarised counterdrug policies and hard-line diplomatic measures, 
such as decertification, are viewed to weaken state institutions further: 
damaging public trust and popular legitimacy.  For example, democratically 
elected governments in source nations have been pressured into accepting 
counterdrug measures which are opposed locally.  As part of this, the operation 
of militarised police units adds to public perceptions that state institutions 
protect the interests of the US (and local elite actors) rather than the general 
population (drawn from Garzón, 2008: 145).  Impunity for those implicated in 
human rights abuses and/or the upper echelons of the drug trade exacerbate 
such grievance.   
 
Buxton (2006: 129) argues that such conditions make state institutions more 
vulnerable to corruption: ‘where mechanisms for democratic accountability, 
political renewal and constituency representation are precarious’, politicians are 
more susceptible to corruption.  The drug trade and the ‘war on drugs’, 
therefore, create a vicious cycle that locks source nations into weak 
institutionalisation.  Rejecting US orthodoxy, the solution to eradicating the drug 
trade and associated corruption is instead to focus resources on counter-demand 
policies in the North, and encourage development and institution-building in the 
South.  This approach would weaken organised crime, make source/transit 
nations more resilient to the drug trade’s effects and deepen democracy – and 
democratic accountability – in Latin America. 
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2.3.3 Common Assumptions 
 
There is a degree of overlap between the Drug War and Development Paradigms 
on the topic of state-narco interlinkages.  Fundamentally, both view corruption 
as deviance and corrosive to the state.  As part of this, they share similar 
conceptualisations of why drug traffickers attempt to subvert institutions.  The 
illicit nature of the drug trade places traffickers in conflict with those who 
would enforce the law.  Violence and corruption, therefore, are used to evade 
enforcement.  In terms of the latter, this takes different forms at different 
stages of operations (Lee III, 1991: 121).  This may amount to one-off payments 
for low-level officials to ‘turn a blind eye’, or regularised payments to high-level 
officials in the security forces to ensure non-enforcement.  Drug money may also 
purchase a more direct role for state officials, such as passing intelligence to 
traffickers or targeting drug rivals.   In addition to this, bribes to politicians – in 
the form of campaign contributions – may buy high-level protection.  In the 
Colombian case, the Cali Cartel used its wealth to buy political support and so 
avoid the enforcement measures that were meted out to their more violent 
Medellin rivals (Thoumi, 2003: 208).  The exchange of such payments reflects 
‘not only the penetration of the state but also penetration by the state’, as 
influence flows both ways between the state and the drug trade (Andreas, 1998: 
161). 
 
These behaviours may form distinct models of drug corruption.  Nadelmann 
(1994: 269-270) outlines this as a comparative typology: sporadic, systemic and 
institutionalised.  Sporadic corruption does not follow regular patterns, and 
‘involves individuals or small groups’ who do not share payments with others in 
the government.  Systemic corruption refers to cases where numerous ‘pay-off 
cones’ are present, with different agencies establishing relationships with the 
drug trade and hierarchical systems of payments.  Drug money flows up and 
down these structures, as state institutions exploit their position to extract 
rents.  When these ‘pay-off cones’ are consolidated nationally or subsumed into 
one structure, corruption is said to be institutionalised.  In this case, the 
‘effective authority’, e.g. the regime, controls all aspects of major corrupt 
activity within the country.  Nadelmann argues ‘institutionalised’ drug 
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corruption is more likely in dictatorships, due to centralised power, lack of 
accountability, and (typically) self-interested rule (Ibid: 271-6).   
 
These mainstream analyses of drugs certainly have utility in explaining aspects 
of state-narco interactions.  They provide insights into the causes and effects of 
drug corruption, the motivations of the actors involved and how these 
interlinkages develop.  Such understandings, at times, were reproduced in the 
interview accounts of US and Bolivian actors from the period.  These 
conventional analyses of the drugs literature, though, are also limited in several 
ways.  The top-down conceptualisations and explanatory models of the drug 
literature do not deal adequately with the ‘structured variation’ of political, 
social and economic conditions in source nations (drawn from O’Donnell, 1993: 
1360).  While there are of course commonalities in corrupt behaviour across 
cases, the form and function of these relations is also grounded in distinct 
historic processes of state formation and local dynamics.   
 
The underlying assumptions of much of the drugs literature – e.g. corruption as 
moral failure, or an outcome of North-South disparities – fail to account for the 
nuanced interactions which arise between the state and the drug trade in 
different contexts.  As part of this, the state here is synonymous with the law, 
and involvement in the illicit sphere is viewed as deviation; ‘the line between 
“legal” and “illegal” is held to be clear and definitive inside a given state’ 
(Heyman & Smart, 1999: 11).22  In reality, though, such distinctions may be fluid, 
as different facets of the state establish symbiotic relationships with the ‘illicit’ 
sphere.23  ‘What is legitimate in formal law, in real practices done in the name 
of the state and in the eyes of the population’, therefore, may diverge and 
change over time (Ibid: 1).  In this vein, James (2012: 227) highlights the 
problem of placing actors in binary conceptual categories, i.e. ‘criminal’, 
‘political’ or ‘state’.  For example, drug traffickers may be viewed as caudillo-
                                         
22 These kinds of distinctions are evident in the previous quote from Andreas (1998: 161). 
23 In the case of 1940s Mexico, for example: ‘Far from being ranged against each other in 
(metaphorical) trench warfare, police and narcos operated in a shared no-man’s land, in which 
the supposedly sharp line dividing the state and the criminal world was blurred’ (Knight, 2012: 
121). 
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style leaders and enjoy local legitimacy, while the police, engaged in various 
facets of criminality, are feared by citizens and viewed as ‘Mafia-esque’.  The 
blurring of these theoretically-bound categories highlights this limitation of the 
drugs literature. 
 
The perception that criminal networks mark the frontier of state authority 
appears to reflect underlying normative assumptions about the role of the 
state, rather than being an accurate empirical analysis of the political 
economy of illicit commodities in source countries. (Meehan, 2015: 258) 
 
In this way, the implications of state-narco interactions may also diverge from 
those prescribed by these mainstream discourses.  The assumptions of both 
paradigms, that the presence of the drug trade necessarily is associated with 
violence and weak state capacity, may be challenged (Heyman & Smart, 1999: 
15).  In some case, the establishment of state-narco networks may in fact 
reinforce the authority of the state.  Although state-narco networks may well be 
defined by personal enrichment and greed, they may also create stability, 
control the drug violence and reinforce the authority of the state (Le Billion, 
2003: 415).  This is not to make a normative case for such networks, but to 
understand their varied causes and effects under different conditions.  In order 
to problematize state-narco interactions in the Bolivian case and account for this 
weakness of the mainstream analyses of drugs, I thus draw on the coercion 
literature.  
 
2.4 The Establishment of State-Narco Networks 
 
I utilise the term ‘state-narco networks’ to refer to stable, regular modes of 
exchange between ‘state actors’ and ‘the drug trade’.  The function of such 
networks often blurs such distinctions, so these terms – as well as ‘legal/licit’ 
and ‘illegal/illicit’ – are defined in their formal sense.  These modes of 
exchange, typically involve the extraction of drug rents for non-enforcement 
and/or official protection, establish shared interests and entrench the drug 
trade in state institutions.  As such, the ‘political’ is incorporated into the 
‘criminal’, and the economic power of the trafficker becomes political power 
(Garzón, 2008: 138).  The form and function of these networks, though, is 
dependent on local factors.  For example, the constellation of actors involved, 
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the underlying logic and the implications of these networks may change 
depending on the context.   
 
Whether drug-related corruption is stabilizing or destabilizing depends on 
the level of centralization, the nature of the bargains struck between 
rulers and private actors, and the role of international policies. 
(Goodhand, 2008: 414) 
 
My conceptualisation shares characteristics with Nadelmann’s (1994: 270) 
systemic and institutionalised models of drug corruption, but challenges the 
assumptions that underpin this typology and the dominant paradigms of the 
wider drugs literature.  This broad definition of state-narco networks draws on 
Snyder’s (2006) concept of ‘institutions of join-wealth extraction’. 
 
Snyder (Ibid.) questions why lootable wealth, such as coca-cocaine, is associated 
with civil conflict in some cases, but peace and stability in others.  He advances 
models of rent extraction as important explanatory factors.  In one scenario, 
private interests may exploit the resource exclusively.  As these actors 
consolidate wealth, competing centres of power are created that lead to 
conflict.  Alternatively, no extraction occurs when the state sacrifices potential 
returns to block rivals benefitting from the resource.  In the case of drug source 
nations, such actions may be rewarded by international actors in the form of 
counterdrug aid.  Although, as the experience of the ‘war on drugs’ has shown, 
private actors may be able to circumvent such blocks.  On the other side of this, 
the ‘sticks’ of international counterdrug policies inhibit the model of public 
extraction, i.e. monopoly state control of the resource risks international pariah 
status.  Finally, joint-extraction occurs when the state and private interests 
exploit an illicit income stream together.  The threat of enforcement and the 
potential benefits for both parties create this impulse.  Chouvy (2015: 8) argues 
that the formation of such systems based around drug crops, such as coca, is 
unlikely due to the low barriers to entry to this level of the trade and its diffuse 
nature.  As such, it is unlikely that state actors would be able to exercise 
effective control over cultivation and thereby establish joint-wealth extraction.  
For this reason, such systems are more likely to occur further up the commodity 
chain, where actors are fewer and the value of the lootable resource is greater.   
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The formation of ‘institutions of joint-wealth extraction’ – ‘informal bargains 
rooted in personal ties among rulers, their cronies, and private elites’ (Ibid: 954) 
– create common interests between the state and the illicit sphere that may 
form a basis for political stability.  This can take different forms, ‘from public 
taxation of privately extracted resources to government-run protection rackets’ 
(Ibid: 948).  Referring to the case of Burma, Snyder (Ibid: 959-962) argues that 
the military regime protected and encouraged the development of the heroin 
trade in peripheral areas.  State institutions, such as state-run banks, were 
utilised as part of this, incentivising once hostile armed groups to integrate into 
the existing political order.  The regime subsequently reaped the benefits of 
stability, reduced ethnic tensions and economic growth fuelled by drug wealth.  
Rather than erode the state’s authority, the drug trade provided the resources 
to govern and consolidated state power. 
 
Meehan (2011: 376) also addresses the case of Burma and the heroin trade, 
outlining the incentives (‘legal impunity, protection, money laundering’) and 
threats (prosecution) used by the regime to co-opt and coerce insurgent groups.  
He argues that these became integral to processes of state formation by 
centralising the means of violence and extraction.  The historic development of 
the Burmese state is an important factor here.  Departing from the Western, 
Weberian model, distinct dynamics were created by uneven state control, feudal 
relations and autonomy in the periphery.  These factors created their own logic 
of interaction between the state, society and the drug economy.  The profits of 
the heroin trade and a system of state protection have converted former 
opponents to ‘proxy state actors’ in Burma’s periphery (Ibid: 397).  As well as 
eliminating rivals and protecting market share, selective application of drug 
control against those who would not be co-opted enhances Burma’s international 
image.  Meehan (Ibid: 402-403) argues that these complex inter-linkages and the 
role of the drug trade in such processes have been ignored in the mainstream 
policy response to drugs. 
 
The rationale for state involvement in the drugs trade may extend far 
beyond mere greed and corruption and may instead be instrumental in 
creating ‘symbiotic interactions between the upper- and underworld’ (van 
der Veen, 2003: 104), forming a foundation for peace and stability.  
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This draws on the concept of 'limited access orders' (North, et. al., 2007).  In 
most modern industrialised nations, the state has the monopoly on violence and 
guarantees open access to the political system and the economy.  Within these 
‘open access orders’, competition between different factions occurs within 
these settled boundaries and violence is controlled.  These conditions are often 
not met in developing nations, and limited access orders are instead formed.  
Under this conception, the state generally lacks coherence, and constitutes ‘the 
major avenue for accumulation and inter-factional competition’ (Goodhand, 
2008: 411).  Factions may capture the state and maintain control by distributing 
economic benefits: pacifying rivals and building support.  In such cases, political 
elites maintain social order (and control violence) by dividing rents from the 
economy (Ibid: 412).  As violence and disorder reduce rents, the interests of 
elite actors are bound ‘to support of the current political system' (North, et. al., 
2007: 7).  State-narco networks may constitute one aspect of this system of 
control; where drug corruption functions according to the logic of political order 
and the consolidation of elite power.  The uneven application of the law and the 
apparent failure of state institutions are explained through reference to these 
underlying dynamics.  As such, 
 
It is not the presence of illicit drug production itself, but instead the 
social relations surrounding production and trafficking that determines 
the relationship between drugs, conflict and state 
consolidation/breakdown. (Meehan, 2015: 260) 
 
Echoing this argument, Snyder and Martinez (2009) discuss the function of ‘state-
sponsored protection rackets’ in Mexico from the 1940s to the late 1980s, during 
the rule of the PRI.  These are defined as ‘informal institutions through which 
public officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, enforce it 
selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization in exchange for a share of 
the profits generated by the organization’ (Ibid: 254).24  The hegemonic power of 
the PRI, a political culture of clientelism and the coherent command structure of 
organised crime during this period,25 allowed for the creation of such systems.  
                                         
24 Lupsha (1992: 182) also notes that protected-traffickers were also expected to give-up rivals 
and associates to provide the police and judicial system with sufficient convictions. 
25 At this time, Mexico was a major producer of heroin and marijuana for the US drug market 
(Chabat, 1994).  During the 1980s, its importance as a transit point for Andean cocaine entering 
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Trafficking groups were entrenched in the state’s hierarchical, centralised 
system of patron-client bonds (Lupsha, 1992: 179).  While these relations 
certainly demonstrated corruption and the greed of state officials, they were 
integrated into the PRI’s clientelistic mode of governance and its attempts to 
colonise of all aspects of Mexican society (Astorga, 2004).  This system helped to 
bind regional actors to the federal government, and manage the violent excesses 
of Mexican criminal organisations, thereby contributing to the stability of the 
PRI’s rule.26   
 
There was sporadic violence, as new narcos challenged the old 
(necessarily, the leadership of such enterprises could not be determined 
by transparent shareholder voting), but in general the system ticked over 
quite peacefully and certainly no threat to national security was 
perceived. The political elite did not want to besmirch the Pax PRIísta, so 
violence tended to be limited and exemplary; and, as businessmen, albeit 
illicit businessmen, the drug dealers also liked a measure of order, 
stability, and predictability. The allocation of dealerships (or plazas) 
operated according to well-known informal rules, like so much of the 
PRIìsta system. In short, the political elite retained substantial control 
and the drug ‘problem’ seemed minor and manageable. (Knight, 2012: 
125) 
 
Beginning in the late-1980s, increased political competition, anti-corruption 
reforms and changes in organised crime within Mexico – including the influx of 
Colombian traffickers – led to the breakdown of these rackets (Snyder & 
Martìnez, 2009: 262).  Fracturing power led to the rupture of alliances between 
the state and the drug trade (Garzón, 2008: 137-8).  These factors are 
implicated in the heightened drug violence now seen within Mexico: ‘the old 
“Leviathan of the Zócalo”27 had abdicated, (leaving) the drug cartels ( . . . ) to 
fight their own battle in a Hobbesian “war of all against all”’ (Knight, 2012: 129-
30).  Indeed, it may be argued that public trust in the institutions of the Mexican 
                                                                                                                           
the US market would grow.  Following US success in targeting the Caribbean-Florida route in the 
early-1990s, Mexico became a pivotal point of the Andes-US cocaine commodity chain.  This 
coincided with the fall of the Colombian Cartels, and the rising strength of the Mexican Mafia 
(Gootenberg, 2012: 168). 
26 In the mid-1970s, though, the Mexican government bowed to increasing US pressure to take 
action against the country’s heroin and marijuana trades.  Operation Condor, as it was named, 
involved fumigation of crops.  While the US and Mexican authorities claimed success, others have 
argued that the PRI protected aspects of the trade and that crop failure was the decisive factor 
in the temporary decline in Mexican production.  (See Scott & Marshall,1991: 38-42) 
27 Referring to the Mexican federal government, the Zócalo is the main plaza in Mexico City. 
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state has been badly damaged by this breakdown in political order, with some 
sectors calling for a restoration of the old Pax Mafiosa and an end to the 
violence (Watt & Zepeda, 2012: 182).  The state’s complicity in violence against 
its own citizens – part of the US-backed crackdown28 on the Mexican Cartels 
under President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) – has deepened this legitimacy 
crisis. 
 
2.5 The Fragmented Bolivian State, Uneven Democracy and State-
Narco Networks 
 
In the Bolivian case, state-narco networks were established during the military 
authoritarian government of Barrientos (1964-1969), then extended and 
deepened under the rule of Banzer (1971-1978) and García Meza (1980-1981).  
These formed one facet of the clientelistic mode of governance that enabled 
these regimes to co-opt political support and hold power.  Clientelism is defined 
by interpersonal links, ‘not mediated by formal or bureaucratic organisations’ 
(O’Donnell, 1977: 67).  It entails a mode of exchange, where a patron selectively 
bestows benefits, typically state resources, to a client for some kind of political 
gain (Mainwaring, 1999: 177).  This form of politics had long been a feature in 
Bolivia, tracing its lineage back to the colonial period.  As the coca-cocaine 
economy boomed over this period, drug rents became part of such practices. 
 
These military authoritarian ‘coalitions’ included factional interests within the 
state – most significantly, the military.  Drug rents were used to reward the 
loyalty of supporters and pacify potential rivals.  In addition to this, Banzer 
employed similar practices to cultivate societal support, forming an alliance 
with influential agri-business elites in Santa Cruz who made the transition from 
cotton to cocaine.  This included the provision of soft loans for coca-cocaine 
ventures from state-backed banks.  In many cases, these patron-client relations 
were based in kinship ties between Bolivia’s small economic and political elite 
(Rodas M., 1996: 54).  Levels of drug-related violence were low, as traffickers 
sought accommodation with the state rather than conflict.  The function of 
                                         
28 The 2007 Mérida Initiative committed the US government to US $1.7 billion of counterdrug aid 
to Mexico and Central America. 
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these networks thus entrenched the drug trade in state institutions.  The coca-
cocaine economy enjoyed a level of protection, as drug rents provided these 
regimes with the tools to govern.  Authoritarian government, and the 
acquiescence of the US in Cold War-mode, ensured these networks encountered 
little interference (Gamarra, 1999a: 182).   
 
The Bolivian state may be conceptualised as highly fragmented during this 
period.  It deviates from the Weberian ideal-type that dominates the connected 
discourses of the international counterdrug and state-building agendas.29  The 
state here is defined by its capacity to exercise effective control over the 
national territory; it is a permanent core of institutions, autonomous from 
societal interests (drawn from Centeno, 2002: 2).  According to this view, the 
presence of drug production/trafficking is an indicator of state ‘weakness’ 
(Goodhand: 2008: 413), thriving in territories where state power is contested or 
state actors lack the political commitment to enforce the legal norms of the 
international drug control regime (Mansfield, 2016: 18).  It may be argued that 
this idealised notion of the state is problematic, both on its own terms and for 
its lack of historical contextual analysis (Evans, et. al., 1985: 348).  For 
example, it underplays the multi-faceted nature of the modern state; composed 
of distinct state actors (e.g. agencies), pursuing particular agendas.30  
Furthermore, the notion of state strength/weakness is highly ambiguous.  It may 
be measured along distinct dimensions, including efficacy,31 
domestic/international legitimacy,32 and/or longevity (Knight, 2002).  Scoring 
                                         
29 These interlinkages are discussed in Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
30 Government agencies, for example, are informed by their organisational imperatives, and 
draw on their own distinct bases of societal and economic support (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).   
31 Such a term may be imprecise.  The state’s ‘effectiveness’, for example, may be uneven 
across the national territory and in certain policy domains (both domestic and international).  
This may fail to account for occasions when ‘strong’ Western states (or more accurately, 
particular state actors) choose not to act due to its inability to achieve an outcome; or in other 
cases, its reliance on the implicit consent/support of societal actors.  Cases of corporate tax 
avoidance in the West would lend credence to this point.  The US Federal Government’s inability 
to enforce its drug laws on cannabis prohibition in Colorado and Washington would also suggest 
‘strong states’ are not uniformly strong across all policy areas. 
32 Mansfield (2016: 22) highlights how international legitimacy may be increased, while domestic 
legitimacy is damaged. In the case of Afghanistan, certain political leaders sought international 
patronage – and strengthened international legitimacy – through pursuit of counterdrug policies.  
However, they were unable to establish national legitimacy, and relied on development 
assistance, payments to local elites and the coercive power of foreign military forces in 
attempting to enforce a ban on opium.  These factors and ultimate failure in counterdrug goals 
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high on one measure does not automatically entail high scores on others.  For 
the states of Latin America, for example, non-uniformity across these indicators 
has been common and is partly a consequence of historical factors (Centeno, 
2002; Vellinga, 1998).  As such, Migdal (1988: 9) notes that the broad terms 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ are blunt in accounting for the ‘duality’ of such states: 
‘their unmistakable strengths in penetrating societies and their surprising 
weaknesses in affecting goal-orientated social change’.  Nevertheless, this top-
down, idealised conceptualisation has underpinned the assumed link between 
‘weak’ states and illicit drug economies in the South.   
 
While the Bolivian state certainly falls short of this ideal-type, such assumptions 
fail to account for its distinct historic development and the drug trade’s 
interaction with these processes.  Historically, the Bolivian state has been 
patrimonial in nature, with uneven presence across the national territory and 
fractious relations with a divided and diverse society (Domingo, 2003).  Bolivia’s 
dependent relationship to the US and the loss of ‘national sovereignty’ that this 
entailed may be added as further evidence of the state’s deviation from the 
Weberian ideal-type (Ibid: 374; Lehman, 1999).  However, the Bolivian state’s 
relationship to the drug trade is more complex than the drug policy/state-
building orthodoxy prescribes.  The coca-cocaine economy was absorbed into 
state structures and used by certain actors to extend political order.  As such, 
the drug trade was not ‘a cause and a consequence’ of state weakness.  Instead, 
it was used in processes of state-consolidation, as regime leaders looked to build 
‘limited-access orders’ (North, et. al., 2007).  Drug rents were one factor in the 
‘shifting alliances of power between elites and social actors’ that determined 
the uneven and ‘discontinuous construction of state authority’ in Bolivia (Gray 
Mollina, 2008: 11 & 13).  
 
This is evident in the highly clientelistic systems of governance of the 
authoritarian era.  Regime leaders used the patronage of the state to bind 
different political actors to the existing political order, as ‘the state became 
                                                                                                                           
exposed the structural weakness of the central authority (Ibid: 280).  As such, exogenous forces 
placed the Afghan state into a losing conflict with the drug trade, thereby undermining its 
attempts to consolidate, while creating competing centres of political authority. 
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associated almost exclusively with executive power’ (Malloy & Gamarra, 1988: 
7).  This reflected the typical Latin American experience, where the historical 
legacy of patrimonialism and intra-elite competition meant that state, regime 
and government were often practically indistinguishable (Vellinga, 1998: 5).  The 
Bolivian bureaucracy was politicised with regime appointees, while the 
legislative and judicial branch were packed with political supporters.  These 
institutions thus lacked autonomy.  Furthermore, the police and the political 
parties were also subordinated to the military (Quintana, 2005: 96-97).  In this 
sense, the military became the preeminent institution of the Bolivian state, not 
only in its control of executive power, but through the military officers assuming 
‘political posts at the local, provincial and national levels, and important 
managerial posts in a variety of state enterprises’, as well as the institution’s 
ties ‘to peasant groups and crucial political elites in places like Santa Cruz, the 
Beni and other traditionally isolated regions’ (Malloy & Gamarra, 1988: 21).  
Drug rents constituted an important facet of this system of control, as military 
authoritarian regimes sought to colonise the illicit drug economy with political 
allies.  This included state actors (military officers) and ‘crucial political elites’.  
In this sense, drug rents were a tool of state-building: political actors exploited 
the illicit economy to extend state authority.   
 
In addition to this, the very presence of the drug trade in Bolivia – proof of state 
weakness in the mainstream drug policy discourse – was not indicative of a loss 
of state control over the national territory.  The expansion of coca cultivation in 
the Chapare and the development of the drug trade in the eastern departments 
occurred in concert with the state.33  Colonisation of the Chapare was 
encouraged by state development of the region in the 1960s; there was little 
appetite for eradication campaigns and the ‘retaking of state control’ of the 
region following the expansion of coca (e.g. Dunkerley, 1984: 318).  Although 
not necessarily fostered by the regimes of the period, coca cultivation was 
viewed as a benign influence within Bolivia.  Informal political pacts between 
rural sectors and the military (Mitchell, 1977: 98) also underpinned this view.  
Meanwhile, the drug clans of Santa Cruz and the Beni were supported by the 
Banzer regime.  State-narco networks were established, as the regime sought to 
                                         
33 This is examined in detail in Chapter 4. 
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solidify its base of societal support (Rodas M., 1996).  The coca-cocaine economy 
was thus interwoven with wider political dynamics.  The top-down analysis of 
the conventional drug policy discourse does not account for such nuances in the 
parallel development of the state and the illicit economy. 
Democratic transition in 1982 represents a point of fracture in these processes.  
First, democratisation threatened to shine a light on interactions between state 
actors and the drug trade, and tear-up the certainties of the old, particularistic 
system.  While authoritarianism grants the government and its cronies impunity, 
democratic government promises a free press, political competition, the rule of 
law and an independent judiciary.  As such, democracy would be expected to 
reduce drug corruption (Whitehead, 2002: 801).  Furthermore, renewed US 
interest in the ‘war on drugs’ meant that state collaboration in the drug trade 
would be met with diplomatic and economic sanction.  These dynamics resulted 
in the atomisation – but survival – of state-narco networks.  Where before, 
relatively settled and centralised modes of exchange functioned between the 
state and the drug trade, now multiple political actors – the political parties, the 
military and the police – formed patron-client relations with traffickers.  Rather 
than state-consolidation and the building of factional coalitions, these 
relationships held significance in Bolivia’s post-transition political equilibrium.  
During Bolivia’s uncertain transition, vestiges of former governance systems 
continued to order interactions between the state and the drug trade. 
 
Drawing on Dahl’s theory of polyarchy,34 O’Donnell (1996) argues that uneven 
democracy has been common across Latin America following the Third Wave.  
Formal elements of democracy, such as regular elections, have been 
institutionalised, while the wider social and political rights associated with 
modern, Western-liberal democracy have been deficient.  The assumption that 
these cases are moving towards (or away from) consolidated democracy in the 
image of the West has been challenged, as distinct, enduring forms of polyarchy 
were formed.  Informal rules and particularism, for example, operated outside 
                                         
34 O’Donnell (1996: 35) summarises this concept.  Polyarchy provides a schema for comparing 
different forms of ‘democracy’, broadly defined as a form of government that is responsive to 
the will of the population.  Its seven attributes are: ‘1) elected officials; 2) free and fair 
elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) 
alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy. 
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of formal institutional structures, but were no less important in shaping 
behaviour and expectations, helping to determine who wields political power 
(Ibid: 38-41).  This was clear in the Bolivian case as the ‘old reflexes and 
assumptions, and vested interests created by the previous history’ stood 
alongside democratic institutions (Whitehead, 2002: 807).   
 
The historic development of the Bolivian state and the legacy of 
authoritarianism thus continued to hold influence.  The factionalised Bolivian 
state of the post-transition period functioned through patronage and informal 
pacts.  As described below, this included military and police autonomy, and the 
state-narco networks that ran through both institutions.  In addition to this, 
political power remained concentrated in the executive branch (Malloy & 
Gamarra, 1988: 226-227).  The judiciary was packed with political appointees 
and so lacked independence, while the legislature was a vehicle of patronage for 
the political parties (Gamarra, 1991 & 1996).  These trade-offs allowed Bolivia’s 
pacted-democracy to function.35   As such, the Bolivian state remained ‘weak’: 
non-unitary and fragmented.  Again, though, the illicit drug economy’s role 
within these processes was complex.  Coca cultivation in the Chapare was 
viewed as a vital social safety net following the neoliberal structural reforms 
that had neutered organised labour (e.g. see US Embassy La Paz to Secretary of 
State, 1985b & 1986b).  Although Chapare coca could not be formally endorsed 
given US counterdrug pressure, there was no impulse to ‘retake state control’ of 
the territory and confront the coca unions.  Furthermore, drug rents were 
extracted by the main political actors of the post-transition period – the 
military, the police and the political parties – and subsumed into a finely 
balanced post-transition settlement.  Elements of the drug trade, therefore, 
remained embedded within state structures, partly as a hangover of the 
authoritarian era.  This was indicative of Bolivia’s uneven democracy. 
 
Military and police autonomy constituted one facet of this uneven 
democratisation.36  The former’s longstanding political role made many civilian 
political leaders wary of provoking the institution during the post-transition 
                                         
35 This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
36 These are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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period.  As such, politicians practised a policy of non-interference in the internal 
matters of the military (Barrios M.,1994).  The recalibration of the police’s role 
was partly a result of this uneasy relationship.  As well as reflecting the new 
principles of Bolivian democracy, increased police resources and prerogatives 
were designed to counteract the military’s predominant role.  An informal 
reciprocal arrangement was formed, where the institution enjoyed autonomy in 
return for supporting the interests of the government (Quintana, 2005: 96-7).  As 
a consequence, both the police and military operated with little transparency 
and accountability.  This allowed elements within both institutions to carry on 
with entrenched practices of drug corruption.  The ‘compromise’ of non-
enforcement and lack of civilian oversight – holding state officials to the rule of 
law – was justified in maintaining political stability and (formal) democracy.  
Here, ‘institutional endurance is rooted in the systematic absence of 
enforcement’, as such actors are induced ‘to accept rules they would otherwise 
seek to overturn’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014: 204). 
 
Pockets of authoritarianism meant that factional interests were able to operate 
without accountability.  Bolivian state actors – such as regional military or police 
commanders – formed alliances with private actors to exploit drug revenues; 
eroding notions of an even and universal the rule of law (O’Donnell, 1993).  
Autonomous military and police institutions stood beyond accountability.  The 
pursuit of these particularistic interests thus limited notions of meaningful 
democracy, as political competitors are locked out of the process.37  This may be 
supplemented with Auyero’s (2007) concept of ‘grey zones’ of the state: where 
state and non-state actors collude in illicit activity to pursue common interests.38  
In such cases, these interactions become part of the normal practice of politics, 
thus dissolving normative boundaries between these categories.  Arguing in the 
same vein, Thoumi (2003: 176-7) argues that the application of Western-centric 
conceptualisations of corruption, for example, may be inappropriate due to local 
conditions. 
                                         
37 The application of locally-opposed US counterdrug efforts may be added to this.  At the behest 
of an external actor, the Bolivian government has implemented policies which large swathes of 
the population believe to be against the country’s interests. 
38 Auyero (2009) addresses state collusion in violence, using the case of public disorder in 2001 
Argentina. 
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Authoritarianism has deep roots in the Andes, where governments have 
not had a tradition of accountability.  At best, they have to account for 
their actions to powerful economic groups, but are not accountable to the 
general public, and individuals lack mediating institutions that could 
exact government accountability. ( . . . )  In patrimonial and clientelistic 
political systems, the enrichment of those in power by the use of power is 
a normal way of life.  Corruption makes sense only when private benefit is 
gained through the abuse of power in the democratic context.  
 
Focusing on the period of the Andean Initiative, US interlocutors interpreted 
these processes through the Drug War Paradigm.  Perceived ‘rampant’ 
corruption in the Bolivian state and political class, for example, justified the 
extension of US control against ‘corrupt’ local power structures.  Bolivian 
interlocutors, meanwhile, recognised these networks as being part of a fragile 
political equilibrium.  While not endorsing state-narco relationships, they viewed 
the political order and Bolivia’s recent transition as inextricably bound up with 
them.  This partly underpinned both opposition to Bolivia’s ‘Colombianisation’, 
and calls for a development-led response to drugs.  Additionally, US efforts to 
remove ‘corrupt’ politicians were framed against the legacy of US Cold War 
political manipulation.  In this sense, the US was viewed to be more interested 
in leveraging supposed state-narco links to shape Bolivia’s internal politics, than 
tackling drug corruption in the Bolivian political class and consolidating 
democracy.  Contested narratives around these cases of drug scandal emphasise 
the competing agendas of US and Bolivian actors around this time.  Their distinct 
understandings of state-narco interactions were folded into narrative of US-
Bolivian relations of power and control.  These arguments are fully examined 
through Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the thesis.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter thus builds on different areas of the literature to construct an 
original framework for analysis.  Elucidating the main themes of the drugs 
literature, I outline the two overarching paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’, and 
the associated political and institutional factors that affected the course of 
policy.  These are vital to understanding the dynamics of the period, and 
providing important background on the introduction of the Andean Initiative, 
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e.g. the post-Cold War escalation of the US ‘war on drugs’, and the social, 
political and economic priorities of the Bolivian government.  As part of this 
discussion, I consider how the Drug War and Development Paradigms 
conceptualise the drug trade, and attached phenomena.  Such 
conceptualisations framed the interview accounts of elite US and Bolivian actors.  
In Chapter 5, I examine in depth how these shaped their perspectives of the ‘war 
on drugs’, and their interpretations and responses to state-narco networks.  
Therefore, the analysis that follows is in conversation with the drugs literature, 
addressing key themes such as the securitisation of drugs, and the clash of 
enforcement and development-led visions of drugs.   
 
However, this chapter also highlights the limitations of the drugs literature, and 
the need for a shift in theoretical approach.  Employing the literature on 
coercion, my analysis problematises the relationship between the state and the 
drug trade, and breaks with the assumption of synergy between the drug trade, 
violence and weak states.  In this way, the thesis aims to provide a 
contextualised account of Bolivian state-narco interactions.  In providing an 
overview of this literature, I argue that it offers insights into the complex and 
myriad ways the drug trade becomes embedded in local social, political and 
economic structures.  The cause and effects of these relations may extend 
beyond the typical assumptions of the drugs literature; as evidenced in my 
discussion of the examples of Burma and Mexico.  In the case of post-transition 
Bolivia, uneven democracy and entrenched political interests ensured the 
survival of atomised state-narco networks.  Incorporating elements of the 
literature on Latin American democratisation, my analysis raises questions 
around the entanglement of the drug trade in process of political transition.  
This theme is returned to in Chapter 6.   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the unique dynamics of the (understudied) 
Bolivian case offers new insights into state-narco interactions.  Shifting from 
authoritarianism to (formal) democracy and constituting a major arena of the US 
‘war on drugs’, the study of Bolivia allows for exploration of the propositions of 
the coercion literature in a distinct setting.  My theoretical framework, 
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therefore, crosses and advances the research agendas of different areas of the 
literature. 
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Chapter 3|Linking Theory, Methods and Empirical 
Analysis: US and Bolivian Fieldwork 
 
Reflecting on methodology is a critical part of the research process.  From 
formulating the research design to gathering data in the field and responding to 
unforeseen challenges, decisions are made which shape the findings of the 
thesis.  In mapping and considering the implications of these choices, the 
interplay between theory, methods and empirical analysis is drawn out.  Closely 
allied to this, open and transparent discussion of the research process ensures 
that others may assess its validity.  This is a foundation of good research.  The 
researcher should detail and evaluate each stage of the process.  The strengths 
and limitations of the data and the robustness of the methodology may then be 
weighed, and the findings compared with similar cases (Jacobson & Landau, 
2003: 2).   
 
This chapter describes how these principles underpinned my research.  
Discussion of  my mixed methods approach is included in Chapter 1.  Here, I 
outline the planning and conduct of crucial fieldwork trips to the US and Bolivia, 
which yielded my original interview data.  As part of this, I discuss the principles 
of ethical research, strategies for gaining access, formulating interview 
schedules and dealing with unanticipated issues.  Although there are 
commonalities across the fieldwork trips, I explore the distinct challenges faced 
in the US and Bolivia.  In the US, for example, the discourse of the ‘war on 
drugs’ has become contested.  This caused me to recalibrate my approach, and 
consider the changing interpretations and perceptions of illicit drugs and 
counterdrug policy.  In Bolivia, I encountered issues around researcher-
researched power differentials, ‘ethnographic seduction’ (Robben, 1995) and 
reflexivity.  These shaped my thinking on the competing US and Bolivian agendas 
of the period, and the use of framing narratives in conceptualising state-narco 
networks and their implications.  In this sense, the juxtaposition of US and 
Bolivian fieldwork had a profound impact on my analysis.  The chapter thus 
considers the experience of my interviews, and my shift from a positivist model 
of elite interviewing to oral history methodology.     
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As such, these factors had important implications along a range of dimensions.  
For example, in defining the field, researchers take theoretical and 
methodological decisions that necessarily privilege certain perspectives over 
others.  In my case, this entailed a focus on political elite perceptions of state-
narco interactions.  While this was primarily informed by the analytical 
considerations described in the previous chapter, practical decisions in the field 
also held influence.  Furthermore, a sampling strategy of ‘snowballing’ 
interviews also contributed to the historical perspective of the thesis and 
consequently my selection of an oral history methodology.  Both of these 
features are unusual within the wider drugs literature, but were pivotal to the 
establishment of several of the original findings of the thesis.  In sum, this 
chapter gives the reader understanding of the development of the research 
project, while also standing alone in providing insights into elite interviewing 
methodology, as well as research on politically sensitive topics and illicit 
practices. 
 
3.1 US Fieldwork 
 
The primary aim of this phase of fieldwork was to interview US officials who had 
either direct or indirect experience of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia.  Although I 
planned to slowly focus my analysis and resources on a particular period, I 
adopted a wide lens initially.  As well as ensuring a broad knowledge base of the 
case, it also meant that different research paths were open to me during 
fieldwork.  Locating and gaining access to officials, past and present, was 
uncertain as I had few prior contacts to draw upon within the population of 
interest.  This flexible approach ensured more avenues of investigation were 
open to me during the fieldwork.   
 
I frequently encountered blocks when attempting to penetrate US government 
agencies.  Aside from the low priority of my work to these agencies, the decline 
of US-Bolivian relations meant that current officials were typically less willing to 
participate.  This included both a general lack of experience with the case (US 
government aid and cooperation with Bolivia has been scaled back since the rise 
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of Morales) and the politically sensitive nature of the topic (e.g. the Bolivian 
government’s expulsion of the DEA in 2008).1  One potential participant 
criticised my selection of the Bolivian case on the basis that it had become 
‘somewhat pro-drug culture’ (Personal correspondence to the author, 2013).  
Additionally, the public affairs departments of agencies also sought oversight 
over the involvement of officials.2  Current officials tended to be well-briefed on 
the official policy line, recycling publicly available materials.  As such, there was 
an effort to control and sanitise the outflow of information.   
 
By contrast, I found that ex-officials, most of them semi-retired, were more 
willing to participate.  ‘Snowballing’ from these interviews was also more 
successful and my interviews began to cluster around the era of the Andean 
Initiative.  As a result, I started to focus more of my resources on this period.  
This methodological consideration, then, also played a role in case selection and 
the historical perspective of the thesis.  Further to this, though, these 
interviewees seemed more open and frank in their responses.  Of course, they 
too presented a particular version of events, but their accounts also had an 
added richness.   From an oral history perspective, they had evaluated and 
reflected on their experiences over the years, interpreting and reinterpreting 
events.   
 
These interviews provided an interesting point of comparison with documents 
created at the time of the Andean Initiative.  The 1990 National Drug Control 
Strategy Report (US Gov., 1990), for example, outlined the Bush administration’s 
counterdrug policy and was aimed at garnering public support.  It reinforced the 
securitisation of illicit-drug and set bold goals for dismantling the international 
drug trade.  In retrospect, one official recognised how ‘winning’ the Cold War 
had emboldened those charged with formulating the Andean Initiative (Miller 
                                         
1 ‘Timing is everything, and it is particularly relevant when interviewing elites during moments of 
political sensitivity, as it impacts on access to interviewees and the quality of information 
exchanged’ (Desmond, 2004: 266). 
2 Subsequently, during my fieldwork in Bolivia, I had made contact directly with an individual 
working in the US Consulate in La Paz.  He had been keen to speak to me, but decided to run it 
past his superior before proceeding.  The Consulate, in turn, sought approval from State 
headquarters in Washington DC.  After a few days, the official phoned me to apologise, and relay 
the news that the interview had been refused because the US would be unable to control the 
information I published and US-Bolivian relations were at a sensitive point. 
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interview, 2013).  Post-Cold War optimism had brought with it a naïve belief 
that the US was capable of achieving whatever goals it set for itself.  This belief 
had knock-on effects on how actors conceptualised both the problem and the 
solution to illicit drugs.  The failure of the Andean Initiative to meet its targets 
and the intervening years, though, seemed to have provoked personal reflection.  
The ex-official developed these ideas as a way of explaining the policy and the 
motivations and beliefs which had driven it.  This historical perspective thus 
brought with it new insights.   
 
The process of planning and conducting this fieldwork is outlined in more detail 
below, including specific issues around the ethics process, contested language 
and interviewing elites. 
 
3.1.1 Ethics Process 
 
Prior to commencing the fieldwork, I gained approval for my research from the 
University’s Ethics Committee.  Guided by the principle of ‘do no harm’, I 
deemed the associated risks for participants and myself to be minimal.  
Interviews would cover the professional lives of officials and no sensitive 
personal information would be sought.  Although I thought it unlikely, 
interviewees may have divulged details of incriminating activity.  Under such 
conditions, the researcher cannot guarantee anonymity and, indeed, may choose 
not to protect the participant.3  I decided that, should such a situation arise, I 
would stop the participant and make this fact clear to them.  Participants may 
also have damaged their career prospects by sharing information deemed to be 
inappropriate by current or future employers.  It was important to clearly 
outline the nature of the research to participants and how their data would be 
used, so that they could judge for themselves the possible consequences of their 
participation (Homan, 1991: 71).   
 
                                         
3 If the researcher has made no prior commitment not to report illicit activity, they may feel 
compelled (and ethically justified) to pass on information to the authorities, for example.  Even 
when such promises have been made, legal proceedings may force the researcher to hand over 
recordings and transcriptions, e.g. see the case of the ‘Boston Tapes’ (McDonald, 2014). 
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Interviewees would also be given options around anonymity, i.e. whether they 
permit use of their name and/or direct quotes in any publications, as well as 
selection of the venue for the interview and use of audio recording.  These 
issues would be addressed with participants through the process of informed 
consent.  The consent form contained details along all of these dimensions and I 
planned to invite questions on the issues covered.  I would also provide 
interviewees with an information sheet for their own reference, detailing the 
project, the consent agreement, and up-to-date contact details of both me and 
my supervisor.  Finally, participants would also have the opportunity to ask for a 
final report of the main findings of the thesis.  Such measures are in keeping 
with standard guidelines for ethical social research.  
 
Generally, the ethical safeguards I put in place seemed to be robust.  I was able 
to address any questions raised by participants, and all seemed comfortable with 
the parameters of the project.  However, ethical considerations should not end 
with the receipt of ethical approval.  There may be a tendency to fall back on 
the processes and procedures outlined during ethical approval as a final fail-
safe.  In this sense, ethical approval allows the researcher to transfer 
responsibility to the ethical review committee.  For example:   
 
A signed consent form becomes a guarantee that interviewees are 
informed about the research and consent to participate.  Unfortunately, 
this procedure leads is to perceive moral responsibility as something to 
get done initially, something to be ticked off as ‘done’, as a symbol of 
goodness. ( . . . )  External policing also tends to turn research ethics into 
an either-or issue: participants either consent or they do not, things are 
good or bad, harmless or not. (Ryen, 2011: 428) 
 
Ethical issues are fluid and social research occurs in complex environments.  As 
such, fieldwork may develop in unexpected and challenging ways.  While these 
issues can be minimised by careful planning, it is impossible to anticipate all of 
the implications of the research.  On occasion, these may fall outside of agreed 
ethical safeguards and require the researcher to make their own judgements in 
the field.  I thus attempted to stay alert to this when conducting my fieldwork.  
The following example demonstrates how I adapted my approach to conditions in 
the field.   
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3.1.2 Don’t Mention the ‘War on Drugs’ 
 
The information sheet I circulated with potential interviewees contained a brief 
description of the research project (see Appendix A).  This had been included as 
part of the ethics process.  In outlining the project, the researcher must be open 
and truthful to ensure informed consent, but careful not to disclose ‘too much’ 
information, thereby prejudicing the interview.  I balanced these two aspects in 
the formulation of the information sheet.  Furthermore, as the ‘war on drugs’ is 
a divisive contemporary issue in the US, I sought to pose my research in neutral 
language.  Within the first two weeks of fieldwork, though, my research goals 
were challenged by one potential participant.  On the basis of my information 
sheet, I was accused of having an agenda against US counterdrug policy.  For this 
individual, my research outline had placed me alongside opponents of the ‘war 
on drugs’ and he was, therefore, unwilling to participate.  The examples I had 
presented of policy difficulties in Bolivia during this period (themselves drawn 
from US government documents) and the very term ‘war on drugs’ caused 
controversy.   
 
The lineage of the term ‘war on drugs’, therefore, had analytical implications 
for my research.  Richard Nixon is credited with first using the term in his 1968 
run for the presidency, but it was under Ronald Reagan and then George H. W. 
Bush that the idea entered into common parlance.  For example, President Bush 
had used the language of war during a televisual address on the administration’s 
drug policy:  ‘If we fight this war as a divided nation, then the war is lost’ (Bush, 
1989).  Such rhetoric underpinned the justification for US counterdrug policies in 
Latin America; a logic which stated a ‘war’ against drugs was necessary due to 
the existential threat of Andean cocaine to US society.  While such ideas are still 
present in US counterdrug policies today, the language of war now has less 
traction.  The term ‘war on drugs’ has become politically charged, used by 
opponents of the policy as shorthand for the ‘failed’ aspects of US counterdrug 
policy, e.g. mass incarceration and the perpetuation of drug-related violence in 
Latin America.   
 
(ONDCP-head) Gil Kerlikowske said the bellicose analogy was a barrier to 
dealing with the nation’s drug issues. “Regardless of how you try to 
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explain to people it’s a ‘war on drugs’ or a ‘war on a product’, people see 
it as a war on them,” he said.  “We’re not at war with people in this 
country”. (Fields, 2009) 
 
Former and present US officials were uncomfortable with this characterisation of 
the policy and sought to play down the Drug War rhetoric.  Although they 
continued to draw on elements of the Drug War Paradigm – viewing the issue 
from an enforcement perspective, for example – interviewees emphasised 
alternative development, institution building, and the rule of law.  These 
strands of policy placed the concerns of the Bolivian people at the centre of 
justification for US counterdrug efforts in the country, linking back into ideas of 
American Exceptionalism.  Shifting rationalisations were couched in their own 
dialect: securitisation, war and threat, on one hand; technocratic development 
and institution building, on the other. 
 
Although I had been sensitive to these dynamics in the planning of my fieldwork, 
by highlighting well-known policy issues and using the term ‘war on drugs’ I had 
marked myself out as a critic of US counterdrug policy.  At times, past and 
present US officials with a stake in the policy were immediately wary of my 
research. 
 
So emotive is the use of language that key words can potentially restrict 
access or give the impression during fieldwork of bias on the part of the 
investigator.  The nomenclature of the researcher is replete with 
politically sensitive words. (Knox, 2001: 215) 
 
In order to engender the trust of interviewees, I decided to further soften the 
tone of the information sheet: leaving the question of how agencies had worked 
together hanging and removing examples of common policy difficulties (see 
Appendix B).  It was crucial to reassure participants that they would be treated 
fairly and objectively, and that I was a credible researcher with no hidden 
agenda (Knox, 2001: 211).  However, as my research deals explicitly with the 
idea of the Drug War Paradigm, I decided to keep the term ‘war on drugs’ in the 
information sheet.   Morris (2009: 213) argues that selective presentation of 
information, whether to gain trust or access, is essentially duplicitous and should 
be avoided.  Placing the term in inverted commas, I was confident that most 
participants would recognise that I was consciously referring to the term in its 
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historic sense, rather than expressing a preconceived judgement.  In this way, I 
ensured that the revised document continued to reflect the main focus of the 
project. 
 
The different versions of the information sheet elicited different responses from 
participants.  In an early interview with an ex-US official, for example, I had 
encountered a degree of suspicion about my aims.  He seemed to view the 
interview as adversarial.  At one stage, as I paused to consider my next question, 
he laughed and remarked ‘Did I mess up your questions?’  Additionally, he was 
able to speak at length about US policy successes, but shut down when I 
approached more critical aspects.  This may have been an attempt to counteract 
my perceived ‘negative agenda’ against US counterdrug policy.  While these 
tensions may have occurred regardless of the wording of the information sheet, I 
noticed a difference in the interviews following my amendments.  Respondents 
were typically less defensive.  In a subsequent interview, for example, an ex-
official expressed his enthusiasm for the project and its potential value to future 
US government officials in formulating and implementing multi-agency policies.  
He appeared more open when discussing both positive and negative aspects of 
his experience.  His interview and the research generally would help to pass on 
the lessons he had learned during his career to future generations.  Of course, 
the attitude of participants to the interview was dependent on a number of 
factors.  How I initially presented myself and my research, though, contributed 
to the interview dynamic. 
 
3.1.3 Interviewing Elites and Oral History4 
 
Originally, I had started with a positivist conception of what kind of data could 
be obtained from the interviews.  In this sense, the interviewee is thought of as 
a ‘witness’ and the interview is used to access ‘facts’ about the case.5  While 
                                         
4 I define ‘elites’ broadly as individuals who have risen to the top of their field: ‘someone of 
interest because of the position he or she holds (or has held), rather than because he or she is 
representative or typical of a group’ (Seldon & Pappworth, 1983: 6). 
5 A positivist epistemology assumes that the social world exists independent of observation (an 
objectivist ontological position), and that this reality can be accessed through the senses.  With 
roots in the natural science, the aim of social science is to search for law-like generalisations in 
the social world (Morris, 2009: 210). 
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the interviewee’s account will have its own biases and reflect certain beliefs, 
for example, these may be identified and filtered through triangulation of 
sources.  This is not to say that such biases are analytically unimportant, but 
that the researcher is orientated towards validating the data in search of general 
theories with universal application.  In this sense, there is an effort to separate 
belief and perception from objective facts.  I soon found this positivist model of 
interviewing to be unsuitable, and adapted my methodological assumptions in 
the field.  This involved a shift to elements of oral history methodology, as 
outlined in Chapter 1.  The accounts of interviewees were, therefore, dynamic: 
memories recalled and reworked in relation to experience, evolving identity, 
external factors and the interview situation itself (Abrams, 2010: 7).   
 
Returning to contestation around the term ‘war on drugs’, American 
Exceptionalism supported the accounts of many interviewees.  Furthermore, US 
actions in Bolivia were, at times, rationalised in the discourse of development 
rather than war, while I was viewed variously as neutral, a threat or an ally.  As 
a result of this, my research findings too were ‘relational’ (Desmond, 2004: 263): 
a product of the time of the study.  In this sense, the perceived ineffectiveness 
of the policy and polarisation around the ‘war on drugs’ more generally, 
affected the kind of data I obtained.  The same questions posed to the same 
interviewees in 1993 instead of 2013, for example, would likely have been 
couched in different discursive terms, explanations and analysis.  Where 
opinions, beliefs, rumours and conspiracies are of secondary importance under a 
positivist paradigm of interviewing, oral history methodology places these 
aspects of the account at the centre of analysis.  Often these illuminate the 
meanings and understandings participants have attached to their experience.   
 
Revising the epistemological assumptions of my interview methodology had 
practical implications.  I had left space within my interview schedules for 
interviewees to take the discussion into different areas, but my questioning was 
aimed at picking apart their experiences.  In this sense, I was attempting to 
uncover the ‘facts’ of the case, with verifiable details and examples.  These 
types of positivist assumptions underpin a number of articles on the methodology 
of elite interviewing (Morris, 2009: 211).  Berry (2002) argues that elites use 
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interviews to project their own agenda onto the historical record, at times 
obfuscating or distorting.  He then goes on to provide advice on how the 
researcher may avoid these pitfalls and gain a more truthful account.  For 
example, the researcher should offer critiques of what the participant has 
said/done from a third party rather than presenting them directly.  In so doing, 
the researcher will appear sympathetic to the elite’s point of view (Ibid: 680).6  
Some of this practical advice was useful, e.g. putting the interviewee at ease.  
But in aiming to illuminate the participant’s understanding of the case rather 
than uncovering an objective reality, I changed to a more collaborative style of 
interviewing.  This is illustrated by the twin issues of monologues and ‘factual 
inaccuracies’. 
 
Many officials began the interview with long overviews of their thoughts on the 
topic and their experience in general.  Initially, I viewed these monologues as an 
attempt by the ‘elite’ to take control of the interview and dictate the agenda.  
In this sense, he/she had come into the interview with a clear idea of what they 
wanted to say on the matter and the image they wished to project.  It was, 
then, a defensive move, designed to counter my efforts to ‘extract the truth’.  
From an oral history perspective, though, these monologues are valuable.  While 
the interviewee may have been seeking to drive the direction of the discussion, 
attempts to steer the interview away from or to particular areas are revealing.  
For example, in downplaying the rhetoric of war and emphasising development, 
interviewees hinted at how they justified their own role in the ‘war on drugs’.  
These long overviews also represented the verbalisation of memories.  This is a 
form of interpretation: part of the active process of creating meanings (Portelli, 
2006: 37).  Linking into an inductive, semi-structured approach to interviewing, 
monologues, at times, took the discussion into new areas and demonstrated the 
analytical links these actors made between different issues (McEvoy, 2006: 187).  
As Chapter 5 describes, this includes viewing state-narco networks in the context 
                                         
6 Similarly, Lilleker (2003: 207) poses the rhetorical question, ‘How would Paxman deal with 
this?’   This suggests that the interview situation is confrontational: the interviewee is as a 
possessor of facts and, in order to extract them, the researcher must use various techniques.  
This includes ‘buttering-up’ the participant with praise, but being careful not to appear ‘too 
sycophantic’ (Ibid: 209).   In the same vein, Leech (2002: 666) advises researchers to begin with 
‘nonthreatening questions’ as a disarming mechanism, before moving onto ‘threatening 
questions’.   
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of the pressures of an uncertain democratic transition or, alternatively, the 
perceived national security threat of Bolivian cocaine on US streets.   
 
Equally, responding to ‘factual inaccuracies’, ‘lies’ or ‘exaggerations’ also posed 
questions for my interview methodology.  If the purpose of the interview is to 
validate and verify the data, then the researcher may be inclined to (softly) 
challenge these parts of the account.  Indeed, I was unsure of how far to push 
with certain lines of questioning for fear of alienating the interviewee.  
Underlying these concerns was the idea that the interview was similar to an 
interrogation: I was attempting to formulate an interview schedule which would 
get the ‘witness’ to give a full and truthful account.  The subjectivity of the 
interviewee, though, was the valuable element of the interview.  Their 
perspective, including inaccuracies or exaggerations, was part of this.  Portelli 
(2006: 36) states that ‘what informants believe is indeed a historical fact (that 
is, the fact that they believed it)’.  In this sense, various US accusations of high-
level corruption in the Bolivian government, said more about fault lines of US-
Bolivian trust rather than the machinations of a ‘corrupt’ political system.   
 
However, it was also important to encourage the participant to explore all 
aspects of their experience.  This meant probing such claims to force the 
interviewee to consider them more deeply.  For example, I invited ‘elaboration 
in a bland and naive way’ (Wood, 2006: 382) and presented alternative accounts 
from other parties.  This was designed to encourage the interviewee to question 
their own assumptions and reflect on their analysis of events.  Generally, 
though, I found participants went into interviews with a very clear idea of what 
they wished to share and what was off limits.  Part of this may have simply been 
memory gaps of events from many years ago, but the experience of these 
officials also meant they were well-versed in handling interviews.  A positivist 
model of elite interviewing offers ways of trying to overcome these barriers; oral 
history methodology questions what these barriers mean in terms of the actor’s 
understanding of events.  For example: 
 
Acts considered legitimate and even normal or necessary in the past may 
be viewed as unacceptable and literally cast out of the tradition.  In these 
cases, the most precious information may lie in what the informants hide, 
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and in the fact that they do hide it, rather in what they tell. (Portelli, 
2006: 38) 
 
The emphasis interviewees gave to some events over others, the issues they 
were reluctant to address and unsupported or outlandish claims, then, were all 
indicative of how these actors made sense of state-narco networks and the ‘war 
on drugs’ in Bolivia.   
 
3.2 Bolivian Fieldwork 
 
My Bolivian fieldwork was informed by my experiences of conducting research in 
the US.  First, as I had begun to narrow my analytical focus on the Andean 
Initiative, I concentrated more of my resources on gaining interviews which 
addressed this period.  Second, many of the ethical issues to consider were 
comparable to those from my US fieldwork, and so I implemented similar ethical 
procedures.  Alert to the issue of contested discourse and with the challenge of 
interviewing in a second language, though, I took additional measures aimed at 
ensuring my research did not deviate from ethical guidelines.  This included 
working with native speakers in the formulation of research materials.  Third, I 
applied my altered interview methodology to my Bolivian fieldwork.   
 
Although interview dynamics were comparable to those in the US, distinct 
themes were also present.  For example, several Bolivian interviewees related 
their accounts back to the legacy of the Cold War and critiques of the Morales 
regime.  In addition to this, I started to question more deeply the researcher-
researched relationship.  The notion of the ‘powerless researcher’, as assumed 
across the literature on elite interviewing, was challenged.  I recognised instead 
fluid relations, where both parties held power due to their respective positions.  
This caused me to reflect on my experiences of interviews in the US.  These 
issues and their implications for empirical analysis are outlined below. 
 
3.2.1 Gaining Access, Managing Resources and Defining the Field 
 
The primary aim of this leg of fieldwork was to conduct interviews with key 
actors from around the period of the Andean Initiative, as well as individuals 
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with general experience of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia.  This included members 
of the government, state officials and representatives of third-sector 
organisations.  I looked to explore the perspectives of these actors, comparing 
and contrasting these with the accounts of US officials.  I lay foundations for this 
fieldwork during a trip to Bolivia in the first year of my PhD: investigating the 
feasibility of my project and making contacts for my later return.  I thus started 
fieldwork with existing contacts and a good sense of the research environment.  
As well as interviewing these individuals for their own thoughts and experience 
of the case, I sought their advice on gaining further interviews.  I was able to 
‘snowball’ several interviews in this way.   
 
However, both here and throughout my fieldwork, interviewees were often 
unable to provide an introduction or contact details for other potential 
participants.  Many from within the population of interest had retired from 
public life and had fallen out of touch with their old peer group.  I tended 
instead to rely on making contact directly with interviewees, using internet 
searches and the phone directory to locate participants.  My success rate in 
finding interviewees was variable and ‘cold-calling’ may have placed individuals 
on the defensive.7  For example, I noted a degree of scepticism/suspicion from 
some individuals, questioning how I got their number and what the goals of my 
research were.  Having explained who I was, and why I was in contact, though, 
most were open to participate.  In total, I conducted 19 interviews over a two 
month period.   
 
My Bolivian interviews mirrored those I had gained in the US.  Most interviewees 
were from a similar cohort: mid- to high-ranking ex-government officials.  As in 
the US fieldwork, their accounts were rich with reflection and analysis of historic 
events and their role with them.  There were similarities too in the way these 
‘elites’ conducted themselves in the interviews; perhaps unsurprising given their 
shared demographics (gender and age) and professional background.  Most were 
confident and authoritative in giving their accounts.  Furthermore, these 
Bolivian and US interviewees often had dealings with each other in the 
                                         
7 This tactic was suggested to me by an existing contact in Bolivia, with experience of conducting 
research in the local context. 
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formulation and implementation of counterdrug policies.  Bolivian interviews 
then provided a counterpoint to those conducted in the US.  Officials from both 
sides interpreted the same events in different ways, drawing on different 
readings of history and ideologies, and outlining distinct motivations and beliefs.  
The juxtaposition of US and Bolivian fieldwork, and its implications for my 
research are discussed in the conclusion to the chapter. 
 
The limitations of my fieldwork strategy and the realities of managing resources, 
though, also shaped the focus of my analysis.  Certain sectors are not 
represented in my interview data set, such as low-level officials from the police 
and military.  This is partly a consequence of ‘snowballing’ interviews, i.e. my 
interviews clustered around one group.  Because I was generally unable to find 
names for police and military officers who had served around the era of the 
Andean Initiative, I was also unable to contact them directly.  I had sought 
access to the FECLN, el Ministro de Defensa and el Ministro del Interior, with 
the intention of using them as a gateway to this population.  In each case, 
emails, official requests and follow-up phone calls went unanswered.  I focused 
my resources on gaining interviews within the population I had already accessed.  
I sought to manage my resources and, in this sense, practical considerations of 
time and money influenced the analysis.   
 
This links into a wider process of ‘defining the field’.  Desmond (2004: 264) 
argues that ‘the demands of conducting a coherent piece of research’ force the 
researcher to demarcate the place and period of the research, and the 
population of interest.  But such demarcations are artificial.  For example, the 
function of state-narco interactions not only touches mid- to high-ranking 
officials, but traffickers and frontline police and military officials, as well as the 
coca growers and communities who occupy the intersection between the licit 
and illicit spheres.  While accounting for such factors in my analysis, I also 
narrowed my field of interest to the actors who formed and implemented 
counterdrug policy.  My research privileges their experience over the other 
groups mentioned.  In this sense, conducting fieldwork entailed a process of 
inclusion and exclusion of various actors (Ibid.).  Although these decisions were 
primarily based on theoretical concerns (producing ‘a coherent piece of 
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research’), such practical considerations inevitably shape the parameters of 
fieldwork. 
 
3.2.2 Establishing Credibility and Approaching Sensitive Topics  
 
Ethical safeguards formulated as part of my fieldwork in the US served as my 
template in Bolivia.  As the subject matter and population of interest were 
similar, I implemented similar ethical procedures along the dimensions of 
informed consent, confidentiality, and privacy.  However, I also considered the 
distinct issues I might face in conducting research in Bolivia.  My previous 
feasibility study was valuable in this regard.  I discussed my research with local 
organisations and familiarised myself with the Bolivian research environment.  In 
this way, I sought to apply a process of ‘risk management’ and follow the 
principle of ‘do no harm’.    
 
First, when setting-up interviews, I provided a letter of introduction from my 
supervisor alongside my own research information sheet.  This is customary in 
most of Latin America, but it may also have helped to establish my credentials 
as a researcher.  Alongside using the names of past participants during first 
contact, the introduction letter may have reassured interviewees of my 
credibility as a researcher (Knox, 2001; 211-213).  Second, some interviewees 
may have felt uncomfortable signing a consent form.  This is linked to historical 
factors around the country’s authoritarian past, where signing one’s name was 
associated with coercive and exploitative practices.  Although this would more 
commonly be associated with marginalised groups in Bolivia, I made provision for 
interviewees to give oral consent. 
 
My experience of contested discourse of the ‘war on drugs’ in the US also figured 
highly in my planning for the Bolivian fieldwork.  Prior to and during my 
fieldwork, I consulted with native Spanish speakers over the formulation of my 
research materials.  This was not simply a matter of translation.  I wanted to 
ensure that I approached potentially sensitive topics in an appropriate way, 
identifying phrases or words with wider connotations and ensuring that the tone 
of such materials was suitable.  Again, my use of language would determine ‘my 
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position’ in the eyes of interviewees.  In balancing the principle of transparent 
research (an ethical concern) and forming a rapport with the participant 
(avoiding language or terms that would alienate them), I provided cues for 
interviewees to construct an identity for me, e.g. as ‘critic’, ‘neutral’ or ‘ally’.8   
My gender, age and background, as well as the process of establishing credibility 
– letter of introduction, using the name of the university and/or a previous 
contact when arranging the interview – may also have prompted certain 
assumptions around ‘my position’ (McEvoy, 2006: 184).  Such factors have 
consequences, not only in terms of access, but in the kind of data interviews 
yield.  For example, whether the participant feels defensive and therefore 
downplays negative aspects, or confident, presenting more open reflections on 
their experience and drawing on assumed shared beliefs. 
 
Translations for both the information sheet and consent form reflected closely 
the amended versions from my US fieldwork; couched in neutral language but 
providing a clear outline of the research for the participant.  As part of this, I 
decided again to include the term ‘war on drugs’ – a key concept of my research 
– in these materials. 9  My use of the term, though, seemed to be less divisive in 
Bolivia: the Drug War was generally viewed as an external imposition on Bolivia 
and US influence has declined significantly in the country.  Indeed, it may have 
marked me as sympathetic to the Bolivian perspective, evoking the critical 
narrative of the ‘war on drugs’ which certain US officials railed against.   
 
The issue of corruption, meanwhile, was more sensitive.  Practically all arms of 
the Bolivian state have been implicated in drug corruption at one time or 
another, from the government and the judiciary, down to local authorities, the 
police and military.  In the case of the Paz Zamora administration, there were 
several high-profile scandals, with various members of the government accused 
of having links to the drug trade.  Furthermore, the notion of ‘the corrupt 
Bolivian state’ feeds into the discourse of the US Drug War Paradigm, which 
                                         
8 This is not to say that these two principles are necessarily in conflict with each other.  Around 
certain emotive issues, however, the researcher may be wary of presenting information which 
would be read as bias by the participant. 
9 I did note the use of several interchangeable terms for the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia.  For 
example, as well as ‘la guerra contra las drogas’, ‘la guerra contra el narcotráfico’ and ‘la lucha 
contra las drogas’. 
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blames the drug trade on producer countries.  Formulating questions on this 
topic, then, posed challenges.  In one sense, how I approached the topic would 
shape the interviewee’s perception of my positionality.  Additionally, there may 
have been a general reluctance to talk about corruption due to fears over 
incrimination of former colleagues, for example.  It was important, then, that I 
was non-accusatorial in my questioning.  In practice, this meant changing from 
direct questions on the subject to talking around ‘corruption’ and presenting 
alternative views for a response.  The following are sample questions from my 
interview schedules. 
 
Was there resistance in the Bolivian state to some elements of the US 
counterdrug approach? 
 
Can you describe relations between the US Embassy and the Bolivian 
Government?  I have read that the Embassy applied pressure on officials 
with presumed links to drug traffickers to force the Government to 
comply with US drug war goals.  
 
Annex III proposed a greater role for the Bolivian Military in counterdrug 
operations.  What was your opinion on this? 
 
In general during this period, was it difficult for the Bolivian Government 
to avoid contact with the illicit sphere?  For example, cocaine dollars had 
penetrated the national economy. 
 
Can you describe relations with the DEA?  From my previous interviews, 
several US officials stated that operational details were often withheld 
from UMOPAR until the last minute for fear that they would be leaked.  
How would you react to this? 
 
Despite these measures, at times, the mood of the interview would change as 
discussion moved into this area.  One interviewee refused to discuss accusations 
against former colleagues, while others seemed uncomfortable and had little to 
contribute on the topic.  Of course, these individuals may simply have been 
unwilling to make statements on such an ambiguous issue.  At other times, 
interviewees responded in interesting ways to the issue.  For example, some 
drew on conspiracy theories of US involvement in the trade and/or brought the 
discussion back to democratisation and development.  Although it cannot be said 
definitively what the effects of more direct questioning would have been on my 
interviews, this strategy helped to establish my identity as an unbiased, credible 
researcher, and contributed to a collaborative interview dynamic.   
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3.2.3 The Researcher-Researched Relationship 
 
I applied my amended interview methodology in Bolivia: semi-structured 
interviews, drawing on elements of the oral history tradition.  As stated 
previously, there were commonalities between the interviews in terms of their 
form, but different themes were present.  For example, where discrediting of 
the ‘war on drugs’ acted as a present-day contextualising factor in the US, 
Bolivian interviewees often related their accounts back to critiques of the 
Morales administration.  The rise of a former cocalero to the presidency has 
brought with it substantial changes to Bolivia’s counterdrug approach; chief 
among them, a diminished role for the US.  Some interviewees believed Bolivia’s 
problems with the trade had heightened under Morales, with suggestions that 
the administration had little interest in addressing the issue.  Former-Under-
Secretary for Alternative Development (1990-1993) Jose Salinas made an 
argument along these lines. 
 
I would say that there are many people from this government linked with 
drug trafficking.  Nothing is said about it, no-one uncovers anything, 
because they are well protected, right? ( . . . ) Furthermore, during the 
past few years, the Bolivian government…  Evo’s government… has 
expelled the DEA, who controlled (the trade); they’ve expelled USAID, so 
there are now no alternative development programs, no American 
programs.  There are no government programs of in the Trópico now, 
right?  These programs have died.  This has facilitated also more people 
entering drug production, because there was control and now there is no 
control.  The government says, ‘yes, the police are going to control it’, 
but this is simply a screen.  Drugs continue to be produced. (Salinas 
interview, 2014) 
 
There was also more general criticism of Morales.  For example, former-
President Jaime Paz Zamora argued that Morales’ confrontational approach with 
the US had been to the detriment of Bolivia, undoing a free trade agreement his 
government had put in place.10 
 
The other Andean countries, when they saw that we were negotiating (a 
free trade agreement) with the US, were brought into the negotiation and 
hence it became an Andean Initiative.  But the idea came from Bolivia. ( . 
                                         
10 Paz Zamora was referring to the APTA agreement, struck as part of the negotiations over the 
Andean Initiative. 
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. . ) The paradox now is that Ecuador, Peru and Colombia still, I think, 
continue to benefit from (that agreement), but not Bolivia, because Evo 
Morales manufactured a fight with Obama and (so) they refused free entry 
to the American market.  This is the paradox we have now. (Paz Zamora 
interview, 2014) 
 
Such critiques served as favourable comparisons to the political records of these 
actors.  Many accepted the flaws of past counterdrug policies and their inability 
to resist US pressure.  Criticising Morales helped to mediate these aspects of 
their account, hinting at the consequences of an alternative course of action.  In 
the examples above: ‘development efforts failed to make much progress in the 
Chapare, but the problem has worsened in their absence’; and ‘the US did 
impose drug war policies on Bolivia, but my administration extracted valuable 
concessions’.  These beliefs and explanations provided justification for their own 
role in the ‘war on drugs’.  My amended interview methodology helped to plug 
into these interpretations; uncovering the relationship between narrative, 
history and present-day context, and how these are used in self-representation 
(James, 2006: 86).   
 
These types of justifications had wider implications.  Interlocutors were working 
out their own understandings of events, but they were also trying to convince 
me as ‘the researcher’ of their point of view.  Robben (1995) conceptualises this 
process as ‘ethnographic seduction’: the personal defences and social strategies 
used by participants (consciously or unconsciously) to ‘seduce’ the researcher 
into adopting their worldview.  These include both verbal and non-verbal 
devices.  For example, Robben (Ibid: 90-91) describes the rhetorical skills of ex-
members of the Argentine junta in his interviews: ‘appealing both to my 
common sense and to the dispassionate logic of reason that is supposed to be 
the hallmark of a scientist.’  As part of this, these officials had assessed the 
identity of their interviewer, not only as ‘scientist’, but in terms of his gender, 
nationality, class and ideology.  More subtle influences were also at play: the 
palatial setting of the Buenos Aires Officers Club, the good manners of the 
officials and their charming and charismatic demeanour.  The collective effect 
of these factors is to lead the researcher away from their intended focus, 
subverting their understanding of the phenomena under study ‘by dissuading an 
inquiry beyond appearance’ (Ibid: 85).  Ex-members of the junta, then, 
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advanced technocratic explanations for their application of ‘dirty war’ tactics, 
grounded in the exceptional context of warfare.  These ‘logical’, dispassionate 
arguments did not address the morality of such actions, nor their devastating 
consequences.  Through their presentation, Robben’s interlocutors sought to 
change the parameters of the issue, and the standards against which they should 
be judged. 
 
I became more attuned to these dynamics during my Bolivian fieldwork.  In 
adopting elements of oral history, interpretations, justifications and the ways in 
which interviewees projected a particular agenda were already an important 
part of my methodology.  However, I began to question what effect they had on 
the researcher-researched relationship and, as a result, the conduct of my 
interviews, underlying assumptions and interpretation of the data.  For example, 
many of my interviewees were charismatic and effective speakers, with long 
careers in the public eye.  They had extensive experience (greater than mine) of 
interviews and presenting their arguments.  The framing of issues in the 
discourse of democratisation and development was part of this, as were 
references to the country’s authoritarian past.  These aspects of their account 
gave them and their accounts added weight, appealed to my sense of empathy 
over events in Bolivian history, and mediated critiques of Bolivian government 
corruption.  For example, former-Interior Minister Guillermo Capobianco (1989-
1991) outlined his generation’s efforts to establish democracy during the era of 
military authoritarianism. 
 
I studied in Chile for one year with a scholarship from Christian 
Democratic Party… I started in the Christian Democrats; my mother was a 
fervent Catholic.  So I went for one year to Santiago, Chile.  After, I spent 
almost three year in Belgium, at the University of Leuven, where future 
leaders went to be formed in Christian Democrat ideology.  This was in 
the 1970s. ( . . . )  So we were there for there for nearly three years, 
before we returned in secret to fight militarism, three years underground, 
clandestine against the dictatorship of General Banzer.  We defeated 
Banzer.  ( . . . )  The topic of drugs wasn’t a priority for us.  It wasn’t.  
Transforming the country was.  That the country enters a transition from 
the dictatorship of Banzer to democracy: this was our priority.  Political 
stability, economic stability, these were our priorities and the topic of 
drug was nothing… an important thing, but as I say, it wasn’t what I 
judge… it wasn’t the priority.  There were other more important things in 
that moment. (Capobianco interview, 2014) 
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The process of constructing ‘my position’ may have contributed to this, as the 
interlocutor subconsciously tailors their account to the perceived identity of the 
interviewer.  Linking back to oral history methodology, the account obtained is 
shaped by the interview situation itself, of which the researcher-researched 
relationship is a crucial component. 
 
Other social cues were also part of this ‘seduction’.  In one case, the 
interviewee sent his driver to pick me up and gave me a tour of his grand 
residence in the countryside.  In other cases, ‘trophies’ were presented in the 
form of photos of the interviewees with famous people, a ‘man of the year’ 
award from a Bolivian magazine, and a presidential letter.  These acts certainly 
demonstrated the courtesy of interviewees and their willingness to aid me with 
my research.  However, they may also be viewed as an effort to impress upon 
me the importance and seriousness of the participant; part of a subconscious 
effort to sway me to their worldview.  Although my aim was to facilitate the 
interviewee’s own understanding of events, the interview was also an 
opportunity for the interviewee to convince me of their interpretation.   
 
This insight challenges the idea of the ‘powerless researcher’ in researching 
elites.  This is prevalent in the literature on elite interviewing, where 
‘interviewing up’ is assumed to pose distinct challenges to ‘those encountered in 
studying down’ (Desmond, 2004: 265).  For example, the researcher is overly 
dependent on a narrow elite group for access and cooperation,11 and elites will 
use this ‘power’ to control the interview/researcher.  This conception of the 
researcher-researched relationship, though, underplays the various facets of the 
researcher’s power.  As ‘researcher’, I was viewed to be the keeper of the 
historical record, with power to shape how a wider audience saw the 
interviewee and their role in events.  In other words, these informants had a 
stake in making me adopt their ‘truths’: ‘we will retell their stories and through 
our investiture as scientists provide them with the halo of objectivity that our 
                                         
11 The prospect of denial of access, both at the time and for future research, places the 
researcher in a difficult position (Aldred, 2008: 894).  He/she may be reluctant to be overly 
critical or challenging for fear of impeding their research. 
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academic stature entails’ (Robben, 1995: 97).  In addition to this, I defined the 
field of interest, including and excluding certain actors from my analysis.  
Furthermore, having given their account, the participant has little control over 
how their responses will be interpreted and integrated into the researcher’s 
thesis (Morris, 2009: 214).  Indeed, many individuals requested I check back 
before using direct, attributable quotes.12  This was arguably a defensive 
mechanism, aimed reclaiming a degree of control and contradicting the idea of 
the ‘powerless researcher’ (Desmond, 2004: 265-266).  Relations of power, then, 
were fluid.  In this way, the researcher is neither inherently powerless or 
empowered (Aldred, 2008: 892; Smith, 2006: 650). 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, my methodology and experience of fieldwork had numerous 
implications for analysis.  For example, this shaped my shift to oral history 
methods, my focus on elite interpretations of state-narco networks, and the 
historical perspective of the thesis.  These elements of my approach were key to 
several of my original findings.  Through exposition of these aspects of the 
research process, the chapter contributes to methodological knowledge, 
including interviewing elites and oral history, and research on political sensitive 
topics and illicit practices.   
 
Finally, the juxtaposition of US and Bolivian fieldwork had a profound impact on 
my approach by clarifying the contrast between distinct US and Bolivian 
accounts of the ‘war on drugs’ and differing interpretations of state-narco 
interactions.  During both periods of fieldwork, I interviewed former political 
leaders and state officials on their experiences of the implementation of the 
Andean Initiative.   There was often divergence between US and Bolivian 
interviewees on how they conceptualised problems and interpreted events.  The 
former viewed the issue through the prism of the Drug War Paradigm, while the 
latter drew on discourse of development and the legacy of the Cold War.  US 
interviewees, for example, typically explained Bolivian corruption through weak 
                                         
12 All participants who requested this courtesy were duly contacted.  Each of them responded, 
and all were comfortable with the quotes being used with some minor corrections. 
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institutions, and/or personal enrichment/greed.  These elements were also 
present in the accounts of Bolivian interviewees, but so too was the lineage of 
state-narco links from the authoritarian era to post-democratisation.  The 
potential consequences of challenging such system for political order, the 
economy and, by extension, Bolivia’s democratisation, figured highly in their 
accounts.  As shown in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, these different discursive frameworks 
were used in the accounts of interlocutors.  In adopting elements of an oral 
history methodology, my analysis draws out the diverging interpretations and 
meanings key actors have attached to the period: identifying competing 
narratives and US-Bolivian contestation around state-narco networks and the 
‘war on drugs’.   
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Chapter 4|The Development of State-Narco 
Networks (1964-1989) 
 
Authoritarian military government benefitted the development of Bolivia’s coca-
cocaine economy.  Shared interests were established between the state and the 
drug trade under the regime of René Barrientos in the 1960s, developing during 
the Banzer period and the cocaine boom of the 1970s, before reaching their 
zenith with García Meza (1980-1981).  Regime leaders used rents from the coca-
cocaine trade to solidify patron-client relations and so engender the support of 
factions within the state and wider society.  As such, they provided protection 
for the expansion of illicit enterprise in Bolivia.  Forming variable patterns of 
state-narco networks, these stable modes of exchange contributed to stability in 
the drug trade.  Drug traffickers sought accommodation with the state rather 
than conflict.  Authoritarianism and US Cold War politics facilitated such 
systems, while Bolivia’s clientelistic politics ‘normalised’ such practices.  As 
opposed to representing state weakness, the drug arena was colonised and 
fostered by factions of the Bolivian state to advance particularistic interests.   
 
Democratic transition in 1982 and evolving US foreign policy priorities in Bolivia 
threatened to dismantle the state-narco nexus.  For example, institutionalisation 
of democratic norms of accountability and transparency would expose 
interlinkages between the state and the illicit sphere; the extension of the Drug 
War Paradigm would target corrupt officials.   But despite these changing 
domestic and international dynamics, Bolivia’s state-narco networks adapted 
and survived.  As the old political order and its factional coalitions fractured, so 
too did their attendant state-narco complexes.  These networks became 
atomised as power became more diffuse.  Drug traffickers sought patron-client 
bonds, not only with elements of the military, but an emboldened police 
institution and the political parties.  Local actors mediated and circumvented 
counterdrug policies imposed from above, resisting the onset of US control.  
Clientelistic and authoritarian practices, including police and military autonomy, 
continued into the post-transition period; indicative of Bolivia’s uneven 
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democracy.  While incompatible with a democratic rule of law, these networks 
formed part of Bolivia’s fragile political equilibrium.   
 
In this chapter, I trace the development of Bolivia’s state-narco networks using 
both existing literature and primary document sources.  This serves as important 
context for later chapters, and demonstrates the interaction between Bolivia’s 
historical trajectory and the coca-cocaine economy.  As such, the chapter shows 
continuity and change in Bolivian state-narco networks from the authoritarian 
period to transition, and Cold War to Drug War.  This analysis also provides new 
insights into the relationship between the illicit economy and the state, such as 
the integration of emerging drug rents into long-standing clientelistic practices 
and their role in ‘regulating’ the drug trade, and the effects of international 
transformations on these relations.  This historic overview thus spans: the 
Barrientos regime and its model of patron-client politics (1964-1969); Banzer’s 
role in the cocaine boom of the 1970s (1971-1978); the ‘cocaine-coup’ of García 
Meza (1980-1981); and the post-transition governments of Siles Suazo (1982-
1985) and Paz Estensorro (1985-1989).  As part of this, key aspects of Bolivian 
history and their effects on the form and function of state-narco networks are 
examined.  These include: the legacy of the 1952 Revolution, Cold War politics, 
democratisation in 1982, the advancement of neoliberal structural reforms 
under Paz Estensorro, and the emergence of the modern US ‘war on drugs’.  The 
evolving structure of the drug trade and its ties to the state are placed in the 
context of wider social, political and economic forces; moving beyond the 
conventional analyses of mainstream accounts of drugs.       
 
4.1 Patron-Client Relations and the Barrientos Regime (1964-
1969) 
 
The Bolivian military was temporarily disbanded following the National 
Revolution of 1952.  It had been a prominent political force throughout Bolivian 
history, but military leaders were swept aside by the populist Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and their allies (Dunkerley, 1984: 39).  The 
new MNR government, led by Víctor Paz Estensorro (1952-1956), re-established 
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the institution and attempted to instil within it the values of the revolution.1  
This also meant diminishing its internal role through a radical overhaul of its 
personnel and funding.  By the 1960s, though, the military had re-emerged as a 
potent, autonomous political actor (Malloy, 1977: 475).   
 
As the divided MNR government struggled to resolve economic crisis and 
maintain societal support, Paz Estensorro (elected to serve his second term as 
president in 1960) looked to co-opt the military’s political support through 
increased funding (Lehman, 1999: 149-50; Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 95).2  In so 
doing, the MNR re-legitimised the military’s political role.  This was reinforced 
by increased US military aid to Bolivia.  Reacting to the Cuban Revolution, 
President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and the new US National 
Security Doctrine supported an enhanced domestic role for the Bolivian Military; 
as supposed agents for development and a bulwark against Leftist influence.  US 
foreign aid accounted for 20 per cent of Bolivian GDP by 1964, making Paz 
Estensorro’s government reticent to challenge encroaching US influence (Field 
Jr., 2012: 149).  The conditions were thus set for the military’s return to 
government.   
 
Supported by the Pentagon – at least tacitly – General René Barrientos3 headed a 
coup that took power from Paz Estensorro in November 1964 (Lehman, 1999: 
141).  With the MNR seemingly unable to resolve unrest from across sectors, 
including the country’s crucial tin mining industry, Barrientos’ regime promised 
to restore political order and suppress ‘radical’ elements within Bolivia.  But in 
comparison to incoming military regimes in Brazil and Argentina, the Bolivian 
                                         
1 Mesa, et. al. (2008: 521) describes how the MNR sought to replicate the corporatist, one-party 
state model of the PRI in Mexico.  In this sense, they asked the military to swear loyalty to the 
party, rather than the nation (or la Patria).  This entailed restructuring, reappointment, and the 
establishment of a new officer corps.  In the end, this same officer corps would get rid of the 
MNR, claiming they were ‘saving the revolution’. 
2 Hernan Siles Suazo served as president between Paz Estensorro’s two terms.  Although 
generally anti-military, Siles Suazo also deployed the military to restore domestic order during 
his administration (Lehman, 1999: 150). 
3 Barrientos had, in fact, run alongside Paz Estensorro on the MNR presidential ticket as vice-
president.  He held political ambitions, though, and maintained links to anti-MNR elements 
within the military and exploited US doubts over the viability of Paz Estensorro’s leadership 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 114-119). 
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military was divided and lacked modernisation (Dunkerley, 1984: 120-122).4  
Divisions existed along the military’s role in national development and security, 
for example, as well as its relationship with the US (Morales, 1992b: 359).  The 
Barrientos regime was personalistic, representing a faction within the institution 
rather than a unified military government.   
 
In Bolivia’s fragmented state and society,5 the regime relied on clientelistic 
relations to sustain itself in power (Malloy, 1977: 479).6  Lehman (1999: xii) 
argues that it has been one of the defining elements of Bolivian political culture, 
rooted in the country’s history of exploitation and dependency.  Barrientos thus 
formed the Pacto Militar-Campesino with the rural sector to establish a base of 
societal support.  This committed the military to the protection of gains made 
by campesinos during the revolution, such as agrarian reform, in return for 
unwavering loyalty (Mitchell, 1977: 98).  In addition to this, though, clientelism 
was used build factional coalitions within the state itself.  Malloy & Gamarra 
(1987: 98) argue that ‘given the dependent nature of political institutions, the 
real basis of executive and state power was military force.’  Therefore, 
Barrientos’ ability to engender the support of the military through patron-client 
ties was fundamental to his rule.  The (re-)emerging coca-cocaine trade was 
incorporated into the government’s clientelistic system.7  
 
 
 
                                         
4 Although regionally, the Bolivian military was not unusual, as   Pion-Berlin (2001: 24) argues: 
‘the typical Latin American military is a divided one, with officers clustered into factions that 
reside within or across services, functions, and ranks and embrace their own ideas.’   
5 The Bolivian state lacked modernisation and strong centralisation, while different sectors were 
frequently in competition, e.g. rural peasants, landowners, urban middle-classes, business and 
organised labour (see Dunkerley, 1984). 
6 Repression was also an important tool of governance for the Barrientos regime. Sectors who 
would not be co-opted through patronage, e.g. the Left, faced brutal repression.   The June 
1965 San Juan massacre of at least 87 miners and their family members, agitating for workers’ 
rights, demonstrated the regime’s willingness to use violence to hold power (Dunkerley, 1984: 
148). 
7 The coca-cocaine economy’s history in Bolivia stretched back to the discovery of cocaine during 
the mid 19th century.  US and European demand for cocaine medicines and consumer products, 
most notably Coca-Cola and Vin Mariani, transformed Bolivian coca into an international 
commodity (see Gootenberg, 2008). 
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4.1.1 The Nascent Coca-Cocaine Trade and Early State-Narco 
Networks 
 
Compared to what was to come, Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy was relatively 
minor in the 1960s.  Producers and traffickers were small-scale, disparate, and 
poorly integrated, while coca cultivation for illicit purposes was still at modest 
levels.  The coca-cocaine trade, though, was growing, and Bolivia was at its 
centre.  The turbulence of the immediate post-1952 period had allowed 
trafficking operations to take hold within the country (Gootenberg, 2012: 163-
164).  Allied to this, peasant migration to the Chapare coincided with the 
emergence of coca processing and trafficking operations in Santa Cruz and the 
Beni.8   
 
Both of these latter phenomena were linked to the program of post-1952 land 
reform and the development of Bolivia’s subtropical and lowland regions. In 
1950, for example, the traditional coca zone of the Yungas near La Paz had 
accounted for 67 per cent of total Bolivian coca cultivation; by 1967, the 
Chapare had overtaken it and accounted for over half (Justiniano, et. al., 1991: 
79).  Although the total area of cultivation was steady during this period and 
remained primarily directed to the domestic market, larger yields in the 
Chapare (Ibid.) suggested that sizeable amounts of coca were being syphoned to 
processing labs.  Some estimates indicated that around half of Bolivia’s coca was 
being used for illicit purposes by 1962 (Gootenberg, 2008: 286).  Meanwhile, the 
vast, remote Beni department provided cover for clandestine labs, and Santa 
Cruz increasingly became known as a hub for trafficking operations (Gootenberg, 
2008: 286; Rodas M., 1996: 52).9  These areas had comparative advantages over 
the Yungas and the Chapare: their geography enabled traffickers to easily hide 
their production facilities and transport operations (Bascopé, 1982: 58-59).  
Local elites – cattle ranchers in the Beni and agri-business interests in Santa Cruz 
– also helped to foster the trade.  With both groups benefitting from growth in 
                                         
8 See Appendix D for a map of Bolivia. 
9 Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s ill-fated guerrilleros, who based their operations in Ñancahuazú on the 
edge of the department of Santa Cruz, were first identified by a Bolivian police unit investigating 
reports of a possible cocaine smuggling operation (Salazar O., 2009: 246). 
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agricultural exports, they started to invest their profits in coca-cocaine ventures 
(Hargreaves, 1992: 57).   
 
As coca-cocaine was a peripheral part of the national economy in the 1960s 
(Canelas O. & Canelas Z., 1983), the regime relied more heavily on other forms 
of patronage to sustain itself in power, such as its control over US military aid 
and the Pacto Militar-Campesino.  Nevertheless, Barrientos utilised spoils from 
the drug trade in the creation of patron-client relationships.  State-narco 
networks functioned through both benefit and the threat of sanction.  The 
regime sought to solidify support within the state, primarily the military and the 
police,10 by distributing rents from the drug trade (Rodas M., 1996: 51).  
Barrientos encouraged supporters within these institutions to facilitate, and 
profit from, cocaine production in the departments of the Beni and Santa Cruz.  
As well as buying support, this form of patronage also gave Barrientos leverage 
over political actors.  The benefits of continued support for the regime sat 
alongside the fear of being exposed as corrupt (Roncken, 1997a: 37).   
 
Further to this, lands were granted to backers of government in Bolivia’s eastern 
departments.  Barrientos had courted the peasant sector and presented itself as 
being in line with one of the key principles of 1952 revolution: land reform.  But 
rather than advancing the cause of agrarian reform for campesinos, the 
government awarded ‘larger plots to fewer people in a more discrete 
exploitation of the statute for political ends’ (Dunkerley, 1984: 132).  As well as 
benefitting newly emerging agricultural elites, parcels of land in the Beni and 
Santa Cruz would be used by military officers to set-up processing labs and 
hidden landing strip (Thoumi, 2003: 120).  These operated under the protection 
of the regime.  As well as reinforcing support, these practices helped to create 
linkages between the state and the nascent drug trade.  Relationships were 
formed which would develop alongside the growth of the coca-cocaine economy.   
 
                                         
10 Quintana (2005: 57) argues that the police were subordinated to the military by Barrientos.  
This included changing their role, structure and depoliticising the institution.  They were used by 
the military regime to repress societal opposition, under the National Security Doctrinal notion 
of fighting ‘enemies of the state and public order’ (Barrios M., 1994: 99).   
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During this period, the US was largely disinterested in Bolivia’s drug issue 
(Brewin, 1990: 51; Gamarra, 1999a: 182).  While the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
(FBN) had noted Bolivia’s growing role in the trade (Gootenberg, 2008: 276), 
Cold War goals dominated US foreign policy in the region.  The US looked on 
military institutions throughout the Americas as partners against the spread of 
Soviet influence.  The Bolivian military was no different and became closely tied 
to the US through funding and training provision.  In 1963, for example, the 
entire senior class of the Bolivian military academy was trained in jungle warfare 
at the School of the Americas, while in the same year Bolivia had more 
graduates from the US Army Special Warfare School in Fort Bragg than any of its 
Latin American neighbours (Lehman, 1999: 151).  Anecdotal evidence suggest 
that the Pentagon was willing to ‘turn a blind eye’ to the indiscretions of its 
anti-communist security partners in the South (Gamarra, 1999: 183).  Members 
of the Bolivian Left, though, received different treatment.  Exposing supposed 
links to the drug trade served to discredit opponents of US policy.  For example, 
labour leader and then MNR vice-president Juan Lechín was subject to 
accusations of drug corruption from the US Embassy and Bolivia’s right-wing 
press in 1961 (Gootenberg, 2008: 282-4).  Whether accurate or not, the episode 
contributed to Lechín’s isolation from the MNR and (temporary) withdrawal from 
Bolivian politics.  As described above, this political tactic was adopted by 
Barrientos (Rodas M., 1996: 51); a method of control where the drug trade is 
used to manipulate perceived rivals.   
 
Under the Barrientos regime, therefore, state-narco networks were folded into a 
clientelistic mode of governance.  Snyder’s (2006: 954) definition of joint-wealth 
extraction echoes with Bolivia’s patron-client politics: ‘informal bargains rooted 
in personal ties among rulers their cronies, and private elites.’  Coca-cocaine 
rents were simply another source of patronage for Barrientos to distribute, 
designed to bind state factions to the regime.  The threat of enforcement, i.e. 
exposing drug corruption, guarded against fragmentation of support.  State 
institutions, the military and the police primarily, began to occupy this growing 
trade and so it became integrated into political structures.  In the absence of 
accountability and transparency, Barrientos had few limits on the dispensation 
of patronage; even in the ostensibly illicit coca-cocaine economy.  These 
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systems were relatively ad hoc, reflecting the nature of the trade at this time.  
As discussed in the next section, though, the growth and consolidation of the 
drug trade dovetailed with the deepening of Bolivia’s state-narco networks.   
 
4.2 Banzerato State-Narco Networks (1971-1978)  
 
Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1969,11 sparking a scramble 
for power between ‘array of personalistic and quasi-ideological’ blocs within the 
military (Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 99).  Over a turbulent two year period, Left-
leaning regimes headed by General Alfredo Ovando (Sep. 1969 – Oct. 1970) and 
then General Juan José Torres (Oct. 1970 – Aug. 1971) sought to consolidate 
their power.  The military’s conservative elements, though, united behind 
General Hugo Banzer.  Supported by the middle-classes, fearful of the rise of the 
Left (Mesa, et. al., 2008: 547), Banzer staged a successful coup in August 1971.  
The period again demonstrated the factionalised nature of the Bolivian Military.  
Where Ovando and Torres had struggled to build a solid base of support, 
Banzer’s regime achieved stability.  Based on ‘the manipulation of byzantine 
clientelistic networks’ (Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 103) and with US-backing,12 
Banzer held power for close to seven years.   
 
The Banzer government shared characteristics with the Barrientos era.  As part 
of this, the repression tactics favoured by Barrientos and other contemporary 
South American military governments were utilised.  At times, these were 
turned against military rivals, but more frequently they were used to silence 
dissent from societal opponents, such as members of the Bolivian Left (see 
Dunkerley, 1984: 206).  Banzer also used of drug rents as a form of patronage.  
The cocaine boom of the 1970s and the mid-decade collapse of international 
cotton prices, though, meant that coca-cocaine took on greater importance.  
Links between the ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ spheres were extended, creating complex 
                                         
11 There were suspicions that Barrientos had been the victim of sabotage.  Major Faustino Rico 
Toro, who would serve under the García Meza regime and was at the centre of political scandal 
during the Paz Zamora administration, was held on charges related to the incident, but 
subsequently released (Dunkerley, 1984: 156). 
12 Banzer had strong connections to the US, serving previously as military attaché in Washington 
and training at the School of the Americas (Lehman, 1999: 165). 
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state-narco networks.  Crucial to these dynamics were Banzer’s close ties to 
Santa Cruz. 
 
Bolivia’s eastern departments had become the engine of the national economy 
over the first few years of the regime.  In addition to the region’s booming 
nationalised oil and gas industry, agricultural exports grew rapidly.  Although the 
development of the eastern lowlands had been initiated by the MNR and 
supported by US assistance in the 1950s (Lehman, 1999: 185), Banzer made the 
region a focus of government policy.  Where Barrientos had formed the Pacto 
Militar-Campesino as a source of societal support, Banzer – as a Cruceño himself 
– looked to the emerging agri-business elite (Rodas M., 1996: 54).  As such, the 
regime sought patron-client relations with this group: ‘not with a class as such, 
but with individuals and groups who became his personal retainers’ (Malloy & 
Gamarra, 1987: 104).  The growth of agricultural exports was encouraged by 
favourable fiscal policies, subsidies, development aid, and cheap credit.  For 
example, the state-backed Banco Agrícola de Bolivia (BAB) was a key financer 
for Santa Cruz-based business.  Between 1972 and ’77, loans to this sector 
constituted 67 per cent of the BAB’s total lending (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 
57).  Furthermore, Banzer’s government ramped-up the Barrientos practice of 
exploiting land reform laws as a form of patronage (Rodas M., 1996: 55).  
 
Santa Cruz’s new prosperity extended beyond the landowners transforming 
themselves into large-scale agricultural producers, to the private banks financing 
expansion and the hallmark commercial businesses of a boom town, such as car 
dealerships and import houses (UDAPE, 1990).  As noted previously, some of the 
region’s excess wealth was already being diverted to coca-cocaine ventures in 
the 1960s.  However, the collapse of cotton prices in 1975-1976 marked a 
watershed in the Santa Cruz elite’s relationship to the coca-cocaine economy 
(Ramos S., 1980).  High prices for cotton had brought large investments in the 
crop, leading to an increase of 70 per cent in the total area under cultivation 
between 1972 and 1975.  This extension was largely fuelled by loans from the 
BAB.  When market prices fell dramatically, therefore, both producers and the 
bank were left in financial difficulty.  The coca-cocaine trade offered a solution.   
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Increasing demand for Andean cocaine in the US and lucrative returns on 
investments meant that many cotton producers became involved in the drug 
trade (Malamud-Goti, 1992: 10).13  In the second half of the 1970s, the coca-
cocaine economy would grow exponentially in Santa Cruz and the neighbouring 
Beni department as agri-business elites turned their attention to illicit 
enterprise.  Large increases in coca cultivation in the Chapare, which was crucial 
to the growth of the drug trade in Bolivia, were indicative of this trend.  By the 
time Banzer left office in 1978, the area of coca cultivation in Bolivia had 
increased from 5,340 hectares in 1971 to 18,860 hectares, with the Chapare 
accounting for almost 80 per cent of this final total (Justiniano, et. al., 1991: 
79).  During this period, ‘the illegal industry grew and developed a tight nexus 
with Santa Cruz’s elite and the military’ (Aguilo, 1992: 52). 
 
4.2.1 From Cotton to Cocaine 
 
Bolivian journalist René Bascopé (1982: Ch. 3) suggests intimate state 
involvement in the shift from cotton to cocaine.  Bascopé claims that the regime 
was warned of the impending fall in cotton prices by the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) and so proceeded to carry out a detailed study of the 
coca-cocaine market as a possible substitute.  This included the identification of 
current producers and traffickers, investigation of production methods and 
access to precursors, and planning of trafficking routes.  The plan was then put 
into action in alliance with members of the Asociación de Productores de 
Algodón (ADEPA – Cotton Producers Association).  Lands of ADEPA members north 
of Santa Cruz were used to set-up new processing labs and landing strips, while 
the BAB continued to provide credit, this time, to directly finance the drug trade 
(Canelas O. & Canelas Z., 1983: 130; Lee III, 1991: 119; Malamud-Goti, 1992: 
72).  This analysis would suggest the development of the coca-cocaine industry 
was largely state-led during this period.  Considering this through the lens of 
Banzer’s clientelistic mode of governance, the regime sought to exploit coca-
cocaine revenues to maintain patron-client relations with agri-business elites.  
                                         
13 Lehman (1999: 186) states that some cotton producer instead turned to sugar production.  
Towards the end of the 1970s, though, a fall in this market meant that these producers also 
began to invest in coca-cocaine.  
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As well as making up for shortfalls in economic growth and loan defaults caused 
by plummeting cotton prices, coca-cocaine rents served to underpin an 
important societal base of regime support. 
 
Bascopé (1982: 90-91) argues that this ADEPA-Santa Cruz operation constituted 
one of three geographical axes of the Bolivia coca-cocaine trade at this time.  In 
addition to the state planning and financial backing described above, ADEPA’s 
shift into cocaine was supplemented by personal links between state actors and 
traffickers.  Most notably, Roberto Suárez Gómez – el Rey de la Cocaína (the 
King of Cocaine) – was well-connected to Bolivia’s elite circles (Gamarra, 1999b: 
176).  Suárez came from an ‘aristocratic’ Bolivian family, who had made their 
fortune in rubber around the turn of the nineteenth century.  They had historic 
ties to the military stretching back to Bolivia’s 1902 war with Brazil (Levy, 2012: 
Ch. 1).  Suárez was first cousin to Colonel Luís Arce Gómez; later dubbed García 
Meza’s ‘Minister, but at this stage, still establishing his connections to the drug 
trade.  He had also been gifted lands by Banzer (Aguilo, 1992:251).  A network of 
shared interest was formed through such personal links: patron-client relations 
running between state and economic elites.  Other prominent landowners in the 
ADEPA-Santa Cruz axis contributed to this network, such as Banzer’s brother, 
Wily Banzer Ojopi, who was reputed to have made the transition from cotton to 
cocaine (Ibid.). 
 
The second axis of the coca-cocaine trade was centred in the Beni, and focused 
more on transportation than coca processing.  The Medellin Cartel had become a 
major force in the Andean coca-cocaine economy, buying-up sizeable amounts of 
Bolivian coca paste to feed their supply chain to the US (Gamarra, 1999b: 176).  
Local traffickers, such as Suárez, developed relationships with counterparts in 
Colombia.  Light-aircraft, though, were unable to make the non-stop flight from 
Santa Cruz to the southern Colombian town of Leticia – the entry point for coca 
paste to Colombia (Dunkerley, 1984: 316).  They were forced to make stop-overs 
in the Beni.  These operations were facilitated by the department’s sparse 
population, remoteness and thousands of hidden landing strips.  As a result, 
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Suárez’s home town of Santa Ana de Yacuma became an important centre for 
Bolivian trafficking operations.14     
 
Military allies of the Banzer government also benefitted from the Beni’s growing 
importance to the Andean coca-cocaine trade.  Redistribution of lands had been 
accelerated under Banzer, and many military officers had been granted lands in 
the Beni (Rodas M., 1996: 55; Bascopé, 1982: 76).  Such officers, working 
alongside local land-owning elites (Hargreaves, 1992: 58), were able to extract 
rents for use of their land as a logistical stop-off point for trafficker flights.  
Their connections to the government guarded against external interference.  As 
the coca-cocaine trade grew, several officers made the transition into drug 
trafficking (Hargreaves, 1992: 110).  More formal institutional involvement was 
also alleged.  Paraparáu, a privately owned cattle farm, was taken over by René 
Barrientos in 1966 and later inherited by la Corporación de las Fuerzas Armadas 
para el Desarrollo Nacional (COFADENA) –  the development arm of the Bolivian 
military set-up in 1972.  COFADENA became implicated in processing and 
trafficking operations at Paraparáu.  Commander of the powerful Second Army 
Corps of Santa Cruz, Hugo Echeverría, was rumoured to have oversight over this 
operation (Bascopé, 1982: 63).   
 
The third geographical axis of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine trade was based on the 
border area between the departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.  It had 
quietly emerged around 1977 as an important producer of coca paste (Ibid: 92).  
This group was believed to be composed of traditional large landowners, and 
based in bonds of kinship (Dunkerley, 1984: 317).  Here as well, elements of the 
axis were linked to the military, e.g. prominent trafficker, Willy Sandóval Morón, 
was an advisor to Arce Gómez (Bascopé, 1982: 95).  These types of interactions – 
along all three axes – would suggest that drug rents had become entrenched in 
the Bolivian state, forming a system of patronage to reinforce the authority of 
the Banzer government. 
 
                                         
14 The ‘King of Cocaine’ exploited his twin lands in Santa Cruz and the Beni to extend his 
business.   
Chapter 4  115 
 
While in other drug producer/transit nations, the existence of distinct axes of 
drug trafficking might be associated with competition and violence, in Bolivia, 
relations were cordial and cooperative.  This breaks with mainstream accounts 
of Latin American narco-violence.  These groups avoided violent confrontation 
with each other, preferring collaboration.  Various explanations have been 
proposed for this, e.g. the role of personal ties and the closeness of Bolivia’s 
elites (Rodas M., 1996: 217); cultural factors, i.e. the influence of Bolivian 
‘Indian society’, which is considered to be less violent and seeks peaceful 
resolution to conflict (Thoumi, 2003: 250); and/or profits were enhanced by 
cooperation, hence the avoidance of competition.  The function of state-narco 
networks, though, can also be added to this list.  The account presented above 
suggests that the state, more specifically the regime and its military allies, had 
a large degree of control over the operation of the drug trade.  As such, 
trafficking was subsumed into a centralised political structure and a level of 
political order was maintained.   
 
The restructuring of the drug trade along these three axes was part of this: 
streamlining state-narco interactions.  Over the course of the decade, existing 
small-scale producers were marginalised by state-linked trafficker networks: 
losing their land, absorbed into the new axes, arrested or assassinated (Bascopé, 
1982: 60).  The consolidation of the Bolivian trade by state-narco networks was 
also accelerated by the consolidation of trafficking routes and cocaine 
processing by Colombian export syndicates (Gootenberg, 2008: 306).  In effect, 
the Cartels turned the Andean coca-cocaine economy from ‘mom and pop’-type 
operations into a multinational, corporate business.  Bolivian traffickers were 
vertically integrated into expanding Colombian transit chains.  Snyder & 
Martinéz (2009: 256) note that this kind of consolidation eases systems of rent 
extraction, by reducing the number of actors and creating more certain 
transactions.  As such, the colonisation of the drug trade by the state and the 
consolidation of its structure helped to create more stable modes of joint-wealth 
extraction.  
 
 
 
Chapter 4  116 
 
4.2.2 A Note of Caution  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a certain degree of uncertainty around the 
veracity of claims on the nature of state-narco interactions.  Aspects of 
Bascopé’s thesis outlined above are certainly open to challenge.   First, his 
journalistic account is based largely on informant and second-hand accounts, 
which may be embellished and/or distorted by rumour.  Additionally, Thoumi 
(2003: 119) casts doubt on one of Bascopé’s key claims, stating that it was highly 
unlikely that the IADB would have had the capacity to predict, years in advance, 
the dramatic fall in cotton prices.  As such, the claim that the state actively led 
a process of substitution – cotton for cocaine – may be called into question.  
While Dunkerley (1984: 315) gives credence to Bascopé’s three axes assessment 
of the Bolivian drug trade in the 1970s, he takes the position that 
incontrovertible evidence ‘to prove a concrete policy of unqualified state 
backing and patronage under Banzer’ is absent’.   
 
But whether one accepts the theory of a centrally planned state-led expansion 
of the coca-cocaine economy or not, it is difficult to refute the development of 
state-narco links during Banzer’s regime.  Thoumi (2003: 351) argues that 
Bolivia’s authoritarianism, overtly-political military institution and small elite 
meant that ‘the illegal drug industry had to involve people close to the top of 
the power structure to operate successfully’.  In other words, the significant 
expansion of any industry in Bolivia – even an illicit one – would not have 
escaped the attention of Banzer’s military authoritarian government.  At the 
very least, the trade would have required the general ambivalence of the 
regime, occasional backing and high-level co-conspirators in order to function 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 315).  In this way, state-narco networks formed one facet of 
Banzer’s clientelistic mode of governance.  This analysis demonstrates the 
integration of the illicit economy into the political complexes of Bolivian military 
authoritarian government.  The stability of these modes of exchanges was a 
factor in the largely non-violent, stable Bolivian coca-cocaine economy.  These 
findings thus challenge conventional analyses of drugs linking the illicit trades 
with state weakness and violence. 
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4.3 The ‘Cocaine-Coup’: García Meza’s Regime (1980-1981) 
 
The Banzer regime ran into problems similar to those experienced by other 
military authoritarian governments in the region.  Economic mismanagement of 
key resources, such as tin and oil, and profligate government spending had led to 
a ramping-up of foreign debt.  In the absence of legitimacy at the ballot box, 
the delivery of economic development and modernisation was viewed as a 
substitute by authoritarian regimes of the period (Loveman & Davis, 1997: 8).  
By 1978, though, it was apparent that economic growth achieved under Banzer 
was built on insecure foundations (Lehman, 1999: 168).  In addition to this, 
suppressed popular sectors began to assert political demands.  This included the 
labour movement, the peasant sector and political parties from across the 
spectrum (Rodas M., 1996: 65).  While coca-cocaine had acted as an important 
tool in the maintenance of certain patron-client relations, the regime lacked the 
political ‘legitimacy’ of a wide-base societal support.  Even within the military 
itself, support for Banzer was less stable than it appeared, as factions of officers 
pursued their own political ambitions (Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 108).  This 
would suggest that the government’s control over drug rents was also insecure, 
i.e. allies and rivals could pursue rent extraction independently of the regime.  
Furthermore, the government’s international patron changed tack.  Jimmy 
Carter was elected to the US presidency in 1977 and took action to advance 
human rights and democracy in the Americas.  As part of this, Banzer was 
pressured to open-up the political system (Gamarra, 1999a: 186).   
 
The government’s efforts to hold onto power, while satisfying both US demands 
and those from Bolivian society backfired; leading to a period of political 
contestation.  Banzer’s chosen successor, General Juan Pereda Asbún, was 
elected in limited elections in July 1978, but was unable to sustain the regime 
(Lehman, 1999: 170).  Two year of political instability ensued, with further 
elections failing to provide a decisive result and the military continuing to flex 
its political muscle.  Finally, elections in June 1980 delivered a clear win for 
Unidad Democrática y Popular (UDP) – an alliance of Leftist political parties 
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headed by Hernan Siles Suazo.15  This was met with opposition from a faction of 
right-wing military officers, led by General Luís García Meza and his close ally 
Colonel Luís Arce Gómez.  They rejected the new government, calling on 
familiar themes of South American military authoritarianism, e.g. saving la 
Patria from internal ‘Castroite’ enemies (Dunkerley, 1984: 290).  As part of this, 
rumours circulated of CIA involvement in the overthrow of the leftist UDP 
(Opinión, 1993).  Working with Argentine Military advisors, and Nazi war criminal 
Klaus Barbie16 and his mercenary paramilitary group los Novios de la Muerte (the 
Bridegrooms of Death), García Meza executed a coup in July 1980.  In Bolivia’s 
recurring cycle of coup d’état, though, this one stood-out as the first planned 
and funded with the aid of drug traffickers. 
 
In building support for his coup, García Meza looked to exploit links to the drug 
trade.  As detailed above, close ties had developed between the coca-cocaine 
economy and elements of the Bolivian state during the Banzer regime.  Arce 
Gómez, in particular, had become deeply involved in the drug trade.17  For 
example, his light-aircraft business was used to transport cocaine (Hargreaves, 
1992: 107); and, as first cousin to Roberto Suárez, he had important associations 
at the top of Bolivia’s drug clans.  General Hugo Echeverría, a rival of García 
Meza, reportedly had the backing of individuals within the Beni axes of the drug 
trade.  But García Meza was able to call on the support of Arce Gómez and, by 
extension, the rents of the Santa Cruz-ADEPA and Beni axes.  Reports suggest 
that this caused other high-ranking military officials to fall in behind García 
Meza as leader of the new junta (Aquí, 1980).   
 
                                         
15 Jaime Paz Zamora’s el Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) was part of this alliance.  
Paz Zamora was chosen to serve as vice-president. 
16 Barbie was an officer in the Nazi SS.  He committed atrocities in Lyon during WWII, but 
escaped to Bolivia after the war, reportedly with the help of the CIA who considered him a 
useful asset.  There he became linked to the Bolivian Military, acting in an advisory role.  Barbie 
took an active role in recruiting mercenaries for the paramilitary group los Novios de la Muerte, 
largely drawn from European Fascist groups (Hargreaves, 1992: 109).  He was extradited to 
France during the Siles Suazo government in 1983, and convicted of crimes against humanity  
(McFarren & Iglesias, 2013), 
17 García Meza was also rumoured to have his own processing facilities, built on lands gifted to 
him during the Banzer regime (Thoumi, 2003: 251). 
Chapter 4  119 
 
García Meza distributed patronage in the form of drug rents around the military 
institution.  For example, it was reported that one month prior to the coup, the 
commanding officers of the Cochabamba and Oruro military division, and the 
Tarapacá Regiment in La Paz were each paid US$50,000 in return for their 
support (Leclere & Fallareau, 1981b).  Patron-client relations were also 
cemented by allowing military officials to extract their own drug rents.  In 
addition to allies such as Rico Faustino Rico Toro and Ariel Coca, Hugo 
Echeverría also maintained his interests in the trade (Morales, 1992b: 356).  
Dividing lines between state actors and the drug trade became evermore ill-
defined. 
 
Allied to this, Bolivia’s drug traffickers played an active role in the installation 
of García Meza.  Fearful of the potential business implications of open, 
democratic government, traffickers provided financial backing for García Meza.  
Suggestions that the incoming UDP was consulting with the DEA to increase 
counterdrug cooperation with the US seemed to confirm the suspicions of the 
illicit trade (Dunkerley, 1984: 320).  It was reported that Roberto Suárez 
convened Bolivia’s top drug traffickers several months before the coup to pull 
their resources and support for García Meza and Arce Gómez (Hargreaves, 1992: 
108).  Echoing National Security Doctrine, Bolivian traffickers justified their 
actions in nationalistic tones, claiming to be saving Bolivia from dangerous leftist 
influence and political chaos (Canelas O. & Canelas Z., 1983: 141).  Leaving 
aside questions of the sincerity of their stated aims, the promised benefits of a 
pro-cocaine regime were undeniable.  As one US State Department official 
commented, ‘for the first time, the mafia has bought itself a government’ 
(Sivak, 2001: 243).  
 
These organisations, though, did not pose a direct threat to the state.  Bolivian 
traffickers, such as Suárez, seemed to have little interest in challenging the 
state, unlike their counterparts in Colombia, but rather attempted to work 
through existing power structure.  They viewed themselves as ‘functional 
economic actors’ and, working through elite networks, pursued ‘a strategy of 
peaceful coexistence with the state’ (Roncken, 1997a: 37).  In this sense, the 
interests of traffickers entered into the calculations of would-be regime leaders, 
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such as García Meza.  Drug rents could be diverted to political rivals, as in the 
case of Echeverría noted above.  The new government thus called on its personal 
ties to these traffickers and co-opted their support with the promise of 
protection.  This included the elimination of competitors, allowing Suárez and 
his associates to consolidate their control of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy 
(Gamarra, 1999: 178; Hargreaves, 1992: 109).18  Actions against such trafficker 
were also an attempt to placate the US, demonstrating the regime’s supposed 
anti-drug credentials.  These dynamics created ‘a virtual symbiosis between drug 
trafficking and the state’ (Lee III, 1991: 199).   
 
Aside from adding to personal wealth of García Meza and his cronies, drug 
money was used to buy-off potential challengers.  For example, García Meza 
paid out over US$2 million in bribes to 26 military officers in June 1981 to stave-
off a coup plot brewing in the institution (Dunkerley, 1984: 334-335).  This also 
extended to elements of the police, who were rewarded for their role in 
repression with drug rents (Quintana, 2005: 60).  In addition to this, the regime 
utilised drug rents to fund Los Novios de la Muerte.  The paramilitary group sat 
outside of the military and were formed on the advice of Barbie and the 
regime’s Argentine military advisers.  This reflected García Meza’s uneven 
control of the Bolivian military, incorporating elements whose backing of the 
regime was low and/or contingent.  Los Novios’ purpose was to carry out 
repression and intimidation against the ‘enemies’ of the regime; importing a 
strand of Argentina’s ‘dirty war’ tactics.  At times, this meant eliminating rival 
trafficking organisations as part of the consolidation process described earlier.  
More often, los Novios took part in abuses against opponent societal groups.  In 
January 1981, for example, the regime was responsible for the torture and 
murder of nine unarmed MIR members in the Sopocachi neighbourhood of La Paz 
(Hargreaves, 1992: 111).   
                                         
18 Gamarra (1999b) discusses claims from former-DEA agent, turned author Michael Levine, that 
Suárez headed la Corporación: an organisation of traffickers, based out of Santa Ana, who had 
established a monopoly over the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy.  Levine argued that this 
organisation was transnational in scope and produced pure cocaine, but successfully avoided the 
limelight.  This contradicts much of the literature, which asserts that the Colombian Cartels 
were the primary players in the Andean cocaine trade during this period.  Furthermore, 
expressing the view of the US Embassy of this era, former Deputy Chief of Mission Alexander F. 
Watson (1997: 254) stated that, ‘the Colombians probably ran almost everything, one way or the 
other.  What they didn’t run, they tolerated.’  At the very least, it seems to be the case that 
Bolivia’s traffickers were loosely aligned and cooperated in some respects. 
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4.3.1 Changing US Priorities 
 
Such notorious human rights abuses, alongside the state-narco nexus, provoked a 
strong reaction from the US.  For example, President Carter had cut-off all 
relations with Bolivia shortly after the coup (Gamarra, 1999a: 186).  Despite the 
support of other military regimes in the region, the patronage of the US still 
mattered greatly.  The loss of US$125 million in US assistance was keenly felt, as 
was the withdrawal of US$40 million in Venezuelan assistance as part of the 
country’s exclusion from the Andean pact (Lehman, 1999: 177).  The regime’s 
actions had turned Bolivia into an international pariah just as it was struggling 
under the weight of massive foreign debt.  García Meza gambled on a Reagan 
victory in the upcoming US presidential elections, hoping for an endorsement of 
his government’s anti-communist stance.  It was reported that he had been 
encouraged by members of the DoD mission in Bolivia, as well as US Senator 
Jesse Helms, that US assistance would be restored once Reagan came to power 
in January 1981 (Gamarra, 1999a: 186).  Although Reagan did return to a 
Hawkish, Cold War policy in Central America, the regime remained isolated: 
‘even the Reagan administration regarded the Bolivian military as unsuitable 
protégés’ (Whitehead, 2001a: 32).   
 
Reagan refused to lift sanctions, primarily due to the issue of drug corruption.  
The DEA played a key role in highlighting the state-narco links, circulating 
evidence and rumours to the media (Lehman, 1999: 177).  For example, in 
February 1981, a 60 Minutes TV special on the ‘Minister of Cocaine’ – Arce 
Gómez – brought the spectre of a ‘narco-state’ into American homes.  A shift in 
US foreign policy emphasis was beginning to occur, with the ‘war on drugs’ re-
emerging as an important theme in US politics (see Chapter 2).  The DEA helped 
to drive this agenda.  Under pressure from an external international actor, the 
Bolivian government thus incurred penalties for state involvement in illicit 
activity (Snyder, 2006: 950).  Elements within the Bolivian Military were 
dismayed at these developments and the sullying of the institution’s reputation 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 329).  Institutionalists thus united to remove García Meza in 
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August 1981, and slowly plan the institution’s retreat from the political sphere 
and a transition to democracy (Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 114).19 
 
The García Meza regime and Reagan’s slow adoption of the ‘war on drugs’, 
therefore, represents a watershed moment for US-Bolivian relations; where Drug 
War substitutes for Cold War in the logic of US foreign policy engagement in 
Bolivia.  As stated previously, Cold War goals had dominated in Bolivia.  The DEA 
(and its previous incarnations) had been a marginal actor, and the US was willing 
to accept allies with interests in the illicit sphere.  Under Banzer, for example, 
evidence of state-narco networks was largely ignored.20  Instead, under-
resourced, token efforts to improve US-Bolivian counterdrug collaboration during 
Banzer’s government supposedly proved anti-drug resolve (e.g. see Dunkerley, 
1984: 318; Gamarra, 1999a: 185).  By contrast, post-transition civilian 
governments would see US-Bolivian relations consumed by the ‘war on drugs’.  
 
4.4 Post-Transition Atomised State-Narco Interactions (1982-1989) 
 
The previous analysis maps the evolution of state-narco networks, from the 
Barrientos period to the ‘cocaine-coup’.  The form and function of these 
interactions were shaped by changing social, political and economic dynamics, 
and the development of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy.  Growing demand for 
cocaine in the North was key to the expansion of Bolivia’s drug trade and the 
increased rents that were available as a result.  These became an important part 
of the clientelistic systems which sustained military authoritarian governments.  
Typically, the distribution of rents to factional rivals within the state – most 
crucially, the military – acted as a governing tool of regime leaders.  Under 
Banzer, this was extended to societal actors, as agri-business elites moved into 
                                         
19 In addition to this, Dunkerley (1984: 326) argues that, although the regime’s links to cocaine 
hastened its downfalls, ‘more familiar factors’ also played their part: ‘working-class resistance, 
regional discontent, a generalised sentiment of anti-militarism, and seemingly endless downward 
spiral of the economy’. 
20 This was also the case with the General’s personal connections to the drug trade, during his 
rule and into the 1980s.  This included drug scandals involving Banzer’s wife, children, family 
and associates, and even the discovery of a trafficking operation on his ranch in the Beni in 1980 
(see Thoumi, 2003: 252-3).   
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the coca-cocaine trade.  These pervasive links dissolved the borders between 
the state and the drug trade, and licit and illicit economic actors.   
 
During this period, figures around the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy are scant.  
It was not until the mid-1980s that the US began serious efforts to gather and 
publish data on the size and composition of the Andean drug trade; UNODC 
efforts (UNFDAC and UNDCP in its previous incarnations) would not begin until 
the late-1990s.  The Bolivian government’s own estimates of coca production 
over this longer period – collected through SUBSEDAL (Subsecretaría de 
Desarrollo Alternativo) – may be challenged for their accuracy, e.g. there are 
questions around the methodology used.  However, Figure 4.1 approximates the 
exponential growth of Bolivian coca production from 1970 to 1989.  Although this 
does not account for a range of crucial factors (e.g. coca-paste productivity), it 
serves as an indicator of the rapidly increasing size of the Bolivian coca-cocaine 
economy during this period.   
 
Figure 4.1: SUBSEDAL Estimates of Total National Coca Production in Metric 
Tonnes (1970-1989) 
 
 (Justiniano, et. al., 1991: 79) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1.3.1, drawing firm conclusions between this type of 
metadata and the function of state-narco networks is problematic.  For 
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example, there are gaps in knowledge around how the coca-cocaine economy 
actually worked, e.g. the value added at each stage of the trade, the exact 
number of actors involved and how wealth was divided between them.  
However, it may reasonably be concluded that the Bolivian coca-cocaine 
economy was growing rapidly over this period and, as a result, greater drug rents 
were available.  The likelihood of competition over market share (caused by 
scarcity) between drug trafficking clans was thus also reduced.  Additionally, 
drug rents became increasingly more significant as a tool of governance for the 
military authoritarian regimes of the pre-transition period.  
 
To some extent, then, Bolivia’s political system during this period resembled a 
‘limited access order’ (North, et. al., 2007), with competition between elite 
factions reduced through the apportionment of drug rents.  As such, regimes co-
opted and coerced different groups, ‘through the provision of legal impunity, ( . 
. . ) and protection’ on one hand, and ‘the threat of prosecution’ on the other 
(Meehan (2011: 379).  The networks formed, woven through the state, 
entrenched these modes of exchange within political structures.  They were 
typically hierarchical in nature, with a large degree of central control, e.g. the 
use of the BAB in financing coca-cocaine ventures or Arce Gomez’s close contact 
with Roberto Suárez and his cohort.  Consolidated trafficking organisations, 
meanwhile, created a level of stability in interactions with the state (Snyder & 
Martínez, 2009).   
 
Of course, the factors underpinning the maintenance of these governments 
extended beyond state-narco networks.  In the case of Barrientos, for example, 
his pact with the rural sector was crucial to sustaining his rule, while Banzer’s 
delivery of economic growth largely formed the basis of his government’s 
‘legitimacy’.  Left-Right divisions within Bolivia, against the background of the 
Cold War, also engendered support for these authoritarian regimes from factions 
within the military and police, right-wing political parties, business and the 
middle-classes, and the country’s international patron, the US.  Shadowing this, 
violent repression suppressed opposition from those who would not be co-opted.  
Furthermore, the brief rule of García Meza demonstrated the limits to rule 
grounded solely on state-narco networks (Henman, 1985: 156; Thoumi, 2003: 
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254).  In addition to lacking a base of societal support and the changing priorities 
of the US, the regime’s blatant profiteering of the drug trade and the military’s 
descent into ‘little more than a collection of predatory warlords parcelling out 
pieces of the state’ created a backlash from elements within the institution 
(Malloy & Gamarra, 1987: 114).  Drugs rents alone could not be relied upon to 
solidify García Meza’s rule.  In this sense, the role of Bolivian state-narco 
networks in reinforcing – or indeed weakening – regime authority must be 
considered in relation to these wider factors.  The thesis does not claim, 
therefore, that the function of state-narco networks and the distribution of drug 
rents alone determined relations between elite actors.  Falls in drug rents (and 
increased competition for market share), therefore, would not necessarily be 
expected to lead to violence between elite actors.  Rather, these were utilised 
as one resource among many in establishing clientelistic webs of political 
support (although with the caveat that this resource was more central to García 
Meza’s short-lived regime). 
 
Into the post-transition period, then, these networks and the logic that 
underpinned them both changed and remained the same.  This is examined in-
depth in Chapters 6 and 7, but here I introduce the main arguments for the 
adaptation of post-transition state-narco networks and outline key contextual 
factors during this period (1982-1989).   
 
Reflecting Bolivia’s uneven democracy, clientelistic and authoritarian modes of 
governance persisted.  This included police and military autonomy, with both 
institutions resistant to civilian oversight, and democratic principles of 
accountability and transparency.  This allowed them to maintain linkages to the 
drug trade and extract rents.  These lubricated internal institutional patron-
client relationships (e.g. see Hargreaves, 1992: 95).  In addition to this, the 
political parties were implicated in taking campaign contributions from 
traffickers, as the latter sought high-level patronage.  A tacit vow of silence 
between the parties meant that few politicians were ever held accountable for 
taking ‘kick-backs’ (Painter, 1994: 72).  The extent of influence that such 
payments bought is uncertain, but it was clear that drug rents continued to 
permeate political structures. 
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In both cases – drug links in the security forces and the political class – non-
enforcement of the rule of law was associated with maintaining political 
stability.  During the uncertainty of the transition period, support for democracy 
from these various actors was viewed as contingent.  As such, non-enforcement 
limited the potential resistance to democratic institutionalisation of ‘informal 
veto players’, inducing ‘powerful actors to accept rules they would otherwise 
seek to overturn’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014: 204).  Bolivia had transitioned to 
formal democracy, not because of any convergence between factional interests, 
but because other routes to power had been exhausted.  There was 
‘democratisation by default’, with the main ‘praetorian’ actors – the military 
and the far-Left – ‘discredited and marginalised rather than persuaded of the 
benefits of cooperation’ (Whitehead, 2001a: 29).   
 
(The transition) both revealed and exacerbated the deep fissures in every 
part of Bolivian society; it was marked by power struggles inside the 
armed forces, extreme discord within the civilian political elites, and 
both class and regional conflicts. (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 89) 
 
As such, ‘democracy had triumphed but was known to have feet of clay’ 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 344).  The military, for example, were in political retreat, but 
their history made definitive assertions over their commitment to democracy 
less secure (Barrios M., 1994).  The police, meanwhile, had benefitted from the 
transition.  Where previously they had been subordinated to the military, they 
now saw their funding and prerogatives enhanced.  Post-transition governments 
looked to the institution to keep order and act as counterweight to the military; 
in return, granting the police a high degree of autonomy from civilian control 
(Quintana, 2005: 96).  Finally, pacted democracy between the parties,21 allowed 
political elites to share power and divvy-up the patronage of the state.  Accusing 
opponents of corruption served as a rhetorical weapon, but pursuing convictions 
threatened to expose drug links throughout the political establishment and bring 
down the whole edifice (e.g. Thoumi, 2003: 256).  As such, uneven democracy, 
and the tacit acceptance of state-narco networks, mediated factional interests.   
                                         
21 The Pacto por la Democracia is described below, while the Acuerdo Patriótico is discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
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As Roncken argues (1997b: 24), ‘Bolivia moved toward democracy, but proved 
unable to part with the power structures erected during ten years of 
dictatorship’.   
 
State-narco networks, though, fractured and became more diffuse following 
transition.  This occurred due to changes in the pattern of political power and 
the drug trade itself.  In terms of the former, the centralised systems of the 
authoritarian period were dismantled as the government was open to political 
competition.  The military retained a level of power and independence, but the 
police and political parties became more influential.  As such, the military’s 
loose monopoly over the control of the drug rents was broken, creating multiple 
potential ‘patrons’.  Allied to this, US pressure made the kind of systems that 
had flourished during the authoritarian period unfeasible.  Post-transition 
governments, struggling with a collapsing economy, could ill-afford the 
economic and diplomatic sanctions that accompanied non-compliance with the 
‘war on drugs’ (Gamarra, 1994a).  No politician wished to be associated with the 
García Meza period and Bolivia’s international shaming as a ‘narco-state’ 
(Giacoman interview, 2014).  In this sense, drug rents were not used to build 
factional coalitions behind a central authority, as was the case during military 
authoritarian governments, i.e. the state’s disbursement of material benefits to 
reduce competition between elite actors.  Rather, different political actors 
pursued their drug rents independently (to different degrees).  Tacit-acceptance 
of these practices between different actors was tied to the maintenance of a 
post-transition political settlement.  The legacies of authoritarianism were 
tolerated within an uncertain process of political transition. 
 
Restructuring of the drug trade mirrored these changes, evolving over the course 
of the 1980s.  A new generation of traffickers emerged from the shadow of 
Roberto Suárez and his contemporaries.  For example, by the time of Suarez’s 
arrest in 1988, the ‘King of Cocaine’ had already been surpassed by his nephew.  
Jorge Roca Suárez – or ‘Techo de Paja’ – undercut his uncle with Colombian 
traffickers (Hargreaves, 1992: 59).  Reports suggested that he had widened his 
profit margins by expanding cocaine processing facilities within Bolivia, and 
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opening-up his own smuggling routes via personal connections in Los Angeles22 
(Painter, 1994: 31).  Techo was believed to be member of a loose collection of 
drug trafficking groups operating out of Santa Ana in the Beni that included 
other prominent traffickers, such as Carmelo ‘Meco’ Domínguez.  Meco’s 
business incorporated a paste-buying setup in the Chapare, processing labs in 
the Beni, and connections with US-supply chains via Colombia and Mexico.23  
According to the DEA, his was the most lucrative of all Bolivian trafficking 
operations (Gamarra, 1994b: 230).  However, this was no duopoly.  Reflecting 
the fragmented nature of Bolivia’s post-transition coca-cocaine economy, Roca 
Suárez and Domínguez shared the market with approximately 30 other 
trafficking groups (Rodas M., 1996: 219).24  As in the past, these were based in 
family ties, and relations between the groups were largely cordial and 
cooperative (Hargreaves, 1992: 58). 
 
While these changes cannot be explained by one cause, the dispersal of political 
power was a contributing factor.  Gamarra (2004: 32) argues that ‘the very 
process of democratisation had the paradoxical effect of democratising the 
structure of organised crime’.  As described above, the drug trade had become 
consolidated during the authoritarian period, creating stable modes of exchange 
with the state.  Now multiple actors sought connections with different facets of 
the political complex.  As before, Bolivia’s drug trafficking clans preferred to 
work through these structures rather than challenging them (Rodas M., 1996: 
229).  
 
(Bolivia’s drug organisations have) deepened rather than extended 
previous systems of kinship-patronage and corruption, building on existing 
modes of illegal practice in the armed forces, police and leading political 
                                         
22 Techo had spent most of his youth in the US, only returning to Bolivia in the early-1980s to 
work alongside his uncle. 
23 It was reported that Bolivian traffickers, such as Meco, were also increasingly looking to 
Europe as a new export market, due to the higher prices on offer in comparison to the US (Durr, 
1989). 
24 Of course, this is an estimate and there are uncertainties over how such groups may have been 
organised.  For example, the inter-connections between them and their distinct roles at 
different stages of the trade make it difficult to define where one group ends and another 
begins.  FELCN-head General Lucio Añez claimed that there were six trafficking clans with 
‘international connections’ in Bolivia (Gamarra, 1994b: 234).  By contrast, Jorge Alderete, then 
Subsecretary for Social Defence, stated in early-1989 that 13 traffickers controlled between 75 
and 85 per cent of Bolivia’s drug trade (Painter, 1994: 31). 
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parties in a relatively 'unpartisan' fashion.  The legacy of the open 
association of the military regime of 1980-82 with the cocaine trade has 
been a pattern of discreet infiltration - not the much vaunted 'takeover'. 
(Dunkerley, 1990: 4) 
 
The following figures demonstrate that the size of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine 
economy remained relatively stable during this period.  Again, great caution 
must be taken in drawing links between this metadata and the function of state-
narco networks.  However, such figures would suggest that extensive drug rents 
were available during this period.  This would reduce the possibility of violent 
competition and instability in relations between actors in the illicit economy; as 
well as possible instability between elite actors as drug rents dry-up.  
Furthermore, Figure 4.2 shows how important the drug trade was to the Bolivian 
national economy in the 1980s, both as percentage of exports and GDP.  Such 
facts added to local ambivalence towards the coca-cocaine economy.  Figure 
4.3, meanwhile, indicates Bolivian coca’s overall position in the Andean coca 
trade.  While Colombia would later emerge as the largest producer of coca due 
to a range of factors, the role of each country in the trade during this period 
remained stable and well-defined: Bolivia and Peru as producers of coca and 
low-grade coca products, Colombia as epicentre of the trade with its organised 
crime responsible for cocaine production and transport. 
 
In the final part of this chapter, I provide a broad overview of post-transition 
state-narco networks prior to the main period of study.  This includes social, 
political and economic contextual factors, US-Bolivian relations and discussion of 
important events, such as the 1986 Huanchaca scandal.   The next section thus 
addresses the government of Hernan Siles Suazo.  This period was characterised 
by economic instability, governmental ambivalence towards coca-cocaine and 
the low-prioritisation of US Drug War goals. 
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Figure 4.2: Size of Bolivian Coca-Cocaine Economy (1986-1990) 
 
 (Franks, 1991: 20; World Bank, 2016)25 
 
Figure 4.3: Andean Coca Cultivation in Hectares (1985-1995) 
 
(US State, 1991 & 1995) 
 
 
                                         
25 Franks’ (1991) estimates of the size of the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy have been plotted 
against World Bank (2016) data on Bolivian GDP. 
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4.4.1 The Siles Suazo Administration (1982-1985) 
 
Subject to competing pressures, the Siles Suazo government struggled with 
severe economic crisis throughout its term.  The IMF and Bolivian business called 
for neoliberal structural reforms to tackle the country’s deficit, foreign debt and 
hyperinflation, while popular sectors simultaneously pressed for increased wages 
and government support (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 121).  Groups such as the 
unions and the peasant sector had long been supressed and excluded from 
political participation.  They now staged strikes and protests to advance their 
interests and demand government action.  This added to the sense of national 
chaos, but Siles Suazo – embracing the new ideals of democratic openness – 
refused to resort to repressive tactics (Ibid: 123).  He was also wary of escalating 
the situation, fearing the consequences of applying harsh economic policies.  
The country’s new democracy was fragile and such policies would heap more 
hardship on suffering societal sectors.  The economic programs advanced by his 
administration were thus a compromise between international and domestic 
priorities.  In the end, they proved to be woefully inadequate.  Bolivia’s tin 
mining industry declined rapidly, the country defaulted on its foreign debt in 
May 1984, and hyperinflation reached 25,000 per cent the following year 
(Lehman, 1999: 194).   
 
Bolivia’s coca-cocaine trade was one of the few successful areas of the national 
economy.  Indicative of this, the population of the Chapare increased from 
40,000 to 215,000 between 1980 and 1987, while the total area of coca 
cultivation grew from 16,370 to 51,798 hectares (Durana, et. al., 1987; 
Justiniano, et. al., 1991: 79).  The informal economy of coca-cocaine provided 
employment and a source of growth in the national economy.  It acted as a 
safety-net for former miners and peasants,26 who migrated to the Chapare in 
search of work (Healy, 1994; 203).  As a result of these factors, Siles Suazo was 
reluctant to take action against the trade.  He recognised the political 
implications of an aggressive counterdrug policy that targeted the livelihoods of 
these sectors (Malamud-Goti, 1992: 27).  In this view, tackling the drug trade 
                                         
26 Drought in central and southern areas of the country in 1982 had a devastating impact on 
farming in these areas (Painter, 1994: 6). 
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would only serve to aggravate economic crisis and societal unrest; threatening 
‘to close off a critical economic safety-valve’ (Dunkerley, 1990: 45).  Again, 
though, the Bolivian government was caught between international and local 
demands.   
 
The ‘near bankruptcy’ of the formal economy meant that restoring US 
assistance, post-García Meza, was a priority (Dunkerley, 1984: 325).  With the US 
pressuring for measures against the coca-cocaine economy, channels of 
counterdrug cooperation were thus re-opened.  In April 1983, for example, Siles 
Suazo accepted US counterdrug aid and eradication targets.  The bilateral 
agreement included US$30m in narcotics control aid, US$53m in development 
aid, and coca eradication targets of 5,000 hectares each year until 1985 
(Malamud-Goti, 1992: 65).  Aid was conditioned on the achievement of 
eradication goals and ‘satisfactory’ cooperation in the war on drugs (GAO, 1988: 
48).  The US thus showed its prioritisation of Drug War goals over local concerns 
of the potentially damaging implications of its approach.  The social and 
economic impact of targeting coca/withholding aid was ominous to Bolivia’s 
transition; worsening internal instability.  The US itself also recognised the 
precariousness of Bolivia’s democratisation.  For example, in a cable to the 
Secretary of State shortly after this period, the US Embassy (1986c) expressed 
concerns over the security of US counterdrug investments. 
 
Program planning for Bolivia this far in the future (for INC funding in 1988) 
requires a degree of confidence in the survival of Bolivia’s democratic 
system and some reasonable hope for the nation’s economic recovery.  An 
unforeseen change in government caused by economic pressures and 
frustrations could conceivably result in the type of regime that governed 
Bolivia in 1980-81, under which a narcotics assistance program would be 
unwelcome. 
 
US economic leverage over Bolivia and the shadow of García Meza’s ‘narco-
state’ left the Siles Suazo with no alternative.  The government accepted the US 
approach.  But progress on these counterdrug commitments was underwhelming.  
The Bolivian government lacked the necessary resources to carry out an 
effective program of eradication and missed its targets (Gamarra, 1994a: 123).   
In addition to this, the newly created police anti-drug unit, UMOPAR (Los 
Unidades Móviles de Patrullaje Rural) clashed with coca unions in the ‘lawless’ 
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Chapare region, and failed to make ‘operational progress’ (US Embassy La Paz to 
Secretary of State, 1985).  Local tensions were further heightened by the 
Chapare Offensive in July 1984.  Siles Suazo bowed to US pressure and sent in 
1,500 army troops to restore order and support UMOPAR’s operations.  Concerns 
over granting the military this internal role were outweighed by a threat from 
the US Congress to block foreign assistance aid (Malamud-Goti, 1990: 39).  
Conforming to what would become a recurring cycle of counterdrug policy in 
Bolivia, success in disrupting the coca-cocaine economy proved to be temporary; 
the operations of high-level traffickers were little affected.  Adopting 
counterdrug goals it would never achieve, Siles Suazo’s government sought to 
placate the demands of the US, all the while, showing ambivalence to the coca-
cocaine economy and its domestic effects. 
 
An abortive coup attempted brought home the fragility of Bolivia’s new 
democratic consensus.  The government was in disarray, as UDP ‘partners’ and 
opposition parties alike turned-on Siles Suazo for his handling of the economy.  
This discontent extended to the military and the police.  In June 1984, members 
of UMOPAR and the army took Siles Suazo hostage for several days (see Prado S. 
& Claure P., 1990).  Loss of faith in the government was the apparent reason 
behind the rare show of military-police unity (Quintana, 2005: 137), but 
suggestions that drug interests lay behind the coup attempt hung in the air 
(Malamud-Goti, 1992: 28).  On this occasion, opposition from within the military 
and the US Embassy helped to secure the President’s release.  The government, 
though, remained in crisis.  In September, the major political parties discussed 
the possibility of a ‘constitutional coup’ and the installation of vice-President 
Jaime Paz Zamora of the MIR (El Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) as 
interim-president (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 125).  Talks mediated by the 
Catholic Church would eventually lead to a settlement, where Siles Suazo agreed 
to early elections in May 1985.  However, these episodes demonstrated that the 
new ‘rules of the game’ were not settled.  Support for democracy remained 
conditional.  Factions within the military and police, and even the political 
parties, were willing to consider extraordinary means to remove the 
government.  As described previously, these dynamics had implications for the 
function of state-narco networks. 
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Finally, scandal towards the end of Siles Suazo’s term suggested another aspect 
to the President’s realism on the drugs issue.  Rafael Otazo, head of the Consejo 
Nacional de Lucha contra el Tráfico Ilícito de Drogas (CONALTID) and close ally 
of Siles Suazo, revealed that he had met with Roberto Suárez in June 1983 under 
the orders of the President.  Siles Suazo had apparently asked Otazo to approach 
the ‘King of Cocaine’ to explore the possibility of a low-interest loan to help 
solve the country’s economic problems (Gamarra, 1999a: 190).  In the ensuing 
Congressional investigation, Otazo implicated other members of the government 
in trafficking operations.  His accusations were never substantiated and it 
remains unclear what Suárez had supposedly been offered in return, but they 
added to the pressure on Siles Suazo and contributed his early withdrawal from 
office.  Whether the case represented a new state-narco nexus between the 
civilian democratic government and the drug trade or the unfounded allegations 
of a political rival attempting to depose an unpopular leader, is open to 
speculation.  It established, though, a pattern of scandal that suggested links 
between the political elite and the drug trade, as well as the use of drug 
corruption accusations on political conspiracies.  This theme is returned to in 
Chapter 7. 
 
4.4.2 The Paz Estensorro Administration (1985-1989) 
 
By contrast to Siles Suazo, President Paz Estensorro fully embraced the 
neoliberal economic agenda.27  Looking to overcome the congressional blockages 
that had hindered his predecessor and ensure the passage of his reform program, 
the veteran leader of the MNR formed a voting alliance with the centre-Right 
ADN, led by the former-dictator, Banzer.  ADN’s backing ensured the 
government had the congressional votes to push ahead with its stabilisation 
plan: la Nueva Política Económica (NPE – New Economic Policy).  The ADN had 
proposed a similar program in the run-up to the election and so was willing to 
                                         
27 One US Embassy official (interview, 2013) described his view of Paz Estensorro: ‘It was the 
fourth time he had been elected over a period of 35 years. (He) was in his late-70s at that point, 
(and) his objective was to correct the errors he had made in his three previous administrations.  
It was a noble activity.  By that time, he had the maturity and the experience to have figured 
out (things) he wished he had done differently, and to make a stab at it.’ 
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support the government.  However, they still extracted a number of concessions, 
such as control over state corporations.  These powers were used to feed the 
party’s patronage machine (Gamarra, 1991: 13).  The Pacto por la Democracia 
thus gave Bolivia’s ‘new’ politics a decidedly retro feel, both in terms of the 
actors involved and the clientelistic practices which sustained it.  Nevertheless, 
the Bolivian government’s close adherence to the NPE, and the positive 
macroeconomic performance it achieved, made Bolivia a model for the 
Washington Consensus.  Hyperinflation was brought under control, tax revenues 
increased, debt shrunk and modest levels of economic growth were registered 
(Lehman, 1999: 197).   
 
These achievements, though, had severe social costs, as levels of poverty 
increased, living standards dropped and unemployment soared (Conaghan & 
Malloy, 1987: 186-187).  Furthermore, tin prices collapsed two months into Paz 
Estensorro’s term.  This caused both a surge in unemployment and further drops 
in Bolivia’s exports.  While in 1980, tin accounted for 40 per cent of Bolivia’s 
exports, by 1987, this figure had fallen to 8 per cent (Ibid.).  This time, 
opposition to the government’s policies was met with force (Mesa, et. al., 2008: 
581-583).  For example, as the unions moved for a general strike in mid-1985, 
Paz Estensorro declared a state of siege.  Here, pacted democracy gave the 
executive a freehand to implement the NPE over social opposition.  In addition 
to this, the government was reliant on the police to quell the societal unrest.  In 
return for supporting this agenda, the police were guaranteed their autonomy 
(Quintana, 2005: 96).  As discussed in Chapter 6, these dynamics were 
demonstrative of Bolivia’s uneven democracy.  Informal rules continued to 
govern relations between elite factional interests; reflected in the informal 
modes of exchange between elements of the state and the drug trade. 
 
As in the case of Siles Suazo, coca-cocaine eased the pressure on Paz 
Estensorro’s government.  The drug trade helped to mediate the harsh societal 
effects of the NPE by providing employment for a large sector of Bolivian 
society; a fact recognised by the US Embassy in the following cables:  
 
While accepting the necessity of continuing to pursue the traditional 
priority on eradication, (the Embassy’s strategy) argues for greater 
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emphasis on interdiction.  The latter appears to have a far more 
immediate impact on coca by depressing prices (and implicitly 
cultivation), provokes far less governmental and opposition resistance and 
ultimately comes closer and faster to (counterdrug) objectives. (US 
Embassy La Paz to Secretary of State, 1985b) 
 
No, repeat no, Bolivian government has been able to survive against 
strong and united campesino opposition (campesinos increasingly view 
coca cultivation as the main escape from abject poverty). (US Embassy La 
Paz to Secretary of State, 1986a) 
 
Furthermore, coca-cocaine also boosted national reserves and stimulated inward 
investment (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 198; UDAPE, 1990).  For example, in 
1987, the President announced a tax amnesty on repatriated capital, relaxing 
disclosure requirements and banning investigations into new wealth brought into 
the country (Menzel, 1996: 11).  As such, drug money flowed unencumbered into 
Bolivian banks, helping to stabilise the economy, augment internal investment 
and bolster national reserves (e.g. see Ramos, 1988).28  The reforms were 
technically in keeping with the neoliberal orthodoxy advanced by the IMF, i.e. 
relaxing regulation and capital controls.  But they also indicated Paz Estensorro 
willingness to put economic, social and political goals ahead of the ‘war on 
drugs’.   
 
His government had already sought to leverage support for US counterdrug goals 
for greater economic assistance (Lehman, 1999: 200).  Paz Estensorro looked to 
reverse US perceptions that the Bolivian government was uninterested in the 
‘war on drugs’ and re-establish good relations.29  In collaboration with the US 
Embassy, the Bolivian government helped form 1986’s Operation Blast Furnace: 
a landmark militarised US-Bolivian joint-operation that included the US army for 
the first-time in counter-supply efforts abroad (Walker III, 1994: 3).30  In addition 
                                         
28 The policy has clear parallels with efforts by the Burmese government to induce drug 
traffickers to share their wealth (see Snyder, 2006: 960). 
29 As a result of Bolivia’s failure to meet eradication targets, US Congress had withheld US$9.5 
million in economic and military assistance for FY1986 (GAO, 1988: 49).  Funds were withheld 
again in FY1987, this time, US$8.7m. (GAO, 1988: 49), before US Congress became convinced of 
the Bolivian Government’s commitment to the ‘war on drugs’ (Gamarra, 1999a: 191). 
30 US agencies distrusted UMOPAR, believing corruption was rife.  For this reason, they were 
often only informed of the identity of targets at the last minute (Menzel, 1996: 18; Painter, 
1994: 82).  Through a combination of leaks and press coverage of the operation, though, 
traffickers were able to anticipate raids and escape before the arrival of the security forces 
(Malamud-Goti, 1990: 41).   
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to this, Paz Estensorro passed the 1988 Ley del Regimen de la Coca y Sustancias 
Controladas (Law 1008) in response to US concerns over Bolivia’s fragmented 
and incomplete laws on coca-cocaine (GAO, 1988: 55).  Law 1008 established 
distinctions between legal and illicit coca, and brought in tough penalties for 
trafficking.31  Taken together – Law 1008 and militarisation – these elements 
formed the basis for counterdrug policy in Bolivia through the 1980s and 90s, and 
reassured the US of the Bolivian government’s commitment to the ‘war on drugs’ 
 
There was a certain tension, then, in Paz Estensorro’s approach to the ‘war on 
drugs’: extending counterdrug operations with the US, while balancing the 
reality that coca-cocaine was hugely important to the economy and, by 
extension, political stability.  Indeed, this tension may be identified across the 
Bolivian administrations of this period.  Economic and political realities made 
cooperation in the ‘war on drugs’ unavoidable, but the terms demanded by the 
US ‘could not possibly have been met without destroying both the constitutional 
order and the economy’ (Dunkerley, 1990: 4).  The web of state-narco 
interactions were part of this calculus, as these networks formed part of the 
post-transition political order. 
 
4.4.3 The Huanchaca Case 
 
The case of Huanchaca, though, suggested that the interests of the political 
class in the drug trade extended beyond pragmatic concerns of political 
stability.  In September 1986, the murder of well-known Bolivian biologist Noel 
Kempff and two of his colleagues at the hands of drug traffickers shocked the 
country.  The expeditionary team of scientists had stumbled upon a large coca-
cocaine processing facility, near Huanchaca, in the remote border region of the 
department of Santa Cruz.  The incident and its fallout seemed to confirm 
publicly, the deep and enduring links between the state and the drug trade.   
 
First, the slow response to the murders raised suspicions that both the US and 
Bolivian authorities were protecting the traffickers behind the murders.  A 
                                         
31 However, it also made concessions to cocaleros: banning chemical eradication methods and 
committing the government to development as a condition of eradication (Painter, 1994: 79-80).   
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passing civilian plane spotted Kempff’s burned-out plane around 24 hours after 
last contact and rescued a surviving member of the team (Malamud-Goti, 1992: 
52).  Despite the reports that followed, it took the DEA and UMOPAR three days 
to make it to the scene of the crime.  By then the traffickers had escaped, along 
with most of their assets.  The response of the Bolivian government was also 
slow.  Minister of the Interior, Fernando Barthelemy, rejected calls for local 
Bolivian military personnel in Santa Cruz to be sent to the area.  He instead gave 
responsibility for the incident to an air force anti-drug unit, hundreds of miles 
away in the Beni.  The unit’s mission was cancelled altogether after they 
encountered mechanical problems (Rodas M., 1996: 111).  The following day, 
Barthelemy then declared that UMOPAR had already begun operations in 
Huanchaca.  These formed part of a series ‘inexplicable’ order and counter-
order that were characteristic of the bungling response from all levels of 
government (Ibid.). 
 
Public criticism increased when it was found that the authorities had been told 
of the facility four months prior to the murders (Thoumi, 2003: 254).  The source 
of the information, Ariel Coca, raised even more questions.  As detailed above, 
Coca had been part of the García Meza regime and had developed deep interests 
in the drug trade.  His sudden conversion to informant caused surprise.  There 
were suggestions that Coca’s motives stemmed from a dispute between different 
factions of Bolivia’s state-narco networks.  Rodas M. (1996: 127) claims that 
Huanchaca lay at the heart of a power struggle between Banzerato and 
Garcíamescista drug-linked officers, and the emergence of the new generation 
of traffickers led by Jorge Roca Suárez.  Regardless of his reasons, the 
information was taken seriously.  The DEA and UMOPAR carried out 
reconnaissance on the location and confirmed Coca’s account (Malamud-Goti, 
1992: 52).  US Embassy communications, though, played down the size and 
significance of the Huanchaca facility.  Furthermore, planned operations were 
cancelled on three occasions due to weather conditions, or technical issues 
(Gamarra, 1994a: 50).   
 
These details fed rumours that the US also had interests in Huanchaca it wished 
to protect.  The conspiracy held that the facility was part of the CIA’s shadow 
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operations against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (Marcy, 2010: 113; Scott & 
Marshall, 1991).  According to the theory, Bolivian coca paste produced in 
Huanchaca fed a supply-chain linking right-wing Colombian traffickers and Cuban 
exiles to the Contras (Hoy, 1988).  Cocaine sold on US streets would thus fund 
anti-communist operations in Central America.  The DEA had long complained 
that CIA operations had undermined counterdrug goals, with the intelligence 
agency employing the well-known tactic of exploiting the underworld for 
information and ‘off-the-books’ funding (McCoy, 2003).  In the case of 
Huanchaca, reports that a DEA agent had filed a protest with the US Embassy 
over obstructions against their operation, seemed to lend credence to the theory 
of US complicity in the Bolivian drug trade (Roncken interview, 2013). 
 
Alternatively, problems of bureaucratic politics, and the poor capacity of 
Bolivian counterdrug agencies support the idea that mistakes were due to 
incompetence rather than conspiracy.  This occurred at the same time as 
Operation Blast Furnace, where inter-agency conflicts occurred due to 
overlapping duties (Malamud-Goti, 1990: 42).  For example, there were 
disagreements over which laboratories should be raided and when.  The 
Huanchaca site was apparently listed number 157 on the task force’s targets 
(Menzel, 1996: 18-9).  One US army officer later asserted that ‘he would 
vehemently oppose any attempt to stage another operation’, as ‘coordination 
and cooperation among the participating forces was deplorable’ (Malamud-Goti, 
1992: 31).  Menzel (1996: 19-20) also asserts that delays in the destruction of 
precursor chemicals found at the site were caused by debates over the 
environmental impact of using explosives to destroy the store.  Such 
explanations go some way to counteracting the conspiracy theories. 
 
Congressional investigations into Huanchaca, though, failed to provide any 
definitive answers.  The first in 1986 cleared the MNR government of wrongdoing 
and was branded a whitewash.  The findings were delivered after the 
assassination of the man originally charged with leading the investigation: 
Congressman Edmundo Salazaar.  There were indications that Salazaar was 
uncovering links between Huanchaca and Paz Estensorro’s administration.  
Minister Barthelemy, for example, was said to have close ties to trafficking 
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organisations in Santa Cruz (Gamarra, 1994a: 51).  The murder of Salazaar added 
to the sense of national shock; an act more in keeping with the ruthless violence 
of the Colombian Cartels than Bolivia’s trafficking clans.  Several suspects were 
rounded-up and charged, but all were acquitted.  The poor handling of the case 
by both the police and the courts led many to conclude that drug money had 
penetrated the judicial system (Malamud-Goti, 1992: 53-6).  Others who 
attempted to shed light on state-narco links were also targeted.  For example, 
three would-be whistle-blowers – police lieutenants Ciro Jijena Centeno and 
Waldo Panoso Meneses, and navy Captain Jaime Paredes Sempértegui – were 
subject to smears and counter-accusations (Roncken, 1997b: 27).   
 
In 1992, the Bolivian Congress agreed to open another investigation into the 
events around Huanchaca.  This time, the investigation descended into a 
political game of claim and counterclaim.  The MNR argued that reopening the 
case was designed to discredit the party and harm their prospects in up-coming 
presidential elections.  For example, Barthelemy was accused of ordering the 
death of Salazaar.  The MNR, in-turn, pointed the finger at the MIR and Banzer’s 
ADN for the numerous drug scandals that had engulfed the parties (see Chapter 
7).  As the accusations intensified, the situation threatened to discredit all the 
main political parties.  Finally, in an attempt to bring a close to events,  
Congress voted to expel Barthelemy, lift his parliamentary immunity and hand 
responsibility for the investigation over to the judiciary (Gamarra, 1994a: 152).   
 
For many, the former minister appeared to be a useful scapegoat, as the parties 
sought to draw a line under Huanchaca and the issue of drug corruption in the 
political parties.  Again, the political subtext of corruption accusations made 
separation of fact and fiction near impossible.  The belief continued, though, 
that behind Huanchaca lay a network which included elements of the 
government, the state and the illicit sphere.  Rodas M. (1996: 252) argues that 
the case was grounded in the history of state-narco relations: the creation of a 
Cruceño elite who owed a proportion of their wealth to coca-cocaine and the 
patronage of the state, e.g. land redistribution and financing.  As such, 
Huanchaca threatened to uncover the systems of joint-wealth extraction that 
had been established between these elites and elements of the state.  Whatever 
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the truth of Huanchaca, state-narco networks had adapted to the post-transition 
period. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter, then, provides a historical overview of the development of state-
narco networks.  The trade became integrated into the governments of the 
authoritarian era, serving as crucial form of patronage in the building of 
factional coalitions.  As such, these became integrated into state structures.  
Transition and the onset of the ‘war on drugs’ changed the ‘rules of the game’, 
leading to the fracturing of state-narco networks and the atomisation of 
interactions between traffickers and different facets of political authority.  
These evolving relations were grounded in the changing political, social and 
economics dynamics of these different eras, as well as the changing structure of 
the drug trade and the preference of the regional hegemon.    
 
This analysis provides important grounding for the following chapters, raising key 
themes.  These include: both continuity and change from the authoritarian era 
to post-transition, both in terms of political dynamics and the function of state-
narco networks; the shift in US foreign policy priorities, previously linked to 
tacit-acceptance of state-narco networks during the Cold War, but now focused 
on Drug War goals; and the political subtext and ambiguity of drug scandals.  But 
in addition to this, my analysis provides new insights into the relationship 
between the state and the drug trade.  Challenging conventional analyses of 
drugs, the chapter elucidates the distinct relationship that emerged between 
the state and the illicit economy and its place within wider social, political and 
economic processes.  This was associated with the preservation of a limited 
political order, and a stable drug trade based in personalistic ties.  Dividing lines 
between state actors and illicit actors were blurred as a result.  This breaks with 
the typical assumptions of the mainstream drugs literature.  Furthermore, across 
this period, the preferences of the US had important implications for the form 
and function of state-narco networks.  These webs of interactions were affected 
by international changes, with knock-on effects for Bolivian domestic politics.   
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My conclusions here are drawn from secondary and documentary sources and, as 
such, they are necessarily tentative.  The clandestine nature of these 
interactions creates a level of uncertainty in assertions around their form and 
function.  In the remaining chapters, then, I change tack.  I explore in greater 
detail links between the security forces and the drug trade (Chapter 6), and the 
political class and Bolivia’s drug traffickers (Chapter 7), continuing to utilise 
secondary and documentary sources where appropriate.  However, I also 
incorporate interview data with key actors from the period to examine differing 
interpretations of state-narco interactions, their attached meanings and 
significance, and their relationship to the wider dynamics of US-Bolivian 
relations and the ‘war on drugs’.  As part of this, the following chapter considers 
the narratives that informed these interpretations, and the competing US and 
Bolivian agendas at work during this period.  In this sense, I explore the object 
of study from multiple perspectives.  
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Chapter 5|Contrasting Perspectives of the ‘War on 
Drugs’ 
 
The introduction of the Andean Initiative exposed divergent US and Bolivian 
agendas.  As the US Embassy sought the escalation of the Drug War in Bolivia, 
the Paz Zamora government proclaimed its ‘democratising mission’ and called 
for a development-led counterdrug response.  US-Bolivian relations were marked 
by low-levels of trust and competition for control.  This chapter maps the 
competing narratives of the ‘war on drugs’ that underpinned these dynamics.  
Drawing on contemporary interviews with key elite US and Bolivian actors,1 I 
focus on two main aspects.  In the first section of the chapter, I outline US and 
Bolivian conceptualisations of ‘the drug problem’, incorporating analyses of 
state-narco interactions, and wider political, social, and economic forces.   
While these actors reproduced strands from the mainstream discourse of drugs 
(see Chapter Two), their accounts also transcended these debates.  In the 
second section of the chapter, I consider how interlocutors conceived of US-
Bolivian relations.  This places American Exceptionalism against historically-
grounded narratives of the US role in Latin America.  In this way, the chapter 
reveals the motivations and assumptions underlying contrasting US and Bolivian 
perspectives of the ‘war on drugs’ and the relationship between the state and 
the drug trade. 
 
This analysis is crucial to the chapters that follow, considering the discursive 
frameworks that shaped how elite actors understood and responded to state-
narco networks.  US securitised notions of drugs, for example, justified the 
extension of US control and efforts to bypass or target ‘corrupt’ local power 
structures.  Bolivian ambivalence towards the drug trade and the prioritisation 
of political stability led to compromises over uneven democratisation, tolerance 
of police/military drug corruption, and opposition to US Drug War policies.  In 
addition to this, narratives of US-Bolivian relations informed contested 
interpretations of state-narco networks.  Drug corruption accusations and 
attached political subtext were folded into US-Bolivian relations of power and 
                                         
1 Details on all interviewees are provided in Appendix C. 
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control.  These facets of state-narco networks are examined in Chapters 6 and 7 
respectively.  The chapter, then, grounds this analysis in the overarching 
narratives of the ‘war on drugs’ employed by US and Bolivian interlocutors.  As 
such, it also provides insights into the development of US counterdrug policy in 
Latin America: how key actors made sense of the Andean Initiative and its 
implementation in Bolivia. 
 
This chapter thus marks a shift in focus: from the analysis of secondary and 
documentary sources to exploration of the interpretative frameworks that were 
employed by US and Bolivian actors in the formation of their accounts.  
Employing elements of oral history methodology in this analysis, these included: 
the Drug War and Development Paradigms, and narratives of Bolivian 
democratisation, American Exceptionalism and the legacy of the Cold War.  
James (2000, 123) argues that interlocutors ‘construct stories’ with the twin 
aims of legitimising their role to an external audience and making sense of the 
period for themselves.  Discursive techniques, such as framing narratives, are 
constitutive of this process.  To persuade me of their worldview, then, 
interlocutors interpreted events, and defined how they should be understood 
(see Chapter 3).  But these frameworks also gave meaning to their own role, and 
provided explanations.  These combined personal experience with cultural 
understandings, theories and ideologies, both past and present.  Interview 
accounts, therefore, reveal how these actors responded to important contextual 
factors, such as the end of the Cold War and Bolivia’s democratic transition.  
These perspectives are woven through my analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.1 Conceptualising ‘the Problem’ 
 
The two overarching paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’ and attached political and 
institutional factors (outlined in Chapter 2) shaped the accounts of interlocutors.  
US actors typically adopted the assumptions of the Drug War Paradigm in their 
conceptualisations of drugs.  This included US cultural constructs, the 
prohibition model, drug corruption as deviance, and the securitisation of the 
issue.  By contrast, Bolivian actors called on the conceptual framework of the 
Development Paradigm in their explanations, such as the stimulus of US demand 
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in the creation of the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy.  In this sense, these elite 
actors reproduced mainstream discourses of drugs when framing their accounts.   
 
In addition to this, though, interview accounts both crossed-over and diverged 
from these dominant themes.  For example, the interpretations of US 
interlocutors displayed a duality in their conceptualisations of Bolivia’s role in 
the drug trade.  Moralistic judgements on illicit behaviours sat alongside more 
sympathetic readings of Bolivia’s circumstances.  This perpetrator/victim 
narrative thus displayed synergy with both enforcement and development-led 
models of the ‘war on drugs’.  This duality helped to reconcile militarised 
responses to drugs with modern critiques of US policy and ideas of American 
Exceptionalism.  For Bolivian actors, the historically grounded ‘Democracy 
Generation’ narrative exerted a strong influence over their accounts of the 
period.  This establishes democracy as an overriding priority, and justifies their 
opposition to a destabilising, ‘Colombianised’ counterdrug approach, and their 
ambivalence towards aspects of the coca-cocaine economy.  Where the US had 
its Drug War, so the argument goes, the Bolivian government had its 
‘democratising mission’.  Utilising passages from these interview accounts, these 
narratives and their application are examined below. 
 
5.1.1 The US Drug War Perspective 
 
There was a view in the Bush administration that addicts were casualties 
of the Drug War and there wasn’t much you could do.  Once someone was 
addicted, you couldn’t really save them, so don’t waste your time 
focusing on them. ( . . . ) The budget has always been around 60-70 per 
cent for domestic law enforcement, interdiction and international, and 
that was driven by the belief that stopping drugs would stop people from 
using them. ( . . . )  There was a decade long push, probably starting in 
’88 to around ’97 or ’98, where that ideology or thinking really drove the 
drug strategy, so that the focus on an Andean strategy, which includes 
Bolivia of course, was big. (Carnevale interview, 2013) 
 
The above quote from former-ONDCP official, John Carnevale, identifies the 
‘ideology’ of the Drug War Paradigm as a key factor in the introduction of the 
Andean Initiative in the late-1980s.  This ‘ideology’ and its underlying 
assumptions still hold influence, as evidenced by the interview accounts of US 
actors.  In discussing the crack-cocaine scare of the 1980s, for example, US 
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interlocutors called on US cultural understandings of drugs and securitised 
notions of the issue.  Forming an important component of their accounts, these 
instilled a sense of urgency and moral right to the US counterdrug role in Bolivia.  
The following description from Ambassador Charles Richard Bowers emphasised 
the necessity of US action against the Bolivian drug trade.  The powerful 
assertion that cocaine produced in the Andes was ‘killing our kids’ reinforces the 
idea that the drug trade represented a threat to US national security.  It also 
echoes the moral dichotomy of the Drug War Paradigm, where drugs are viewed 
as an ‘evil’ that must be defeated.     
 
I mean, the reason we were down there to begin with was because of the 
massive flow of cocaine into the United States which was killing our kids.  
Still is.  That’s a whole other argument about Drug War… not Drug War… 
but the basic thing is, that product made its way into the United States, 
so the goal was to stop that product coming in. (Bowers interview, 2013)2 
 
In this example, though, Bowers pulled back from using the contested term 
‘Drug War’.  This reflects the effects of contemporary criticism of US 
counterdrug policy on the accounts of US actors.3  Interlocutors such as Bowers 
implicitly responded to these critiques in the construction of their historical 
accounts.   
 
Following in this vein, Ambassador David Greenlee explained the logic of US 
counterdrug efforts in Bolivia.  Greenlee externalised responsibility for the 
‘devastating’ effects of crack-cocaine in urban-America.  Intervention in Latin 
America to address the problem was rationalised against the background of 
perceived domestic crisis.   
 
I think what really intensified the focus on Bolivia and the coca producing 
countries was the advent of crack-cocaine.  Before, cocaine had been a 
sort of high-end drug… the doctors and lawyers… and it was quite refined, 
and it was a problem, (but) it wasn’t devastating the inner-cities.  Crack-
cocaine really changed the game. (Greenlee interview, 2013) 
                                         
2 Bowers (interview, 2013) finished the interview by stating, ‘the root of the problem – if you 
want one final quote – there would be no problem if American kids stopped using the product’.  
While this contradicts the externalisation of the problem, puritanical elements of the Drug War 
Paradigm are evident: abstinence from drug use (deviant behaviour) would solve the problem. 
3 This is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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It is interesting to note here the delimitation between high-end cocaine-use 
among ‘doctors and lawyers’ and crack-cocaine in the inner-cities.  The effects 
of the former are largely dismissed, while the latter is viewed as a ‘game-
changer’.   During this period, these types of perceptions were reflected in wide 
disparities in prison sentences for each form of cocaine.4  Those caught in 
possession of the ‘ghetto drug’ were subject to draconian mandatory sentences.  
As such, some commentators argue that the ‘war on drugs’ caused more harm to 
predominantly African-American, inner-city communities than crack-cocaine 
itself (e.g. see Reinerman & Levine, 1997c).  This was viewed to reflect the 
country’s 'racialised' history of drug control, its intermittent cycle of drug 
scares, and the division between mainstream US society and marginalised 
sectors.  Although Greenlee does not engage directly with these issues (and it 
would be unfair to extrapolate from his account), this passage demonstrates the 
subtle influence of the conceptual framework of the Drug War Paradigm on the 
interpretations of US actors.   
 
In terms of defining the parameters of the response, the Drug War model 
prescribes enforcement-led policies.  Adopting the vocabulary of war, the 
‘enemy’ of the drug trade should be met with the US security apparatus and 
defeated.  Such ideas informed the formulation of the Andean Initiative and the 
process of defining a new post-Cold War security agenda in Latin America.  
Ambassador David Miller, who headed the drug unit of the NSC (National Security 
Council) under Bush, suggests that US government agencies, emboldened by 
post-Cold War euphoria, adopted this thinking.   
 
We were ploughing new ground, and I think it is important to bear in mind 
that there are some issues that they’ve already thought out and the NSC 
has wrestled with for many years.  The idea of a co-ordinated Drug War in 
South America was something that had not been done.  And so you had a 
lot of serious, separate commentary from people.  (But) I think everybody 
was very enthusiastic, and they had a President who cared a lot about it 
which makes a difference. And it was new and exciting.  I mean at that 
point people weren’t wandering around saying, ‘I wonder if this is going 
to work’.  They were sort of wandering around saying, ‘well this is really 
                                         
4 This assumed harsher sentencing and counter-supply efforts abroad were more effective in 
addressing the problem than alleviating social deprivation in inner-city areas. 
Chapter 5  148 
 
different; we’re going to try and see if we can solve the problem at its 
origins’. (Miller interview, 2013) 
 
Searching for new missions in this new era, government agencies adopted 
notions of human security.  This chimed with American Exceptionalism: 
addressing the ‘threat’ of drugs – and by extension drug corruption – would 
create the conditions for human rights, democracy and development.  But there 
were also more prosaic explanations for sudden bureaucratic interest in the 
drugs issue.  Former-Deputy Administrator of the DEA Terry Burke (interview, 
2013), described the post-Cold War scramble for a share of the newly expanded 
counterdrug budget: ‘these other agencies… that were searching for funding and 
wanted to expand… they decided, “gee, let’s get into the drug business”. ( . . . ) 
It got so out of hand!’  Accordingly, the onset of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia 
and US preferences for policy are partly explained by the institutional drive of 
these government agencies.   
 
This institutional-bureaucratic narrative was also identified by Bolivian actors, 
but applied differently.  Taking a more critical view, conceptualising drugs as a 
security issue, and the policy responses that this elicits, had been used to 
institutionalise the ‘war on drugs’.  The discourse of security and the 
militarisation of counterdrug policy have fed the Drug War bureaucracy, often to 
the detriment of the South.  Former-President Jaime Paz Zamora argued along 
similar lines. 
 
The problem was it turning into a war, or it becoming ‘Colombianised’ or 
‘Mexicanised’.  ( . . . )  The American agencies… in this respect, the 
European agencies are different… they need the problem to continue to 
survive.  They aren’t interested in resolving the problem.  They’d be left 
without work… it’s an interesting problem.  It complicates their daily 
work, as they have to keep on generating situations that will make the 
news… a violent act, etc... so they appear like heroes who are in the front 
line, fighting for the mental health of the people, etc.  Here, on many 
occasion, (the problem) was exaggerated, so they could survive.  And this 
occurred with all agencies, including the UN.  It’s something that has to 
be done because everyone needs to survive.  So there are always more 
problems, always more things, more bureaucracy.  That was our 
experience. (Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
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In this way, the interests of counterdrug agencies were bound to continual 
insecurity and the survival of the drug trade.  There is a gap between the stated 
aims of US counterdrug policy and the interests of those who execute it.  As 
discussed in the following chapter, US securitised notions of Bolivia’s coca-
cocaine economy were resisted by the Paz Zamora government.  While US 
interlocutors adopted the assumptions of securitisation and looked to extend the 
Drug War in Bolivia, local actors rejected this conceptualisation and considered 
it detrimental to local priorities.  Here, Paz Zamora argues that the US agenda 
was linked to bureaucratic politics.  Along this and many other dimensions of the 
‘war on drugs’, elite US and Bolivian actors interpretations stood in contrast to 
each other. 
 
5.1.2 Bolivia as ‘Victim’ and ‘Perpetrator’ 
 
The Drug War Paradigm was also reflected in hardened US interpretations of 
Bolivia’s role in the coca-cocaine economy.  Under this conception, those 
involved in the drug trade were viewed as criminals, exploiting drug-use for 
profit and threatening US society.  The following passage from Ambassador 
Greenlee’s account outlines the growth of Cochabamba on the back of the coca-
cocaine economy.  He suggests an element of extortion to the Bolivian position 
on the issue.   
 
So you look at Cochabamba… you were there recently… there are some 
nice tall buildings in Cochabamba.  Well believe me, back in the mid ’70s 
there weren’t.  When I was a Peace Corps volunteer in that area, 
everything was low rise, the adobe kind of buildings.  The skyline of 
Cochabamba was built with profits from drug trafficking and that’s where 
it’s from and you can even talk to Bolivians about, like, ‘What would it 
take you to get out of the trafficking business, to really crack down on 
this thing?’  And Bolivians would say, ‘well, you know, this is four or five 
hundred million bucks for our country’s (economy)’… back when that 
money meant a little bit more and… ‘we would have to be compensated 
for that’.  It’s sort of like, ‘we will stop robbing the bank if you give us 
what we’re taking out of the bank’.  It was almost like that. (Greenlee 
interview, 2013) 
 
Former-INC head Melvyn Levitsky expressed similar sentiments.  For example, 
cocaleros were characterised as shrewd operators rather than ‘idyllic farmers’ 
(Levitsky interview, 2013).  As such, they moved into coca cultivation because of 
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the potential for large returns, rather than poverty and desperation.  Other 
elements of Bolivian society had also profiteered from US drug-use, spending 
their returns on conspicuous consumption.  Drug boom towns, such as Santa 
Cruz, contradicted conceptions of Bolivia as a poor, developing nation.   
 
Santa Cruz, you would see a pretty rich, very rich city, very fancy hotel, 
car dealerships that sold expensive cars.  It was very clear that it was a 
city that was fed by the cocaine trafficking.  So it was had to deal with 
embedded beliefs, pretty much, in that society. ( . . . )  It was quite an 
eye opener in terms of, here was a very poor country, one of the poorest 
in Latin America, South America, and you saw a lot of examples of wealth 
which was certainly tied to drug trafficking. (Levitsky interview, 2013) 
 
Such ideas serve as justification for the extension of US control and the 
installation of Drug War policies.  Bolivia’s active role in the coca-cocaine trade, 
and the benefits that it had accrued, underpin a hard-line counterdrug response.  
As part of this, then, cocaleros who did not accept the rules of alternative 
development became legitimate targets for crop eradication; and uncooperative 
government officials were legitimate targets for US pressure. 
 
However, the accounts of US actors also exhibited a duality.  Bolivia was viewed 
simultaneously as both perpetrator and victim of illicit activity; exploiting 
cocaine for profit, but also driven to the drug trade due to economic necessity.  
As such, elements of the Development Paradigm were present in the accounts of 
US interlocutors.  The following passage from an interview with a US Embassy 
official, stationed in Bolivia in the mid-1980s, mirrors this view. 
 
The farmers growing the coca have a huge investment in this.  They have 
no cash, capital resources.  If you take away the coca, their families 
starve.  ( . . . )  It’s not that they loved growing coca, but it was reliable.  
If you grew the coca, you could sell it.  The price was always high enough 
so you could make a living.  You weren’t going to get rich.  You were 
always going to be a campesino.  But you could make a living. ( . . . )  I 
had proposed that we finance the carry-over from eradicating coca to 
getting something that was harvestable, that was different.  But the 
authorities in Washington thought that coca was an evil product and 
people who grew it must be bad, and therefore they didn’t deserve any 
financing.  That’s a hard message to sell. (US official (A) interview, 2013) 
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As this passage demonstrates, there was certain recognition of political and 
economic realities within Bolivia at this time.5  This stance clashed with views 
back in Washington, where coca was ‘evil’ and coca cultivators were ‘bad’.  
Again, the potency of the Drug War Paradigm and its moral dichotomies in 
shaping policy is identified.  In this case, though, the US Embassy tried to defend 
the interests of ‘victims’ of the coca-cocaine economy.   
 
These victim-perpetrator narratives thus expose a tension in the way US 
interlocutors perceived the coca-cocaine economy and the Bolivian government.  
To a certain extent, US actors who had been on the ground in Bolivia sought to 
distance themselves from aspects of the Drug War model.  This helped to 
rationalise their role within Bolivia, advancing benevolent foreign policy goals.  
Accordingly, such actors frame their accounts with ideas of American 
Exceptionalism: extending constructive support to a country struggling with 
coca-cocaine and underdevelopment.  Narrating these perspectives from the 
present-day, including current debates of the ‘war on drugs’, affected such 
interpretations.  US actors, therefore, engaged with the contradictions of US 
policies, local context, and their own experiences; their role as faithful servant 
of the US government and their re-evaluations of the implications of the ‘war on 
drugs’ in Bolivia.   
 
It’s the conundrum… it’s kind of like America and guns.  There’s this 
sacredness to the coca leaf, like there’s Americans’ right to own guns.  
Some people look at it from outside and think, ‘this is kind of crazy’.  So 
the idea that there was this bad coca, which we were supposed to get rid 
of and eradicate, and there’s this good coca over here, and the line 
between the two of them gets rather fuzzy.  Theoretically, all the coca 
down in the Chapare is bad coca, (and) at least most of the coca down in 
the Yungas is okay.  But then all of a sudden coca production in the 
Yungas mushrooms like crazy, and stuff was being syphoned off onto the 
drug side.  That was a major disconnect. ( . . . )  The fact that most of 
the folks who are involved in the lowest level of transit of cocaine to the 
United States, were poor, uneducated, humble people, trying to feed 
their families, who had few, if any, alternatives.  And doing that, the 
repressive big colossus from the North, working with the Bolivian power 
elite to try and get them out this business.  I guess if we could have done 
                                         
5 Such considerations were evident in the US Embassy-led shift away from coca eradication to 
focus on interdiction (see Chapter 4).   
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one thing differently on my watch, it would have been to push harder on 
the alternative development side. (Bowers interview, 2013) 
 
This duality also extended to conceptualisations of drug corruption.  Continuing 
with Ambassador Bowers’ account, for example, he discussed corrupt politicians 
as ‘crooks’.  This is grounded in Western liberal ideals of government and dyadic 
legal/illegal categorisations, where interactions between the state and the illicit 
trade are labelled one-dimensionally as corruption: deviance, requiring stronger 
enforcement of the law.  He developed these ideas over the course of the 
interview, highlighting weak Bolivian institutions and greed as causes of 
corruption, and contrasting Bolivian political culture with the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ 
political tradition.  This passage, then, introduces important themes in US 
perceptions of Bolivian state-narco interactions.   
 
There were a number of people who were not... totally on-board, with 
what we were all trying to do, and, in fact, they were corrupt and were 
filling their pockets and were being bought off by the narco traffickers.  
That plays into Bolivian politics, and it plays into how the Bolivian people 
see their government as being independent and democratic, versus ‘they 
just do whatever the gringos tell them’.  There were always those 
tensions. ( . . . )  So you work through the Bolivian political process; sit-
down with the president and say, ‘you guys want to be our partners in 
this, then you’ve got to be our partners.  We’ll do our part, but you have 
got to do your part; you’ve got to clean-up this corruption.  You’ve got to 
get rid of this guy who has clear – dead to rights –been taking money from 
the narcos’. ( . . . )  The higher ranking the individual was… the corrupt 
individual… the more difficult it could be.  Likewise, the party politics 
comes into play.  And if this particular person has been a loyal member of 
the party for a long time, then for the party bosses to cut him off at the 
knees, gets tougher.  And the Anglo-Saxon, American view of what is 
appropriate and what is moral and what is ethical… inherited from our UK 
brethren… does not fit totally with what that view might be in Latin 
America. (Ibid.) 
 
Bowers’ account indicates deep rooted corruption running through Bolivian 
institutions, and these are presented as barriers to US counterdrug interests.  In 
seeking to address the problem, though, the US was faced with severe 
challenges.  This included anti-US sentiment, lack of local political will, and 
Bolivia’s model of patronage politics.  Diminishing the role of US coercion, 
Bowers here suggested a level of collaboration with the Bolivian government in 
the removal corrupt officials.  But the former-Ambassador also emphasised 
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‘cultural’ differences in how actors from both sides conceptualised corruption.  
He argues that ‘Western values’ clashed with ‘normalised’ local practices.  
Reproducing the Drug War Paradigm, then, he understood corruption as moral 
and ethical failure.   
 
More sympathetic discourses of drug corruption in Bolivia, drawing on the 
conceptual framework of the Development Paradigm, ran parallel to this type of 
framing.  Focusing on ground level state-narco interactions, for example, the 
following anecdote from one US Embassy official highlights the power of drug 
traffickers as a key causal factor.  In this view, accepting bribes was often a 
matter of self-preservation rather than greed and moral failure.   
 
There was a Bolivian army officer, who had been very, very good and they 
had had a series of army officers in the Cochabamba region who had been 
– I’ll put it in quotes – ‘corrupted’.  And this Bolivian army officer had an 
outstanding reputation, a very good person.  He went to Cochabamba, 
and approximately two weeks after he arrived, there began to appear in 
his mail box, photographs of his wife and his daughters: inside school 
classrooms, inside friends’ houses, inside the hairdresser, inside the 
restaurant.  And these pictures just kept on appearing, and nothing.  Then 
finally, there was a message that reached him and it said, ‘be sick next 
Monday, and don’t go to work, and you will have a year’s earnings in your 
bank account.  But if you’re not sick, your wife and daughters will be 
fatally ill’.  What do you do?  (US official (A) interview, 2013) 
 
According to this narrative, then, the wealth and violence of drug traffickers 
allowed them to subvert institutions and the rule of law.  In this example, the 
Bolivian officer is placed in an impossible position, and the drug trade itself is 
identified as the cause of ‘corruption’.  The coca-cocaine economy is thus 
portrayed as an invidious force within Bolivia, i.e. the country as victim rather 
than criminal.  As above, moral dichotomies between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and 
parallel distinctions between ‘state/drug trade’ and ‘licit/illicit’ are assumed.  
Arguing along similar lines, Miller cautioned against judgement of officials in 
producer nations who ‘succumb’ to corruption. 
 
In general, my overall sense is that there is so much money involved, and 
so much violence it would be foolish on our part… because we don’t live 
with those pressures… to assume that folks on the other side are immune 
to those pressures or that if they succumb that somehow or other they 
must be inferior human beings.  They’re living in a terribly difficult 
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environment, so from a personal standpoint I always sort of look carefully 
at people to say, ‘I hope they’re okay… I hope they’re straight… I hope 
their family survives… I hope they survive… I hope their country gets 
better’. But it’s tough.  I mean if you’ve been researching this you’ll know 
as well as I do, it’s a tough, tough situation. Overall that’s sort of how I 
looked at it and how I look at heroin production in Afghanistan, or the 
Golden Triangle or anyplace else.  This is a big, dangerous industry. 
(Miller interview, 2013) 
 
In sum, these conceptual dualities of the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy frame 
interpretations of the US role in Bolivia.  For interlocutors, they help to 
reconcile the extension of US control in addressing an ‘existential threat’, and 
deeply held beliefs around how the US uses its influence in the world.  They 
balance the idea of waging a ‘war’ against drugs in the Andean Highlands, with 
contemporary critiques of this approach, personal experiences, and noble 
intentions of extending democracy and development to the South.  In Chapters 6 
and 7, I draw out these dualisms in interpretations of state-narco interactions. 
 
5.1.3 Development Discourses and Bolivian Ambivalence 
 
Where the US Drug War Paradigm externalises accountability for domestic drug 
consumption, Bolivian interlocutors frequently conceptualised the coca-cocaine 
economy as a demand-side problem.  Drawing on the Development Paradigm, 
then, the Bolivian drug trade was explained by simple market forces.  Former-
Interior Minister Guillermo Capobianco (1989-1991) accepted Bolivia’s obligation 
to repress the drug trade, but ultimately he claimed US responsibility for the 
problem.   
 
On one hand, I can understand the feelings of American families affected 
by drug consumption… the families of those young people.  But on the 
other hand, it’s a market. ( . . . )  We were conscious that we should 
provide help to the United States for the fight against drugs, but on two 
dimensions.  (One), to attack consumption there, the market for drugs, ( . 
. . ) because as any undergrad of any university can tell you, it’s supply 
and demand.  If there is no consumption, then what production would 
there be?  So we were always of this judgement that the alliance with the 
United States had to have a double dimension.  Repression, okay, but also 
control of consumption. (Capobianco interview, 2014) 
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In this view, the US should focus its counterdrug efforts closer to home.  This 
interpretative framework underpinned Bolivian arguments against the US 
counterdrug response and criticisms of the country as a drug producing nation.  
This perspective thus contrasts with US securitisation of the Bolivian coca-
cocaine economy and the extension of control.  As shown throughout this and 
the following two chapters, such ideas were important in the pursuit of 
competing US and Bolivian agendas. 
 
In addition to counter-demand efforts, Bolivian actors called for a development-
led counterdrug response.  This holds that the presence of drug trade in the 
South is also a consequence of underdevelopment.  Bolivian interlocutors 
integrated these ideas into arguments emphasising the cultural significance of 
coca in the Andes.  These historical claims are powerful themes within Bolivia, 
and portray coca farmers as victims of the drug trade.6  Former-Subsecretary of 
Social Defence Gonzalo Torrico, drew on these ideas when laying-out the 
rationale for alternative development.  The focus on coca producing countries 
such as Bolivia, rather than industrialised nations, who produced essential 
precursor chemicals, highlighted the imbalance of the ‘war on drugs’.   
 
The coca leaf is not harmful.  The drug is produced when the coca leaf is 
mixed with precursor chemicals, and the vast majority of Latin American 
countries don’t produce these chemicals.  The precursor chemicals come 
from North America, they come from Europe, they come from Asia.  Coca 
is produced in the Andes (but) it has (local) uses and an ancient history.  
So we searched for an important component, which was alternative 
development. (Torrico interview, 2014) 
 
As part of this, the accounts of Bolivian actors displayed a level of ambivalence 
toward the coca-cocaine economy.  Although the necessity of action against the 
drug trade was assumed, its effects on the Bolivian economy and society were 
                                         
6 Some Bolivian interlocutors were more sceptical of coca.  For example: ‘the campesino 
practice of coca leaf chewing is a tradition that, in some ways, is also getting high. ( . . . )  Many 
scientists have said that the mouth is cocaine lab’ (Salinas interview, 2014).  In addition to this, 
former-UMOPAR Commander Luis Caballero (interview, 2014) argued that ‘the influence of drug 
trafficking in the (Chapare) region was, effectively, quite substantial.  The mobilisations of the 
major campesino sectors cost money, quite a lot of money.  It was never explained how 
thousands of campesinos in vehicles were mobilised in the road.  Who was paying for this?  There 
was influence from drug traffickers in this type of mobilisation.  Why?  Because drug trafficking is 
protective of its interests’. 
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viewed as relatively benign.  Taking the economy first, coca-cocaine had 
softened the blow of the neoliberal structural reforms, providing jobs and 
inward investment (see Chapter 4).  Member of Bolivia’s business community and 
former-Interior Minister, Carlos Saavedra (interview, 2013), stated, ‘that in the 
1980s (the coca-cocaine trade’s influence) was very strong. ( . . . )  It 
constituted a large weight on the economy’.  The implications of this are two-
fold.  First, the drug trade was not viewed according to the moral dichotomies of 
the Drug War Paradigm, as its effects were not uniformly negative.  Second, 
Bolivia should be compensated for eliminating this vital sector of the national 
economy.    Looking back on the period now, one member of the Paz Zamora 
government remarked: 
 
The United States was always more pro-eradication than alternative 
development, and I think that was a waste. ( . . . )  I think we made a 
mistake when we signed those agreements with the US.  We said ‘You’re 
going to aid us, give us so much money’… I think we should have asked for 
much more.  We didn’t realise the impact that drug trafficking (had) on 
the economy.  And I think it was a mistake on our part not to ask for 
more. ( . . . )  When we started the eradication plan, it created a problem 
of foreign currency and income in the country, without a doubt.  It was 
quite difficult.  I think that the amount of help that the US gave us on this 
was relatively small compared to what impact it had on the economy. 
(Bolivian official (A) interview, 2013) 
 
As such, there were political consequences in taking action against coca-
cocaine.   While normatively opposed to the drug trade, Bolivia’s social, political 
and economic realities had to be recognised.  Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) 
highlighted some of these:    
 
We had to go on creating alternative jobs because, if not, the social 
problem would be unmanageable.  It could end up in violence because, 
what could we do with that number of coca producers?  They had already 
lost their jobs when they were expelled from the mining sector, due to 
the shock plan that was applied in Bolivia in 1985 to address 
hyperinflation.  So, to address hyperinflation, what they did was reduce 
the public sector, reduce the fiscal deficit.  Because of this they had to 
greatly reduce the jobs in mining.  So there were thousands of workers on 
the streets and they found a source of income in the coca fields of the 
Chapare.  They went there to survive.  So we couldn’t enter directly with 
full eradication, because it was going to generate a social problem too 
great.  In the meantime, then, to reduce these areas, you had to generate 
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jobs and investment for these people who were going to be displaced.  
(Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
Aside from the political (and electoral) pressures Paz Zamora faced, these 
economic and social dynamics placed strain on Bolivia.  Societal upheaval and 
demands from below had formed part of the dynamic of Bolivia’s post-
revolutionary history.  Polarisation and contestation had contributed to a cycle 
of coup d’état, military authoritarianism and repression.  In the 1980s, economic 
crisis under Siles Suazo and the neoliberal reforms of Paz Estensorro had resulted 
in similar social turbulence.  In the latter case, 27,000 miners of the once-
militant COMIBOL were laid-off (Lehman, 1999: 198).  As Paz Zamora describes, 
coca-cocaine softened the blow and provided an alternative for such groups.  In 
the context of Bolivia’s recent democratisation and relatively untested political 
consensus, these dynamics were a source of concern.  This underpins an 
ambivalent attitude towards coca-cocaine, and a contrasting perspective to 
those of US actors. 
 
Such views of the drug trade also extended to other aspects of the Bolivian 
perspective.  The accounts of Bolivian interlocutors echoed Thoumi’s ‘evil 
Colombian’ thesis (2003: 242).  As outlined in Chapter 2, Bolivia’s role in the 
drug trade is viewed as being largely limited to coca cultivation, and absent of 
violence.  Returning to Saavedra’s account, he drew comparisons between the 
situation in Colombia and Bolivia.  His interpretation recognised the stability of 
Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy and, again, its benign effects.   
 
In Colombia, the government was torn apart by Pablo Escobar’s 
(proposed) extradition.  Here, drug trafficking was not violent.  Here, 
there had been no bomb blasts or kidnappings of politicians, journalists or 
judges.  Here, there had been practically no revenge killings by 
traffickers.  If there had been deaths, it had been among the traffickers 
themselves. ( . . . )  Despite Bolivia being the second or third largest drug 
producer, violence wasn't something that had existed here, like it had in 
Colombia, or equally Peru. (Saavedra interview, 2014) 
 
By arguing that ‘Bolivia is not Colombia’, these actors rejected the orthodoxy of 
the US Drug War model.  Coca-cocaine was not viewed as an issue of national 
security and its effects were more complex than assumed by US counterdrug 
policy.  These types of interpretations are important in understanding how 
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Bolivian actors perceived state-narco interactions and the meaning they 
attached to them.  Below, Capobianco describes a level of general 
‘permissiveness’ to the drug trade; a period in which it was viewed much like 
any other business. 
 
I think in this era of the ’80s, there was a lot of social permissiveness 
towards the major traffickers.  Right?  There was permissiveness.  It 
wasn’t an issue.  And I can tell you, they appeared in the grand social 
clubs… people linked to these (traffickers) appeared, and there was no 
indiscriminate repression.  I think, in this sense, those were very different 
times to those we live in now. (Capobianco interview, 2014) 
 
This does not amount to an endorsement of the drug trade.  Capobianco himself 
noted, for example, how the Huanchaca scandal caused public shock, changing 
how traffickers were perceived.  Furthermore, the spectre of the García Meza 
period had changed the domestic conversation about the coca-cocaine economy 
(Meza, 2008: 584).  Political parties seen to be in some way endorsing it risked 
punishment at the ballot box and, at the same time, the international 
environment created pressure to act (Giacoman interview, 2014).  However, 
normative opposition to coca-cocaine and a desire to remove Bolivia from the 
drug circuit also gave way to more benign conceptualisations of the problem that 
contrasted with US securitisation.  This links into democratisation narratives of 
the Paz Zamora government. 
 
5.1.4 The ‘Democracy Generation’ 
 
For several Bolivian actors, development discourses and ambivalence toward the 
coca-cocaine economy were subsumed into the ‘Democracy Generation’ 
narrative.  The term was offered by Paz Zamora (interview, 2014), forming a 
discursive framework that establishes Bolivia’s democratic transition as an 
overriding priority of his government.  As part of this, conceptualisations of the 
‘drug problem’ are viewed through the lens of democratisation.  This includes, 
for example, opposition to destabilising ‘Colombianised’, US policies.  Although 
the US viewed counterdrug and democratisation goals as complementary, Paz 
Zamora’s government contested the political, societal and economic 
implications of the ‘war on drugs’.  Going into negotiations for the Andean 
Initiative, dealing with the US Embassy and responding to state-narco 
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interaction, Paz Zamora’s government was first and foremost concerned with 
sustaining Bolivia’s democratic transition.   
 
I’m from what’s called… from what some in Bolivia call… the Democracy 
Generation.  We were first moved to consider the idea of a democratic 
Bolivia, because we were born in the Bolivia of the military golpista.7 
Bolivia is one of the few countries in the region where, since its birth as a 
republic, it had only military governments.  Civil-military golpismo 
became a model of government, a mode of governing the country… There 
was gunfire when they entered the presidential palace, and gunfire when 
they left.  The political parties were organised with the aim of finding a 
military leader and staging a coup, until another party would find a 
different ally in the military and remove them.  In many ways, we were a 
barbaric and unpredictable nation.  Anything could happen in any 
moment.  So this affected our generation.  In this, I played a leading 
role… because of this cause, I entered into public service. (Paz Zamora 
interview, 2014) 
 
The narrative thus situates Paz Zamora and his contemporaries on the path of 
Bolivian history.  They had lived through the era of authoritarianism and political 
instability, where the military had been the dominant political actor.  Due to 
this experience, he and his generation were instilled with a sense of purpose: to 
bring democracy to a country that had only ever known military government.  
Pacted-democracy between the MIR and ADN was part of this, reconciling leftist 
and right-wing political factions (see Chapter 6).  In making the Acuerdo 
Patriótico, Paz Zamora had helped to bring the cycle of military ‘golpismo’ to an 
end. 
 
There was a problem when democracy began in Latin America.  The Left – 
influenced by Cuba – said, ‘no, this is bourgeois.  This isn’t the road of the 
Left’.  We thought that the Left should participate.  So we were the first – 
the first – the first party of the Left in South America, if not Latin 
America, that entered the electoral process.  (Working) among parties of 
the Right, it was hard for us.  Nowadays, this is normal for the Left… for 
the Latin American Left, right now.  Lula treated us like traitors.8 
President Lula with his Grupo de San Pablo released a document against 
us for entering democracy.  What do you make of that?!  The continent 
has changed a lot since then. (Ibid.) 
 
                                         
7 This translates as ‘coup d’état’. 
8 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became President of Brazil in 2003. 
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Developing the historical perspective of the ‘Democracy Generation’ narrative, 
Paz Zamora emphasises themes of struggle and sacrifice.  For example, the MIR 
was at the vanguard of the region’s shift to electoral democracy, despite the 
criticism of prominent members of the Latin American Left and the difficulties 
of dealing with former adversaries, such as Banzer.  The persecution of the Left 
in Latin America during the Cold War adds further substance to these themes 
(e.g. see Smith, 2009: Ch. 7).  The MIR’s experiences of repression mirrored 
those of other Left-wing parties in the region.  Paz Zamora here alludes to his 
own imprisonment under Banzer, although there are other significant cases of 
authoritarian abuses he could have drawn on.  For example, it is widely 
accepted that he was subject to an assassination attempt by Right-wing 
elements of the Bolivian military in June 1980.9  This is the potent history from 
which the ‘Democracy Generation’ narrative rises: leaving bitterness in the past 
to support the installation of a viable democratic government.   
 
Before talk of left or right, the issue for Bolivia (was) democracy or not; 
to be a modern nation, to be a nation.  So this was our struggle.  We were 
7 years in the underground resistance against the military, with all that 
entailed: exile, imprisonment.  I was imprisoned in one of the military 
prisons here… that gives an idea of what it was like for that generation, 
that Latin American generation; like the current president of Uruguay10 
(and) Rousseff in Brazil.11  (But) our efforts would close this cycle in 
Bolivia definitively, the military golpismo mode of government.  It was 
finished, closed; opening democracy.  I was the third democratic 
president, and the first vice-president of democratic government in 
Bolivia.  Democracy was installed for the first time in Bolivia.  We 
couldn’t say, as they could in Chile or Uruguay, that we were reinstalling 
democracy… Chile had democracy, but it was halted by Pinochet, it was 
the same in Uruguay.  In Bolivia?  No, there hadn’t been a democratic 
system.  In the Constitution, yes, but that was only a piece of paper.  So 
to finish this military cycle, to establish democracy in 1982 and to try and 
get a country that doesn’t have a democratic culture to develop one, 
                                         
9 Paz Zamora was the sole survivor of a plane crash during the 1980 electoral campaign 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 284).  He was part of a joint-Leftist ticket with Hernan Siles Suazo, which was 
opposed by General Garcia Meza and his allies.  Few doubted that the latter were responsible for 
the ‘accident’.  Paz Zamora’s house had been bombed a day prior to the crash, and later it was 
found that the plane had been hired from a company owned by Colonel Norberto Salomón, a 
close ally of Arce Gomez. In addition to this, under the Garcia Meza regime, nine members of the 
MIR were gunned down during a party meeting in La Paz.  Arce Gomez was also implicated in this 
case. 
10 Paz Zamora here is referring José Mujica, who served as President of Uruguay between 2010 
and 2015. 
11 Dilma Rousseff became President of Brazil in 2011.  
Chapter 5  161 
 
little by little… we had a very prominent role.  At times, the necessity of 
guaranteeing the democratic governability of the country wasn’t 
understood; we weren’t used to that here.  So we had our own 
government, headed by the MIR, but we made alliances.  We helped make 
it happen, including political factions that were not aligned with our 
values.  We were part of international socialism, the social democratic 
parties of Europe… all of this.  I was vice-President of the Socialist 
International… that, from the start, made me appear a little 
untrustworthy.  Anyway, in this way, with these objectives, we set the 
trajectory, and today we can see that this line may continue and that we 
have left a mark on a modern democracy in Bolivia. (Ibid) 
 
Paz Zamora’s interpretation is thus couched in wider historical trends.  For 
example, his actions as president were shaped by his formative political 
experiences under Bolivian golpismo.  In these passages, the Cold War remains in 
the background, but Paz Zamora suggests that his leftist roots made him ‘appear 
untrustworthy’.  This hints at his explanation for the fraught relationship 
between his government and the US.12  Situating the case in the present, he 
places himself alongside contemporaries of the new-Left in Latin America.  In 
some ways, the ‘war on drugs’ seems less compelling to him than the history of 
the Third Wave and the significant political changes it wrought.  Such context, 
though, gives his account a rich historical perspective, where he emphasises 
structural factors in the course of his own life story.  As such, these are viewed 
as affecting personal agency.  The former-President’s self-representation and 
sense of legacy are part of this; strands that become even more pertinent when 
questions are raised around his government’s commitment to counterdrug goals 
and involvement in cases of corruption.   
 
The idea of maintaining ‘democratic governability’ is also important here.  
Because of their experiences under authoritarianism, the ‘Democracy 
Generation’ was heavily invested in a democratic Bolivia and understood the 
fragility of this political consensus.  This included compromises around pacted-
democracy and a concern to ensure political stability.  In the following chapter, I 
argue that aspects of this narrative are used to justify uneven democratisation 
and the tacit-acceptance of state-narco networks.  In other words, imperfect 
democratic institutionalisation, ambivalence towards coca-cocaine, and the 
                                         
12 In the next section, I outline this parallel framing narrative, emphasising the effects of the 
Cold War legacy on the ‘war on drugs’. 
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remnants of authoritarianism and clientelism, were the price of maintaining 
democratic transition.  The US ‘war on drugs’ was viewed as contradictory to 
these goals.  Opposition to the US approach, then, was not indicative of a lack of 
political will, corruption or anti-Yankee sentiment, but grounded instead in the 
goals of political order and democratisation.  As elected government has been 
sustained and parties of the Left across the region have engaged in the 
democratic process, the MIR’s actions are given historical weight and legitimacy.  
According to the ‘Democracy Generation’ narrative, then, the US had its Drug 
War, while the Bolivian government had their ‘democratising mission’. 
 
5.2 The Nature of US-Bolivian Relations 
 
As the preceding discussion shows, US and Bolivian interlocutors drew on 
different interpretative frameworks.  Often, these perspectives diverged in 
significant ways, solidifying divergent agendas.  In this section, I consider 
another important facet of this dynamic: how these actors conceived affairs 
between their countries.  These narratives of US-Bolivian relations are important 
to Chapters 6 and 7, in mapping contestation around the escalation of the ‘war 
on drugs’ in Bolivia, the extension of US control and cases of political drug 
scandal. 
 
For US interlocutors, themes of American Exceptionalism were present, as they 
pursued the ‘three Ds’ in Bolivia: drugs, democracy and development.  These 
goals were believed to be mutually-reinforcing, and beneficial to both the US 
and Bolivia.  US paternal attitudes towards Latin America may also be identified, 
i.e. the Northern patron providing assistance to its underdeveloped Southern 
client.  Bolivian actors, meanwhile, rationalised their fractious relationship with 
the US Embassy against the background of the Cold War.  Its legacy continued to 
shape US-Bolivian relations.  For example, the former-leftists of the MIR were 
viewed with suspicion by US Cold Warriors, who continued to engage in the 
political subterfuge that had characterised the authoritarian era.   
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This historical framing was largely absent from the accounts of US 
interviewees.13  At least outwardly, they drew a sharp division between the Cold 
War and the ‘war on drugs’.  The interpretations of Bolivian interlocutors, 
though, were grounded in a longer view of history.  Their period of reference 
was not neatly demarcated ‘1989-93’.  This type of historical contextualisation is 
not only crucial to their analysis of the formulation, negotiation and 
implementation of counterdrug policies, it also provides insights into how they 
conceptualised interlinkages between the state and the illicit sphere.  In this 
sense, uneven democratisation – the continuation of clientelistic and 
authoritarian practices – and the compromises these actors made to ensure 
stability (e.g. pacted democracy), are interpreted against the development of 
Bolivian history.  Here, the path to democratisation and the Cold War period are 
crucial, incorporating the nature of state-societal dynamics, civil-military 
relations and the role of the US in Bolivia.  It is through reference to these 
factors that such actors interpreted state-narco interactions and the onset of 
the ‘war on drugs’.   
 
5.2.1 The ‘Three Ds’ 
 
US counterdrug efforts in Bolivia formed a triumvirate of foreign policy 
objectives, alongside democratic consolidation and economic development: ‘We 
had what we called “the three Ds”: democracy, drugs and development.  That’s 
what we were about; what we were trying to do’ (Bowers interview, 2013).  
These goals were proffered as complementary.  For example, dismantling the 
drug trade would allow for institutionalisation of democracy and enable 
economic growth; and free market policies would reduce the drug economy by 
creating growth, and so strengthen democratic institutions.  Solving ‘America’s 
drug problem’, then, would not just be to the benefit of the US.  Informed by 
themes of American Exceptionalism, US counterdrug policy was defended in 
terms of shared interests with the country’s regional partners in the South.  The 
                                         
13 Ambassador Bowers noted the importance of this when describing his relationship with the Paz 
Zamora government: ‘We got on fine.  I went to the University of California, Berkley, and they 
were Latin-Leftists, so they were aware that Berkley was sort of at the fore-front of free-speech 
movement and the Leftist insurrections of the 1960s that took place in the United States.  
Whether I had anything to do with that or not’ (Bowers interview, 2013). 
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following quote from a letter from President Bush to Ambassador Bowers (Bush 
correspondence, 1991) is indicative of these beliefs. 
 
As leader of the democracies, our Nation faces an historic opportunity to 
help shape a freer, more secure, and more prosperous world, in which our 
ideals and way of life can truly flourish.  As President, I intend to advance 
these objectives around the globe, and I look to you, as my personal 
representative in Bolivia, as my partner in this task. 
 
Paternal attitudes towards Bolivia were also evident in this US narrative.  North-
South disparities are underplayed, as are more critical readings of US influence 
in Latin America.  The US, as the ‘City on the Hill’ is charged with the 
responsibility of extending its ideals to the world.  Possible US complicity in 
creating, for example, past-authoritarian governments or violent trafficking 
organisations, is glossed over.  US exploitation of uneven North-South power 
relations for its own ends is similarly ignored.  Instead, this strand of the 
narrative emphasises benevolent US foreign policy intentions within Bolivia, and 
portrays the country as a poor relative, unable to properly manage itself.  
Addressing Bolivian reactions to the withholding of US aid linked to eradication, 
Ambassador Bowers (interview, 2013) stated: 
 
Well they would say, ‘we’ve tried very hard… we’ve worked very hard… 
we’re doing this… you don’t understand… politically we can’t go down and 
do this right now… you have to give us a little more slack, a little more 
time’.  So most of the time it was more a bargaining than it was, ‘of 
course we signed this contract, so of course we’re going to live up to the 
terms of it’.  So that gets back to mind-set… that is different.  And they 
had a lot to lose if things go south.  And they’ve gone south, I mean not 
on my watch, but in the last few years.  Evo Morales was known to the 
Embassy.  I don’t remember ever meeting him, but he was known as a 
low-level rabble-rouser, not very bright, not very educated, but was 
able… had a charismatic capability and now he’s president of the country.  
 
 
In this example, the US plays the role of guardian to Bolivia’s errant child.  
Bowers’ commentary suggests a lack of will, as the Bolivian government is 
reluctant to honour the terms of its ‘contract’.  He also alludes to the 
consequences of failure to comply with these agreed goals: Bolivia ‘had a lot to 
lose’.  The discussion of President Evo Morales (2006- ) is interesting in this 
regard.  The Morales government’s anti-US stance, including expulsion of the 
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DEA in 2008, has entailed a rejection of its Northern patron.  Bowers here is 
dismissive of Morales and argues that the country has ‘gone south’ under his 
rule.  In terms of US paternalism, then, Bolivia has suffered in the absence of 
the guiding hand of the US.  These kinds of attitudes bleed into interpretations 
of the US counterdrug role in Bolivia during the period of study. 
 
Looking back, though, some US interlocutors recognised the inadequacy of 
aspects of US policy.  For example, former-Ambassador David Greenlee (2002-
2006), who also served as Deputy Chief of Mission to  the US Embassy from 1987 
to 1989, suggested that the ‘war on drugs’ had been detrimental to wider US 
objectives.  He believed that democracy and development goals were frequently 
diminished in favour of US counterdrug objectives.  Simply put, US politicians 
were more concerned about cocaine on their streets than US strategic interests 
in Latin America.  Budgetary and domestic political realities drove the US 
agenda in Bolivia. 
 
I would always say our interest is a consolidation of democracy, the 
stabilisation of the country and so forth.  I would not say it’s the drug 
effort.  I never said that.  But, in-fact, because of where the money went, 
there was so much money going into that, that it was a kind of distortion 
of what I think our real priorities ought to be.  When people say, ‘well 
what is it about Bolivia that links back to the States that makes things, 
really touches our interests?’  It was, in those days, back in the late ’80s 
particularly, it was Bolivian cocaine hitting the streets of the US. ( . . . )  I 
was always a little bit sceptical about how useful this great concentration 
on the anti-drug stuff was in terms of our bigger interests in Bolivia, 
which were less tangible: democratisation and helping Bolivia move from 
its very chaotic kind of revolutionary history into something more stable. 
(Greenlee interview, 2013) 
 
Greenlee was US Ambassador to Bolivia when former-cocalero Morales became 
president and adopted an anti-US stance.  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that 
he see the contradiction in US foreign policy.14  Several other US interviewees 
also made the connection between US counterdrug policy and the rise of 
Morales.  Such views recognised the dominance of US counterdrug goals in 
                                         
14 Former DEA official, Terry Burke (interview 2013), observed the frustration of certain US 
Embassy officials being forced to pursue the ‘war on drugs’: ‘Most people don’t go to the State 
Department to run enforcement operations, most of these people were economics folks or 
whatever, and law enforcement was not their forte’. 
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Bolivia, as development aid was conditioned on the eradication targets and ‘the 
advancement of democracy – beyond the technical matter of holding regular 
elections – received little more than lip service’ (Lehman, 2006: 132).  As 
discussed in the following chapter, the vigorous pursuit of Drug War goals came 
before local concerns around political, social and economic instability caused by 
counterdrug policies.  This included the installation of Drug War proxies to 
circumvent ‘corrupt’ local power structures, and direct pressure on 
uncooperative partners in the Bolivian government, all aimed at exerting US 
counterdrug control. 
 
5.3.2 The Cold War Legacy 
 
The Cold War Legacy narrative provides insights into how some Bolivian 
interlocutors made sense of their relations with the US.  First, they believed US 
policy was influenced by the politics of the past and so the US Embassy was 
suspicious of the once radical MIR.  Linked into this, the US security apparatus 
was populated by the same officials from the Cold War era: although the focus 
had changed to the ‘war on drugs’, the ‘Cold War mentality’ remained (Paz 
Zamora interview, 2014).  Second, the US is portrayed as controlling and, at 
times, ruthless.  Reflecting themes of Imperialismo Yanquí, interlocutors discuss 
the role of the US in the region’s unstable history and its efforts to shape 
Bolivia’s internal politics.  As the Cold War ended, the realities of a new unipolar 
world placed the US in an even stronger position to influence events within 
Bolivia.  From this perspective, then, the ‘war on drugs’ may have substituted 
for the Cold War, but both are placed along the same unbroken line of US-
Bolivian history.  These aspects of the Cold War Legacy framing narrative are 
illustrated in passages from interviews with Guillermo Capobianco and Jaime Paz 
Zamora.   
 
Capobianco was a founding member of the MIR, and went on to serve as Interior 
Minister in Paz Zamora’s government before resigning under the weight of US 
drug corruption allegations.  He made reference to wider historical dynamics in 
his analysis of the period; from his foundational political experiences in post-
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revolutionary Bolivia to the great upheavals of the Cold War.  Throughout his 
account, the US is often portrayed as the antagonist. 
 
During this time,15 we began to blame the United States for everything… 
imperialism… and we would go and protest. ( . . . )  We would go to 
USCIS,16 throw stones and everything… a typical young anti-imperialist… a 
revolutionary of the period. ( . . . )  The radicalization of the Cuban 
Revolution in 196117 divided Latin America in two.  Because of the battle 
at the Bay of Pigs and the revolutionary victory, the presence of guerrillas 
trained in Cuba begins to spread like wildfire through Latin America.18  
I’ve been to Havana a number of times.  I went there because we were 
friends with the Cubans… the MIR, like other revolutionary parties of the 
era, were friends of the Cubans: the ELN, the Communist Party, Marxists, 
MNRistas, etc., and among them, the MIR.  But the most terrible… most 
terrible of all this, querido joven,19 was the reaction of the United States.  
It was brutal.  It was criminal.  At least, 50,000 young people died 
between the Bay of Pigs and the 1970s, before Carter became president 
and human rights and all of that.  At least 50,000 young people!  The 
brightest of the middle classes… academics, professionals… full of ideals.  
It was… It was… the decade of dreams… the decade of socialist utopia, in 
which we participated because our heroes were the Barbudos de la 
Sierra, who arrived on the first of January and all of that.  So all of this is 
what I call… I think I’m the only one… ‘the Holocaust of the Latin 
American Youth’. (Capobianco interview, 2014) 
 
The upheaval in Latin America overs the 1960s and ’70s informs Capobianco’s 
understanding of the US.  It links into US ‘distrust’ of the MIR, in the sense that 
his party was aligned with the Latin American Left during this period of great 
division in the region.  More than this, though, the MIR is portrayed as being part 
of an idealistic movement that was then crushed by the US.  The ‘brutal’ use of 
US power to fulfil geopolitical goals and intervention in the internal politics of 
                                         
15 Capobianco here is referring to his days as a student during the 1950-60s. 
16 The Office of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
17 This was the year of the Bay of Pigs invasion.  Right-wing Cuban exiles, based out of Miami and 
supported by the CIA, launched an ill-fated attempt to depose Castro and his government.  In the 
aftermath, the Cuban government became more closely aligned with the Soviet Union.   
18 Capobianco (interview, 2014) here segues into Che Guevara’s revolutionary expedition in 
Bolivia: ‘In Peru, in Argentina, in Chile, in Bolivia… focos and guerrillas appeared with theories 
taken from Régis Debray.  Okay?  The guerrilla foco was his theoretical work and that was 
adopted by el Commandante Ernesto Guevara; and he came because he was convinced of 
Debray’s theory.  But life was different.  He arrived in a country where there had already been a 
revolution.  The campesinos already had land, agrarian reform had been introduced’.   
19 Roughly translates as dear boy/young man/son.  Capobianco also uses the word ‘joven’ in his 
subsequent description of those young people killed during this period.  Subconsciously or not, he 
placed me as a young academic alongside those young people who had lost their lives under 
authoritarianism. 
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foreign nations are central themes of Latin American notions of Yankee 
Imperialism (Smith, 2009).   
 
From the Monroe Doctrine and the backing of oppressive authoritarian regimes 
to economic exploitation and Dependency Theory, the US is said to be 
overwhelmingly self-interested, acting frequently to the detriment of its less 
powerful southern neighbours.  Local priorities, such as democratisation, are 
placed secondary to US foreign policy goals.  This idea continues to hold 
relevance for certain sectors in Latin America and instils a sense of grievance 
against the regional hegemon.  Lectures from US politicians over drug 
production, trafficking and corruption may be countered with a list of crimes – 
real or perceived – committed by the US.20  Paz Zamora makes these connections 
in the following passage. 
 
So this is what I can tell you… of what was our experience.  There are 
important issues.  For example, the fact that all of this occurred between 
’89 and ’93, in the context of a brutal change in the planet, with the end 
of the Cold War and the beginning of a new age.  This had a huge 
influence on the US personnel.  From 1989 a new unipolar international 
political system starts.  So this is shown in Bolivia in the ‘war on drugs’, in 
the imposition of the neoliberal model.  That is to say, ‘this planet is 
ours, including Bolivia’.  They were already involved in everything here.  
It was already very difficult… that a military leader could take power… 
they controlled all of the armed forces and the police.  It was very 
complicated… that it was they who had won the Cold War. ( . . . )  We 
were the first Leftist party in Latin America that entered electoral 
politics.  Our party, the MIR… before Lula in Brazil.  After Allende, the 
first Leftist president in South America was me.  After the tragedy of 
Allende and just as the Cold War was ending.  At that time, the Americans 
felt victorious.  I tell you this because it had a lot to do with the way they 
confronted the issue of drugs.  They faced it with the Cold War mentality, 
because it was the same personnel that had fought the Cold War, in the 
intelligence services, etc… the fight against communism, all of this.  The 
same personnel… (they) didn’t retire, they moved on to another enemy 
and they took the issue of the day which was drug trafficking.  I was three 
months in government when the Berlin Wall fell.  I was the only Leftist 
president in South America and the Berlin Wall fell.  I didn’t know where 
to go!  Two years later, the Soviet Union falls.  So, this is context in which 
I happened to face these problems. (Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
                                         
20 As discussed in Chapter 2, this is an important strand of the Development Paradigm.   
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The end of the Cold War was, therefore, a crucial contextual factor for Paz 
Zamora’s presidency and the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia.  He made reference to 
themes of Yankee Imperialism, in the projection of US power and control in the 
South, for example.  The changing international balance, though, imbued the US 
with almost unchecked influence.  Echoing institutional-bureaucratic narratives 
and the securitisation agenda, the search for new missions brought the ‘war on 
drugs’ to the fore.   But there was also continuity in personnel and attitudes.  
This entails Paz Zamora’s position as an outsider, and enduring US influence 
within Bolivia, reaching into the security forces.  In his account, he was a leftist 
in the mould of Allende, faced with the same ‘Cold War mentality’, and the 
same US personnel who had provided support to Bolivia’s past authoritarian 
regimes.   
 
The Cold War Legacy narrative thus provides insights into how these Bolivian 
actors rationalised US-Bolivian relations.  As discussed in the following two 
chapters, historical undercurrents underpinned their interpretations.  The US 
was viewed, in many ways, as the same Cold War actor, who had interfered in 
Latin American politics and sabotaged the goals of the Latin America Left.  
Although the MIR had changed, the US continued to judge them through the 
prism of Cold War politics.  For these interlocutors, this explains the top-down 
control of the US in the ‘war on drugs’, as well as the turbulent relationship 
between Paz Zamora’s government and the US Embassy.  In addition to this, the 
outpouring of post-Cold War triumphalism – or hubris, as some interviewees 
would suggest – led to the extension of US power: ‘that is to say, “this planet is 
ours, including Bolivia”’ (Paz Zamora interview, 2014).  Stated normative US 
goals, such as protecting ‘America’s Youth’ and ‘liberating’ Latin American 
democracies from violent traffickers, are dismissed in this narrative.  Instead, US 
conduct in the advancement of counterdrug policy is explained through existing 
and long-standing models of power and control in Latin America.21   
 
 
                                         
21 This cynicism is also present in the conspiracy theories which frequently emerged in my 
interviews with Bolivian actors.  As discussed in the Chapter 7, these aspects of their accounts 
diminish Bolivia’s implied guilt for its role in the coca-cocaine economy. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
Gamarra (1997) argues that lack of progress in US-Bolivian counterdrug efforts 
owed much to a clash of perceptions, where US actors saw drugs as matter of 
national security and Bolivians did not.  Contributing to this failure, the level of 
mistrust between the Bolivian government and the US Embassy during this period 
was an open secret.  This chapter unpicks the contrasting perspectives of US and 
Bolivian actors, which underpinned such dynamics.  Their distinct 
conceptualisations of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy, the ‘war on drugs’ and 
the nature of US-Bolivian relations, reflected and entrenched distinct agendas.  
Analysis of these interpretative frameworks brings into focus competing US and 
Bolivian priorities.  For example, the Embassy’s Drug War stood alongside the 
Paz Zamora government’s ‘democratising mission’; American Exceptionalism 
clashed with the Cold War legacy.  These are crucial to how these actors 
understood state-narco interactions, and how they navigated them.  The 
narratives mapped in this chapter thus inform the analysis in the final two 
empirical chapters: uneven democracy, and links between the security forces 
and the drug trade; and contestation around drug scandals in the Bolivian 
political class. 
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Chapter 6| Uneven Democracy and Uneven Power 
 
This chapter examines how police/military state-narco networks were 
interwoven in the political dynamics of post-transition Bolivia.   Drawing on the 
accounts of US and Bolivian actors, I discuss Bolivia’s post-transition political 
settlement and the introduction of the Andean Initiative as important contextual 
factors.  First, uneven Bolivian democratisation entailed the continuation of 
clientelistic and authoritarian practices alongside formal institutional processes.  
Transition had brought relatively free and fair elections, but pacted democracy,1 
and military and police autonomy perpetuated informalism.  I argue that this 
limited transparency and accountability, and contributed to the maintenance of 
state-narco networks running through the security forces.  During this period of 
uncertainty, when the ‘rules of the game’ were still in flux, such governance 
was viewed to form part of a fragile political equilibrium.  As such, the 
installation of the US Drug War model challenged the local political order and 
the preservation of Bolivia’s imperfect transition.  As negotiations for the 
Andean Initiative unfolded and policy filtered down to Bolivia, distinct US and 
Bolivian agendas came into focus.  US Drug War goals clashed with the 
proclaimed ‘democratising mission’ of the Paz Zamora government and its 
ambivalent attitudes towards the coca-cocaine economy.  My analysis shows how 
differing interpretations of drugs and state-narco networks informed divergent 
US and Bolivian counterdrug preferences.  Distinct priorities led to competitive 
US-Bolivian relations of power and control. 
 
The first half of the chapter outlines the Acuerdo Patriótico, the political-police 
pact and unreformed civil-military relations as important facets of uneven 
Bolivian democracy.  Moving beyond conventional accounts of drug corruption, 
                                         
1 This draws on O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986: 37-47), who define a pact as ‘an explicit, but not 
always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seek to 
define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual 
guarantees for the vital interests of those entering into it.’  This takes on different forms in 
different countries, but such agreements generally represent well-established interests, limit 
competition and accountability, control the policy agenda and distort citizen equality.  Pacts 
may be used to reduce uncertainty between key actors/institutions in the process of 
transitioning to democracy.  In the Bolivian case, this included the Pacto por la Democracia 
between the MNR and ADN during Paz Estensorro’s presidency, and the subsequent Acuerdo 
Patriótico between the MIR and ADN. 
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my analysis provides insights into the function of state-narco networks during 
this period and their relation to processes of political transition.  I argue that 
this also reveals how Bolivian actors prioritised their ‘democratising mission’, 
opposing destabilising, ‘Colombianised’ counterdrug policies, and rejecting US 
securitised notions of drugs.  In the second half of the chapter, I consider how 
this view clashed with US perspectives during the introduction of the Andean 
Initiative.  As the policy was implemented at ground-level, the US Embassy 
exerted control over the Bolivian government, attempting to bypass local 
‘corrupt’ power structures and install its own Drug War proxies.  However, the 
US approach was resisted by the Paz Zamora administration.  The passing of a 
repentance law, for example, reflected long-standing Bolivian government 
tendencies of seeking accommodation with the drug trade rather than 
confrontation.  Through this discussion, I elucidate competing Bolivian and US 
agendas, underpinned by different conceptualisations of Bolivia’s drug 
‘problem’.  The chapter, therefore, explores how elite US and Bolivian actors 
understood and responded to state-narco networks in different ways, against the 
background of uneven democracy and the escalation of the ‘war on drugs’.  This 
analysis furthers understanding of the interactions that evolve between the state 
and the drug trade in different contexts, US-Bolivian relations, and the 
development of US counterdrug policy in Latin America. 
 
6.1 Pacted Democracy: the Acuerdo Patriótico 
 
The MIR and ADN formed the Acuerdo Patriótico following 1989’s indecisive 
presidential election.2  The agreement made Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) president, 
and gave Hugo Banzer’s ADN significant influence within the new government.  It 
was emblematic of the great changes that had occurred within Bolivian politics: 
on one side, the former radical leftist embracing democracy and free market 
economics; on the other, the dictator turned democrat passing-up his 
opportunity to become president.  The MIR and Banzer’s fractious shared history 
                                         
2 The top three candidates each gained around a quarter of the poll, with Sanchez ‘Goni’ 
Gonzalo de Losada (MNR) narrowly ahead of Hugo Banzer (ADN) and Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR) 
respectively.  According to electoral rule, when no candidate was able to take over 50 per cent 
of the popular vote, Congress was required to select the next president.  The Acuerdo Patriótico 
ensured Paz Zamora had the support of the ADN in Congress and so sufficient support to become 
president.   
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added to the symbolism.  The left-wing MIR had been caught-up in the often 
violent repression that characterised periods of Banzer’s authoritarian rule.  In 
the run-up to the 1989 election, Paz Zamora had expressed still lingering 
animosity, stating: ‘a river of blood separates the MIR and Banzer’ (Comas, 
1990a).  The subsequent pact between the former enemies, then, drew 
accusations of political opportunism.  Speaking at the UN General Assembly 
shortly after his inauguration, Paz Zamora (UN, 1989: 7) addressed such 
criticisms, arguing that ‘a new cycle’ had begun, making ‘consensus, agreement 
and harmony, rather than conflict and confrontation, the foundations of Bolivia's 
democratic policy.’  This was a view shared by former-government minister 
Gonzalo Torrico (interview, 2014) of ADN. 
 
Bolivia had already left behind the era of ‘los golpes de estado’.  There 
had been a political maturity… democratic compromise.  And between the 
political parties as well, there existed a dialogue, there existed a 
democratic culture. (Torrico interview, 2014) 
 
Actors such as Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) highlighted their repression under 
Banzer, but stated that the MIR had left this in the past to bring ‘the military 
golpismo mode of government’ to a close, and open democracy.  Aligning with 
factions who did not share their political convictions, Paz Zamora argued that 
‘the necessity of guaranteeing the democratic governability of the country 
wasn’t understood’ (Ibid.).3  According to this view, the agreement between the 
parties was crucial to ensuring effective government (Azcui, 1989).  It 
represented the beginnings of a new way of doing politics, as these factions 
settled matters through negotiation rather than coup d’état.  Learning the 
lessons of the Siles Suazo period, for example, such agreements prevented 
deadlock and ensured the government’s agenda passed Congress (Gamarra, 
1996: 74-5).  Drawing on historical perspective and the symbolism of the 
Acuerdo Patriótico, this established ‘democracy’ and political stability as 
overriding goals of the Paz Zamora government.  Consequently, US counterdrug 
goals and securitised responses to drugs were diminished.   
 
                                         
3 The full passage of the interview transcript in which these quotes appear is produced in 
Chapter 5.1.4. 
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The topic of drugs wasn’t a priority for us.  It wasn’t.  Transforming the 
country was.  For the country to transition from the dictatorship of Banzer 
to democracy: this was our priority.  Political stability, economic 
stability, these were our priorities, and the topic of drug was nothing… an 
important thing, but as I say, it wasn’t what I judge… it wasn’t the 
priority.  There were other more important things in that moment. 
(Capobianco interview, 2014) 
 
The claimed ‘democratising mission’ and political pragmatism of the MIR and 
ADN, though, was also subject to more negative assessments.  Rather than 
building and maintaining democratic political consensus, it was argued that 
Bolivia’s ‘old ways of doing politics had survived’ (Gamarra, 1991: 14).  In this 
view, such arrangements were used by political elites to limit popular 
representation, implement popularly opposed policies, and distribute the spoils 
of power among themselves.  Reducing transparency, this established a 
policymaking process ‘reminiscent of the exclusionary processes of previous 
authoritarian experiences’ (Ibid.).  This included the trading of political 
patronage between the parties (Morales Q., 1992a: 106).  While notionally 
committed to the neoliberal ideal of reducing the size of the state, for example, 
the government created three new ministries, 16 new vice-ministerial posts and 
added 20,000 new public sector employees.  Areas of Bolivia’s ‘new politics’ 
were thus characterised by particularism.4   
 
This form of clientelism led to accusations of ‘widespread corruption’ in the 
Bolivian political system (Conaghan & Malloy, 1994: 230).  Reflecting this view, 
James Cason (2009: 346-347), the US Embassy’s Political Counsellor at this time, 
argued that such pacts were used by political elites to ‘steal as much money as 
they could for themselves’. 
 
The traditional politicians in the ADN, the MIR, and the MNR had run the 
country for years, excluding the indigenous majority from political life. 
They looked after themselves and their particular interests.  ( . . . )  
There was a lot of manoeuvring going on between the elite trying to keep 
power.  I’m very cynical about it, but it’s realistic… to steal as much 
money as they could for themselves, to get rich.  They didn’t care about 
the poor people.  Indians didn’t get much out of this.  So this was an elite 
                                         
4 O’Donnell (1996: 40) uses this term to refer to informal practices that contradict the universal 
rights and formal processes promised by modern, liberal democracy, including patronage and 
nepotism.  
Chapter 6  175 
 
game they’d played for centuries, divvying-up the pie.  That’s why they 
made these strange alliances of the Right and Left, which didn’t make any 
sense, such as you looked at them as a way to divvy up the resources of 
the country for themselves. 
 
Viewed from the ‘Anglo-Saxon, American’ perspective (Bowers interview, 2013), 
political pacts and the systems of patronage that maintained them, amounted to 
little more than corruption.  Under this conception, uneven democracy and 
informalism were divorced from their political context.  This stands in contrast 
to the interpretations of Bolivian interlocutors, who looked on the Acuerdo 
Patriótico as a symbol of democracy.  Although open to accusations of 
opportunism and self-interest, for actors such as Paz Zamora, the pact was the 
culmination of years spent in opposition to authoritarianism.  Bolivia’s turbulent 
political past justified these compromises.  These were essential to establishing 
a new mode of politics.  As such, the ‘Democracy Generation’ accepted 
imperfect democratisation – including police and military autonomy – as the 
price of maintaining the transition. 
 
6.2 The Political-Police Pact 
 
Informalism was also evident in relations between the political class and the 
police institution.  During the authoritarian period, the police had been 
subordinated to the military and used as part of the repressive state apparatus 
(Gamarra, 1991: 23).  Post-transition, the balance of power between the 
institutions was recalibrated.  The military saw its internal role reduced, while 
the police grew in stature (Barrios M., 1993: 4).  The police benefitted from 
increased prerogatives, protected budgets and foreign counterdrug funding (see 
Figure 6.1).  Such changes would bring Bolivia in-line with the principles of 
modern liberal democracy and a democratic rule of law.  But this shift was also 
grounded in civilian fears of a return to military government, and their reliance 
on the police to maintain internal order (drawn from Quintana, 2005: 100).  The 
political-police pact established mutual interests, and was aimed at maintaining 
the post-transition political settlement.  First, the military’s commitment to 
democracy remained uncertain, and so civilian governments looked to bolster 
the police as an institutional counterweight.  Second, against the background of 
economic instability and the implementation of unpopular structural reforms, 
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the police were called upon to maintain order.  Mirroring the limited 
competition and accountability of pacted democracy, societal opposition was 
quelled by the police.  This included, for example, the suppression of a general 
strike during Paz Estensorro’s government (Mesa, et. al., 2008: 581-3).  In return 
for fulfilling these roles, the police enjoyed independence from external control.   
 
Figure 6.1: US INC and FMF Assistance to Bolivia (1982-1989)5  
 
*No figures were available for FMF assistance to Bolivia prior to 1984. 
(USAID, 2013) 
 
Institutional reform of the police was placed on hold, as the political parties 
instead utilised patron-client bonds to achieve their aims (Barrios M., 1994: 95).  
This included power over appointments to command positions, and disbursement 
of discretionary government funds.  Particularism thus defined relations 
between politicians and the police.  In addition to this, though, post-transition 
governments feared that encroachments on the institution risked their support 
(Quintana, 2004: Para. 96).  Lack of reform meant that the authoritarian 
tendencies of the police remained unchallenged: limiting transparency, 
accountability and oversight (Ibid: Para. 95).6  Furthermore, as political leaders 
                                         
5 International Narcotics Control Assistance (INC) is part of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA – 
passed 1961, INC amendment 1971).  At this time, the Bolivian air force and navy benefitted 
from assistance in the creation of two counterdrug support unit, but the police were the main 
beneficiary.  Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is used in the purchasing of US defence equipment, 
services and training for foreign armed force.   
6 Efforts to reform the police and address issues of corruption under Paz Zamora fell short, as the 
government gave-up control of the process to the institution itself (Quintana, 2005: 167-8). 
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were reluctant to push for prosecutions of officers suspected of corruption or 
abuses, impunity was common.  Between 1982 and 2002, for example, 20 
national police commanders were linked with significant cases of corruption, 
many of these related to drugs, but not one was prosecuted (Quintana, 2005: 
206).  In this way, the political-police pact led to tolerance of illicit practices. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, state-narco networks atomised in the post-transition 
period.  Linkages between the police and the drug trade formed one aspect of 
this constellation of interactions.  The institution’s natural proximity to illicit 
activity, of course, created numerous opportunities for the extraction of bribes.  
Poorly-paid officials in the Chapare, for example, were able to supplement their 
wages with ad hoc pay-offs, allowing contraband to flow in and out of the region 
(US OIG, 1991: 32).7  Reports suggested, though, that police drug corruption was 
not only ‘sporadic’, but that drug rents were also integrated into ‘pay-off cones’ 
(Nadelmann, 1994: 269-270).  The police had been incorporated into state-narco 
networks during the authoritarian era8 and, in the post-transition period, such 
practices continued.  Patron-client interactions within the unreformed police 
institution were solidified with drug rents (Hargreaves, 1992: 95).  Formal codes 
and institutional arrangements ran parallel to irregular practices, such as 
hierarchical systems of corruption (Mansilla, 2003: 11).  Bolivia-based academic 
and activist, Theo Roncken, described how this worked; suggesting a clientelistic 
system running through the institution, reaching as far as the government 
 
One person here in Tiquipaya told me… he is an ex-official of the police… 
it’s done like this: the president has to assign a new head of the police, 
the Bolivian National Police force.  This person pays $100,000 or a 
similarly high amount to get his job and then he has to assign ten officials 
to his command.  So they have to pay, in total, double the sum that he 
paid for his job and then the same with all those at the next rank.  This is 
how corruption is continued. (Roncken interview, 2014)   
 
                                         
7 In addition to this, ‘the Department of State’s 1987 International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report noted that the average salary for an UMOPAR Lt. Colonel, the normal rank for a unit 
commander in the Chapare, was $440 per month. This notwithstanding, NAU and DEA personnel 
in the Chapare region reported that drug traffickers were offering from $20,000 to $25,000 for 
72 hours of “protection,” asking only to be left alone while airplanes were being loaded and 
during take-off from clandestine airstrips, or during a major movement of coca paste during this 
period of time’ (US GAO, 1988: 54). 
8 This is outlined in Chapter 4. 
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According to this view, relationships with the drug trade were cultivated to raise 
these patron-client payments.  Jose Salinas, who worked in the Chapare during 
this period, believed that such linkages included regular meetings with high-
level traffickers, to plan and coordinate their operations.  In this way, state 
officials extracted drug rents through non-enforcement. 
 
You have to recognise that there has been, and there is, a lot of 
corruption; a lot.  There have been police officials involved in drugs that 
were narcos.  We haven’t yet figured out exactly how these connections 
work, but we supposed… we supposed… that they planned meetings in 
Santa Cruz or the Beni, and they entered into agreement, saying: ‘Okay, 
this our program for transporting drugs… these are the roads, the 
vehicles, and all of this is going to happen on such a date.  So, you police 
go somewhere else and let it pass.’  So the counterdrug units would go to 
the other side of the road, and let the vehicles go by freely.  So this was, 
more or less, the agreement between the traffickers and the police. 
(Salinas interview, 2014) 
 
As is typically the case with assertions on illicit topics (see Chapter 3), there is a 
degree of ambiguity around these interactions.  These sources suggest, though, 
that drug rents were integrated into the police institution, creating stable 
modes of exchange between the state and the drug trade.  The political 
dynamics of Bolivia’s post-transition period safeguarded the autonomy of the 
institution, impunity for its officials and thus the maintenance of state-narco 
interlinkages.  
 
6.3 Unreformed Civil-Military Relations 
 
The military also enjoyed a high degree of autonomy during this period.  Civil-
military relations to an extent mirrored the political-police pact.  Post-transition 
governments retreated from institutional reform, and instead formed an 
informal-tacit agreement of non-interference with the military.  Given its history 
of political intervention, there was reluctance to challenge the interests of the 
institution: a potential veto player to Bolivia’s (formal) democracy.  As such, 
civil-military relations and the institution itself remained unreformed.   
 
The military, though, had been severely damaged by the García Meza period.  
The institution had come to the point of disintegration, and its public reputation 
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was in tatters (Morales, 1992b: 357).9  The military’s international patron had 
also changed tack, with US funding and support in decline due to changing 
foreign policy priorities (Avilés, 2010: 131).  Added to this, neoliberal economic 
reforms impinged on military budgets, as its prominent role in Bolivian politics 
and society was diminished (Gamarra, 1996: 86).  Responding to these factors, 
institutionalist factions within the military were in the ascendency.  Keen to re-
build trust in the institution, they looked to remove military officers who had 
been implicated in the drug trade under García Meza (Dunkerley, 1984: 346).  
Ambassador Greenlee (2009: 208) argued that, ‘the military knew their game 
was up.  The world had changed and they had failed utterly in government’.  
Looking back on the period now, in the context of Bolivia’s subsequent political 
development, the withdrawal of the military from the political arena seemed 
inevitable.  This was a theme of the ‘Democracy Generation’ narrative, where 
Bolivian actors could now point to their role in bringing the ‘cycle of golpismo’ 
to a definitive end (Paz Zamora interview, 2014). 
 
As time went on, the risk of a return to coup d’état and a military state 
diminished, because (Bolivia’s politics) had matured.  There was a 
political maturity. (Torrico interview, 2014) 
 
However, during this time, the memory of authoritarian government was fresh.  
There remained concerns that the military’s support for democracy was 
contingent (Barriós M., 1994: 74-5).  The civilian political leaders of this era had 
lived with a politicised military for decades, and so continued ‘to fear its 
political leverage and a possible return to military rule’ (US Congress, 1990b: 
68).  Reports of an abortive coup attempt in early-1984, planned by recently 
discharged officers Faustino Rico Toro and Norberto Salomón (Morales, 1992b: 
357), supported such suspicions.  Indeed, the suggestion that the plot had been 
hatched in the wake of attempts to investigate the military for their 
involvement in coca-cocaine confirmed the anti-democratic tendencies of 
certain factions.  Many officers who had served under authoritarian regimes 
                                         
9 Mesa, et. al. (2008: 569) argue that nearly all factions of the military had been behind the 
Garcia Meza coup, but discord grew as the regime engaged in practices which contradicted 
internal norms and codes of behaviour. 
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continued to hold prominent positions.10  They now professed support for 
democracy, but these were the same military leaders against whom Paz 
Zamora’s generation had previously struggled.  While the tide appeared to be 
turning toward democracy, then, Bolivian civil-military relations were still 
delicately balanced (Youngers, 1991: 10).11   
 
Institutional reform of the military was thus delayed (Barrios M. & Antonio M., 
1994: 8).  Questions around the military’s role in modern Bolivian society, the 
professionalisation and modernisation of the institution, and its adaptation to 
democratic modes of governance, including civilian oversight, were unresolved.12  
Instead, an informal pact existed between the military and the civilian political 
elite.  Each practised a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the other 
(Barrios M., 1994: 95).  The military would stay out of politics, in return for 
institutional autonomy.   As part of this, politicians looked to cultivate support 
within the institution through political patronage, e.g. appointments to the high 
command for loyal supporters (Quintana, 2004: Para. 49).  As well as 
demonstrating the role of informalism in Bolivia’s uneven democracy, it also 
showed the continued political relevance of the military.  Post-transition 
governments were keen to keep the institution on side and reduce the chances 
of political intervention.  Therefore, the military continued to enjoy autonomy 
                                         
10 For example, Vice-Admiral Alberto Saenz Klinsky, who had attended the School of the 
Americas in 1973 and served as a cabinet minister in the Garcia Meza government (Equipo 
Nizkor, 2015), was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the military in October 1991 (Gamarra, 
1994b: 241). 
11 The court case of García Meza demonstrates how Bolivia’s recent authoritarian past sat 
uneasily alongside its democratic present.  The former-dictator had already been expelled from 
the military when, in 1986, he was summoned before the Bolivian Supreme Court alongside 54 of 
his collaborators to stand trial for crimes committed during his government.  The prosecution 
appeared, again, to be a positive sign for Bolivian democracy.  It would take until 1993, 
however, for the court to find García Meza and 47 of his allies guilty (HRW, 1993).  By that time, 
the former-dictator had gone into hiding.  Hargreaves (1992: 115) claims that his escape would 
have been ‘impossible without high-level protection from the police, and military and 
government officials.  Many suspect that García Meza’s chief protector (was) General Banzer, 
who (was) known to have paid him a visit a few days before the coup.  “Military men stick 
together,” says one prominent MNR politician’.  Additionally, human rights groups accused the 
authorities of a lack of will to capture García Meza while he was still rumoured to have been in 
Bolivia (Long, 1993).  He was, though, eventually located in Brazil and extradited to serve his 30 
year sentence in a Bolivian prison in 1995. 
12 Paz Zamora had stated that modernisation of the military was crucial to the consolidation of 
democracy (Gamarra, 1994b: 241).  Attempts to redefine the military’s role during his 
government, though, actually had the effect of reinforcing military autonomy, as there was no 
civilian input into this process (see Barrios M., 1994: 107-8). 
Chapter 6  181 
 
from the government, and clientelistic and authoritarian elements of its internal 
organisational culture persisted.13   
 
This had implications for drug corruption within the institution.  Increased 
factionalisation and the military’s retreat from power meant that the 
centralised systems of rent extraction of the authoritarian era no longer 
functioned (Gamarra, 1999: 184).  As described previously, institutionalists 
targeted corrupt officers who had brought the military to the brink.  But the 
reach of this ‘token purge’ was limited, meaning that elements of the 
institutions continued to pursue their interests in the drug trade (Dunkerley, 
1990: 45).  In key areas of the coca-cocaine trade especially, military regional 
commands deepened links to drug traffickers.  Pay-offs to secure profitable 
posts in the Chapare and the Beni then filtered through the institution 
(Hargreaves, 1992: 118).  The Chapare Seventh Army division, for example, was 
believed to be closely connected to the drug trade, to the extent that they 
inhibited DEA-UMOPAR operations.14  Inter-institutional rivalry was supposedly 
the cause of such clashes, but official protection of the coca-cocaine economy 
was also suspected.  In mid-1989, the division’s commander, General Arrázola, 
was charged with drug offences after his superiors reported him (Malamud-Goti, 
1992: 72).  Other high-ranking members of his command fled before they could 
be arrested.  The fact that such corruption now elicited a response 
demonstrated changed attitudes towards such practices within the institution, as 
well as the effects of US Drug War pressure.  They also indicated, though, that 
state-narco interactions remained deeply embedded in the military. 
 
The US government shared this perception.  For example, a 1989 DEA report 
stated that ‘all elements of the military are involved in drug trafficking to some 
                                         
13 A shared history contributed to this stance, as many politicians were implicated in the 
authoritarian period.  Striking-up alliances with military leaders to enter power, political leaders 
of all stripes had engaged in ‘a provocative style of politics that courted military intervention’ 
(Conaghan and Malloy, 1994: 90).  There were, then, enduring common interests between the 
parties and certain factions within the military.  Barrios M. (1994: 92) suggests that the indirect 
complicity of political actors – in human rights abuses, as well as drug trafficking – led to the 
protection of potentially guilty partners within the military.   
14 Santa Ana de Yacuma in the Beni provides another example of close military involvement in 
the drug trade during this period.  A clash between the local navy garrison and the DEA-UMOPAR 
is discussed in the following chapter. 
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extent’ (Painter, 1994: 71).  Such sentiments were replicated across US 
government reports: ‘most United States and Bolivian officials’ admit corruption 
is ‘widespread and generally accepted within the Bolivian military’ (US Congress, 
1990a: 63).15  Given all of this and the institution’s intimate past relationship 
with the drug trade, Andean Initiative proposals for an expanded counterdrug 
role for the military came under scrutiny.16  Elements within the military had 
also been opposed to such a move, fearing that close proximity to the trade 
risked heightened corruption and institutional integrity.  The Bolivian 
government, meanwhile, argued against the militarisation of counterdrug 
efforts, reflecting local pressures, as well as concerns that an increased internal 
role for the military would destabilise the post-transition political balance.  In 
other words, the wounded and pacified military would emerge again as a 
prominent political actor.  As described in the following section, on this and 
other facets of the Andean Initiative, distinct US and Bolivian agendas may be 
identified.  Where the US had its Drug War, the Bolivian government professed 
its ‘democratising mission’ (Paz Zamora interview, 2014). 
 
6.4 Uneven Power: Negotiating the Andean Initiative 
 
Bolivia’s uneven democracy, then, contained contradictions.  Free and fair 
elections, the military’s retreat from politics, and governing agreements 
between the parties fed into democratising narratives of the period.  But these 
existed alongside informalism, limited accountability, and clientelistic and 
authoritarian practices.  Consequently, this led to continued tolerance of drug 
corruption in the police and military, as state-narco interactions became 
entrenched in the post-transition political settlement.  Non-democratic 
elements, such as unreformed civil-military relations, contributed to the 
maintenance of political stability, and ensured factional interests and 
institutional actors adhered to the transition.  Placing this in historical 
                                         
15 Of course, US assessments of Bolivian drug corruption extended far beyond the military to 
almost every level of the state.   
16 One DEA official considered the introduction of the army counterdrug role as, “the biggest 
mistake we have ever made.  You haven’t seen corruption till you’ve seen the military involved 
in fighting drugs” (quoted in Painter, 1994: 94). 
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perspective, Bolivia’s turbulent political past seemed to justify such a 
compromised approach.   
 
These themes informed Bolivian preferences for counterdrug policy.  They 
dovetailed with other concerns, such as the national economy’s reliance on 
coca-cocaine and demands from societal actors, and were also grounded in 
Development Paradigm conceptualisations of the ‘war on drugs’.  In short, the 
Paz Zamora government argued against destabilising ‘Colombianised’ policies 
and called for a development-led response.  This was viewed to prioritise the 
preservation of Bolivia’s transition, but clashed with the US enforcement-led 
approach.  Uneven power relations between the countries, though, meant that 
US policy preferences were advanced in Bolivia.  Describing his impressions of 
the introduction of the Andean Initiative, Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) argued 
that the process was marked by top-down control and Cold War-era US thinking.   
 
Where we had problems was in the way the United States acted in Bolivia.  
Before, they had ensured their presence through agreements made during 
the Cold War, that is joint-defence, etc., and everything else.  Now, as it 
had it turned out, their presence, their… their influence… their 
domination over the country was exercised through the ‘war on drugs’ and 
the economic system of the country… with pressure from the monetary 
fund of the World Bank due to the neoliberal politics agreed in 
Washington.  That would be the Washington Consensus.  Overnight the 
Cold War in Bolivia was changed to two objectives: drug trafficking and 
neoliberalism.  Except in politics… this complicated the reality in Bolivia 
for us enormously, because it distorted things.   
 
Paz Zamora argued that the legacy of the Cold War was evident in the way the 
US pursued their objectives in Bolivia.  Cold War goals changed ‘overnight’ in 
Bolivia, but the same ‘mentality’ remained.  In this view, the ‘war on drugs’ and 
neoliberalism were tools of US ‘domination’ over Bolivia.  This US agenda was 
identified as being harmful to Bolivian politics and contrary to local priorities.  
The demands of the World Bank ran parallel, placing pressure on Bolivia’s 
society and economy.  The ‘war on drugs’ links into this, in the sense that coca-
cocaine economy alleviated the effects of structural reforms. 
 
Bolivia was beginning to construct its democracy.  But the abuses that 
were committed in the ‘war on drugs’, as well as the demands of the 
World Bank were also damaging the development of democracy, human 
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rights, etc.  So here we had problems of a distinct and very complicated 
type.  I was the first president that clashed with the United States on this 
issue, although I got on very well with the President, the people from the 
State Department and everyone else.  They made a very important 
invitation to me to go the United States; to make an official visit to 
Washington.  And during this visit, they wanted me to approve a new 
extradition treaty.  That was bad for Bolivia.  And always with their 
militaristic tendency… that the army enter the fight against drug 
trafficking… things which damaged the internal life of the country and the 
democratic system. (Ibid.) 
 
According to this view, the US Drug War approach was incompatible with 
Bolivia’s efforts to construct democracy.  This includes militarised policies, 
which threatened human rights and gave the army an internal role.  While Paz 
Zamora resisted US pressure for an extradition treaty,17 he eventually agreed to 
an enhanced counterdrug role for the army.  A US government report (US OIG, 
1991: 41-2) noted widespread opposition to the proposal due to fears that ‘an 
invigorated army may endanger Bolivia’s fragile democratic institutions’, and 
cause ‘an escalation in human-rights abuses and drug-related corruption’ and 
‘unrest among farmers, fostering an insurgent movement like those in Colombia 
and Peru’.  Paz Zamora’s acceptance of such policies ran contrary to his 
‘democratising mission’.  He sought to reconcile this both through reference to 
the gains his administration made in negotiations and historical narratives of US 
dominance over Bolivia.   
 
I more than achieved my objectives.  I went (to Washington) with the 
problems of opening the market and the external debt.  We achieved 
them thanks to direct conversations with the President.  So here the 
problems were, at root, problems with drug trafficking on one side and, 
on the other, economic policies.  Neoliberalism that began with Lady 
Thatcher and continued with Reagan; it had already become global.  This 
had a lot of influence on Bolivia’s democratic development because it 
brought the politics that one day would bring a government like that of 
Evo Morales. ( . . . )  Bush was a very good president, but the 
administration was bad.  Because the administration still had the 
mentality of… they acted with Cold War mentality... those from the DEA, 
all of them… the State Department, the diplomatic corps. (Paz Zamora 
interview, 2014) 
 
                                         
17 To the US Embassy’s consternation, a policy of ‘repentance’ was instead introduced to deal 
with the country’s major traffickers.  This is discussed below. 
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Again, drug policies (and, in this case, neoliberalism) are identified as ‘the 
problem’, as opposed to the drug trade itself.  This chimes with the ‘evil 
Colombian thesis’ (Thoumi, 2003: 254) and the rejection of securitised notions of 
drugs.  It also dovetails with the prioritisation of ‘democratic governability’, and 
tacit-acceptance of state-narco networks.  In the next section, I draw out these 
themes in the negotiations for the Andean Initiative.  First, I address Paz 
Zamora’s efforts to advance his development agenda, before describing clashes 
with the US Embassy and its vigorous pursuit of Drug War goals.  As such, 
Bolivia’s uneven democratisation contrasts with the escalation of US counterdrug 
efforts. 
 
6.4.1 ‘Coca por Desarrollo’18 
 
Paz Zamora spent the first few months of his term on the international stage 
attempting to realise a shift to a development-focused counterdrug policy.  In 
September 1989, for example, he addressed the UN General Assembly and called 
for the international community to recognise the principle of shared 
responsibility (UN, 1989).  This included the provision of development 
alternatives for Bolivia: ‘coca por desarrollo’.  During his speech, Paz Zamora 
employed a North-South perspective of power dynamics between the US and 
Bolivia.  For example:  
 
As the President of a poor and humble country, I would recall the wise 
message of Ecclesiastes, where it is written that, ‘Wisdom is better than 
strength.  Nevertheless, the poor man's wisdom is despised, and his words 
are not heard’. (Ibid: 32) 
 
To the chagrin of the US, he criticised the Andean Initiative for its bias towards 
repression (Gamarra, 1994b: 225).19  Although alternative development formed 
part of US counterdrug policy, the Bush government’s new strategy marked an 
                                         
18 This translates as ‘Coca for Development’. 
19 Paz Zamora had intended to diminish the US counterdrug role in Bolivia by turning towards 
Europe and his connections to the region’s social democratic parties.  European support, though, 
was not forthcoming, as the EU was reluctant to involve itself in a US policy domain (Saavedra 
interview, 2014).  
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intensification of militarised enforcement measures.20  There was a belief among 
the Andean governments that the US was acting unilaterally, installing a 
militarised approach in the region with little thought for its local implications 
(Bagley, 1994: 64).  Faced with the US Drug War Paradigm, the Bolivian 
government sought to persuade the US directly of its approach.  Paz Zamora 
summarised his government’s stance. 
 
Here is the Bolivian position of the form (counterdrug policy) should take.  
It was our position.  It was sound as far as we were concerned.  In that 
moment, I began a kind of ideological war… that Bolivians are still in 
agreement with… where I said, ‘coca is not cocaine’.  I kept saying it until 
it became something of a slogan, specifically, to beat the Americans 
psychologically… a little like they had always done.  So it was always part 
of the discussion: ‘why is (coca not cocaine)?  Why (are they the same)?  
In what sense are they (the same)?  In what sense are they not?’  I said 
‘coca is not cocaine’ because to become cocaine there has to be the 
products that produce cocaine… chemicals that we didn’t produce.  It is 
impossible to make cocaine without them.  So fine, we launched that and 
we launched something (else) that was very important: the concept of 
shared responsibility.  There hadn’t been this concept.  ( . . . )  Under this 
principle of shared responsibility, we said, ‘very well, Bolivia is willing to 
be at the forefront of this fight against drugs, in interdiction as well as 
eradication, but we believe that it has to be made very clear that Bolivia 
does this in return for receiving certain benefits of alternative 
development’… or in other words, all the areas that produce coca and the 
profits that the country extracts from coca money, that is invested in the 
country, etc.  Dirty money, but (money) that enters our country… 
(investment) that will die if we combat (the trade)… In return, Bolivia has 
to have alternative development. (Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
Paz Zamora’s interpretation was thus grounded in the Development Paradigm.21  
Externalising responsibility for Bolivia’s drug trade, he distinguished between 
coca and cocaine, highlighted the role of precursor chemicals and called for 
shared responsibility.  These kinds of arguments played well to the domestic 
audience, as demands from societal actors shaped the government’s position 
(Gamarra, 1994b: 219).   
 
                                         
20 Alternative development had been included in US counterdrug strategy for some time.  In 
1972, USAID started its first crop-substitution projects in the Chapare (GAO, 1988: 45).  Even Law 
1008, which had been introduced to placate the US, linked coca eradication to alternative 
development (Bolivian Congress, 1988: article X).   
21 Themes from the Cold War Legacy narrative were also present in Paz Zamora’s reference to 
the psychological tactics ‘they had always’ used.   
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Ambivalent attitudes towards coca-cocaine were also part of this (see Chapter 
5).  For example, the notion of shared responsibility, in this case, refers to the 
costs of fighting the ‘war on drugs’ as opposed to the negative effects of the 
drug trade itself.  In other words, coca-cocaine had brought benefits to Bolivia.  
International counterdrug efforts, which were not necessarily in the best 
interests of the country, should compensate for this fact.  According to this 
view, then, the impulse for the Drug War came from outwith.  Bolivian 
interlocutors expressed general normative opposition to drugs and a desire for 
Bolivia to remove itself from this ‘dirty’ business.  But such views were 
accompanied with pragmatism concerning the coca-cocaine economy’s role in 
Bolivia (Comas, 1990b).  The Bolivian government did not share the crusading 
Drug War drive espoused by Bush; its position to the drug trade and counterdrug 
policy was a matter of expediency.  Alternative conceptualisations of the 
problem, and distinct priorities could thus be identified. 
 
The US met with the governments of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru to negotiate the 
Andean Initiative at Cartagena de Indias.  Paz Zamora claimed a prominent role, 
as the governments of the Andean region argued for greater emphasis on 
institution-building and development (Lozano, 1990).22  The US ceded ground.  
The final agreement included additional funding for alternative development, 
formal recognition of the idea of shared responsibility, and a free trade 
agreement (US NSC, 1989: 4).23  In the case of Bolivia, it was estimated that the 
country would receive US$830 million in aid over the course of the planned five 
year initiative.  A sizeable proportion of this was allotted to economic support, 
used to compensate for the economic effects of curbing the drug trade and 
                                         
22 Each government, though, had slightly different priorities.  Internal conflicts in Peru and 
Colombia, linked to the drug trade, complicated matters for the governments of those countries. 
23 The Andean Trade Preference Act (APTA) was designed to foster greater trade between the US 
and the Andes, by lowering trade tariffs.  As it passed through the US Congress, though, a 
number of the region’s exports were exempted in order to protect US producers.  Bolivia, due to 
its lack of exports, was relatively unaffected by these exemptions, according to Paz Zamora 
(interview, 2014).  Furthermore, he expressed frustration over President Morales’ perceived 
carelessness with his government’s inheritance: ‘The drive for (APTA came from the Bolivian 
government) and the paradox now is that Ecuador, Peru and Colombia as well, I think, continue 
to benefit from the Andean Initiative.  And Bolivia?  No, because of Evo Morales.  There was a 
fight between him and Obama and they refused us free access to the American market.  That’s 
the paradox we have now’ (Paz Zamora interview, 2014). 
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paying-off part of Bolivia’s external debt.24  Both then and now, the Bolivian 
government believed it had won significant concessions.  Although US assistance 
was conditioned on ‘satisfactory cooperation’ with counterdrug goals, the US 
had agreed to short and long term measures aimed at developing Bolivia’s 
economy.  The Acuerdo Patriótico ensured the agreement with the US was 
passed with little public debate or congressional scrutiny (Gamarra, 1994b: 227). 
 
Figure 6.2: US INC, FMF and ESF to Bolivia (1987-1995)25  
 
(USAID, 2013) 
 
However, US preferences for policy survived largely intact.  As suggested 
previously, this support came with conditionalities, such as coca eradication 
targets.  Supply-side, repressive policies, including increased funding for 
militarised counterdrug police units, remained the main focus of US counterdrug 
strategy.  This entailed a strong US presence within Bolivia, from the DEA to 
                                         
24 Discussing efforts to have Bolivia’s external debt forgiven, Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) 
stated: ‘It was the first time in South America the problem of external debt was debated.  Fidel 
Castro held events in Havana against external indebtedness.  He held three, four events with 
professionals, workers, intellectuals, etc.  I was with one of them, seated with Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez at the same table there in Havana, and so I said, “the one thing we ask for in this fight, 
is that the consumers, the consuming nations and particularly the United States and Europe, 
agree a special policy on the treatment of Bolivia’s external debt”’. 
25 Economic Support Funds are administered by the State Department, providing funds to 
governments in areas of US strategic interest.  They can be used for a variety of purposes.  In 
this case, funding was used primarily to relieve external debt.  Painter (1994: 137) states that 
balance of payments support was designed ‘to compensate the government for income and 
foreign exchange earnings lost because of coca eradication.  The funds were used to finance 
government payment of US and multilateral debt and US exports to the Bolivian private sector.’  
As Menzel (1996: 61) notes, however, ‘there was no mandatory reciprocal commitment on the 
part of the Bolivian government to use these savings in support of the anti-drug policy.’ 
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Southcom military trainers.  Furthermore, the US agitated for the Bolivian army 
to take on a greater counterdrug role (described below).  Such policies 
threatened to tip the balance of Bolivia’s post-transition political order.  Using 
the levers of US diplomatic and economic power (the promise of US funding on 
one hand; decertification, and economic pressure on the other), though, the US 
ensured the Drug War model would be exported to the region.  Such dynamics 
left the Andean governments ‘scant room for manoeuvre in American 
narcopolitics’ (Walker III, 1994: 14).  Within Bolivia, the strategy was criticised 
for its perceived central focus on interdiction and eradication over development 
(Opinión, 1991c). 
 
One Bolivian government official ((B) interview, 2014) from this time summed-up 
the clash of enforcement-led and development perspectives of drugs.  He argued 
that the stated commitments of the US – making concessions to the Bolivian 
position – tended to fall short.26  US Drug War Paradigm conceptualisations of the 
problem dominated the policy on the ground. 
 
The reaction of the United States was good, but it was a great discussion 
between two distinct visions.  The vision of the Andean countries was a 
vision of development, that’s to say, ‘we have to attack this problem 
together with alternative economic and, of course, social development’.  
The vision of the United States was more repressive, that’s to say, ‘you 
have to attack the problem, okay, development, okay, but you have to 
attack the problem hard from the point of view of interdiction’.  So, this 
was the difficult part, to unite these visions.  In the end, an effort was 
made and they arrived at a certain equilibrium.  The United States 
understood that our principal objective was the search for opportunities 
for economic development, such as open markets, transfer of technology, 
investment; in short, consistent help from the United States.  But in the 
main, in my opinion, the plan didn’t work, because we were never able to 
give the same intensity to the two dimensions.  The United States each 
time pressured us more on the issue of repression, interdiction, 
repression… and they didn’t show anything tangible, verifiable, about the 
opening of the market, the topic of technology, the topic of investment, 
                                         
26 Analysis of the alternative development strand of this policy falls outwith the bounds of this 
thesis.  However, both Painter (1994: Ch. 6) and Thoumi (2003: Ch. 11) argue that, despite some 
successes, these were generally underfunded, and plagued with problems of planning and 
implementation.  Jose Salinas (interview, 2014) admitted that policymakers struggled to find a 
crop that could compete with coca: ‘The supply is here, but the demand is in the United States, 
in Europe, in Asia… everywhere.  If there is a market, then people will produce.  Because of this, 
I would say, “ooft… I hope to God there exists the same demand for bananas!”’ 
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etc.  So this reduced the importance of the plan, until it was finally left 
as a piece of history. 
 
Negotiations for the Andean Initiative, then, attempted to reconcile alternative 
US and Bolivian ‘visions’ of drugs.  But as the policy filtered down to Bolivia, a 
disjuncture was exposed between the final agreement and the implemented 
policy.  This official noted continuous US pressure to apply more repression, as 
development efforts were diminished.  There was a sense across Bolivian 
interview accounts that US counterdrug goals were prioritised over local 
concerns, with uneven power dynamics in evidence.  Dismantling the coca-
cocaine trade in the absence of viable alternatives risked plunging the national 
economy into recession, and provoking societal unrest.  Uneven democracy was 
also part of this equation.   
 
The ‘war on drugs’ threatened the settled political order, not only in targeting 
clientelistic modes of governance and state-narco networks, but in expanding 
the internal role of the military.  Arguing against the ‘Colombianisation’ of the 
country (Paz Zamora interview, 2014), the Bolivian government opposed policies 
that would escalate conflict with traffickers.  There was ambivalence to a trade 
that was considered stable and a relatively benign force within Bolivia.  In this 
sense, US counterdrug policy was viewed to conflict with the post-transition 
political settlement.  As the next section describes, though, the US Embassy - 
under the leadership of Ambassador Gelbard - pursued counterdrug goals 
vigorously.  Distinct agendas came into conflict, as the US extended control; 
installing a Drug War security apparatus aimed at bypassing ‘corrupt’ local 
power structures. 
 
6.5 Gelbard’s Embassy 
 
Ambassador Robert Gelbard took a prominent role in formulating US counterdrug 
strategy within Bolivia.  Discussing the Embassy’s high-degree of autonomy, he 
stated, ‘first, I was convinced I knew Bolivia a lot better than (Washington) did.  
Second, I convinced them that I knew Bolivia a lot better than they did’ (Gelbard 
interview, 2013).  Gelbard also gained a reputation for his bold, abrasive style of 
diplomacy.  A US OIG (1991: 4-5) audit of the Embassy went as far as 
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commenting on this, stating that while impressed by his leadership and 
influence, ‘we suspect that US counternarcotic objectives could have been 
achieved in a more diplomatic, low-profile manner’ (US OIG, 1991: 4-5).27  
Described as an ‘activist ambassador’, Gelbard often intervened in Bolivian 
politics, and used his connections in Washington to garner support for his 
initiatives (Gamarra, 1994b: 221-223; El Tiempo, 1996).  He could also call on 
backing within the Bolivian government.  Banzer – a Cold War ally of the US – and 
his ADN party were viewed as being more sympathetic to US goals than Paz 
Zamora’s MIR (Gamarra, 1999: 195).  The threat of withholding US assistance and 
decertification, though, were the Embassy’s most effective tools in realising 
counterdrug goals.  During this period, the US applied significant pressure on the 
Bolivian government to advance unfettered US-led counterdrug operations, the 
introduction of the army into the Drug War, and the removal of ‘corrupt’ 
officials and politicians.28 
 
The Embassy’s relationship with the Paz Zamora government, and the Bolivian 
state generally, was characterised by low-levels of trust.  On one hand, there 
was frustration that the Bolivian government did not share the US assessment of 
the country’s ‘drug problem’.  Counterdrug goals dominated the US agenda in 
Bolivia, but the Paz Zamora administration did not view it with the same 
urgency.  This constituted a clash between securitised notions of drugs and the 
ambivalent attitude of the Bolivian government towards the coca-cocaine 
economy.  Under this view, the local lack of political will to advance 
counterdrug goals and apply hard-line approaches stemmed from differing 
priorities and understandings of the issue.  In the following cable, for example, 
Ambassador Gelbard expressed his frustration at Paz Zamora government’s 
lukewarm response to the capture of prominent drug trafficker, Carmelo ‘Meco’ 
Dominguez.  
 
                                         
27 Other US actors were more appreciative of Gelbard’s approach.  David Miller (interview, 2014) 
of the NSC stated: ‘Gelbard is a classic, superb, wonderful, hard-nosed, crazy ambassador. 
There’s never been a concrete wall that he has not run through. If you see little holes in 
concrete walls, you’ll know Bob has visited your neighbourhood. ( . . . )  Because of Bob 
Gelbard’s nature, drugs got a lot of attention and I think he did fine’. 
28 The issue of drug corruption in the Bolivian political class is discussed in the following chapter. 
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Paz Zamora – along with the bulk of Bolivians – continue to engage in a 
process of denial regarding virtually any other aspect of the drug problem 
in Bolivia other than coca cultivation and the sense that it is a problem 
only of economic development and poverty. This accounts for the 
extraordinary lack of reaction on the (Bolivian government’s) part after 
the truly impressive success in the operation against the Meco Dominguez 
organisation, i.e. if they were to acknowledge successes against drug 
trafficking organisations they would have to acknowledge the existence of 
a problem. (US Embassy La Paz to Secretary of State, 1990) 
 
In addition to this, though, low-levels of trust were also due to US perceptions of 
pervasive Bolivian drug corruption.  The US Embassy ‘viewed it as the largest, 
single problem affecting US narcotics control efforts’ (US GAO, 1988: 54).  
According to the Drug War Paradigm, such deviant behaviour should be targeted 
forcefully.  As discussed in the next chapter, this led to US efforts to remove 
‘corrupt’ politicians and officials; at times, threatening to halt US economic 
support for failure to comply.  In terms of the Bolivian security forces, the US 
focused its efforts on the creation of ‘vicarious surrogates’ (Nadelmann, 1994: 
204).   
 
The US Embassy had their own people in the Bolivian police and the 
army… their own people.  There were problems with the US when we did 
things without their people. (Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
The establishment and close monitoring of US Drug War proxies – specialist anti-
drug police and military units in the South – constituted an attempt to 
circumvent local state-narco networks and exert US control.  The FECLN,29 for 
example, was completely dependent on the US for its resources, and 
intelligence, making the anti-drug police beholden to the DEA and INM 
(Quintana, 2004: Para. 117).  Furthermore, UMOPAR30 was funded and subject to 
oversight mechanisms from the US State Department Bureau of International 
                                         
29 The Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra El Narcotráfico (FECLN), was established by presidential 
decree in July 1987.  It is the lead counterdrug law enforcement agency in in Bolivia, with 
personnel drawn from the Bolivian National Police.  It has under its control a number of 
specialist units, including UMOPAR.  The US monitored personnel, and had complete access to 
internal reports and records (Williams, 1997: 25). 
30 The Unidades Móviles de Patrullaje Rural (UMOPAR) were created in 1983.  ‘Nominally 
responsible for interdiction efforts, these encompass destroying coca processing pits and 
laboratories; seizing paste, base and cocaine; intercepting the flow of precursor chemicals; and 
arresting traffickers.  ( . . . ) Its director is usually a retired army officer (in part to appease the 
army’s concern that their traditional rivals, the police, provide the recruits for one of the best 
armed units in the country)’ (Painter, 1994: 81). 
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Narcotics Matters (INM), trained by Southcom Special Forces in paramilitary 
tactics, and directed in operations by the DEA (Presencia, 1991).  Such controls 
were justified in terms of guarding against corruption and inefficiency, and 
improving capacity.  A close working relationship with the DEA was engendered, 
with the US Embassy planning major operations.31  As such, these controls 
allowed the US to bypass the Bolivian government and the wider police 
institution; factions considered ‘corrupt’ and/or opposed to US Drug War goals.   
 
Former-DEA Deputy for Operations Terry Burke, recognised different levels of 
corruption within the Bolivian police and described how the DEA would work 
around the issue.  According to Burke, the DEA’s close relationship with these 
units enabled them to deal with these state-narco interactions. 
 
What we would find, and Bolivia is an example, is… there’s a lab in the 
Beni, and you want to go raid it.  And normally you would go to General 
García… he’s worked with you before, and taken action… so you say, 
‘come on General García, we’ve got to go raid this place’.  ‘Eh… why 
don’t you go talk to General Lopez over there and get him to do it’.  In 
other words, ‘I’m on this guy over here’s pay roll, and if I go raid him, I’m 
in a lot of trouble’.  And so we’d go over to this guy over here, who has 
got no connection, and we’d use him to go do the raid.  It’s really a 
matter of building personal relationships, by being in the field with them. 
( . . . )  Some of the greatest problems were, the more senior you went in 
the local authority, the more you had problems, because then it became 
very political.  You know, these guys are in bed with these guys… many of 
them are not… and politically it became more sensitive to cooperate with 
us, whereas the local commander on the ground didn’t always have those 
conflicts. (Burke interview, 2013) 
 
There were limits to US control.  As outlined above and suggested here by Burke, 
sporadic and systematic corruption remained a problem within these agencies.  
Gelbard (interview, 2014) claimed that high-level officials in the government 
added to this problem.  The US was typically permitted vetting of appointments, 
but the final power over this remained in Bolivian hands.  According to Gelbard, 
this was exploited by corrupt elements within the government to sabotage US 
counterdrug efforts.  ‘Honest’, reliable and effective US counterdrug partners 
                                         
31 The level of collaboration between the DEA and UMOPAR led a Bolivian army area commander 
in the Chapare to brand their rivals in the police as 'Yankee co-conspirators' (Malamud-Goti, 
1991: 147).   
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represented a threat to the interests of these actors.  In this way, Gelbard 
argued that US counterdrug efforts clashed with local agendas.  
 
We were engaged in trying to train highly capable Bolivian units, the idea 
being that we would try to work ourselves out of jobs.  Hard to do 
because people would get transferred.  Sometimes if they became too 
capable, they would get transferred, because the government didn’t want 
people to be too capable. (Gelbard interview, 2013) 
 
The US Embassy thus sought the extension and deepening of US counterdrug 
operations in Bolivia.  Actors such as Gelbard, though, were frustrated by the 
differing priorities of the Bolivian government, viewed to be underpinned either 
by a rejection of securitised notion of drugs or corruption.  The Bolivian 
government’s divergent conceptualisation of the country’s drug trade and the 
appropriate response were most evident in the introduction of a repentance law 
for traffickers and resistance to an enhanced counterdrug role for the army.  In 
the case of the former, this reflected ambivalent attitudes towards the ‘benign’ 
coca-cocaine economy, and efforts to find accommodation with the illicit sphere 
rather than conflict.  For the latter, US counterdrug plans threatened to unsettle 
Bolivia’s post-transition settlement. 
 
6.6 The Repentance Decree 
 
The US had argued that Bolivia’s role in the drug trade had changed by the time 
Paz Zamora was in office.  Whereas before, Bolivian coca paste had been 
exported to Colombia for final processing, it was claimed that local traffickers 
were now producing and transporting cocaine via their own routes.  As 
Ambassador Gelbard (interview, 2013) put it, Bolivia ‘was still shipping coca 
paste to Colombia, but not nearly as much, and instead all stages of production 
were occurring more and more and more within the country’.32  If such 
assertions were accurate, greater profit margins would be gained by these 
                                         
32 ‘US drug officials estimate that by 1990 as much as one-third of Bolivian cocaine paste – or 
between 150 and 200 tonnes of cocaine – was being processed into HCl within Bolivia.  US 
officials were adamant that Bolivia had become the second-largest cocaine producer after 
Colombia’ (Painter, 1994: 28). 
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groups with resultant increases in the available drug rents.33  However, drugs 
stats from the State Department and the DEA (shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3) 
were far from conclusive. 
 
Table 6.1: US State Dep. INCSR Figures for Labs Destroyed (1989-1994) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Cocaine 
HCL 
26 45 40 33 34 17 10 32 
Coca 
base/paste 
1,112 3,542 6,957 1,446 1,461 1,393 1,300 1,891 
(US State, 1991: 88-9; & US State, 1995: 72) 
 
 
Figure 6.3: US State Dep. INCSR Figures for Coca-cocaine Seizures in Bolivia 
(1987-1994) 
 
(US State, 1991: 88-9; & US State, 1995: 72)  
*No figures reported for coca base prior to 1989. 
**After 1990, INC claimed that local producers had largely eliminated the stage 
of coca paste production from their process. 
***From 1991-onward, figures for coca base include seizure figures for Agua Rica 
(coca base suspended in a weak acid solution).  
****In 1991, INC estimated that 35 per cent of Bolivian cocaine HCl production 
occurred in Bolivia, with the remaining occurring in Colombia. 
*****In INCSR 1994, ‘coca base’ was reclassified as ‘cocaine base’. 
 
First, cocaine seizures in Bolivia around this time remained relatively flat.  
Although there is an increase in the cocaine labs destroyed from 1988, coca 
                                         
33 One might generally expect this to cause increased competition (and violence) between 
groups, as they compete for a share of the larger revenue available.  Alternatively, this may 
reduce scarcity and reduce competition.  In the case of Bolivia, there was no concurrent spike in 
violence.   
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paste/base seizures and lab destructions continued to dominate the figures.  
Such trends would seem to contradict US claims of Bolivia’s shift to cocaine 
production.  It should be noted, though, that coca paste/base loses around half 
of its mass as it is processed in cocaine HCl, so lower weights of seizure for the 
latter would be expected.  In addition to this, labs for producing coca 
paste/base were both less sophisticated and costly, and generally more 
prevalent due to the greater number of producers at this stage.  Further to this, 
cocaine HCl labs may have had greater capacity, i.e. fewer labs are needed to 
produce greater amounts.  These factors may underpin the disparities between 
the numbers of coca paste/base and cocaine HCl labs destroyed.  In addition to 
this, coca paste/base producers in the Chapare may have been less adept at 
evading interdiction efforts than those further up the coca-cocaine commodity 
chain, or counterdrug operations may have been more focused on this aspect of 
the trade.  These issues demonstrate some of the problems in interpreting such 
data.  There is a degree if ambiguity when attempting to draw conclusions over 
the amount of drug rents available to state-narco networks.  Fluctuations in 
rates of production and changes in the role of certain actors (e.g. moving to the 
greater profit margins of cocaine HCl production), may not be accurately picked-
up in this data. It should be noted, furthermore, that Figures 4.2 and 4.3 both 
indicate stability in the size and revenue of the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy 
during this period.  Such considerations partly underpin the justification for my 
mixed methods approach.  The beliefs and agendas advanced by key actors 
during this period were as important in defining events as (supposedly) hard 
data. 
 
Regardless of how one interprets such figures, the US looked to counter the 
Bolivian narrative that the country’s role in the drug trade was limited to that of 
humble coca cultivation.34  The US Embassy painted a picture of increasingly 
influential native criminal organisations, who posed a threat to Bolivian society 
and politics.  A US OIG (1991: 11) report stated that these organisations had 
‘both the inclination and wherewithal to manipulate corrupt officials and 
undermine government drug control programs.’  Plugging into this narrative, the 
                                         
34 Following the ‘evil foreigner/Colombian’ thesis (Thoumi, 2003: 242), true power and wealth 
was said to lie with external actors (see Chapter 5).   
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US Embassy planned their biggest operation to date in June 1991.  A raid 
designed to secure state authority and law and order in ‘Bolivia’s Medellin’, 
Santa Ana de Yacuma in the Beni.  The implication: the Bolivian state had lost 
control of a town, overrun with powerful Bolivian trafficking organisations.  
 
The US Embassy claimed the operation as a success, disrupting the drug trade 
and re-establishing ‘Bolivian sovereignty of Santa Ana’ (Gamarra, 1994b: 233), 
but no major traffickers were arrested.  In the aftermath of the raid, discord 
and controversy began to spread.  For example, the local navy garrison 
commander was detained in the midst of the operation, and accused of collusion 
with drug traffickers.35  Military officers rallied against the DEA and UMOPAR’s 
actions, claiming that the commander had been assaulted, and that the DEA had 
exceeded its authority (Primera Plana, 1991).  Gelbard’s robust public defence 
of the operation and further accusations of high-level corruption in the Bolivian 
military added to anti-US sentiment (Menzel, 1996: 56).  Furthermore, reports of 
heavy-handedness and police brutality caused a public backlash.  For example, a 
local parish priest alleged that the security forces had ‘roughed-up’ local 
residents and caused significant property damage (Youngers, 1991: 14).   
 
Bolivian ministers believed that they had been marginalised by the US in the 
execution of the Santa Ana operation.  The Bolivian government capitalised on 
the negative spin around the episode to reassert control.  This included new 
limits on DEA operations (Williams, 1997: 16) and, more significantly, 
introduction of the Decreto de Arrepentimiento (Repentance Decree) in July 
1991.  Drug traffickers who turned themselves-in, cooperated with the 
authorities, and forfeited their drug gains would be compensated with 
significantly reduced sentences.  This represented a rejection of the US Drug 
War Paradigm.  The Bolivian government argued that dialogue and compromise 
would be more effective in combatting the drug trade than militarised US 
policies.  Carlos Saavedra (interview, 2014), who replaced Capobianco as Interior 
Minister in March 1991, claimed a key role in this change of tack. 
                                         
35 A previous raid on the town in 1989 had ended in clashes between the DEA-UMOPAR, and drug 
traffickers, residents and the local navy garrison (US Congress, 1990a: 57).  For the US Embassy, 
the incident clearly demonstrated local and official complicity in the drug trade. 
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The DEA operation was a big opportunity, (out of it) came something very, 
very interesting.  I go to Santa Ana to make a record (of what had 
happened) with the local residents, okay?  They were going to help in the 
fight against drugs, because they didn’t want drug traffickers there.  They 
hadn’t helped the drug traffickers.  They were terrorised by the drug 
traffickers, because nightclubs were brought to city, Colombians arrived 
and, at times, there were deaths, including among the population.  It was 
decided (they would) collaborate with the government in the fight against 
drugs.  It was decided that the DEA wouldn’t carry-out more operations.  
It was one of the decisions, right? ( . . . )  That night I sleep in Santa Ana, 
we sign the documents and peace returns to the city, because the city 
had been very angry about the intervention.  The army had arrived, the 
police, planes, so the population was afraid… kids… people sought refuge 
in the churches… (it was) like a film.  So as I am returning (home), a 
woman comes to me and delivers me a letter, and says to me… it’s a Mrs 
Roca… that her husband wants to turn himself in, right?  A Mrs Roca 
delivers me a letter in the hotel, in which she explains that her husband 
wanted to turn himself in.  I took the letter away, I read it and it said 
that her children couldn’t study in foreign schools because the American 
and Europeans knew about their life and they blocked their studies.  And 
that they didn’t have a social life, they lived hidden and the family were 
cast-outs, because of the husband.  She recognised that he was involved 
in the production of cocaine and drug trafficking.  So there, an idea came 
to me.  I had read that in Colombia they had made a type of decree for 
people to turn themselves in, not to be extradited to the United States. ( 
. . . )  In Colombia, the no extradition decree was torn apart because of 
Pablo Escobar.  Here, drug trafficking was not violent.  Here, there had 
been no bomb blasts or kidnappings of politicians, journalists or judges.  
Here, there had been practically no revenge killings by traffickers.  If 
there had been deaths, it had been among the traffickers themselves.  So 
I began to prepare the decree. 36  
 
Saavedra’s account reflects the typical Bolivian view over the nature of the 
country’s drug trade, i.e. the ‘evil Colombian’ thesis (Thoumi, 2003: 242).  In 
this sense, the residents of Santa Ana were victims of drug traffickers rather 
than accomplices.  They were willing to contribute to efforts against the drug 
trade, but not on the abrasive terms of the ‘war on drugs’.  While Saavedra 
noted that Bolivian drug traffickers, and their Colombian partners, had brought 
problems to the town, they too were not as the US portrayed them.  The story of 
‘Mrs Roca’ shows the traffickers as family men, not dangerous criminals in the 
                                         
36 Saavedra typically recounted his anecdotes of this period in the present tense during our 
interview.  It gave the effect of placing both of us more immediate to events. He also wrote 
notes and timelines of what he was saying as he said it.  I left with the impression that he was 
re-living/picturing the events in his mind as he spoke to me.  
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mould of Pablo Escobar.  Starting from this position, the ‘Colombianisation’ of 
Bolivian counterdrug efforts was unwarranted and ineffective.   
 
This was the best road for the counterdrug fight in Bolivia.  Why?  Because 
there wasn’t violence, and if violence was arriving in Bolivia, like in 
Colombia, it was going to be worse.  So the Bolivian drug traffickers… I 
said, ‘there are great possibilities to have them turn themselves in, and 
ultimately, this can help the counterdrug fight in Bolivia’ (Ibid.). 
 
The surrender of seven of Bolivia’s top ten traffickers suggested Saavedra had 
been right to introduce the law.  Furthermore, the testimonies of the traffickers 
appeared to confirm the idea that Bolivia’s drug clans were based in family 
networks.  The ‘repentant ones’ were primarily ranchers and businessmen rather 
than international criminals (see Irusta M., 1992).  Gamarra (1994b: 235) writes 
that, ‘by Colombian standards, Bolivia’s drug kingpins were paupers.’  However, 
some were left with the sense that the trafficker had not been held properly to 
account, receiving token sentences for their ‘confessions’.  It was clear that 
they had agreed together to hand themselves over to the authorities (Irusta M., 
1992: 83).  There were doubts over the veracity of their testimonies, and 
statements accounting for their drug wealth.  The traffickers all claimed minor 
roles in the drug trade and were unable to shed light on the illicit trade beyond 
the activities of their fellow ‘repentant ones’, nor indeed on their relationship 
to elements within the state.  As such, the Repentance Law may be viewed as a 
‘sweetheart deal’ (Snyder, 2006: 961): the state protected elements of the drug 
trade, while demonstrating to international actors its ‘commitment’ to 
counterdrug goals.  The US Embassy, though, was far from content.  The 
establishment of an extradition treaty for drug trafficking offences had long 
been a priority for the US, but it remained elusive.  The Repentance Decree 
stood in stark contrast to US conceptualisations of the Bolivian coca-cocaine 
trade and the appropriate response.  Accommodation between the Bolivian state 
and the drug trade, and the reassertion of Bolivian control, clashed with the top-
down control of the US Embassy. 
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6.7 Entry and Withdrawal of the Army 
 
US plans for an enhanced counterdrug role for the Bolivian army also came into 
conflict with local priorities.37  Paz Zamora came under sustained pressure to 
sign Annex III of the 1987 US-Bolivian anti-drug agreement (Gamarra, 1994b: 
228).  Annex I and II had committed the nations to cooperation on interdiction 
efforts and crop-substitution; Annex III concerned the army’s counterdrug role 
(see Gamboa, 1993: 389-450).  The policy reflected the securitisation and 
militarisation trend of US counterdrug policy at this time, which included 
Southcom’s increased role in the Drug War.38  It was sold as being necessary to 
support the out-gunned Bolivian police, against the ‘security threat’ of Bolivia’s 
drug traffickers.  In addition to this, though, counterdrug funding to the military 
would re-balance the institution with the police (US OIG, 1991: 42).  Historic 
inter-institutional rivalries had re-emerged, with the military jealous of 
increased budgets to better-armed and more prominent police anti-drug units 
(Quintana, 2004: Para. 157).  Having served their penance for the García Meza 
episode, concerns over the institutional implications of being close to the drug 
trade were placed to one side, as budgetary considerations took centre stage.39   
 
They were it all for it, likes bees to honey, because these were guys who 
had a transportation battalion with two World War II jeeps in it, one 
quarter tonne truck, and all of a sudden they’re going to get 25 big brand 
new trucks.  So from their perspective, it was good deal. (Bowers 
interview, 2013)40 
 
                                         
37 The air force and navy had, since 1987, preformed a logistical, support role to UMOPAR.  The 
Diablos Rojos (Red Devils) provided aerial support for counterdrug operations, while the Diablos 
Azules (Blue Devils) provided riverine support for counterdrug operations. 
38 The DEA were against the policy, preferring to maintain a law-enforcement response to the 
drug trade (Painter, 1994: 94). 
39 Indicating that there were differing opinions within the military on this, Greenlee (interview, 
2013) stated: ‘When I was DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission), the military had been reluctant to get 
involved in the drug stuff because they saw it as corrupting and something that had corrupted 
the police’.  In addition to this, Ambassador Rowell (1995: 317) noted the lasting-effects of the 
‘cocaine-coup’ on the institution: ‘The Bolivian Armed Forces were determined to stay out of the 
anti-drug business. ( . . . ) Involvement in the drug traffic (during García Meza) had corrupted 
the armed forces. It had hurt internal discipline and unity in the armed forces. In effect, it was 
tearing apart an institution that meant a great deal to the people who were in it.’ 
40 In a meeting with Bolivian generals, DoD officials were reportedly surprised that the Bolivians 
were satisfied with ‘post-Korean war scraps’ and wondered why they had not demanded 
submarines and aircraft-carriers (Malamud Goti, 1991: 147). 
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Aside from fears of the implications of giving the army an internal role, Paz 
Zamora had campaigned against militarisation.  There was resistance to the 
policy from within government, and across Bolivian society and politics.  
However, the link between US development and security assistance was clear.  
In May 1990, Paz Zamora travelled to Washington and signed Annex III.41  On his 
return, he attempted to convince the public that he had not renegaded on his 
demilitarisation pledge; that the agreement had secured significant economic 
support for Bolivia and the military were ‘an inseparable part of the global 
strategy of alternative development’ (Gamarra, 1994b: 228).  For critics, Annex 
III was emblematic of the prioritisation of US counterdrug goals over local 
concerns. 
 
Despite the agreement, the Bolivian government stalled on releasing the funds 
to the army, and so initiating their entry into the Drug War (Gamarra, 1993: 51).  
Gelbard exerted ‘fierce’ pressure on Paz Zamora to acquiesce to US demands 
(CSM, 1991b).  A cable from October 1990 (US Embassy La Paz to Secretary of 
State, 1990) provides insights into this, and the distinct US-Bolivian perspectives 
of the period.  First, Gelbard used back channels of communication to Banzer’s 
ADN to pursue the Embassy’s goal.  Speaking with Carlos Iturralde (ADN), the 
Bolivian Foreign Minister, he raised US objectives ‘that are either being ignored 
by the GOB (Government of Bolivia) or have been the subject of broken 
commitments’, and stated that this was creating a ‘credibility’ problem.  
Iturralde was reported as saying, ‘in a straightforward manner that the 
‘problem’ is Paz Zamora, who is still not convinced that there really is a need 
for interdiction in Bolivia because he is really not convinced of a cocaine 
manufacturing problem and drug trafficking problem’.  As such, distinct 
conceptualisations of the issue led to differing priorities and policy preferences. 
 
Further to this, Gelbard and Iturralde discussed the implications of failure to 
adhere to Annex III.  Gelbard stated that ‘if (counterdrug) assistance were 
provided to the army and (it was) not used for counternarcotics purposes 
                                         
41 US FMF would be provided to Bolivia for the creation of four new army battalions: two anti-
drug (named Jórdan and Manchego), one engineering and a transportation unit (which became 
known as the Diablos Verdes), all to be trained by Southcom personnel (Menzel, 1996: 49).    
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(Bolivia’s) entire FY91 assistance package, including economic assistance, could 
very well be jeopardized’.  He also argued that the withholding of promised 
funds to the army could cause further tensions between the police and military.  
Although Gelbard discounted the potential for coup d’état, the following 
passage demonstrates that the issue still entered into the considerations of 
these actors.  The cable also shows the willingness of the US to circumvent the 
Bolivian government to deal with old allies from the Bolivian military (past and 
present). 
 
We intend to discuss these issues with the appropriate GOB officials, 
including President Paz Zamora, military commanders and other political 
leaders, particularly including General Banzer.  While I do not feel the 
current lack of definition and mishandling by the GOB has the potential 
for creating army unrest as to generate the possibility of a coup, it is 
symptomatic of the Paz Zamora’s mismanagement of many important 
issues through a lack of clear leadership and decision-making ability and 
does have the ability to continue to weaken this government for the 
foreseeable future. (Ibid.) 
 
Paz Zamora’s perceived indecision on Annex III may be interpreted against the 
background of competing US and local demands (Gamarra, 1994b).  In this sense, 
the Bolivian government was dependent on US economic support and pressured 
to conform to US counterdrug goals.  At the same time, though, there was 
reluctance to introduce policies that were opposed locally, and that had the 
potential to cause economic and political instability.  For Gelbard’s Embassy, 
though, this was emblematic of the administration’s weakness and lack of 
leadership.  Gelbard’s damning indictment of Paz Zamora is indicative of their 
poor relationship, the dominance of US Drug War goals, and contrasting US and 
Bolivian perspectives of the ‘war on drugs’. 
 
The cable also plugs into the dynamics of the MIR’s Cold War legacy narrative, 
including: top-down US control, attempts to bypass a democratically elected 
government by appealing to right-wing allies, and on-going distrust of the 
former-radicals.  In the following passage, Capobianco (interview, 2014) calls on 
similar themes and argues that their relationship with the Embassy was doomed 
from the start. 
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In the past, the United States had a different status in Latin America; the 
United States was tough, definitely… it was very powerful.  The 
international context was totally different to what we have now. ( . . . )  
The US supported Goni,42 but who won the elections?  General Banzer…  
(in) democratic elections.  (But neither he nor Goni) gained the votes they 
needed for one of them to become president.  So Jaime Paz, a great 
strategist… military as well, although he was never in the army… political 
strategy… he said to Banzer – we had already reconciled with Banzer – he 
said to the General, ‘I can’t make you president, because my votes in 
Congress won’t allow me.  I can’t make it happen.  If I could, I would 
make you president, but I can’t’.  So General Banzer… a wise man, a 
military man, a dictator... he was a very intelligent man… said to Paz 
Zamora, ‘Sir, you cannot make me president, but with my votes in 
Congress, I can make you president, so you will be president’.  Huge, huge 
shock worldwide!  But above all in the US, because the US was sure, sure, 
that Goni was going to be president.   
 
Capobianco emphasised the status of the US in Latin America during this period, 
and their influence in the internal politics of Bolivia.  But on this occasion, their 
preferred candidate – Goni – had lost, and the US had been outmanoeuvred by 
Paz Zamora and Banzer.  The reconciliation of the MIR and Banzer, and the 
formation of the Acuerdo Patriótico, reflected the change in Bolivian politics.  
For Capobianco, though, the pact and the MIR’s history produced US distrust. 
 
They didn’t think that the MIR… at this time, considered an ultra-leftist 
party… not ultra-leftist, but progressive and leftist… The Americans 
couldn’t believe it.  (But) so it was: we entered government.  (We) had, 
in sport it’s called a handicap, due to entering government in this way.  
Why?  Because we had an American ambassador who was a fanatic!  A 
fanatic of his country.  He was very, very…  How can I put this?  Fanatical, 
that’s the word.  He was called Mr… Gelbard, American Ambassador.  So 
from the first moment, the Americans had no confidence in the MIR; there 
was distrust of our party due to the way we entered government. 
(Capobianco interview, 2014) 
 
According to this view, then, the Cold War cast a shadow over US-Bolivian 
relations post-transition.  This included both US hegemonic influence in the 
politics of the South, and the continuing Left/Right division of Latin American 
enemies and allies.  Differences between the US Embassy and Paz Zamora’s 
government thus ran deeper than alternative visions of counterdrug policy.  The 
introduction of the Andean Initiative, the installation of the Drug War security 
                                         
42 Sanchez ‘Goni’ Gonzalo de Losada of the MNR. 
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apparatus and US accusations of corruption are viewed through the prism of top-
down US control in Bolivia.    
 
Finally, in early-1991, Paz Zamora bowed to US pressure and deployed the army 
in counterdrug operations.  Interior Minister Carlos Saavedra recognised it as a 
‘costly decision, with a huge political price’ (Opinión, 1991b).  However, due to 
a number of reasons, their counterdrug role proved to be short-lived.  Societal 
protests, including cocalero blockades, and opposition from Congress ensured a 
government commitment preventing army-led operations in the Chapare 
(Painter, 1994: 99).  This significantly reduced the army’s utility in 
counterdrugs.  Indeed, there was confusion over the army’s specific role, 
whether solely as logistical support to the police or as fully-fledged independent 
units.  National Police Commander Felipe Carvajal argued for the former, stating 
publicly that the army would be subordinated to the police (Mansilla, 2003: 18).   
 
“We’re going to live in a permanent climate of mutual accusations.  
We’re going have permanent friction.  It’s inevitable.” (Anonymous police 
chief, quoted in La Razón, 1991) 
 
Such statements stoked inter-institutional rivalries, and the issue of the post-
transition balance of power.  Added to this, the results of the first operations of 
these new units were underwhelming, challenging their suitability to this new 
mission (Williams, 1997: 7).  US Embassy officials and policymakers in Congress 
thus began to question the soundness of their investment (Gamarra, 1994b: 240).  
With Gelbard now gone as ambassador, replaced with Charles Bowers in August 
1991, the policy was slowly rolled backed.    On a trip to Washington in July 
1992, Bolivian Interior Minister Carlos Saavedra announced that Bolivia would be 
the first Andean nation to de-link the army from counterdrug efforts (Painter, 
1994: 102).43  Despite complaints from the military over the cut in funding 
(Gamarra, 1994b: 241), the Bolivian government was able to claim some level of 
success in resisting the US Drug War model. 
 
 
                                         
43 The Diablos were the only anti-drug military units to survive this shift in strategy.   
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
The preceding discussion demonstrates how state-narco networks were 
entrenched in the politics of Bolivia’s post-transition political settlement.  
Uneven democratisation ensured pockets of clientelism and authoritarianism, in 
which, state-narco interactions continued to function.  While incompatible with 
the principles of modern, liberal democracy, these were viewed to be part of 
the stable political order.  Ensuring factional interests and institutional veto 
players remained bound to the transition, police and military autonomy, and, by 
extension state-narco networks, were tolerated.  My analysis thus maps the 
effects of the changing political context on the relationship between the 
Bolivian state and the drug trade.  This breaks with the conventional analysis of 
the drugs literature, and one-dimensional conceptions of drug corruption.  The 
significance of state-narco networks extended beyond ‘mere greed’ (Meehan, 
2011: 402), deviance or institutional failure.  These were instead considered to 
be integrated into relations between political and institutional actors, processes 
of transition and engrained political practices.  As part of this, then, the drug 
trade was absorbed into political complexes, and levels of drug related violence 
remained low.  These dynamics shaped the perspectives of elite Bolivian actors, 
and informed their preferences for counterdrug policy.   
 
The second half of the chapter addresses the clash of these Bolivian views with 
US securitised notions of drugs.  In essence, I argue that elite US and Bolivian 
actors viewed the drug problem and attached state-narco networks from 
different perspectives and responded to them in different ways.  The 
introduction of the Andean Initiative brought this to the surface, as the US and 
Bolivian governments pursued distinct agendas.  The Paz Zamora’s claimed 
‘democratising mission’ and ambivalence towards the coca-cocaine economy 
partly underpinned calls for a development-led response, and opposition to 
destabilising US Drug War policies.  By contrast, the Drug War Paradigm shaped 
US actions.  As my analysis shows, US counterdrug goals dominated; pursued 
vigorously by the US Embassy, despite local concerns.  The extension of US 
control was designed to circumvent ‘corrupt’ local power structures, as the US 
established Drug War proxies to execute counterdrug operations.   Bolivian 
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resistance to such policies was viewed to stem either from denial of the true 
parameters of the country’s drug problem, or corruption.  The introduction of 
the Repentance Decree clarified these distinct conceptualisations.  Where 
Bolivian actors viewed the drug trade as relatively benign and sought 
accommodation with traffickers, US actors looked to exert control and ‘defeat’ 
the drug trade.   
 
The chapter thus demonstrates the interplay between these distinct 
interpretations of the ‘war on drugs’, US-Bolivian relations and the development 
of counterdrug policy.  Therefore, my contextualised analysis of the relationship 
between the Bolivian state and the drug trade, grounded in uneven 
democratisation and the introduction of the Andean Initiative, advances the 
research agenda of the coercion literature.  This includes the contrasting 
perspectives of elite US and Bolivian actors on this phenomenon and how they 
navigated state-narco networks during a key moment in the trajectory of the 
‘war on drugs’.  The period was thus marked by competitive US-Bolivian 
relations of power and control.  Distinct interpretations of drugs and state-narco 
networks were pivotal to this dynamic.  In the following chapter, I develop this 
theme; considering how this played out around the issue of corruption in the 
Bolivian political class.  This reveals further contestation around state-narco 
interactions.  
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Chapter 7|Corruption Accusations and the Bolivian 
Political Class 
 
Nadie es virgen, ni nadie es santo (Reinicke interview, 2014). 
 
The quote above translates as, ‘nobody is a virgin, nobody is a saint’.  Godofredo 
Reinicke, the former Human Rights Ombudsman for the Chapare (1997-2001), 
made the comment when I asked about his perceptions of drug corruption.  He 
accepted that it was a problem in the Bolivian state, but argued that other 
actors were also guilty.  For example, he believed that the US had collaborated 
with organised crime in the past for reasons of political influence and 
intelligence.  ‘Drug trafficking has not only corroded the governmental sphere in 
Bolivia,’ Reinicke stated, ‘but the United States itself’.  While his account may 
be supported by key authors of the literature,1 it was also indicative of the role 
of accusation and counter-accusation in understandings of the ‘war on drugs’ in 
Bolivia.  Allegations of state-narco interactions in the political class were 
enmeshed in competing US and Bolivian agendas.  As the extension of the Drug 
War model met local opposition, such accusations held significance to the form 
and function of US-Bolivian relations, Bolivia’s internal politics and the course of 
counterdrug policy.  In this chapter, I draw on the accounts of US and Bolivian 
actors to explore claims of drug corruption, and the nature of state-narco links 
within the Bolivian political class.   
 
My analysis reveals US-Bolivian contestation and political subtext around these 
phenomena.  Interlocutors incorporated narratives of power and resistance into 
their accounts, advancing distinct interpretations of drug scandals and what they 
represented.  Building on the findings of the previous chapter, I map US efforts 
to exercise counterdrug control in Bolivia and navigate perceived drug 
corruption in the Paz Zamora administration.  As part of this, I examine Drug 
War ‘wins’ of the period.  This exposed deep US-Bolivian fault lines of trust, as 
‘corrupt’ elements of the Bolivian government were bypassed in the rendition of 
                                         
1 For example, McCoy (2003) and Scott & Marshall (1991) both discuss historic cases of CIA 
complicity in drug trafficking. 
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Arce Gomez.  The final part of the chapter considers the drug corruption 
accusations that engulfed the Paz Zamora government.  At the time of the 
Andean Initiative, corruption claims – supported by seemingly rigorous US 
intelligence – were used to pressure for the removal of ‘uncooperative’ Drug War 
partners.  US interlocutors now referenced such cases to justify the extension of 
the US Drug War model.  By contrast, Bolivian interlocutors viewed the 
Embassy’s actions within the historic logic of US Cold War tactics and the 
manipulation of Bolivian politics.  This resonated with views of ‘Yankee 
Imperialism’, questioning the stated aims of the US in Latin America and 
assuming underlying goals.   
 
The chapter, therefore, provides novel insights along three dimensions.  First, 
relating back to Chapter 5’s analysis of atomised state-narco network, I consider 
the penetration of drug money through Bolivia’s political parties.  This supports 
the notion that the diffusion of power following transition led to new patron-
client bonds between the state and the drugs trade.  It shows the adaptation of 
these linkages, and the close interactive effects between local political 
dynamics and the drug trade.  Second, the form and function of US-Bolivian 
relations were shaped by elite perceptions of state-narco networks.  The 
relationship between the US Embassy and the Paz Zamora government was 
marked by distrust and competition.  This links to the analysis of the previous 
chapter and has implications for common understandings of the development of 
the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America.  Third, the chapter draws out the legacy of 
the Cold War on Drug War politics, and the use of ‘corruption’ as a rhetorical 
device.  In terms of the former, old tribal dividing lines were viewed to have 
shaped the implementation of US counterdrug strategy; for the latter, 
allegations were exchanged back and forth, as elite actors defended their record 
and pursued their particular goals.  My analysis thus demonstrates how contested 
interpretations of this facet of state-narco networks formed part of competing 
US and Bolivian agendas.   
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7.1 The US Embassy’s Strategic Approach 
 
As the Andean Initiative filtered down to Bolivia, the US Embassy directed 
resources in the service of its own country-specific strategy.  This included plans 
to identify and map drug trafficking organisations.  It was believed that such an 
approach would enable counterdrug forces to disrupt the coca-cocaine trade and 
dismantle its framework.  Ambassador Gelbard (interview, 2013) argued that this 
targeted approach was more suited to Bolivian political realities.  Rather than 
implement counterdrug efforts that aggravated the cocaleros, with little long-
term effect on the trade, the strategy would drive down the coca price and 
encourage the uptake of alternative development projects.  Indicating a level of 
success, at least in the first strand of this approach, Figure 7.1 shows a 
correlation between the execution of the strategy and a (temporary) decline in 
coca prices.2  
 
Figure 7.1 USAID Estimates of Bolivian Coca Leaf Price (1986-1995) 
 
(Figures drawn from Clawson & Lee III, 1996: 40) 
*Estimate for each year taken in the month of June, although prices fluctuate 
throughout each year. 
 
                                         
2 It is difficult to establish causation here, as coca prices may be affected by multiple factors, 
e.g. patterns of coca cultivation elsewhere in the Andes, over-supply in the Chapare, or changes 
in the configuration of trafficking organisations further up the commodity chain. 
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The US Embassy’s counterdrug efforts, though, also extended into the political 
sphere.  US intelligence was used to target ‘corrupt’ politicians and officials: 
cutting state-narco links and ensuring the implementation of the US Embassy’s 
strategy.  Relations between the Embassy and the Bolivian government were 
marked by growing distrust.  As described in the previous chapter, the 
perception that many within the Bolivian government were either not interested 
in counterdrug goals and/or involved in the cocaine trade was prevalent both 
then and now.  For example, a US OIG (1991: 2) report of drug control activities 
in Bolivia noted that the ‘political will’ of the Bolivian government was 
‘questionable, as demonstrated by some recent appointments of corrupt officials 
to key drug control positions.’  Furthermore, Gelbard (interview 2013) stated, 
‘we were hurt for a couple of reasons.  First, we were dealing with a corrupt 
government’.  The US Embassy thus saw the Paz Zamora government as an 
unreliable ally, and sought to target its ‘corrupt’ elements.  For US actors, such 
as Gelbard, this partly justified the Embassy’s dominant role, and its actions in 
bypassing the government in the execution of counterdrug operations.   
 
James Cason, the Political Counsellor for the Embassy La Paz (1987-1990) played 
a key role in rolling out the Embassy’s plan.  In order to construct ‘family trees’ 
of Bolivia’s drug trafficking organisations, Cason established a system of 
intelligence gathering that involved the trawling of public registries, electoral 
rolls, business records and media reports (Cason, 2009: 343).3   From this 50,000 
name database, the US identified the properties of suspected drug traffickers, 
their associates and family members.  In addition to planning drug raids, the 
database was also used to vet state officials and politicians.  Cason’s (Ibid: 345-
9) description of this system demonstrates an unwavering belief in the strength 
of the Embassy’s intelligence, and elements of the Drug War Paradigm: the 
belief that the ‘war on drugs’ may be won through sustained effort against 
‘deviant’ actors.   
 
I had very, very complete family trees on the major traffickers that 
included the kinds of data needed to identify them, all coming out of the 
electoral registries.  And eventually I got the complete computer tapes of 
                                         
3 Cason won the CIA National Human Intelligence Prize in 1989 for his work in Bolivia (Cason, 
2009: 343). 
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every voter in the country.  That kind of background material allowed us 
to dismantle the organizations and to identify the corrupt people in the 
government.  We managed to get a number of interior ministers, police 
chiefs and other people fired and jailed using, in part, this kind of data.  
(For example), when Jaime Paz Zamora became president we told him not 
to appoint certain corrupt police as chief: ‘don’t put the police chiefs in 
these cities because they’re narco-traffickers.’  And we showed them the 
information and they took our suggestion.  And when they did put people 
in who turned out to be corrupt, with narco ties, we provided information 
to them about what they were doing and the President fired them.  With 
the intelligence we had we were able to put a lot of heat on the 
government.  Unfortunately, too often, they’d put another guy in and he 
turned out to be a narco as well.  So it was a never ending battle, but we 
were at least tactically successful at blocking a lot of appointments and 
getting people fired during the three years that Gelbard and I worked 
along with others on this issue. 
 
Cason presents these cases as relatively straightforward, but there were often 
grounds for doubt.4  For example, Gelbard’s Embassy denied a visa to Max 
Fernandez, a beer magnate with presidential ambitions.  There were questions 
over how Fernandez had made his fortune and his ties to the drug trade.  The 
decision to deny the visa was a public marker that the US considered him to be 
corrupt and/or a drug trafficker.5  It would serve to undermine his bid for the 
presidency and his efforts to create a political movement outside of the 
established parties.  When Ambassador Charles R. Bowers replaced Gelbard in 
August 1991, he reconsidered Fernandez’s case. 
 
So the secretary of state gives you this letter, (and) there is a classified 
version, which would get into areas which are not necessarily public.  
Like, you know, ‘we’re concerned that this guy, who is the minister of 
justice, is a crook’.  And, ‘hey, we want you to find out if he is a crook, 
and if he is, start working with the government to get him out of office, 
cause we don’t want him to be working for the narco-traffickers’.  Before 
my time in Bolivia, the Embassy had declared that an individual named 
Max Fernandez, who was a rather flamboyant beer magnate, who ran for 
president … he died a few years ago… that he had been involved with the 
                                         
4 Finding links between politicians and someone involved in the drug trade was by no means 
unusual in the relatively small circles of the Bolivian elite (Hargreaves, 1992: 184).   
5 Cason (2009: 348) suggested that visa denial had more mundane, but effective, implications.  
‘Cason: We began to use the visa weapon there against traffickers.  Bob Gelbard was very 
supportive.  Q: Well, I would think the visa weapon would be particularly potent, not for the 
narco guy, but for his wife and the kids.  Cason: Exactly.  I’ve found everywhere that when you 
take away the ability of the fat cat to take his kids to Disney World and his wife to go shopping, 
they get really upset.  And lots of times they break down and cry.  But we denied visas on solid 
information.  We kept them from coming to the United States.’ 
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narco-traffickers.  And so when you get involved with the narco-
traffickers, the United States did not look kindly on that.  ‘No more visas 
for you, you can’t come to the United States, you’re not invited to any 
parties,’ and whatever else.  After I was down there, we looked into this 
in a very detailed fashion, and determined that the previous 
determination was wrong.  The guy wasn’t involved.  So I had to try and 
roll this back up, and Washington really fought that, but eventually, we 
worked back-up. (Bowers interview, 2013) 
 
While admitting flaws in the system, Bowers restated the right of the Embassy to 
make these kinds of determinations.  On the surface, the US was solely using the 
diplomatic tools at its disposal to pursue it counterdrug objectives; at times, 
making honest errors.  These were presented as direct punishments for 
perceived transgressions.  Similarly to Cason, the US response to alleged cases of 
corruption was described in plain policy terms of cause and effect.   
 
There was recognition that such decisions had social and political ramifications – 
that was partly the point – but the idea that the US was shaping internal Bolivian 
politics, and the validity of this, was little discussed.  Returning to Fernandez’s 
case, he was forced to field questions about his background and fitness for 
public office.  He had not been convicted of a crime, yet his political career 
was, in-part, dependent on convincing the US of his innocence.6  The sense that 
the US sat as judge and jury on matters of drug corruption, and the lack of 
conclusive evidence in such cases, was a source of contention in Bolivia.  It fed 
into anti-US sentiment: viewed as another aspect of overbearing US influence in 
Bolivia, and the legacy of its Cold War politics.  However, for US interlocutors, 
informed by the Drug War Paradigm and ideas of American Exceptionalism, such 
actions were held as legitimate.  In terms of the former, the US was pursuing 
those who inhibited their counterdrug goals; for the latter, benevolent US 
foreign policy had targeted actors who has travailed ethical norms.   
 
 
 
 
                                         
6 Paz Zamora himself would also be subject to this tactic, when his US visa was revoked in 1996 
(see section 7.4).  He believed this to be a calculated attempt by the US Embassy and his 
political rivals to sabotage his chances of re-election.   
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7.2 Fault Lines of Trust 
 
The US Embassy was able to claim the effectiveness of its strategic approach 
following the arrests of major drug traffickers, such as Carmelo ‘Meco’ 
Dominguez and Jorge Roca Suárez.7  Subsecretary for Social Defence Gonzalo 
Torrico claimed that Bolivia’s drug trade had received its most significant hit to 
due to the capture of these ‘peces gordos’ (Opinión, 1991a).  The capture of 
García Meza’s ‘Minister of Cocaine’, though, was perhaps the Embassy’s most 
significant Drug War ‘win’.  After years on the run, Luis Arce Gomez was caught 
in Santa Cruz in December 1989.  Still apparently wary of provoking the military 
by attempting prosecution within Bolivia, President Paz Zamora agreed that Arce 
Gomez should face trial in the US on drug trafficking offences.  Despite the 
absence of an extradition treaty, the former-Colonel was flown out of the 
country by the DEA and arrested in Miami.  Both Ambassador Gelbard and 
former-Interior Minister Capobianco, claimed Arce Gomez’s capture as a 
triumph, but viewed the episode through different lenses.  They narrated their 
memories of the case in the form of anecdotes,8 with diverging emphases and 
explanatory frameworks e.g. American Exceptionalism (and paternal attitudes 
towards the South) and the Drug War Paradigm, and Yankee Imperialism and the 
Cold War legacy.  Their anecdotes, situated within the assumptions and 
conceptualisations of such frameworks, reveal the fault lines of trust that 
divided the Embassy and the Bolivian government during this period. 
 
Taking Gelbard’s (interview, 2013) account first, the former-Ambassador set the 
scene for the operation by outlining some of the crimes of the García Meza 
regime.  As such, he stressed the US Embassy’s lead role in identifying Arce 
Gomez and advanced US foreign policy as a force for good.  The fascist and Nazi 
links of the García Meza regime and its involvement in human rights abuses and 
drug trafficking created a moral imperative for the US to act.  Ideas around the 
US role as the ‘City on the Hill’ and its ‘responsibility’ to project its liberal 
                                         
7 These traffickers are discussed in Chapter 4.4. 
8 James (2005: 172) argues that, ‘anecdotes are in some fundamental way morality tales with 
both social and individual register: they are about proper and improper behaviour, responsible 
and irresponsible actions, about the way the world is and the way it ought to be.’ 
Chapter 7  214 
 
democrat values support this view.  Gelbard sought to underline the positive role 
of the US Embassy in Bolivia.     
 
You know the García Meza government was this Right-wing narco-fascist 
dictatorship? ( . . . )  (60 Minutes) did a feature on (Arce Gomez) calling 
him the Minister of Cocaine, and he bragged about all the things that he 
was doing.  He was also responsible for the murder of hundreds of people 
and the torture of thousands of people.  Klaus Barbie, the Nazi war 
criminal, was one of his advisors.   There was an Italian fascist terrorist 
named, Stefano Delle Chiaie who had sought refuge in Bolivia after 
blowing up the Bologna train station.  He was an advisor to these guys.  
They would torture and do horrible things.   Meanwhile they were actively 
involved in the cocaine business with Roberto Suarez.  After the García 
Meza government fell, Arce Gomez disappeared and escaped, ultimately, 
to Argentina, where the military dictatorship hid him.  He was arrested in 
the mid ’80s and apparently bribed an Argentine judge a couple of million 
dollars to release him.  He disappeared again.  In early ’89 we began 
getting reports that he was in Santa Cruz, which is where he was from.  
Don Ferrarone came in to see me one day and said that the DEA office in 
Santa Cruz had had reports that the man was there, walking around 
openly.  A doctor I knew in Santa Cruz came in to see me – same thing.  
All these people were really scared of him because of what he had done, 
justifiably.  And the doctor said he had seen Arce Gomez just walking 
along the street.  So we did all the surveillance and we discovered that 
indeed he was there and staying at his house, with his family, brazenly!   
 
Gelbard accentuated his surprise at the apparent openness of Arce Gomez’s 
lifestyle, despite having been indicted by US and Bolivian courts.  Although fear 
is noted as a factor here, there is also the hint of official complicity.  In the 
overall context of Gelbard’s account, either the Bolivian authorities lacked the 
will and ability to bring Arce Gomez to justice, or corruption was involved (Arce 
Gomez had already bribed an Argentine judge).  The US was often portrayed as 
struggling against an uncooperative/unable local state apparatus and pervasive 
corruption.  Linking into this, he continued the anecdote by describing the 
reaction of President Paz Zamora to the news of Arce Gomez. 
 
So I went to the President of Bolivia, Jaime Paz Zamora, and I said, 
‘Jaime, you’ve got a problem’. ( . . . )  Paz Zamora was from a leftist 
political party that had been severely persecuted by Arce Gomez, some of 
his people had been massacred in a notorious attack by Arce Gomez and 
the military.  Many of them had been tortured; bad, bad stuff.  So I went 
to President Paz Zamora and I said, ‘look, we got a problem.  We have a 
problem together.  Arce Gomez is in Santa Cruz’.  He just blanched.  I 
said, ‘it seems to me we have three possibilities – the first, we could try 
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to ignore this but I don’t really think we can, because the man’s walking 
around Santa Cruz brazenly’, I said, ‘or second, we could do an operation 
together and he could be turned over to you’.  And he said, ‘oh no’, he 
said, ‘I wouldn’t be President for more than six weeks after that’.  He still 
feared a military coup, even though the military was discredited.  I said, 
‘or we could do a joint operation and you could turn him over to me’.  He 
said, ‘I like that’.  So we did this by the numbers, and with the approval 
of the President of Bolivia.  We had a specially trained Bolivian Police unit 
go pick him up.  It was a beautiful sunny day, he was barbecuing in 
Bermuda shorts wearing an apron.  The Bolivian Police unit picked him 
up.9 
 
There are three important strands to this passage.  First, continuing with the 
theme of American Exceptionalism, Gelbard gave himself and the US Embassy 
the preeminent role in the operation against Arce Gomez.  The former-
Ambassador expressed sympathy for Paz Zamora and the MIR’s history under 
García Meza, but the Bolivian President was portrayed as a passive actor in 
Gelbard’s recounting of the story: Paz Zamora was frozen with shock by 
Gelbard’s revelation, which compelled the Embassy to step-in and take decisive 
action.  US control, in this sense, was a matter of necessity and benevolence.  
Second, Gelbard noted Paz Zamora’s continuing concern with military 
intervention in the political system.  As discussed in the previous chapter, there 
was an uneasy relationship between the political class and the military 
institution.  Although this issue was largely dismissed by Bolivian interlocutors – 
the intervening years perhaps adding greater certainty – Gelbard identified this 
as an important factor in Paz Zamora’s approval of Arce Gomez’s rendition.  
Third, Gelbard described the operation as ‘by the numbers’, but, in truth, 
regular legal procedures were cut to enable Arce Gomez’s trial in the US.  
Bolivia’s uneven democracy was evident in both the denial of due legal process 
and concerns over the status of civil-military relations.  In this sense, the 
requirements of the rule of law and constitutional government were 
compromised.  As described in the previous chapter, Bolivian political actors had 
been willing to make such compromises to ensure ‘democratic governability’, 
and, in some ways, this decision fits with their claimed pragmatism.  In 
                                         
9 Part of Gelbard’s anecdote is cut here for reasons of space.  The cut section includes a 
description of a misunderstanding between the Bolivian police and the DEA, which meant that 
the Embassy lost track of the operation for several hours. 
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Gelbard’s anecdote, this expediency was defended against the crimes of Arce 
Gomez and his role in the drug trade.   
 
The next day they put him on the plane.  He got on the plane and he 
thought he was going to La Paz, so they started flying and he was 
surrounded by DEA people, and he started cursing at them and telling in 
very graphic terms once he was freed what he… he said he would 
remember who these DEA people were and he started talking about what 
he was going to do to their wives, daughters and girlfriends, in really 
pornographic, nasty terms.  And the DEA people just sat there, and they 
flew for two and a half hours and finally he said, ‘we’ve been flying a long 
time, are we going to La Paz?’  And the chief DEA guy said no.  He said, 
‘where are we going?’  He said, ‘Miami’, and (Arce Gomez) began crying.  
He got a thirty year sentence.  Now, by the time he was freed he had 
been indicted by the Bolivian government, convicted in absentia for 
horrible crimes – murder, torture – and sentenced to life imprisonment or 
whatever it is in Bolivia.  By the time he’d finished nineteen years they 
were going to let him go for good behaviour, he had been through 
prostate cancer and other things and the US was ready to deport him.  
The US government asked me to go and be the witness in favour of his 
deportation, so I had the wonderful job of getting him coming and helping 
him go. So he is back with García Mesa in prison for the rest of his life in 
Bolivia, which I saw as a great object lesson in terms of the drug 
traffickers.   
 
Guillermo Capobianco’s (interview, 2014) account of the case differs 
substantially in emphasis.  President Paz Zamora is presented as the main 
protagonist in Capobianco’s anecdote, and its primary purpose is to demonstrate 
Bolivian compliance in the ‘war on drugs’.  Where Gelbard highlighted Arce 
Gomez’s role in the abuses of the García Meza regime, Capobianco focused on 
Arce Gomez ‘the drug trafficker’.  By the time of his arrest, it was widely 
believed that Arce Gomez was no longer a major player in the cocaine trade 
and, given his history with the MIR, it is perhaps surprising that Capobianco 
made little reference to the past crimes of the ‘Minister of Cocaine’.  In 
countering US accusations of corruption and lack of political will, though, the 
anecdote advanced the Bolivian government’s agency in the expulsion of Arce 
Gomez. 
 
I was relaxing one afternoon, having a BBQ here, when General Añez 
comes in, ( . . . ) and he tells me, ‘Minister, we have taken prisoner, el 
Señor...’ the biggest trafficker at that time, who (had been) a minister of 
state, and he tells me ( . . . ), ‘Arce Gomez, we've taken Arce Gomez’.  
‘Shit!’ I said, ‘bloody hell!’  And so we composed ourselves, and set-up a 
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meeting, and President Paz Zamora, a man, a strategist, spoke with... I 
think that he spoke with President Bush, until finally he said... although 
he never agreed an extradition treaty... (he said), ‘Take him’.  Because of 
a decision - not constitutional, not legal - President Paz Zamora 
authorised the extradition of this major trafficker, Luis Arce Gomez.  He 
was taken prisoner at three in the afternoon and at seven in the morning, 
I was already informing the country that, in a joint operation between 
Bolivia and the US Embassy, the political decision had been made to send 
this major drug trafficker to the United States.  As such, when the country 
learned this at nine in the morning, the man was already in the United 
States; because of a political decision.  I would like to say, then, that 
President Paz Zamora was right when he (made this agreement with) the 
US representatives… that the most important things was the attitude, the 
conviction to fights against drugs.  It was more important that signing a 
treaty and the proof was Arce Gomez.  He departed at dawn in a DEA 
plane, authorised by us, without a treaty, only due to friendship, to work 
together, between Bolivians and Americans.  This is the proof I can give 
you of how our relations... they were difficult, but in a crucial moment 
like this, President Paz Zamora did not waiver.  Because, what was it that 
President Paz Zamora feared?  He feared that, following the seizure of 
him, the factions that controlled certain levels of drug trafficking would 
be able to act against the government, right? (But) this is the proof of 
how the relationship between the US Embassy and our government 
(worked). 
 
In addition to the pivotal role of Paz Zamora, Capobianco noted the 
unconstitutional nature of the decision, and the threat posed to the government 
by Arce Gomez and unnamed drug trafficking factions.  In one sense, Capobianco 
seemed to echo doubts over the strength of Bolivia’s institutions to deal with the 
implications of Arce Gomez’s arrest.  Around this time, for example, Paz Zamora 
had justified the irregular rendition by citing the ‘terrible weaknesses and the 
terrible immorality which plagues our judicial system’ (Hargreaves, 1992: 117).10  
Capobianco, though, also described it as a ‘political decision’.  The anecdote 
stresses the Paz Zamora government’s willingness to engage with the US on the 
topic of drug trafficking and, in this context, the rendition of Arce Gomez is 
designed to placate the US.  But according to Capobianco, the US was still mired 
in Cold War-thinking.  As detailed below, he argued that the Bolivian 
government’s desire for a productive working relationship with the US was met 
with old Cold War-era suspicions.   
 
                                         
10 This may be linked to the drawn out prosecution of García Meza, which would not reach its 
conclusion until 1993.  At this point, the former-dictator was on the run. 
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Capobianco described how he was frequently marginalised in the planning and 
execution of counterdrug operations.  In the case of Arce Gomez, he stated that 
during ‘the most important operation of my time with respect to combating the 
mafias, I was at a barbeque. ( . . . )  Nobody had told me’.  Such actions were 
not unusual.  The US actively sought to bypass ‘uncooperative’ officials, utilising 
its allies in the government and its Drug War proxies, such as UMOPAR, as part of 
its approach.  As noted in the previous chapter, there was frustration at the 
Bolivian government’s refusal to prioritise counterdrug objectives and accept 
the Embassy’s securitised assessments of the country’s coca-cocaine economy.  
Suggestions that the Paz Zamora administration’s lack of political will also 
stemmed from links to drug traffickers added to the atmosphere of distrust.  For 
example, Gelbard (interview, 2013) justified Capobianco’s relegation from the 
Arce Gomez operation in the following terms. 
 
I didn’t trust Capobianco.  We didn’t trust Capobianco.  When we did the 
Arce Gomez operation, we didn’t tell Capobianco what we were doing 
because we were afraid he would blow it.  He was from Santa Cruz and 
we didn’t know what his connections might be with Arce Gomez. 
 
Fault lines of trust, then, were explained not only by the perceived weakness of 
the Bolivian government on the issue of drugs, but through reference to 
corruption.  For actors such as Gelbard, Drug War goals validated the abrasive US 
approach. 
 
By contrast, Capobianco claimed that Gelbard’s Embassy considered the MIR to 
be anti-US and this shaped their relations.  US top-down control and distrust, 
then, was traced back to the legacy of the Cold War, rather than the Bolivian 
government’s lack of political will and/or corruption. 
 
We had a strong-willed ambassador… of a type… how should I put it?  A 
fanatic.  So, he was the man who pressured the government. ( . . . )  We 
were well disposed to carry forward the fight against drugs, but not as an 
absolute priority, you realise… due to the way we got to government, no.  
(But) there was pressure.  There was pressure on President Paz Zamora.  I 
recognised it many times, that there was great pressure for the policies to 
combat drug trafficking to be more indiscriminate, for example: that they 
might be more tough, give more emphasis to repression, less emphasis to 
prevention or alternative development and all of this.  There definitely 
was pressure, it was clear. ( . . . )  The level of dependence of the 
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government with respect to the United States (meant) that the 
suggestions of the Ambassador were not really suggestions.  They were 
orders, okay?  So when the Ambassador suggested something, it wasn’t a 
suggestion.  He was saying, ‘right, carajo,11 do this’.  It was hard.  It was 
hard. ( . . . )  I was the Minister of Government, a very strong and 
powerful minister. ( . . . )  What did I have to do?  Maintain order within 
the country and combat drugs.  I got the poisoned chalice,12 no?!  Of 
combatting drugs. ( . . . )  The American Ambassador did not want me.  
He considered me a bloody Lefty,13  I’m sure.  But in my party, I was 
always politically moderate. (Capobianco interview, 2014) 
 
The US Embassy’s Political Counsellor from this period, James Cason, indicated 
that Capobianco’s beliefs were not without some substance.  He stated that the 
Embassy had ‘wrongly’ viewed the MIR as an ‘extremist far-left party’, and 
noted the US ‘tendency in those days, unfortunately, to stay away from the Left, 
rather than to try to get to know them and influence their thinking’ (Cason, 
2009: 349).  As such, Capobianco folded US distrust and accusations of 
corruption into narratives of the Cold War. 
 
7.3 Corruption Scandals and Political Leverage 
 
Following in this theme, Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) argued that the US took 
extraordinary measures to pursue their counterdrug agenda in Bolivia.  As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the US had argued that Bolivia was now a 
major producer of pure cocaine.  Paz Zamora rejected the US analysis.  
Accepting the Embassy’s claims entailed the adoption of US views on the nature 
of Bolivia’s drug problem, and hence acceptance of the response favoured by the 
US.  Paz Zamora had argued against this during negotiations for the Andean 
Initiative, and continued to view the issue through the prism of the Development 
Paradigm.  Crucially, the Bolivian government sought to avoid politically 
destabilising, ‘Colombianised’ counterdrug policies.  Paz Zamora (Ibid.) claimed 
that the US employed underhanded tactics to stimulate the ‘war on drugs’ in 
Bolivia. 
                                         
11 Carajo may have different meanings depending on the emphasis of the speaker and the 
context.  Here, Capobianco uses it as a pejorative, disrespectful term.   
12 Capobianco used the term, ‘el presente griego’ or ‘Greek present’, referring to the Trojan 
Horse from Greek mythology. 
13 In Capobianco’s words, ‘un izquierdista de mierda’. 
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During my government, one of the problems we had with the US Embassy 
was that they said Bolivia was already a producer of cocaine.  Until that 
moment, Bolivia produced coca paste and it was normally in Colombia or 
elsewhere that they processed it into cocaine. (. . . ) But the Americans 
wanted to sustain the theory that Bolivia was already a producer of 
cocaine, a world producer of cocaine.  I never accepted it, I rejected it. ( 
. . . ) Then, incredibly, all of a sudden from La Paz airport… an enormous 
plane leaves from La Paz to Lima with four tonnes of cocaine… four 
tonnes of drugs, but processed cocaine.  How could they have managed 
this?  Impossible!  In Lima, they seized it. ( . . . )  It was a typical 
operation.  We couldn’t say anything about it in Bolivia: it was four tonnes 
of refined drugs. ( . . . )  The ‘war on drugs’, like the Cold War, justified 
everything. (Paz Zamora interview, 2013)14 
 
According to this view, the seizure in Lima formed part of a conspiracy and 
wider trend of US manipulation of the Bolivian government.  Placing his 
government in opposition to the US Embassy, Paz Zamora argued that US 
priorities damaged the gains made by the ‘democracy generation’.  The implied 
conspiracy theory follows in the lineage of US Cold War politics, and its relations 
of top-down control over Bolivia.  In one sense, this was used to reconcile his 
own beliefs over the nature of both the Bolivian coca-cocaine economy and US 
influence in Latin America.  However, it also portrayed the US as a duplicitous 
actor, countering US assertions that the Bolivian government was ‘totally 
corrupt’, as stated by Gelbard (interview, 2013).   Such theories acted partly as 
a defensive rhetorical device for Bolivian interlocutors, suggesting hidden US 
agendas and tactics.  When it came to the US Embassy’s strategic approach, 
subtext was assumed.  
 
Such dynamics were evident in the corruption scandals that engulfed the Paz 
Zamora administration and the MIR.  These cases seemed to suggest the 
existence of state-narco networks running into the heart of government.  For 
example, drug traffickers looked to penetrate Bolivia’s political parties, 
attempting to engender patron-client bonds through campaign contributions and 
‘kick-backs’.  The US Embassy’s actions and the contemporary accounts of 
officials certainly support this thesis, as the Paz Zamora government and the MIR 
                                         
14 This event, in-fact, occurred in September 1995, after Paz Zamora’s presidency.  It is known as 
the Narcoavión scandal (e.g. see Roncken, 1997b). 
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were viewed as heavily compromised by drug corruption.  For Bolivian 
interlocutors, though, such cases were based on flimsy evidence and instead 
represented US attempts to manipulate the political process.  As such, 
corruption accusations were used as political leverage by the US.  Competing 
theories around corruption scandals demonstrated the political dimensions of 
real or imagined state-narco networks.  The true parameters of these relations 
and the extent of their influence were contested.   
 
7.3.1 The Cases of Rico Toro, Capobianco and Carvajal 
 
Following the appointment of Faustino Rico Toro15 to the head of the FECLN in 
February 1991, the US Embassy’s relationship with the Bolivian government 
began to unravel.  To many observers, his appointment was baffling.  The 
former-Colonel had been heavily implicated in drug trafficking and human rights 
abuses during Bolivia’s authoritarian period (Gamarra, 1994b: 118).  In replacing 
Lucio Añez – a trusted US drug war ally – with Rico Toro, Paz Zamora came under 
immediate pressure, as the Embassy threatened to block all US and international 
foreign assistance to Bolivia.  Although Rico Toro’s appointment was soon 
reversed, the scandal continued to roll on.  Ambassador Gelbard seized the 
moment to successfully push for the removal of Capobianco and Police Chief 
Felipe Carvajal. 
 
Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) outlined his reasons for appointing Rico Toro to 
head of the FELCN.  The former-President argued that this was part of the 
Bolivian government’s efforts to re-take control of counterdrug efforts within its 
borders. 
 
General Lucio Añez was the counterpart of the DEA, in the fight (against 
drugs).  But our General Añez, who they already knew was suffering from 
heart problems, was bad.  Not only could he not work, (but) his character 
was failing, he was fading.  The DEA and the entire American Service 
                                         
15 Rico Toro was a Colonel in the Bolivian army until his discharge in 1982.  This was part of the 
institution’s attempt to purge itself following the García Meza regime.  Rico Toro belonged to 
the Banzerato wing of the army and was a well-known ‘hardliner’, with political ambitions.  
Posing a challenge to García Meza’s rule, the dictator awarded Rico Toro a US$200,000 ‘loyalty 
payment’ to ward-off any coup attempt.  Years prior to this, Rico Toro had been held on 
suspicion of the assassination of Barrientos in 1968 (Dunkerley, 1984: 156, 294, 335 & 346). 
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where abusing this, and they did things as they liked.  So I said, ‘right, 
we’re going to put in a Bolivian military man from days gone by.  A 
military man with nerve’.  And Rico Toro was there, who was this type of 
guy, and he hadn’t been involved in drug trafficking.  Okay?  But he was 
from that era, this cycle of Bolivian military (government), and he carried 
out certain functions.  He was the President of the Corporación del 
Desarrollo de Cochabamba, and he was a member of General Banzer’s 
party, who was our ally.  So I put him in.  I didn’t know him well, but I put 
him in because he was a man… tough… and the Americans wouldn’t be 
able to do whatever they wanted with him.  This was the problem; as 
simple as that.  But how awful!  They laid all of this on poor Capobianco, 
who had nothing to do with it.  He was the Minister of the Interior, he had 
to sign (Rico Toro’s) name, and he named him.  It was ultimately my 
decision, but Capobianco paid the price.  Nothing more!  And to show 
democracy… that they hadn’t been wrong… the US asked for (Rico Toro), 
and took him to the United States, but they had nothing to charge him 
with.  So they applied this thing that the Americans have, that you’ll 
recognise… a misdemeanour… they give you a year.  Rico Toro served it 
and now lives content in Cochabamba.  They took him, they never had… 
when they saw that they had no proof of anything… but they couldn’t 
drop it, so they forced him to incriminate himself of something.  Of what, 
I don’t know.  He spent one year in prison.  
 
Paz Zamora’s explanation of Rico Toro’s replacement of Añez raises several 
points.  First, Añez was viewed as a close ally of the US.  From the US 
perspective, he was considered an honourable man, who could be trusted with 
operational details.  This occurred while other high-level Bolivian officials were 
excluded.  Paz Zamora here claims that the US Embassy took advantage of 
Añez’s ill-health to take such actions.  Rather than a relationship of trust and 
respect, the US was perceived to have exploited the situation: Añez provided 
the constitutional cover required for US officials to operate in Bolivia with 
minimal interference.  Putting Rico Toro in place would reverse this.  Despite 
Paz Zamora’s own history with the military, Rico Toro’s army background was 
seen as a positive, i.e. a strong character who will stand-up to the US.  He 
refuted the idea that Rico Toro was involved in drug trafficking and passed-off 
the former-Colonel’s short prison sentence in the US as a face-saving exercise by 
the US.  Paz Zamora argued, then, that this case should be understood in the 
context of Bolivian resistance to the exercise of US control.  Corruption 
allegations were viewed as a tool of US political leverage.   
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Paz Zamora also highlighted patronage politics as a factor in Rico Toro’s 
appointment.16  The former-Colonel was associated with Banzer and ADN, rather 
than the MIR.  Indeed, Rico Toro was known as a Banzerato during the 
authoritarian period, and was a prominent actor in ADN’s Cochabambino branch 
(Dunkerley, 1984: 294).  As part of this, ADN had given Rico Toro the role of 
President of the Corporación del Desarrollo de Cochabamba.  Nevertheless, 
according to Hargreaves (1992: 166), the US Embassy held Paz Zamora and the 
MIR wholly responsible.  ADN members had apparently shared in the US 
Embassy’s fury over the appointment, and claimed that they had taken no part 
in the decision (Ibid: 164).  Where relations between the MIR and Gelbard were 
strained, Banzer and ADN were considered to be ‘friendly’ to the US.   
 
Old political alliances seemed to underpin these relationships.  In addition to 
Cold War-era links (Lehman, 1999: 165), Banzer’s party adhered to neoliberal 
orthodoxy, and was more sympathetic to the US.  ADN did not carry the radical, 
left-wing baggage of the MIR.  Hargreaves (1992: 166) claims that Gelbard found 
the ideological tendencies of the MIR and Paz Zamora ‘distasteful’.17  ADN gave 
the US an influential ally within the Bolivian government.  Given Banzer and 
ADN’s own connections to the drug trade, the US Embassy’s apparent trust was 
somewhat surprising.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the coca-cocaine trade had 
expanded rapidly during Banzer’s authoritarian regime.  A series of drug scandals 
involving Banzer and family members added further questions.  In 1980, for 
example, a police raid on his property in the Beni found it being used by 
Colombian drug traffickers (Rodas M., 1996: 68).  Furthermore, various relatives, 
including Banzer’s wife, Yolanda Prada de Banzer, were caught up in drugs 
arrests abroad (see Thoumi, 2003: 252-3).  Finally, in 1988, two former-Banzer 
ministers were filmed meeting Roberto Suarez, and accused of accepting 
campaign contributions on behalf of ADN (Rodas M., 1996: 255).  In all of these 
cases, Banzer pleaded ignorance and publicly committed himself to US Drug War 
                                         
16 Gamarra (1994b: 231) notes uncertainty over the reasons behind Paz Zamora’s ‘perplexing’ 
decision to appoint Rico Toro.  However, he states that, ‘the nomination may have had 
something to do with the patronage requirements of the ruling Acuerdo Patriótico alliance’. 
17 Gelbard was also reportedly angry at the Bolivian government’s refusal to back the US 
intervention against Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War (Hargreaves, 1992: 167). 
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goals.  Whether one accepts Banzer’s defence or not, politics appeared to have 
influenced the US Embassy’s differential treatment of ADN and the MIR.   
 
Gelbard’s (interview, 2013) account largely glossed over these political factors 
and focused on the perceived corruption of Paz Zamora’s government.  He 
described how the US Embassy took decisive action to get rid of Rico Toro, and 
later Capobianco and Carvajal, whom he considered to be implicated in a wider 
criminal conspiracy.  His account outlined state-narco networks, linking the 
government to drug traffickers through the police.  While Paz Zamora argued 
that Rico Toro’s appointment was an attempt to defend the Bolivian 
government’s interests, Gelbard claimed that corruption lay at the centre of the 
decision.   
 
We were dealing with a corrupt government.  We knew that Jaime Paz 
Zamora’s government had been receiving drug trafficker money for their 
election campaign.  We knew from the beginning that the Minister for 
Interior, Guillermo Capobianco, was the bag man for all this.  We knew 
that the man who became National Police Chief was the collection man, 
and that he passed the money over to Capobianco.  At a certain point, we 
were having a strategy meeting in Santa Cruz when the Foreign Minister 
called me and said, ‘you’re not going to believe this, I am horrified, I am 
ashamed, I am embarrassed, but the President has just appointed a man 
named Rico Toro to be the head of the counternarcotics police’.  Rico 
Toro had been the deputy to Arce Gomez as Interior Minister.  Utterly 
corrupt, utterly involved with drug trafficking when he had been deputy 
Interior Minister.  Why would anyone want the job as head of the counter-
narcotics police if he has that kind of record?  To make lots of money.  I 
was shocked.  I was horrified by the brazenness of Paz Zamora giving the 
job to Rico Toro.  I was stunned! And as you probably know, that 
government was a coalition government between Paz Zamora and his 
people, and General Hugo Banzer and his people.  The Foreign Minister18 
was from the Banzer side.  There were some very, very good people on 
Paz Zamora’s side too, but there were some people who were not so 
good. (Ibid.) 
 
For actors such as Gelbard, Rico Toro’s appointment confirmed suspicions that 
certain members of the MIR were using their position to advance interests in the 
coca-cocaine economy.  It was theorised that Capobianco, with or without the 
direct knowledge of other prominent members of the MIR, was putting allies 
(including Rico Toro and Carvajal) in key positions to ensure the smooth running 
                                         
18 Carlos Iturralde, a prominent business leader in Bolivia, was an ADN appointment. 
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of trafficking operations (CSM, 1991a).  Such assertions were reportedly backed-
up by US intelligence and the revelations of soon-to-be convicted drug 
trafficker, Carmelo Dominguez.19  They suggested the existence of patron-client 
relations between traffickers, state officials and members of the government.  
Gelbard reportedly held secret talks with Banzer and convinced him to pressure 
Paz Zamora to reverse Rico Toro’s appointment.  Paz Zamora took Banzer’s 
advice, and sent the former-dictator and Oscar Eid, a prominent leader within 
the MIR, to ask Rico Toro for his resignation (Hargreaves, 1992: 166).  Rico Toro 
accepted and stepped down, just three days after his appointment.   
 
At the time, though, there were a number of theories surrounding Rico Toro’s 
appointment.20  For example, the Paz Zamora administration had grown 
frustrated by Añez’s closeness to the US and his vigour in pursuing drug war 
goals.  This included the targeting of FINSA (Firma Integral de Servicios Arévalo); 
a small savings bank in Cochabamba, which was providing suspiciously large rates 
of interest for its numerous investors.21   Capobianco had reportedly advised 
Añez that an operation against FINSA would cause ‘a lot of problems for the 
government’.   The DEA, though, reportedly continued to pressure for action 
against the savings bank (Opinión, 1992).  When Añez went ahead with the 
investigation and closed down FINSA, Capobianco demanded his resignation ‘on 
health grounds’ (Ibid: 179).22  Such stories may be interpreted as the 
prioritisation of other goals beyond the ‘war on drugs’ (i.e. protecting the 
                                         
19 According to Hargreaves (1992: 171), Carmelo ‘Meco’ Dominguez claimed under interrogation 
that Capobianco and Carvajal accepted regular bribes.  US officials argued that this revealed ‘a 
sophisticated network of pay-offs which went higher than anyone imagined’ (Ibid.).  There were, 
though, questions around the over-extension of the DEA’s authority.  The US stated that Meco’s 
interrogation was done jointly by the DEA and UMOPAR.  However, Bolivian officials claimed that 
the DEA had carried out the interrogation alone, raising further doubts over the veracity of the 
accusations (Ibid: 173). 
20 One of the more lurid theories was the claim that Paz Zamora had granted Rico Toro the role 
to get close to his daughter, a Miss Universe semi-finalist (Hargreaves, 1992: 165). 
21 Providing monthly interest rates of 5-6 per cent, it was believed that FINSA was a money 
laundering front for drug traffickers.  When its assets were frozen, partly due to Añez’s 
investigation, around 20,000 depositors lost their investments.  These included police chiefs, 
politicians and high-profile members of society (e.g. folk music group Kjarkas), as well as 
resettled miners, sacked factory workers and cocaleros investing their eradication compensation.  
Shutting-down FINSA, then, placed the government under pressure to prove the accusations 
and/or return the lost investments (Painter, 1994: 61-2). 
22 Añez had undergone a double bypass.  In addition to this, though, Menzel (1996: 56) states 
that Añez had also been implicated in a corruption scandal around this time by the US Embassy, 
but he does not provide further details. 
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savings of thousands of Bolivians) or government complicity in drug trafficking.  
In Paz Zamora’s (interview, 2014) account, it is the former: the US had used a 
weakened Añez like a puppet to pursue policies contrary to Bolivian interests.  
For Gelbard (interview, 2013), the case resonated with his negative view of the 
Bolivian government’s commitment to the ‘war on drugs’: ‘sometimes if 
(counterdrug officials) became too capable they would get transferred, because 
the government didn’t want people to be too capable’.  
 
So the Foreign Minister urged me to do everything in my power to get rid 
of Rico Toro.  So the first thing I did was freeze the entire aid pipeline, 
which was about US$700 million.  That elicited a lot of screams back in 
Washington because some people would have preferred that I had 
consulted with Washington and had some kind of inter-agency decision.  I 
decided that time was of the essence, that we needed to show the 
Bolivian government immediately that this was way beyond the bounds of 
the permissible, that this was a man whose background was so egregious 
that we could not be seen supporting him under these circumstances.  So I 
called the Foreign Minister back up and told him what I had done and he 
was shocked, but said he understood.  My aid director was shocked.  He 
didn’t understand, but so be it.  But the Foreign Minister and others really 
began to put pressure – I went to see General Banzer and I said, ‘this is 
just beyond the pale, unacceptable, this will destroy the relationship, I 
have frozen all our aid, I will get others to do so too.  I will get all our 
aid, all your aid from the IDB – the Inter-American Development Bank – 
the World Bank, the IMF, get all that frozen too.’  Fortunately, the man 
who is the assistant secretary for the Western Hemisphere back here, 
Bernard Aronson, supported me all the way.  It took less than 72 hours for 
Rico Toro to be fired. (Ibid.) 
 
Gelbard’s account thus emphasises the Embassy’s efforts to exercise control 
over the Bolivian government.  It was clear that Bolivia was heavily dependent 
on external financial support, and that economic pressure would have serious 
implications for the government.  Gelbard fully exploited this, and ensured the 
compliance of Paz Zamora’s administration.  Within Bolivia, these were viewed 
as bullying tactics, demonstrating top-down control over sovereign Bolivian 
matters.  Torrico (interview, 2014) stated, that the decision to name the head of 
the FELCN fell within ‘the minister’s power,’ and that ‘Capobianco told (the US) 
that this is a sovereign country, that the government can name whomever it sees 
fit’.  However, the Embassy noted the US government’s own sovereign right to 
act in its national interest (Hargreaves, 1992: 167).  Indeed, the reaction of the 
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US Embassy showed just how much the ‘war on drugs’ had become the overriding 
priority in Bolivia.     
 
I decided that this was the opportunity to leverage (the Rico Toro case) 
into pushing the President to get rid of the Interior Minister, Capobianco, 
and the national Police Chief.  The national Police Chief first had been 
appointed illegally, there is a law in Bolivia, or was at the time, saying 
that to be named national Police Chief the candidate had to have been a 
General already.  This guy had been a Colonel, so it was pushed through 
illegally.  But that was trivia.  The more important issue was that we 
knew he had been the one going around collecting the drug money and 
then giving it to Capobianco. ( . . . )  I called the President and I told him 
I really needed to talk to him about further corruption problems.  He 
invited me over to his house, we sat down and went through a bottle and 
a half of Scotch whisky.  I remember… my wife remembers… I stumbled 
home and I fell into bed saying, “God what I do for my country!”  But he 
agreed to get rid of them.  A couple of days later, he invited me – there 
was a big football game, I was an honorary member of the Board of 
Directors of Bolivar, one of the big teams there – still am, as far as I know 
– and I think Bolivar was playing River Plate.  By coincidence the 
Argentine Foreign Minister was visiting, Guido di Tella, who was a friend 
of mine.  And so the President invited me and he said bring somebody 
along if you want, so I brought my USIA guy, public affairs guy.  And we 
sat there, and there was Capobianco sitting all the way at the far side of 
the Presidential box looking like he had leprosy.  Nobody would go near 
him.  So at that point my aide and I looked at each other and we said, 
he’s clearly been told he’s fired.  And sure enough, they were both fired. 
(Gelbard interview, 2013) 
 
Gelbard stressed combatting Bolivian government corruption as his primary 
motivation, the ‘war on drugs’ and the US national interest.  In this sense, the 
Drug War Paradigm shaped his account, i.e. drug corruption as deviance and the 
drive to ‘defeat’ the scourge of drugs.  He was keen to highlight his proactive 
and uncompromising approach in pursuing these goals.  In addition to meeting 
personally with Paz Zamora, Gelbard and the DEA leaked stories to the Miami 
Herald laying out the case against Capobianco and Carvajal.  Despite no formal 
charges being laid against Capobianco and the refusal of the US Embassy to make 
their evidence public, the pressure was enough to cause the Interior Minister and 
Carvajal to step-down.   
 
I asked Capobianco for his recollections of his resignation during our interview.  
His account overlaps with Gelbard’s in the sense that both saw the US Embassy 
as pivotal in pushing him out of the government.  He himself chose not to engage 
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with the accusations and instead argued that his resignation was due to a 
personal vendetta against him.  Alongside old Cold War animosities and the 
prioritisation of democratic institutionalisation, Capobianco claims he was 
unable to establish the trust of the US.  He discussed his own impulsiveness and 
mishandling of Ambassador Gelbard as key factors in provoking the US Embassy 
to act against him.   
 
The Ambassador practically ordered the party to sack me as minister.  For 
what reason? ( . . . )  I’m only going to comment with one anecdote, and 
you’re going to draw your own conclusions.  In this era, I was the minister 
of state, and information arrived that said things were not good in the 
Chapare, that our officials were not content.  So, one fine day, without 
consulting with anyone, with some journalists… above all, a foreign 
journalist, an English journalist who was a friend of mine… we went to the 
Chapare.  So I arrive unexpectedly there.  People from the DEA were 
there, people from the NAS, right?  So I arrived and I called out the 
officials… I give them the presidential salute and I say to them, ‘good 
people, tell me, I’ve been told things aren’t well.  Speak, tell me what’s 
happening.’  Silence.  ‘Okay’, I say, ‘so nothing’s wrong here?’  Then an 
official raises a finger timidly, and says to me, ‘Minister, the weapons 
don’t work’.  (I say to him),  ‘are you serious?  What are you trying to tell 
me?  That they don’t fire?’  ‘Yes, they don’t fire.’  So I was a very, very 
strong political leader…  I ordered them, ‘bring out all your weapons, here 
to the patio.  I want to see them here, all of them in front of me.’  And 
they brought out around 100, 150 M1 rifles… the rifles they had fought 
with against Che.  (I said), ‘sir, give me the rifle’.  I wasn’t in the army 
for ideological reasons, but I knew how to handle a rifle.  So – clack, 
clack, clack – I put the bullet in the chamber, pointed it in the air, pulled 
the trigger… What do you reckon?  It doesn’t work… it didn’t work.  I 
started to become agitated, and the DEA people were watching all this, 
everything, listening and watching.  (He describes repeating the rifle test 
three more times, becoming more agitated.)  This infuriated me.  It made 
me very, very angry.  I said to them, ‘but how is this possible, that you 
are practically without any defence, without arms.  This can’t be!  It’s 
incredible, it can’t be’.  I said strongly, in raised voice, ‘I’m giving a 72 
hour deadline for the Ambassador to change these arms for the officials, 
and to put in place modern arms that function’. (Capobianco interview, 
2014) 
 
David Greenlee (2007: 89), who was the US Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission 
around this time, also noted the issue of providing modern weapons to UMOPAR.  
Although the US Congress had opposed boosting the Bolivian police’s firepower 
due to concerns over their lack of training and record of human rights abuses, 
the Embassy was eventually able to gain backing.  Capobianco’s account, 
though, claims US inertia on this issue and he uses it to emphasise his willingness 
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to stand-up to the US on behalf of Bolivia.  His resignation over corruption 
allegations is thus transformed from a story of shame to one of nobility.  As he 
continued, Capobianco recognised his political miscalculation and describes his 
decision to fall on his own sword. 
 
That was, I think, an audacious action, without regard for myself, because 
afterwards I drew another conclusion.  I say, and will continue to say now 
that you should meet directly with North-American gentlemen, right?  This 
was my fault, my error, because on this occasion I created a spectacle… 
that the rifles didn’t work and instead of saying this (to Gelbard), I give 
him a deadline.  I appeared more like a Masista23 in this period. ( . . . )  I 
should have called the Ambassador and, in a more collegial way, more 
direct like friends, like allies, in a gesture as important as the fight 
against drugs… I should have spoken with him, not through the press. ( . . 
. )  I think the Americans never forgave me for this.  So after 20 months, 
sure enough, the head of the party with Jaime… Oscar Eid came and said 
to me, ‘look, old friend’… It was March (or) April… ‘you have to go in 
August’.  I told them, ‘I don’t want to, I’ll go tomorrow.  I’m not 
interested in being here without political power’. (Capobianco interview, 
2014) 
 
Ultimately, Capobianco returns to the theme of US control in Bolivia and uneven 
power relations.  He places his resignation in this context rather than the 
corruption allegations and the ‘war on drugs’.  In the absence of conclusive 
evidence against Capobianco, political undercurrents were assumed to have 
played a role in the accusations.  These ranged from Capobianco causing offence 
to the US Embassy and his radical history, to US displeasure at seeing Añez 
replaced with Rico Toro, a non-sanctioned appointment with a very questionable 
CV.  The new Interior Minister, Carlos Saavedra (interview, 2014), stated that, 
‘this turned into a war against Minister Capobianco’.  Torrico (interview, 2014), 
meanwhile noted, ‘the tense relationship’ with the US that ‘obliged’ Paz Zamora 
to get rid of Capobianco.  He also described ‘the willingness of a politician of 
great bravery’ to present his resignation and so prevent ‘harm to the democratic 
process’ (Ibid.).  As such, whether or not Capobianco was in-fact involved in 
state-narco networks was diminished by Bolivian interlocutors in favour of the 
narrative of US top-down control.24  Paz Zamora (interview, 2014) developed this 
                                         
23 This is a reference to Evo Morales and his MAS party, who have had antagonistic relations with 
the US.  
24 The fact that Saavedra and Torrico would also be subject to corruption allegations from the US 
(see Meza, et. al., 2008: 603) may also have influenced their accounts. 
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interpretation in his account of the MIR’s links to drug trafficker, and former-
army captain, Isaac ‘Oso’ Chavarría.  In addition to control over the ‘war on 
drugs’, he argued that the US used corruption accusations to manipulate the 
Bolivian political process.    
 
7.3.2 The MIR and Chavarría 
 
Prior to his presidency, Paz Zamora had come under scrutiny after pictures 
emerged of him together with Chavarría.  This was at the height of the 1988 
‘Narcovideo’ scandal, when officials from both the MNR and ADN were filmed 
meeting with Roberto Suarez.  The political parties closed ranks and decided to 
bury the issue in the run-up to the 1989 presidential elections (Thoumi, 2003: 
256).  But questions around Chavarría and the MIR would not go away.  As 
Gelbard (interview, 2013) alludes to in his account, the US Embassy believed 
they remained closely linked.  This included campaign contributions and ‘kick-
backs’, in exchange for protection (Salazar O., 2009: 283).  While the US 
Embassy ensured the removal of Capobianco and Carvajal, Paz Zamora remained 
in place.   
 
Following the end of Paz Zamora’s term, though, the allegations re-emerged.  
Chavarría was captured in January 1994 and began to disclose details of the 
relationship.  A congressional investigation resulted in the arrest and prosecution 
of Oscar Eid – a prominent MIRista – for his role in accepting campaign 
contribution from Chavarría; but both Paz Zamora and Capobianco were spared 
(La Razón, 1994).  The US Embassy also weighed-in, stating that it first obtained 
evidence in 1988 ‘that Paz Zamora and others in his political party had received 
funds’ from Chavarría, as well as accusing Paz Zamora ‘of providing cover for 
Chavarría during his tenure as president of Bolivia’ (Gamarra, 1999: 195).  As a 
result, Paz Zamora’s US visa was revoked in 1996, alongside Carlos Saavedra and 
several MIR members (Meza, et. al., 2008: 603).25  US Ambassador Curtis 
                                         
25 These were later restored in 2002, apparently due to Paz Zamora’s personal relationship with 
former-President George H.W. Bush.  It has been suggested that Bush Senior made a petition to 
his son, President George W. Bush to resolve the matter. 
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Kamman (interview, 2013), who arrived in Bolivia in November 1994, described 
the US perspective.   
 
The previous President of Bolivia, Paz Zamora, had been accused, and I 
think credibly so, of taking campaign contributions from drug smugglers 
and this had put him sort of in a persona non gratis position vis a vis the 
US Government.  He had political ambitions to come back into office. ( . . 
. )  Paz Zamora, who did have a fairly broad political base in Bolivia, was 
keen to get back in our good graces, but we were unable to give him what 
he wanted… namely legitimacy… because we were pretty well convinced 
that he had taken campaign contributions from people involved in the 
drug trade.  So that was a kind of a problem that we had.  It was also the 
case that other important political players in Bolivia would turn out to 
have drug contacts, and maybe money flowing from drug traffickers. 
(Kamman interview, 2013) 
 
The withdrawal of US ‘legitimacy’ thus had political implications for Paz Zamora 
and the MIR.  Paz Zamora announced his intention to leave Bolivian politics off 
the back of the allegations (El Pais, 1994).  Similarly to other US interlocutors, 
Kamman discussed the case as ‘transgression and punishment’, and 
conceptualised the relationship between Chavarría and the MIR in simple terms.   
 
Called to testify before a congressional inquiry in April 1994, Paz Zamora refuted 
the portrayal of the US Embassy (Azcui, 1994).  He accepted that Chavarría was 
friendly with the MIR and that he had provided ‘in-kind’ support to election 
campaigns (e.g. access to transport), but claimed that no money had been 
taken.  He argued that this did not constitute a narco-political nexus.  While Paz 
Zamora admitted that he had spent time with Chavarría personally, he claimed 
that neither he nor the party were aware of his interests in the coca-cocaine 
economy.  The meetings were dismissed as ‘an error, but not a crime’ (Laserna, 
1997: 190).  The death of the drug trafficker as he awaited trial in 1995 left 
many questions unanswered.  The only member of the MIR to be prosecuted in 
relation to the case was Oscar Eid, sentenced to four years imprisonment for 
aiding and abetting a drug trafficker (El Tiempo, 1994; Meza, et. al., 2008: 603). 
 
When I finished in government, as I already said, there was a Mr 
Chavarría, who had been in the military during the dictatorship of García 
Meza.  During that time, it’s clear that I didn’t know him, because in that 
era… the last Bolivian military government, that of García Meza… we 
fought them clandestinely (and) they assassinated eight leaders of the 
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MIR… that government: eight leaders of our party.  The military had a 
type of organic link with drug trafficking.  The officers themselves, of 
lower rank, obeyed orders from above.  But there was a gentleman called 
Chavarría, that afterwards, many years after in 1986, when I was standing 
for the Presidency of the Republic, he approached us because he 
sympathised with me, our type of politics.  He lived legally.  Years before 
he had had something… like all the military officers of that time… but 
now, no.  So politically, the other parties saw that this type of guy had 
approached us, and they all used it politically against me.  And later, the 
American Embassy used it, but (only) when I had left the presidency. (Paz 
Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
Again referencing the travails of the MIR under the authoritarian period, Paz 
Zamora claimed that Chavarría drug links were historical, due to his military 
background, and that he had changed his ways.  He described how accusations of 
corruption were used as a political weapon.  In this case, the established parties 
and the US sought to sully the reputation of Paz Zamora and the MIR. 
 
Incredible!  We were the youngest party, the new boys that had (just) 
entered the program.  If anyone had problems with drug trafficking, it 
was the old parties, the MNR, ADN. ( . . . )  (The US) carried out an 
operation called ‘los narcovínculos’ (against me and the MIR), I believe to 
sanction… sanction a president who had rebelled against certain things 
and to give a message to the political world: be careful!  But they made it 
up, something that never happened.  It’s the only drug case where not 
one single gram of drugs (was found); not one gram.  I don’t know the 
truth… no idea.  An individual (Chavarría) wanted to help us and 
collaborate with us to produce election leaflets.  These were the kind of 
typical psychological warfare operations that came from (US) Cold War 
working methods.  But they interfered with Bolivian democracy. (Paz 
Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
The idea that the US had used supposed drug-links to target political enemies 
had a long history in Bolivia.  As part of this, the US was said to hold back 
evidence of drug links until opportune moments.  This may have been to 
maintain control over troublesome actors, protect allies or eliminate rivals.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four, for example, prominent leftist Juan Lechín 
temporarily withdrew from politics following accusations of drug corruption from 
the US Embassy and Bolivia’s right-wing press in 1961 (Gootenberg, 2008: 282-4).  
In addition to this, Rodas M. (1996: 128) argues that former allies of García Meza 
were targeted for their involvement in the drug trade post-1982, while Banzer-
aligned officers and politicians were kept in play.  The reason: Banzer and ADN 
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continued to be useful assets for the US.  The threat of corruption scandal, then, 
forced,  
 
the major political parties into a constant state of alert, (keeping) 
Bolivian policy in line with the demands of the US. ( . . . )  Those Bolivian 
collaborators closest to the US embassy generally (had) skeletons in their 
own closets. (Roncken, 1997a: 50)26 
 
Paz Zamora’s (interview, 2014) interpretation chimes with this analysis: the 
accusations against him served a political purpose for the US and their co-
conspirators.27   
 
I confronted the Americans on these issues, that is to say, I confronted 
them on the way they wanted to act in counterdrugs and also on their 
neoliberal policies.  I finished my government with 60 per cent approval, 
but the United States… the American Embassy has already apologised (for 
this), but if it’s all already in the past, what good are apologies?  They do 
nothing.  But President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who was a North 
American… I think he has a US passport, Sanchez de Lozada.  The 
American Ambassador spoke better Spanish than him…  So between them, 
they formed a conspiracy against me, so I wouldn’t be re-elected.  After I 
left government – and I left it with good ratings – I could have been re-
elected, (but for) the way I participated in the drug trafficking debate, to 
try and address the abuses and the militarisation, the violence.  I didn’t 
want violence to arrive here.  I think Bolivians are a peaceful people.  
Sanchez de Lozada started the privatisation, the capitalisation of the 
largest companies – Yacimientos, Entel, etc. – after me, after my 
government.  They were sure that I was going to return after Sanchez de 
Lozada and reverse all of this here, because it wasn’t positive for the 
country. ( . . . )  So this cost me personally. (Paz Zamora interview, 2014) 
 
In this view, corruption allegations formed part of the US agenda of control in 
Bolivia.  This included both the Drug War and neoliberal structural reforms.  
Calling on themes of the ‘Democracy Generation’ narrative, Paz Zamora argued 
that his government opposed the militarised and violent US counterdrug 
approach.  This demonstrates the ambivalent Bolivian view of the effect of the 
                                         
26 When Banzer finally won the presidency in 1997, he implemented a hard-line policy of forced 
eradication in the Chapare.  Given Banzer’s controversial record with the drug trade, Plan 
Dignidad was said to be an effort to soothe US doubts of the new Bolivian government’s drug war 
credentials. 
27 At the time, Paz Zamora stated to a congressional inquiry that the allegations were based in 
US displeasure at his ‘coca diplomacy’ and Bolivia’s relations with Cuba: ‘our difficulties with 
the United States reached their highest level with the arrival of Fidel Castro in La Paz’ (Azcui, 
1994 – translated by the Author). 
Chapter 7  234 
 
drug trade compared to the destabilisation of US ‘Colombianised’ policies.  Paz 
Zamora claimed he paid the price for his opposition, as drug scandals were 
essentially used as political leverage.  As such, he diminished claims of pervasive 
corruption in the Bolivian state and securitised notions of the coca-cocaine 
economy’s influence.  Political stability and the post-transition political 
settlement were instead prioritised. 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Many questions around the relationship between Bolivia’s political class and drug 
traffickers remain unanswered.  It is difficult to refute the penetration of drug 
money in Bolivian politics, but drawing firm conclusions on what these 
represented also presents challenges.  For example, addressing the Chavarría-
MIR scandal, Laserna (1997: 190) argues: 
 
If it can be proved in court that Isaac Chavarría was an important drug 
trafficker, it would demonstrate that he made enormous efforts to get 
close to presidential circles, and that he also documented his actions with 
his intention to use files as leverage at a later date, but his approach 
served him very poorly, and it was unable to affect presidential decisions 
except perhaps marginally.  Chavarría himself in his testimonies 
complained of how the former president evaded him, denying him 
influence in his business with the Government. 
 
In this sense, there is uncertainty concerning the parameters of these relations.  
However, it seems clear that the drug trade adapted to the post-transition 
period and sought new patron-client bonds with the political parties.  The 
interactive effects between the changing political context and the state’s 
relationship to the drug trade are thus evident.  
 
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, key actors from the period 
conceptualised these relationships and their significance in distinct ways.  US 
interlocutors viewed corruption as widespread, interpreted it in relatively simple 
policy terms, and sought to exert US power to combat it.  Moralistic and 
enforcement-led prescriptions from the Drug War Paradigm were utilised, as the 
political implications of US actions against ‘corrupt’ politicians were 
underplayed; a by-product of US efforts to stem the flow of cocaine north.  
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Bolivian interlocutors, meanwhile, understood such accusations in terms of 
relations of US top-down control of Bolivia.  Viewed in historical perspective of 
US policy in Latin America, corruption accusations could be dismissed as dirty 
tricks.  Counter-accusations in the form of conspiracy theories were part of this, 
and served to deflect criticism, calling into question the true motives of the US.  
Political subtext was assumed.  As such, alleged linkages between the political 
and illicit spheres served rhetorical and practical purposes. 
 
This facet of state-narco interactions was thus intertwined with competing US 
and Bolivian agendas of the period.  In the case of the former, US actors looked 
to expose supposed drug corruption in the advancement of Drug War goals.  Who 
within the political class was targeted and who was spared, though, also seemed 
to be linked to old political alliances.  The US had long-standing ties to Banzer, 
with ADN demonstrating closer affinity to US economic goals in Latin America.  
These were nurtured and cultivated by the US Embassy, while Paz Zamora’s MIR 
was subject to pressure both during and following government.  For Bolivian 
actors, then, accusations of drug corruption could be largely dismissed.  Their 
opposition to US counterdrug policies was emphasised; alleged involvement with 
drug traffickers was downplayed.  In this way, my contextualised analysis 
demonstrates that complex webs of state-narco links were understood and 
utilised by different actors in different ways.  ‘Drug corruption’ held significance 
beyond a simple economic transaction between state official and trafficker, or 
institutional failure.  Instead, contestation around interactions between the 
political class and the drug trade were crucial to US-Bolivian relations of power 
and control.  As such, the implications of Bolivia’s post-transition state-narco 
networks crossed both domestic and international spheres of politics. 
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Chapter 8|Conclusion 
 
Tracing the relationship between the Bolivian state and the drug trade from 
authoritarianism to formal democracy, this thesis proposes a contextualised 
analysis of state-narco interactions.  My analysis of original document sources 
and in-depth interviews with key elite actors from the period reveals the role of 
fragmented authoritarian era state-narco networks in Bolivia’s post-transition 
settlement.  Uneven Bolivian democratisation was reflected in the continuation 
of clientelistic and authoritarian practices, including police and military 
autonomy.  As part of this, tolerance of drug corruption within both institutions 
was linked to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium.  The thesis 
challenges mainstream discourses of drugs, including assumptions of synergy 
between illicit economies, weak states and violence.  Instead, I argue that state-
narco links were integrated into informal forms of governance, and used to 
reinforce the political order.  These modes of exchange contributed to the 
relative stability of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy, as drug traffickers sought 
accommodation with the state rather than conflict.  This stands in contrast to 
conventional readings of Latin American narco-violence, holding the drug trade 
as necessarily violent and destabilising. 
 
Furthermore, real and imagined state-narco networks were also enmeshed in US-
Bolivian relations of power and control.  Contrasting the accounts of US and 
Bolivian elite actors, the thesis shows how distinct interpretations of this 
phenomenon – informed by alternative paradigms and narrative of the ‘war on 
drugs’ – were folded into competing US and Bolivian agendas.  The extension of 
US Drug War goals and the targeting of ‘corrupt’ local power structures, clashed 
with local ambivalence towards the drug trade, opposition to destabilising, 
‘Colombianised’ policies and the claimed ‘democratising mission’ of the Bolivian 
government.  ‘Drug corruption’ held significance beyond simple economic 
transaction or institutional failure.  Contestation around state-narco interactions 
was entangled in the dynamics of top-down US control and local resistance.  This 
strand of my analysis thus illuminates how key actors from the period 
understood and navigated state-narco networks.  It speaks to key themes of the 
drugs literature, such as the installation of the US Drug War model in the South 
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and the (unintended) consequences of policy interventions.  But in breaking with 
the orthodoxy of this literature, the thesis transcends these themes to examine 
the multiple facets of state-narco interactions and their implications across 
spheres of domestic and international politics. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I discuss the theoretical contributions of the thesis; 
providing an overview of my main findings and relating these back to the 
literature.  First, the study of the Bolivian case advances the research agenda of 
both the drugs and coercion literature, providing fresh insights into the 
development of state-narco interactions, and how this phenomenon relates to 
processes of democratic transition.  Second, my analysis of the accounts of US 
and Bolivian interlocutors elucidates the escalation of the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin 
America, considering how key elite actors perceived and responded to the 
introduction of the Andean Initiative.  Third, the thesis furthers understanding of 
the nature of US-Bolivian relations, showing how contested interpretations of 
state-narco interactions shaped this relationship.  The final part of the chapter 
draws out the normative implications of these findings, and considers their 
relevance to contemporary debates around counterdrug policy in Latin America 
and beyond.  I argue that the Drug War has typically failed to account for 
embedded state-narco interlinkages, thereby causing social, political and 
economic instability in drug producing and transit nations.  This raises important 
questions of how drug policy decouples exclusionary and corrupt systems of rent 
extraction from such states, while avoiding widespread violence and institutional 
decay.  In the first section of this chapter, though, I restate the rationale for 
study in order to contextualise my findings. 
 
8.1 Rationale for Study 
 
Bolivia constitutes a crucial, if understudied, case of the drugs literature.  The 
country has been a major drug producer since the 1970s, but, unlike its Andean 
neighbours, it has not experienced high-levels of drug related violence.  While 
Pablo Escobar and the Cartel declared war on the Colombian state, Bolivian 
traffickers rarely made headlines for spectacular acts of violence.  In addition to 
this, Bolivia transitioned from military authoritarian government to formal 
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democracy in 1982.  This transition was sustained even as the illicit coca-cocaine 
economy grew.  Furthermore, as the US heightened its counterdrug efforts 
during the 1980s, Bolivia became a key testing ground for the ‘war on drugs’.  
The US has often been described as Bolivia’s northern patron and the post-Cold 
War advancement of the US Drug War followed in that lineage (Lehman, 1999).  
Drugs literature studies on Bolivia have tended to focus on this power imbalance 
(e.g. Gamarra, 1994a), the role of coca cultivation in Bolivian society and 
politics (e.g. Healy, 1988a), and the effects of development and/or 
enforcement-led counterdrug policy (e.g. Ledebur, 2005; Menzel, 1996; Painter, 
1994).  Within such studies, the form and function of state-narco interactions is 
undertheorised.  But as this brief synopsis suggests, the development of Bolivia’s 
drug trade, in different ways, confounds the typical assumptions of this area of 
the literature; namely, the ‘essentialised’ linkages between drugs, weak states 
and violence (Meehan, 2011: 402).   
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the two dominant paradigms of the ‘war on drugs’ 
provide distinct perspectives on the drug trade, corruption, and their causes and 
effects.  The Drug War and Development Paradigms are drawn from the drugs 
literature, and have informed mainstream discourse on the topic.  In the case of 
the former, the issue of drugs is securitised, conceptualised as deviance, and 
viewed as a contributing factor to institutional weakness in producer nations.  
For the latter, the drug trade is understood as a problem of underdevelopment 
and North-South social, political and economic disparities, i.e. drug consumption 
in the US has created wealthy and violent drug traffickers with the power to 
challenge vulnerable Latin American states.  In both cases, illicit economies and 
state-narco links are viewed as essentially destabilising, and typically a cause of 
violence.  The bounds between the state and the drug trade, and categorical 
distinctions between legal and illegal, are held as clear and definitive (Heyman 
& Smart, 1999: 15).  The Bolivian case, though, shows the limitations of these 
top-down conceptualisations of drug economies and their relationship to the 
state.  Although the generalisations of the drugs literature are certainly not 
without merit, this thesis sought instead a contextualised account of Bolivian 
state-narco interactions.  Its aim, therefore, was to problematise this 
relationship, account for the peculiarities of the Bolivian case, and to 
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understand how these relations developed during a period of flux: from 
authoritarianism to democracy, and Cold War to Drug War.   
 
This analytical approach was influenced by the literature on coercion.  Focusing 
on the role of formal and informal institutions of rent extraction in processes of 
state formation and/or conflict resolution, this area of the literature provides 
insights into the development of state-narco relationships, their underlying logic 
and effects.  Crucially, as opposed to a source of instability and weakened state 
capacity – as typically assumed by the drugs literature – these links may form the 
basis of political order.  Snyder (2006) identifies the formation of ‘institutions of 
joint-wealth extraction’ as an important factor here, as public and private 
actors come together to exploit a ‘lootable resource’ and so form common 
interests.  Studies in this area, though, have generally addressed cases outwith 
Latin America.  These include studies of post-conflict societies, such as 
Afghanistan (e.g. Goodhand, 2008), and authoritarian states, such as Burma (e.g. 
Meehan, 2015).  In selecting the Bolivian case, the thesis examines the approach 
and propositions of this emerging literature in a new context.  This incorporates 
the particular conditions of the Bolivian drug economy, and the country’s 
specific social, political and economic development.  But in addition to this, 
Bolivia was not subject to armed campaigns from internal actors, it successfully 
transitioned from authoritarian government, and it was subject to strong 
external counterdrug pressure.  These are distinct and interesting dynamics 
within which to explore interactions between the state and the illicit economy.  
As such, the thesis crosses and contributes to two areas of the literature.  My 
analysis speaks to the key themes of the drug literature by investigating a crucial 
case in the modern-day US ‘war on drugs’, while also advancing the research 
agenda of the coercion literature.  
 
The illicit nature of this topic, though, posed methodological challenges.  This 
included limits to data collection on clandestine activity.  Managing such issues, 
I applied a mixed methods approach, offering discrete yet complementary 
perspectives on the object of study.  First, I utilised primary and secondary 
document sources to establish a detailed base-line account of the evolution of 
Bolivia’s coca-cocaine economy, and crucial social, political and economic 
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factors across the period of study.  This runs through my empirical chapters and 
contributes original findings on the development of Bolivian state-narco 
networks.  I supplemented these sources with interviews from key US and 
Bolivian elite actors.  This constituted a shift in analytical approach, examining 
how these actors perceived and responded to state-narco relations, and other 
facets of the ‘war on drugs’.  My use of elements of oral history methodology 
helped to complicate and unfurl the various meanings elite actors had attached 
to state-narco interactions and the introduction of the Andean Initiative.  The 
historic perspective and mixed methods approach of this thesis are unusual 
within the drugs and coercion literature.  As I argue below, this innovative 
approach yielded novel insights. 
 
8.2 Theoretical Contribution 
 
Analysing interactive effects between Bolivia’s political development, the 
changing international environment and the coca-cocaine economy, this thesis 
makes theoretical contributions along a range of dimensions.  First, Chapter 4 
maps the evolution of Bolivia’s state-narco networks from the authoritarian era 
to the immediate post-transition period (1964-1989).  This serves as crucial 
context to the main focus of study, as well as providing new findings and original 
analysis.  I demonstrate how drug rents were used by authoritarian military 
regimes to reinforce authority.  They formed part of clientelistic webs of 
governance that bound factional interests to the existing political order.  For 
example, under Banzer’s government, allies within the military were granted 
access to drug rents in the form of lands in the Beni department.  These served 
as landing strips for trafficker flights to Colombia.  Additionally, agri-business 
elites made the move from cotton to cocaine with the assistance of state-backed 
bank loans.  The nascent drug trade went from strength to strength, stimulated 
by booming demand in the North.  State-narco relations developed alongside this 
growth, solidified by kinship ties between Bolivia’s small political and economic 
elite.  This illicit economy, though, was characterised by low levels of violence, 
as centralised rent extraction systems created stable modes of exchange 
between the state and the drug trade.   
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Similarly to PRI-era Mexico’s ‘state-sponsored protection rackets’ (Snyder & 
Martínez, 2009), Bolivia’s expanding drug trade was colonised by elements of the 
state and absorbed into institutional structures – most notably, the military.  The 
Bolivian case also has clear parallels with North, et. al.’s (2007) theory of 
‘limited access orders’.  Illicit rents were used as tools of governance, 
controlling competition between elites and leading to relative stability in the 
drug trade rather than disorder and violence.  In this sense, my analysis accounts 
for the nuanced interactions that emerged between the state and the drug 
trade, challenging the typical assumptions of the mainstream drugs literature. 
 
However, democratisation in 1982 and the changing foreign policy priorities of 
the US represented a point of fracture.  This led to the atomisation of 
authoritarian era state-narco networks, as power became more diffuse across 
Bolivia’s post-transition political system and traffickers sought new patron-client 
bonds.  The US shift from Cold War to Drug War was also crucial in this regard.  
Where before drug involvement had been tolerated in Cold War allies, now the 
US looked to pressure the Bolivian government to take action against the drug 
trade.  Centralised systems of rent extraction, then, came under attack from an 
external actor.  Focusing on this period of flux, the thesis demonstrates the 
effects of domestic and international political changes on the function of state-
narco networks.  Echoing Snyder (2006: 950), authoritarianism and the tacit-
acceptance of the regional hegemon were important conditions for centralised 
forms of Bolivian drug rent extraction.  This analysis thus demonstrates the 
interplay between Bolivia’s political development and the adaptation of the drug 
economy.   
 
Fragmented state-narco networks continued to function following 
democratisation and the escalation of the ‘war on drugs’.  As outlined 
previously, these were integrated into the post-transition settlement between 
different political and institutional actors.  Clientelistic and authoritarian 
practices continued within the bounds of Bolivia’s uneven democratisation.  
First, an autonomous police institution benefitted from increased prerogatives.  
Civilian governments bolstered the police as an institutional counterweight to 
the military, and looked to it to maintain societal order as unpopular structural 
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reforms were rolled out (Quintana, 2005).  This informal pact reduced 
transparency and accountability, and ensured impunity for police officials.  Drug 
rents lubricated hierarchical patron-client bonds within the institution.  Equally, 
politicians remained wary of the military and their political ambitions.  A tacit-
agreement of non-interference was struck, where civilian government’s 
respected military autonomy in return for the military’s respect for civilian rule 
(Barrios M., 1994).  As a result, state-narco links within the institution went 
unchallenged.  Third, Bolivia’s political parties also became embroiled in 
corruption scandals, accused of accepting campaign contributions from drug 
traffickers (Torranzo R., 1988: 73).  A pact of silence between these parties 
reflected the pacted nature of Bolivia’s post-transition democracy.  Political 
parties negotiated and traded patronage, and avoided destabilising actions.  
Pulling at the threads of corruption scandals, in which actors from across the 
political spectrum where implicated, threatened to bring the whole edifice down 
(Thoumi, 2003: 256).   
 
This analysis builds on the coercion literature.  It demonstrates how systems of 
joint-wealth extraction formed part of a limited, democratic political order.  
Elements within the police, military and the political elite were linked to the 
drug trade to varying degrees.  Tolerance of these relations formed part of a 
strategy of non-confrontation with potential veto players to Bolivia’s new formal 
democracy.  ‘Institutional endurance’ was bound to the ‘systematic absence of 
enforcement’, inducing such actors ‘to accept rules they would otherwise seek 
to overturn’ (Levitsky & Murillo, 2014: 204).  As such, the formal features of 
democracy, such as free and fair elections, existed alongside the old vestiges of 
the authoritarian and clientelistic system.  As O’Donnell (1996) argues, these 
informal systems are no less important in shaping behaviour and the 
expectations of political actors.  The thesis thus shows how state-narco networks 
interacted with processes of uneven democratisation; limiting accountability, 
transparency and competition, but binding factional interests to (formal) 
democracy.   
 
This further supports the rationale for contextualised analysis of the relationship 
between the state and the drug trade.  For example, the drug trade, and its 
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assumed violent and corruptive effects, are typically held as anathema to 
democracy.  While my analysis indicates that state-narco networks certainly ran 
contrary to the principles of modern liberal democracy, it also demonstrates 
their place within an uncertain process of transition.  This does not constitute a 
normative endorsement of such practices, rather it highlights the importance of 
considering the distinct political dynamics of such cases.  Referring to the Latin 
American Third Wave, for example, O’Donnell (1993: 1360) noted that top-down 
conceptualisations of democracy failed to adequately account for the 
‘structured variation’ of regional political, social and economic conditions.  In 
this sense, Bolivia’s uneven democracy did not fit the model of Western 
democracy.  Operating according to both formal and informal processes, this 
formed a point of equilibrium, grounded in Bolivia’s specific conditions and 
historical development.  Consequently, state institutions interacted with the 
drug trade in particular ways.  These formed part of the post-transition political 
settlement, and were also linked to the control of drug-related violence.  The 
illicit economy’s effects on ‘democracy’ – or, perhaps more fittingly, ‘polyarchy’ 
(see Chapter 2) – are not uniform, but a result of contextual factors. 
 
Even as these networks atomised and new traffickers emerged, then, levels of 
drug-related violence in Bolivia’s post-transition period remained relatively low.  
Carrying on from the authoritarian period, drug trafficking organisations were 
based in kinship ties and practised a strategy of non-confrontation with the 
state.  This level of stability added to attitudes of ambivalence towards Bolivia’s 
drug trade.  Coca-cocaine had provided jobs and inward investment during a 
period of economic instability, without the kind of widespread violence seen in 
Colombia.  The García Meza regime had openly profiteered from drug rents, 
bringing international notoriety to Bolivia and causing general opposition to the 
coca-cocaine economy.  However, this was balanced with pragmatism and the 
view that the effects of the drug trade on Bolivia were relatively benign.  By 
contrast to developments in the US, it was not conceptualised as a national 
security threat.  These distinct perspectives, along this and other dimensions of 
the ‘war on drugs’, formed part of competing US and Bolivian agendas.  Chapter 
5 draws these out, and considers how they shaped the accounts of US and 
Bolivian actors.  These were important in defining how these elite actors 
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understood and responded to state-narco networks, contributing to the fractured 
US-Bolivian relations that defined the period. 
 
For US actors, the Drug War Paradigm led to securitised notions of drugs, and 
moralistic, one-dimensional views of drug corruption.  Bolivia was intermittently 
viewed as ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ of the drug trade, but ultimately, the 
extension of the US Drug War model was prioritised.  This was justified against 
ideas of American Exceptionalism, where US counterdrug policy would liberate 
partners in the South from the drug trade, and create the conditions for liberal, 
market democracy.  Reproducing elements of the mainstream discourse of drugs, 
the drug trade was viewed as both cause and consequence of a weak state 
(Meehan, 2011: 377).  The US sought a ‘more state’ solution, attempting to 
remove the ‘malignant tumour’ of the drug trade, from the ‘healthy body’ of 
Bolivia’s society, politics and economy (drawn from Gutierrez, 2015: 2).  As 
such, the blurring of boundaries between these categories in Bolivia’s post-
transition period was underplayed by elite US actors.   
 
Bolivian actors, meanwhile, called on development discourses of drugs and, as 
noted previously, displayed ambivalence towards the drug trade.  They argued 
that Bolivia’s role in the drug trade was limited to humble coca production and 
that large sectors of the population were dependent on it for their livelihood.  
They called for a development-led response, and placed responsibility for the 
drug trade on drug consumers in the North and powerful Colombian Cartels.  This 
underpinned opposition to the enforcement-led policies of the US.  However, 
distinct interpretations of state-narco networks, and their wider implications, 
also held influence.  This included arguments against the ‘Colombianisation’ of 
Bolivia.  Drug traffickers had not been in conflict with the state in Bolivia; 
relations were stable, and entangled in the political dynamics of uneven 
democracy.  The stability of Bolivia’s post-transition political system was 
prioritised, as Bolivian interlocutors talked of the ‘democratising mission’ of the 
Paz Zamora government, and the compromises made to ensure ‘democratic 
governability’.  In this sense, the extension of the US Drug War model 
represented a greater threat to post-transition stability than the drug trade 
itself.  Grounded in an historical perspective, the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia was 
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said to follow in the US Cold War model of top-down control and interference in 
Latin America.   
 
My analysis shows the influence of the dominant themes of the drugs literature 
on elite actors, and how these applied to their understanding of state-narco 
networks.  Where Drug War goals dominated the US response, Bolivian actors 
balanced these against local priorities.  This links into debates around the 
effectiveness of drug policy interventions and the role of the US in advancing its 
prohibition model of drug control.  In this case, the US and the government of a 
producer nation conceptualised the problem in different ways, and proposed 
responses that were at odds with each other.  Negotiations for the Andean 
Initiative attempted to reconcile these views, but as described below, these 
agendas clashed as the policy filtered down to Bolivia.  Securitised notions of 
drugs, which were key to the escalation of the US Drug War, glossed over the 
embeddedness of illicit economies in producer nations and assumed their 
effects.  As described in the final section of the chapter, such misconceptions 
are linked to the damaging unintended consequences of drug policy.   
 
The implementation of the Andean Initiative in Bolivia thus exposed these 
competing agendas.  The US Embassy, for example, sought the installation of 
Drug War proxies to bypass ‘corrupt’ local power structures.  US interlocutors 
described pervasive drug corruption in the Bolivian state, and applied an 
abrasive approach designed to target state-narco links.  Securitisation of the 
issue underpinned justification of the extension of US control within Bolivia, as 
the Embassy sought to navigate perceived state-narco networks.  US actors 
expressed their frustration at the Paz Zamora government’s refusal to accept 
the Embassy’s securitised conceptualisation of Bolivia’s drug problem, and its 
general lack of political will on counterdrugs.  However, this was indicative of 
differing US and Bolivian priorities.  The Bolivian government demonstrated 
resistance to the US approach.  This included the introduction of the Repentance 
Decree, reflecting the government’s efforts to find accommodation with the 
drug trade rather than confrontation.  Furthermore, Paz Zamora’s stalling on 
Annex III revealed concerns over an enhanced internal role for the military.  This 
represented a destabilising threat to elected government.   
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Relating this back to the coercion literature, the extension of US control clashed 
with the local political order.  Again, the Drug War rather than the drug trade 
was viewed as representing the greater threat to post-transition political, 
economic and political stability.  The thesis therefore shows how these differing 
perspectives influenced policy preferences and disputes over implementation.  
As such, I argue that contested interpretations of state-narco interactions were 
enmeshed in US-Bolivian relations of power and control.  Nowhere was this 
clearer than in cases of drug scandal, and alleged links between the political 
class and the drug trade.   
 
As described in Chapter 7, relations between the US Embassy and the Paz 
Zamora government were characterised by deep mistrust.  US accusations of 
corruption were used to remove ‘uncooperative’ Drug War partners, who 
jeopardised US counterdrug goals.  The political implications of such actions 
were underplayed, as the US capitalised on uneven power relations to extend 
counterdrug control.  But these allegations had political subtext.  ADN and 
Banzer – considered US allies – were spared, while the former radical leftist Paz 
Zamora and his MIR party came under pressure.  US drug corruption accusations 
leveraged opponents of counterdrug policy.  Bolivian interlocutors, who were 
caught-up in these scandals, dismissed their alleged complicity in corruption, 
and focused instead on US manipulation of Bolivia’s internal politics.  In both 
cases, state-narco networks were folded into combative relations between the 
Bolivian government and the US Embassy.  The purpose of the accusation formed 
the focus, rather than the substance of such claims.  Complex webs of state-
narco links were thus understood and utilised by different actors in different 
ways.  ‘Drug corruption’ held significance beyond a simple economic transaction 
between state official and trafficker, or institutional failure.  Instead, state-
narco links, whether real or imagined, shaped the course of US-Bolivian 
relations, and competing agendas of the ‘war on drugs’ in Bolivia.  The 
implications of Bolivia’s post-transition state-narco networks crossed both 
domestic and international spheres of politics. 
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8.3 Normative and Contemporary Relevance 
 
This thesis addresses a key juncture in the trajectory of the modern US ‘war on 
drugs’.  Drug War rhetoric, the prohibition model of drug control and counter-
supply efforts were nothing new, but the Andean Initiative, in many ways, set 
the template for US counterdrug policy for the subsequent decades.  This 
includes the post-Cold War securitisation of the drugs issues, militarised 
counterdrug units, and the creation of a large Drug War bureaucracy.  The US 
approach, though, has been subject to frequent criticism for both its 
ineffectiveness, and its harmful effects on Latin American society.  While an 
evaluation of US counterdrug policy in Latin America is clearly beyond the scope 
of this thesis, in this final section, I aim to draw out some of the normative, 
contemporary implications of the thesis.   
 
Bolivia itself has undergone significant changes since the period of study, 
including the rejection of US counterdrug policies under the government of Evo 
Morales.  Relations between the US and Bolivia have deteriorated significantly, 
with the expulsion of the DEA in 2008 marking a low point.  Echoing Paz 
Zamora’s ‘coca is not cocaine’ slogan, the Bolivian government has argued for 
the lifting of international bans on coca exports, hoping to commercialise the 
product and direct cultivation to licit markets.  Control of coca cultivation is 
sought through consultation with cocaleros, rather than conflict and forced 
eradication.  Development-led conceptualisations of Bolivia’s coca-cocaine 
economy, therefore, continue to hold sway.  As part of this, the ‘evil Colombian’ 
thesis has been expanded to include Peruvian, Mexican, Brazilian and Argentine 
organised crime (e.g. McDermott, 2014).  The Morales government has called for 
assistance in aerial interdiction, arguing that Bolivia has now become a major 
transit point for Peruvian cocaine on its way to Western drug markets.  Foreign 
trafficking organisation are said to have set-up in Santa Cruz and the Beni, 
bringing with them violence and placing strain on local law enforcement.  
 
This indicates the endurance of many of the themes raised in my analysis.  
Development perspectives of Bolivia’s drug problem and organised crime 
conceptualised as an external phenomenon are still evident.  Equally, the clash 
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of US and Bolivian views of drugs has contributed to the deterioration of inter-
governmental relations between the countries.  However, as the Bolivian 
government pursues an alternative policy approach and in the absence of an 
internal US security presence, there is scope for investigation on how the state 
now relates to the drug trade.  Post-transition state-narco networks were partly 
a consequence of long-established political practices within Bolivia.  The 
country’s political development since this period has been dramatic, but 
whether this has extended to state-narco networks is an open question.  
Furthermore, there have also been great changes across the wider Andean coca-
cocaine economy.  These have shaped Bolivia’s own drug economy, and have 
likely affected state-narco interactions.  If Bolivia is now truly a hub of Latin 
American drug trafficking, how are local state actors responding to these 
dynamics?  As this thesis demonstrates, assumptions that such developments will 
necessarily lead to increased drug-related violence and state weakness should be 
challenged.   
 
In addition to this, re-thinking the linkages between illicit economies, violence 
and weak states has important implications for drug policy.  In Bolivia, state-
narco links were viewed to be interwoven with political order.  Local actors 
resisted US Drug War policies that would either directly or indirectly threaten 
this equilibrium.  Across Latin America, counterdrug efforts aimed at defeating 
the drug trade and establishing security have frequently been associated with 
heightened violence.  Drug War ‘wins’ destabilise the drug trade, lead to the 
emergence of new actors and (violent) competition to establish supremacy.  The 
causes of drug related violence in Mexico, for example, are complex, but the 
breakdown of the Pax Narcotica has been identified as a contributing factor (see 
Chapter 2).  Although links between the state and the drug trade run contrary to 
modern liberal democracy, they may also bring stability.  As noted above, these 
relationships may play a role in managing and mediating the violent excesses of 
the drug trade.  Ordinary citizens in drug producer nations may well prioritise 
peace and order over the chaotic effects of fighting a war against the drug 
trade.   
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As this thesis and the wider coercion literature argues, whether the drug trade is 
associated with violence or stability is dependent on the informal institutions 
that arise around it.  Counterdrug policies must adequately account for local 
context, and be clear on what they are trying to achieve.  The prioritisation of 
Drug War goals may fracture the local political order, causing insecurity and 
further limiting the civil rights of local communities.   
 
Of course, this is not to say that such networks are desirable or sustainable in 
the long-term.  In the Bolivian case, these relations were part of an uneven 
democracy, that contributed to limited transparency, accountability and 
competition.  Stability and the maintenance of transition may have been used to 
justify such practices, but they also represented the accumulation of wealth and 
power among elite actors.  As Gutierrez (2015: 7) notes, ‘this kind of stability is 
short-term and may come at the expense of building more legitimate and 
accountable governance institutions’.  This raises important questions of how 
such particularistic and exclusionary systems may be decoupled from the state, 
while avoiding violence and institutional decay.  Returning to the Mexican case, 
democratisation and the implementation of institutional anti-corruption reforms 
were perversely related to the outbreak of widespread drug violence, as the 
state lost overarching control of criminal activity.  These dynamics plug into 
Hobbesian/Lockean debates, concerning the tension between political order, 
and the extension of full civil and political rights to all citizens.  State-narco 
networks may contribute to the former, while inhibiting the latter.  As Latin 
American leaders both past and present challenge the US Drug War orthodoxy, 
local demands for both security and democracy may form the future focus of 
responses to the drug trade.  
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Biography 
 
7 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Bolivian official (A) 
 
High-level official during the Paz 
Zamora government. 
8 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Bolivian official (B) 
 
High-level official during the Paz 
Zamora government. 
8 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Bolivian official (C) 
 
High-level official during the Paz 
Zamora government. 
9 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Bolivian official (D) 
 
Police official during the Paz 
Zamora government. 
12 Apr. 2013; 
Nashville, TN, 
USA. 
Bowers, Charles R. 
 
US Ambassador to Bolivia 1992-
1996.    
5 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Caballero, Luis 
 
UMOPAR Commander, 1990-1996; 
subsequently head of FELCN in the 
early-2000s. 
16 Apr. 2014; 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia. 
Capobianco, Guillermo 
 
Bolivian Interior Minister, 1989-
1991. 
26 Apr. 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Carnevale, John 
 
ONDCP official, 1988-2002. 
3 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Céspedes, Jaime 
 
Commander of the Bolivian 
National Police, 1990-1992. 
8 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
(Phone interview) 
Coomer, Mark 
 
Southcom official, 1985-1996, and 
ONDCP, 1995-2009. 
17 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Dalence, Tatiana 
 
Current official at the Bolivian 
Ministry of the Government 
7 May 2014; EU official Official of the EU Delegation to 
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La Paz, Bolivia.   Bolivia. 
13 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Gelbard, Robert 
 
Ambassador to Bolivia 1988-1992 
and Assistant Secretary State of INL 
1993-1997. 
14 Apr. 2014; 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. 
Giacoman, Diego 
 
Official at DIRECO, 2000-2004, and 
the Bolivian Vice-Ministry of Social 
Defence, 2004-2005. 
26 Apr. 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Greenlee, David 
 
Deputy Chief of Mission to the US 
Embassy in La Paz, 1987-1989, and 
US Ambassador to Bolivia 2002-
2006.  
5 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Healy, Kevin 
 
Academic and grant officer of the 
Inter-American Foundation. 
28 Apr. 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Isacson, Adam 
 
Senior associate for regional 
security policy at WOLA (the 
Washington Office on Latin 
America). 
2 May 2013; 
Chicago, IL, USA. 
(Phone interview) 
Kamman, Curtis 
 
US Ambassador to Bolivia, 1994-
1997. 
7 Apr. 2014; 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. 
Ledebur, Kathryn 
 
Director of the Andean Information 
Network 
7 May 2013;  
Ann Arbour, MI, 
USA. 
(Phone interview) 
Levitsky, Melvyn 
 
Assistant Secretary State of INM, 
1988-1992, and current board 
member of the UN’s International 
Narcotics Control Board. 
9 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
Lupo, Javier 
 
Secretary of CONALID, 1990-1991.  
3 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Miller, David 
 
NSC Deputy Assistant Secretary 
1988-1992. 
26 Apr. 2013; OAS Official Current official of the Organisation 
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Washington, DC, 
USA. 
of American States (OAS). 
26 Apr. 2014; 
Tarija, Bolivia. 
Paz Zamora, Jaime President of Bolivia, 1989-1993. 
18 Apr. 2014; 
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. 
Reinicke, Godofredo Human Rights Ombudsman for the 
Chapare, 1997-2002. 
6 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Reuter, Peter 
 
RAND Corporation 
4 Apr. 2014; 
Tiquipaya, Bolivia. 
Roncken, Theo Director of Acción Andina. 
15 Apr. 2014; 
Santa Cruz, 
Bolivia. 
Saavedra, Carlos 
 
Bolivian Interior Minister, 1991-
1993. 
23 Apr. 2014;  
Cochabamba, 
Bolivia. 
Salinas, Jose 
 
Bolivian Under-Secretary for 
Alternative Development, 1990-
1993.  
16 May 2014; 
La Paz, Bolivia. 
UK official 
 
Current official of the British 
Embassy in La Paz. 
6 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
US official (B) ONDCP official. 
7 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
US official (C) ONDCP official. 
8 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
US official (D) State Department official. 
8 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
US official (E) State Department official. 
8 May 2013;  
Washington, DC, 
US official (F) 
 
State Department official. 
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USA. 
8 May 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
US official (G) 
 
State Department official. 
2 May 2014; La 
Paz, Bolivia. 
Torrico, Gonzalo Bolivian Vice-Minister of Social 
Defence, 1989-1993. 
29 Apr. 2013; 
Washington, DC, 
USA. 
Youngers, Coletta 
 
Senior Fellow, at the Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA). 
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